INSTRUCTIONS FOR U.S. COMMISSIONER, SALT STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, GENEVA, APRIL 2, 1974

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-486-6-4-2
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 18, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/19: LOC-HAK-486-6-4-2
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20500
NSC REVIEWED DOCUMENT AND HAS NO
OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION. 9/28/07
April. 18, 1974
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MORI/CDF
C03334583
National Security- ecision Memorandum 252
TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
The U. S. Commissioner, SALT Standing
Consultative Commission
SUBJECT: Instructions for U. S. Commissioner, SALT Standing
Consultative Commission, Geneva, April 2, 1974
The President has approved the following instructions for the U. S.
component of the SALT Consultative Commission:
1. U. S. Commissioner should continue his efforts towards
achievement of an agreed set of procedures governing replacement,
dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof for Strategic .
offensive Systems and for ABM Systems and Their Components as
called for in the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement and its
Protocol.
2. U. S. Commissioner is authorized to accept the Joint Draft
Texts for Strategic Offensive Arms and for ABM Systems and Their
Components, dated November 16, 1973, as the basis for negotiating
the mutually agreed procedures called for by the ABM Treaty and
the Interim Agreement. He is also authorized to make appropriate
language changes in the Joint Draft Texts including those resulting
from the review by government lawyers.
3. The U. S. Government considers the achievement of these
mutually agreed procedures to be important, but not at the expense of
essential U. S. security interests. The U. S. Commissioner should
proceed accordingly consistent with the instructions contained herein.
4. In the negotiations, the U. S. Commissioner should accord
priority to inclusion of the following items in the Agreed Procedures
for Strategic Offensive Arms:
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-- in the case of soft launch sites an area of the launch pad
per se at the location of the launch stand must be made unusable by
dismantling or destruction; removal of launch device alone is not
considered adequate.
-- In the case of silo launch sites the silo headworks shall
be dismantled or destroyed.
-- In the case of ballistic missile submarines and SLBM launchers,
the U. S. Coaissioner should attempt to obtain Soviet agreement to
U. S. proposals in the JDT of November 16, 1973, including those for
H-class submarines. The U. S. Commissioner should make clear that
in implementing the proposed procedure for "removing the submarines
missile section in the open, " the missile section will not be replaced
by a new section of similar dimensions. Any replacement hull section
must be significantly shorter in overall length than the missile section
it replaces. The U. S. Commissioner is authorized to drop the proposed
procedure of sinking in international waters if the Soviets refuse to
accept prior notification thereof.
5. The U. S. Commissioner should continue to seek notification that
SLBM launchers under construction are intended as replacement for
older ICBM launchers or for launchers on older submarines. Notification
should be given prior to the start of sea trials of the replacement SLBM
launchers. If after several weeks it is clear that the Soviets will not
accept any form of prior notification, the U. S. Commissioner should
seek instructions.
6. The U.S. Commissioner is authorized to negotiate agreed
language for the remaining issues as indicated by the bracketed text
of the procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms in order to achieve the
important elements set forth in para. 4, above, and to protect para. 8
of the Protocol. In this connection:
-- U.S. Commissioner should continue to seek inclusion of
a definition of a modern SLBM, and is authorized to modify the language
of the present sentence to achieve same objective. If he is unable to
obtain Soviet agreement, he is authorized to drop the sentence, but should
attempt to obtain Soviet agreement for the record that "launchers for
SLBM's first flight tested after 1965 and deployed on diesel submarines
are also modern SLBM's. It
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-- The U. S. Commissioner should attempt to achieve Soviet
agreement that facilities remaining at ICBM launch sites will not be
used for storage, support or launch of ICBMs.. If unable to achieve
Soviet agreement after several weeks, he should seek instructions.
7. The U. S. Commissioner is authorized to accept Soviet language
on the remaining dismantling or destruction issues as reflected in para.
I. 2 of the $0T of November 16, 1973, for ABM Systems and Their
Components.
8. At an appropriate time the U. S. Commissioner should inform
the Soviet Commissioner that the U. S. does not desire to negotiate
ABM replacement procedures during SCC-IV; in the event that the Soviet
side indicates an interest in beginning work on these procedures at the
next SCC Session (SCC-IV), the U. S. Commissioner should seek instructions.
9. The U. S. Commissioner should retain the current wording
regarding voluntary information in the JDT's of November 16, 1973.
10. The U. S. Commissioner should not raise the subject of
publication of these procedures. If raised by the Soviet side he should
respond that the U. S. has no plans to make these procedures public at
this time.
11. Sensitivity of the SCC negotiations and the avoidance of leaks
must be maintained. All substantive statements on SCC activities are
to be cleared through the White House.
This NSDM supersedes NSDM 217 and NSDM 237.
cc: Chairman, 'Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Central Intelligence
Chairman, U. S. SALT Delegation
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/19: LOC-HAK-486-6-4-2