THE ARAB-ISRAELI MILITARY BALANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-533-6-17-5
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: April 13, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/04/03: LOC-HAK-533-6-17-5
SENSkTIVE ArR 13 1970
NatLcrnal Security Study Memorandum 93
TO:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central intelligence
SUBJECT: The Arab-Israeli Military Balance
909Z
The President has directed thet, as a follow-up to the study produced
in reopens* to NSSM 81 and in the light of recent exchanges with Israeli
intelligence representatives, further studies be prepared which will
provide the following:
--Present intelligence estimates of Israeli and Arab air order
of battle. The study should (1) identify U.S. and Israeli
estimates and (2) where there are significant differences explain
the reasons for the differences as specifically as possible.
-Present detailed intelligence assessments of the principal
indicators of Arab air capability. The study should (1) identify
'U.S. and Israeli assessments and (2) where there are significant
differences explain the reasons for the differences insofar as
poseible.
--An assessment of the present effective Arab-Israeli military
balance. This study should present a refinement of the analysis
in the NSSM 81 paper in the litbi of any revision in estimates of
quantitative and qualitative factors and in the light of any improve-
ment in analytical technique.
The NSC Ad Hoc Group created by NSSM 81 will be reactivated for the
purpose of assembling this study. The study will be submitted by
May 15 to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs for
reference to the Special Review Group.
(Sigued) HENRX,i0JUSSINGER
DOS, OSD, NSS
Reviews Completed.
cc: Chairman. Joint Chiefs of S
SVS
111iSaunde 4/9/70
Henry A. Kissinger
12?5 11-eith /V5DA1 44
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/04/03: LOC-HAK-533-6-17-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/04/03 : LOC-HAK-533-6-17-5
MEMORANDUMS 4
Vil
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASRINGTON
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: Harold H. Saunders
?7
et.? 'L4!
ACTION 9092
Ittle
April 9,4970
C 1 - -9 3
SUBJECT: Following up on Israel's Latest Aircraft Presentation
Following General Yariv's presentation here, I recommend that
yo.t..1 take the steps outlined below to insure quick handling of Israel's
presentation on its aircraft needs here over the last four days:
1. Sign the attached NSSM. This will reactivate the NSC
Ad Hoc Group which I chaired last fall to produce the technical
study which identified our options. I would prefer to do this by
NSSM for two reasons:
--It puts in writing the requirement for an intelligence
analysis which either reconciles or explains U.S. -
Israeli differences on air order of battle.
--It permits us to keep the analysis in the framework
established last fall with emphasis on capability which
is the essence of the military balance. EI asked Yariv
to put their best thinking on capabilities into the DIA
channel--and to give it to me as well.]
To meet a May 15 deadline, the sooner we can get this memo out,
the better. I have not given you a memo for the President since this
is simply a necessary follow-on to our earlier study.
Before you sign, I recommend you touch base with Elliot Richardson.
Or if you'd rather,_ I'll ask Bill Cargo to take it up with him. There
may be some in Defense who see this as a White House effort to go
beyond the March 23 announcement. I think we just have to take the
line that the purpose of this NSSM is simply to update our technical
analysis of the balance in the light of new information. Having
Richardson aboard would be useful.
TOP SECRET A;
47
/v?ppR 1 3 1970
No Obiection to Declassification in Part 2013/04/03: LOC-HAK-533-6-17-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/04/03: LOC-HAK-533-6-17-5
?
T,OP S*91,11Cj
Approve
3. Fe
Disapprove
vs te 1 f
w*y that doer not commit us to any
tut. You told Rabtn you would do this. As you do, you should be
war* of the follovAng:
--This proposed arrangeznent has almost no Mende in
the bureaucracy. There are two principal groups of
opponent.:
Top
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/04/03: LOC-HAK-533-6-17-5
25X1
7,P
111
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/04/03: LOC-HAK-533-6-17-5
IP
TOP SECRET - 3
a. One group believes this arrangement would
complicate negotiation of any future German offset
arrangement. It is politically sensitive issue on
each side and its involvement v1 an unusual deal in
the Mid-East situation could be embarrassing in either
Bonn or Washington.
b. Another group has the related concern that Israeli
use of this money would reduce 13.5. balance of payments
return since the Israelis would otherwise be spending
other funds here.
-- Given these concerns, U.S. agreement to this arrangement
would constitute an extraordinary step. Before taking such a
step, we may want the results of our consultation with the
Israelis on their longer range economic needs. These con-
sultations begin in Tel Aviv April 23.
--From the U.S. -Israeli viewpoint, the U.S. will find it very
difficult from normal programs in FY 1971 to muster the kind
of financial package we have just given them($190
We may be relieved to have such a device to fall back on.
In short, you may want to see what kind of reaction you get to a tentative
question about the German feeling on the subject, but I suggest your
position be that we are still studying the proposal.
Concurrences
in substance: L. Lynn
F. Chapin
F. Bergsten
H. Sonnenfeldt
R. Kennedy
TOP SECRET
HHSaunders:trnt 4/9/70
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/04/03: LOC-HAK-533-6-17-5