U.S. RESPONSE TO KHMER COMMUNIST INTERDICTION OF THE MEKONG RIVER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-558-15-20-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: December 17, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/24 : LOC-HAK-558-15-20-4
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MEMORANDUM
61-56
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
December 17, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCRO
FRC7IVI: WILLLANI L. STEA
SUBJECT: U. S. Response.to Khmer Communist
Interdiction of the 1Vlekong River
OSD and NSA
reviews completed
On November 11, you sent a merriorandum Tab C) to IVlajor General
Wickham asking Defense to explore passible U. S. responses to an
interdiction of the Mekong River b.y the Khmer Communists. At Tab A
is Defense's reply to your request.
Their analysis includes the following keys points:
-- It seems unlikely that the ,Communists will attempt a coxa.certed
interdiction of the Mekong;
-- An attempted interdiction could probably not be sustained to the
point of forcing the government's dawxifall. The reason for this is the
present relatively law state of Communist preparedness as well as .
FANK's superior firepower axxd improved tactical air and naval support;
.... The ixaost,useful short term U. S. response to any interdiction
effort would be to ensure .that stockage levels. of casxlbat supplies area
adequately maintained. .Defense i.s .currently doing this within the tight,
constraints of the budget for military assistance to Cambodia.
The DOD analysis, :however, : is partly contradicted by a December .l7
assessment in the National Intelligence Bulletin (Tab S). This latter
itexri states t~~at the Khxzicr Canirxiunists apparently intend to make a major
--~ For the longer range, selected investment items wi11 have to be
funded to ensure the rnainte.naz~ce of Cambadis,n I..OC's. To this. end an
airlift self-s~_i?ficiency package wla~ich included 1L~ E-123K transports is
in the :Final. stages of DOD review anal approval. Other studies of
possible additions to the Cambodian .naval farces, are aJ.so being considered.
MORI/CDF
003232858
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/24 : LOC-HAK-558-15-20-4
effort to interdict the 1Vlekong River during the, next f'ew months. A11
indications are that this will be th.8 most concerted attempt since their
spring 1973 effort. Analysis of recent intercepted messages show that the
Coxnxnunists will comsriit over. I0, 000 troops to a series of attacks against
FANK strong points along the river..
Cambodian arm}r coxnrnanders are aware of the Communist intentioxis anal
are sending reinforcements to thin area. This will raise the gave.rnn~.ent
troop strength along the river to over 8,.000..
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SECRET
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/24 : LOC-HAK-558-15-20-4
~~
OFFICE OF TWE SECRETARY OF'DEFENSE
WASNINGSON, 4.G. . soaar
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE pEPUT1C gSS(?STANT TO THE PROS(DGNT FOR.NPiT(ONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: Cambodian Assessment (U)
.
been committed to the Bassac Operation;`since;August 21, has been able.
to inflict serious losses on the enemy for-ces, the divisivn.is too
. For example, while the Zd Division, which has'.
during the wet season
(S) On the other hand, FANK has also been unable to rest .and. refit
1 i mi t the chances of any near-term KC success .
advantage, improved tactical air support ana strong r~verine ror~e~,
its manpower; and ammunition. 1n comparison.to 1as year the'KC appear
- - .. - . _ r~_.._ r~._-._ r__a~....
seems unlikely. The' risk of a loss to these areas would- ar outwe~g
the success achieved by interdicting the Mekong which in all likeli-
hood could not be sustained to the point of forcing the governmen t
downfall. Outing the.. course of this wet season initiatives by govern-
ment armed forces (FANK) continually disrupted enemy. plans. Consequently,
(C) In your memorandum of November 11, 1974, you ,suggested that it.
might be useful to explore possible US responses to the threat of a
concentrated Khmer Communist (KC) interdiction effort on Cam6adian
Lines of Communication`(.LOC). '
(S) While it is still too early to predict what actions the enemy
intends. to follow during this dry season,, Gambadian analysts agree
the KC will most probably continue their provincial str-ategy,.caupled
with rocket attacks against the capital and its airfield and attempt
the interdiction of the major LOCs such as the Mekong .and Tor71e Sap.'
Rivers and Routes 4 and 5.' Aithaugh significant. KG forces are avail-
able east of the Mekong, their commitment to a concerted interdiction
f h
the KAF Tactical Air Improvement Plan approved in Washington a year ago.
y
be Hated that this progress results fr?am actions undertaken as a part.af
and coordination for convoy security writhin Cambodia. The KAF has. shown
improvement in the applicati-on of close. air support and it should
stead
vu1nerabil`ity of Mekong. convoys at that point while centralized command
of the Mekong corridor under the Khmer Navy (MNK) has simplified control
weak to exploit these opportunities. Other trends, howdver, tna cote
favorable FANK progress. Along the Cambodian-South Vietnam border,
combined efforts of the FANK and the South Vietnamese have reduced: the
;fipcl b~~_ ASOIISA
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 During the uvet seasan which is ,just ending, KC Forces were able to
interdict. Routes l+ and 5 at varicsus times. However, once FANK responded
to the threat, the KC were unable to withstand ggvernment forces and
withdrew. Enemy personnel losses resitting frgm these aperatons:are
believed to have been severe. and are expected to have a deleterious
effect on KC, efforts in this dry seasan.
(S) It would appear the. most useful~US response ta.KC interdiction
efforts would be~to insure that present stackage levels in combat con-
sumablos for TANK are adequately maintained. Within the limits:;of his
tightly constrained budget, Chief MEDTC has done and is doing exactly this:
Ammunttien requirements for the first twa quarters, have been fully
funded, however the status of funding beyond this will: remain vague',
until Congress completes actign on Foreign Assistance Bi11 far FY75?
Far the longer range, selected investment and attrition items`wi'll have...
to be .funded to insure the continuity and maintenance of the Cambodian
LQCs. A KAF Airlift Self-sufficiency package, designed to make the
KAF self-sufficient in airlift capability b.y July 1975 is in the .final
stages of DOD review and approval. It will provide the KAF an'airlift
capability of 16 C-123K transports and should a]low the phasing out of
the current civilian ccantract C-13p Fl.ight5 by July 1975- A..second
area.of concern has been the combat attriticin of ri.verine craft. Since
.lanuary :1.974 a total of 15 craft have been last to .enemy action. To
offset these tosses, actions are underway by DOD to provide additional.. .
riverine graft to MNK. Provision of additional craft is contingent on'
having available funds, and the approval of Congress to implement the
transfer. If successful, .these. craft., should be available 'for. release.
to Cambodia in February 1975. The key however, will continue to be
adequate funding of Cambodia MAP.. tt is appropriate to reiterate that .
the purpose of these steps is to support a level of military parity.
under which both sides can be brought to_negotiate a settlemena.
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 -" No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/24 : LOC-HAK-558-15-20-4
(National intelligence Baulletin
?r,n lv route
and preparation suggests 'that this wi11 be the most con-
certed attempt si.nee the spring of 1973 to cut .this vital
December 17 R ],9'l4
The Khmer Communists apparently intend to mount a
major effort to interdict the Mekong River south of Phnom,
Penh during the next 'few months. The scope of planning
units .along the Mekong..
The air force and navy .will remaz.n ea Y.
both to escorting riven convo~ts and to su:pr~orting gr.yiznd
rYi I.rl}v u7~r r..+. --- J -__ -
3.ng some-`government. positions along the Mekong, many
units scheduled to participate in the interdiction effort
'are still engaged in fighting along the Bassac River-n:ear
Phnom Penh and around the provincial capital of Svay
Rieng. These units will probably have to rest and refit
before they can, be committed to new battlefronts. Insur-
gent commanders may also want to wait until water levels
drop further and riverside terrain dries out before im-
plementing-their attack plans. Details oz~ the timing of
the campaign may, be revealed when several tactical plan-
Wing conferences now under way have ended.'
Cambodian army commanders, aware of Communist.in-
tentions, plan to make 1,700 reinforcements available.
to help man defenses along the Mekong. This will raise
government troop strength along the river to aver 8,000.
h oil committed
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/24 : LOC-HAK-558-15-20-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/24 : LOC-HAK-558-15-20-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/24 : LOC-HAK-558-15-20-4