REPORT: WORKING GROUP ON ANGOLA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
LOC-HAK-102-5-11-0
Release Decision: 
RIPLIM
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
8
Document Creation Date: 
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date: 
October 22, 2012
Sequence Number: 
11
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 27, 1975
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
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PDF icon LOC-HAK-102-5-11-0.pdf357.49 KB
Body: 
60,0?1 OIL swam . skim. a ma. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-102-5-11-0 lip,01,01.,10 WI= II riMAITZ. vim 1111,11111m ler Copy # f Ai_ Copies EYES ONLY ANGOLA WORKING GROUP PAPER #77 REPORT: WORKING GROUP ON ANGOLA At a meeting of the working Group on 22 October 1975, the following points were covered: 1. Military Briefing a. An FNLA attacking column of about 2,100 troops, including 900 Forces Armees du Zaire (FAZ) and 1,200 FNLA, is 'at Sassa Caria near Porto Quipiri preparing to attack Luanda. A UNITA column is working toward Benguela and Lobito. There are signs that the MPLA is worried about the security of Luanda, but they have in the last few months -received large 'shipments of military materiel, including armored vehicles. b. There are reports of several hundred Cuban mili- tary personnel in Angola. More intelligence is needed as to their precise numbers and military specialties, but there are reports putting the presence at as many as 1,200 to 1,900 newly-arrived Cubans in Angola proper, Cabinda, and across the border in the Congo. The intro- duction of Cuban troops may represent a new phase in the conflict. If Cuban combat units are introduced, military superiority may shift back in favor of the MPLA. c. In ?the south, water and electricity services have been restored in Nova Lisboa, and the UNITA forces have made some advances toward Lobito and Benguela (to Quinjenje and just short of Norton de Matos -- see attached map). d. There are now about 11,000 Portuguese troops left in Angola at Cabinda, Luanda, Dondo, Lobito and Mocamedes. The High Commissioner, Admiral Leonel Cardosa, and the Portuguese military commander, General Almendra, DOS, OSD, NSS Reviews Completed. I WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INIELLIGENGE SOURCES. ' AND METI404 WNW Id-EL SENSITIV FYFR nwi v. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-102-5-11-0 STAT etr nnrr torMITlitt No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-102-5-11-0 EYES ONL have declared to the American Consul General in Luanda their intention to destroy or evacuate the major items of Portuguese military equipment. The Luanda Consul General has reported, however, that the Portuguese are planning to leave twenty-five small ships and some "very old artillery pieces" behind. (1) The Working Group noted favorably the Portuguese expression of intention to remove or destroy their equipment. (2) The State representatives will follow up with requests to our missions in Lisbon and Luanda to continue to maintain pressure on the Portuguese on this issue, and specifically to try to get them to remove all ships and to render inoperative any artillery left behind. 2. Political a. The State. representatives distributed a draft paper discussing the issue of recognition and diplomatic representation in Angola after 11 November 1975. b. If the MPLA 'claims to be the legal government of Angola and is recognized by the Communist and some "progressive" _states, the FNLA and UNITA will be tempted to set up rival governments. 25X1 25X1 c. The State representatives recommended that the Guillajtates Government avoid -- at least for the present euguraginz the establishment of a separate FNLA-UNITA _pvprripulat. To do so might- appear to bina us tO recognize such a government, which we might prefer not to do. d. One option to the United States would be to close its Consulate General in Luanda prior to 11 November 1975. This would avoid a situation in which the MPLA, in con- trol of Luanda, could force us to leave if we did not accord them diplomatic recognition. On the other hand, the British, who closed their Consulate in July 1975, have shown indications that they now regard that action as overly hasty and would like to reopen. 2 SECRET/SENSITIVE EYES ?NIX No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-102-5-11-0 No Objection to Declassification in Part 20 13/02/13 :10C-HAK-102-5-11-0 11. 01.1.11W1 IULtiviemo EYES ONLY4 2 f. It was agreed to prepare the FNLA and UNITA leaders, as well as Presidents Mobutu and Kaunda, for the. contingency in which the United States might try to main- tain an official presence in Luanda after 11 November 1975. 5X1)5xi g. The OAU Conciliation Committee has been touring Angola. The majority of the rnmmittee hag rejected the MPLA claim to control Angola 25X1?5X1 The Algeridh representative has been diligently promoting the MPLA cause. He has been supported by the Tanzanian and Moroccan delegates. 25 3 SECREVENSITIVE EYES ONLY No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13 : LOC-HAK-102-5-11-0 xi 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part2013/02/13 : LOC-HAK-102-5-11-0 W 1/10U1IL I %ILIUM I Wia w EYES ONLY, k. It was agreed that the United States Government should try to influence African governments both against a hasty recognition and in favor of adopting an African consensus. Outside Africa the United States should quietly advocate caution about recognizing a minority political group which controls neither most of the people nor most of the territory. 1. The MPLA delegation to Washington, led by Saydi Mingas, was given an appointment at the Department of State at the level of the Deputy Director, AF/C, but they did not show up. They did keep appointments on Capital Hill. 3. Military Aid a. The U.S. Army training team sent to train the FAZ in the M-113 armored personnel carriers has not been fully utilized. 25X1 25X1 25X1 b. As to ways of getting additional .A.P.C=s?to--Zaire to make up for the losses of FAZ Panhard armored cars in Angola, it was agreed to explore two roads: (1) The early acquisition of APC's under the FMS program, which would require help from DOD/OASD/ ISA to cut normal lead times. (This action coul& only follow approval of the continuing resolution authority.) 4 SERETISENSIIIVE EYES ONLY No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-102-5-11-0 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-102-5-11-0 W KWIC! /0010111,L EYES OM (2) The purchase, perhaps offshore, for direct shipment to Zaire out of program funds, if these funds can be increased. (At present no funds are available, but a request iTLLl be ?t ttie 4V?Mmittee.) c. The advantages of the early shipment of at least some vehicles for purposes of training, impact, etc. were noted. d. The first of the two Zairian C-130 aircraft being, overhauled at Marietta, Georgia, has been flown to Zaire with an American crew paid for out of program funds. e. The second aircraft is to be ready in early November 1975. The group felt that the normal inspections should be made, even if some might appear redundant. The Government of Zaire still