REPORT: WORKING GROUP ON ANGOLA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
LOC-HAK-102-5-11-0
Release Decision:
RIPLIM
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
8
Document Creation Date:
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date:
October 22, 2012
Sequence Number:
11
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 27, 1975
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
LOC-HAK-102-5-11-0.pdf | 357.49 KB |
Body:
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-102-5-11-0
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Copy # f Ai_ Copies EYES ONLY ANGOLA WORKING
GROUP PAPER #77
REPORT: WORKING GROUP ON ANGOLA
At a meeting of the working Group on 22 October 1975, the
following points were covered:
1. Military Briefing
a. An FNLA attacking column of about 2,100 troops,
including 900 Forces Armees du Zaire (FAZ) and 1,200
FNLA, is 'at Sassa Caria near Porto Quipiri preparing to
attack Luanda. A UNITA column is working toward Benguela
and Lobito. There are signs that the MPLA is worried
about the security of Luanda, but they have in the last
few months -received large 'shipments of military materiel,
including armored vehicles.
b. There are reports of several hundred Cuban mili-
tary personnel in Angola. More intelligence is needed
as to their precise numbers and military specialties,
but there are reports putting the presence at as many as
1,200 to 1,900 newly-arrived Cubans in Angola proper,
Cabinda, and across the border in the Congo. The intro-
duction of Cuban troops may represent a new phase in the
conflict. If Cuban combat units are introduced, military
superiority may shift back in favor of the MPLA.
c. In ?the south, water and electricity services have
been restored in Nova Lisboa, and the UNITA forces have
made some advances toward Lobito and Benguela (to
Quinjenje and just short of Norton de Matos -- see
attached map).
d. There are now about 11,000 Portuguese troops
left in Angola at Cabinda, Luanda, Dondo, Lobito and
Mocamedes. The High Commissioner, Admiral Leonel Cardosa,
and the Portuguese military commander, General Almendra,
DOS, OSD, NSS Reviews
Completed.
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EYES ONL
have declared to the American Consul General in Luanda
their intention to destroy or evacuate the major items of
Portuguese military equipment. The Luanda Consul General
has reported, however, that the Portuguese are planning
to leave twenty-five small ships and some "very old
artillery pieces" behind.
(1) The Working Group noted favorably the
Portuguese expression of intention to remove or
destroy their equipment.
(2) The State representatives will follow up
with requests to our missions in Lisbon and Luanda
to continue to maintain pressure on the Portuguese
on this issue, and specifically to try to get them
to remove all ships and to render inoperative any
artillery left behind.
2. Political
a. The State. representatives distributed a draft
paper discussing the issue of recognition and diplomatic
representation in Angola after 11 November 1975.
b. If the MPLA 'claims to be the legal government of
Angola and is recognized by the Communist and some
"progressive" _states, the FNLA and UNITA will be tempted
to set up rival governments.
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c. The State representatives recommended that the
Guillajtates Government avoid -- at least for the present
euguraginz the establishment of a separate FNLA-UNITA
_pvprripulat. To do so might- appear to bina us tO recognize
such a government, which we might prefer not to do.
d. One option to the United States would be to close
its Consulate General in Luanda prior to 11 November 1975.
This would avoid a situation in which the MPLA, in con-
trol of Luanda, could force us to leave if we did not
accord them diplomatic recognition. On the other hand,
the British, who closed their Consulate in July 1975,
have shown indications that they now regard that action
as overly hasty and would like to reopen.
2
SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ?NIX
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-102-5-11-0
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EYES ONLY4
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f. It was agreed to prepare the FNLA and UNITA
leaders, as well as Presidents Mobutu and Kaunda, for the.
contingency in which the United States might try to main-
tain an official presence in Luanda after 11 November
1975.
5X1)5xi
g. The OAU Conciliation Committee has been touring
Angola. The majority of the rnmmittee hag rejected the
MPLA claim to control Angola 25X1?5X1
The Algeridh representative has been diligently promoting
the MPLA cause. He has been supported by the Tanzanian
and Moroccan delegates.
25
3
SECREVENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13 : LOC-HAK-102-5-11-0
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No Objection to Declassification in Part2013/02/13 : LOC-HAK-102-5-11-0
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EYES ONLY,
k. It was agreed that the United States Government
should try to influence African governments both against
a hasty recognition and in favor of adopting an African
consensus. Outside Africa the United States should
quietly advocate caution about recognizing a minority
political group which controls neither most of the people
nor most of the territory.
1. The MPLA delegation to Washington, led by Saydi
Mingas, was given an appointment at the Department of
State at the level of the Deputy Director, AF/C, but they
did not show up. They did keep appointments on Capital
Hill.
3. Military Aid
a. The U.S. Army training team sent to train the
FAZ in the M-113 armored personnel carriers has not been
fully utilized.
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b. As to ways of getting additional .A.P.C=s?to--Zaire
to make up for the losses of FAZ Panhard armored cars
in Angola, it was agreed to explore two roads:
(1) The early acquisition of APC's under the
FMS program, which would require help from DOD/OASD/
ISA to cut normal lead times. (This action coul&
only follow approval of the continuing resolution
authority.)
4
SERETISENSIIIVE
EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-102-5-11-0
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-102-5-11-0
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EYES OM
(2) The purchase, perhaps offshore, for direct
shipment to Zaire out of program funds, if these
funds can be increased. (At present no funds are
available, but a request iTLLl be ?t ttie
4V?Mmittee.)
c. The advantages of the early shipment of at least
some vehicles for purposes of training, impact, etc. were
noted.
d. The first of the two Zairian C-130 aircraft being,
overhauled at Marietta, Georgia, has been flown to Zaire
with an American crew paid for out of program funds.
e. The second aircraft is to be ready in early
November 1975. The group felt that the normal inspections
should be made, even if some might appear redundant. The
Government of Zaire still