REPORT: WORKING GROUP ON ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-102-4-19-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: October 20, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Copy # '11 of leo Copies EYES ONLY ANGOLA WORKING
GROUP PAPER #71
20 OCT 1975
NSA review completed
REPORT: WORKING GROUP ON ANGOLA
At a meeting of the Working Group on 15 October 1975, the
following points were covered:
1. Military Briefing
a. The UNITA forces have contained an MPLA drive led
,by? armored vehicles toward Nova Lisboa. They stopped the
MPLA at Cuma and forced them back beyond Quingenge.
b. The FNLA forces have cleared the road between
Caxito and Carmona and have advanced to Sassalemba within
about twenty miles of Luanda. The MPLA can be expected
to try to counterattack, perhaps employing the Cuban
military forces arriving in Angola.
c. The,Soviets are reported to have airlifted large
stocks of fuel to the Henrique de Carvalho airbase which
is under MPLA -control.
DOS, OSD, JCS, NSS
reviews completed.
d. The MPLA successfully interruped the water supply
and cut off.the electric power to Nova Lisboa during the
week ending 4 October 1975.
e. The MPLA ha sent 400 troops from Luanda to rein-
force its garrison in Cabinda. The MPLA is aware of
the separatist tendencies of the Cabindans, including
some Cabindans in the MPLA ranks. The Portuguese are
expected to evacuate .their forces from Cabinda very soon.
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1.'1ARN;:,i,'?.1
SENSITIVE Ic';ii-:LIJE;lCE ?..;OURCES
AM', MF Cii,DOS VOLVED
SECRLIIS-Lf
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EYES .ONLY
h. Mobutu continues to display a commitment to an
?FNLA and UNITA victory. On 16 October 1975'. he responded
to an urgent appeal from Savimbi and sent six more Pan-
hard armored cars to each front -- FNLA and UNITA.
i. Mobutu also continues preparations in support of
an effort by Cabindan separatists to try to get control
of Cabinda.
2. The group considered two draft papers previously
circulated as Working Group Papers Nos. 62 and 63:
a. Portuguese Arms in Anpla; Prevention of Turnover
to MPLA - (Working Group Paper No. 63)
The State representatives alluded to diplomatic
efforts underway with the Portuguese Foreign Minister and
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SECRET/SE-SIEVE
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President with which other members of the Working Group
have been unaware. Suggestions to protest in Lisbon
some recent Portuguese actions favorable to the MPLA
(Working Group Paper No. 58) have been carried out. The
State members did not believe that efforts to enlist
other European governments or political parties in a
campaign would be effective in dissuading the Government
of Portugal from giving power to, turning over to, or
otherwise helping the MPLA in Angola. It was agreed
that State would send instructions on thi s b'
Consul General in Luanda
. South Africa - (Working Group Paper No. 62)
The group felt that purchases in the United States
for delivery of war materiel to FNLA and UNITA, if financed
even indirectly by South Africa, would represent:
(1)' An unacceptable political hazard as revelations
on the subject would do great political damage to the
FNLA and UNITA.
(2), A possible legal issue because of our present
embargo on arms for South Africa (Although these arms
would ostensibly be bought by UNITA, FNLA or Zaire
for delivery in.Zaire).
(3) A security weakness
as the chance of publicity from leaks in Washington
would be increased.
c. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait - _(Working Group Paper
No. 62)
The Saudis have shown some interest -- probably
stimulated by Roland Walter "Tiny" Rowland of Lonrho,
Ltd. -- in extending financial support to Savimbi. We
might crystallize any tendencies toward such support by
telling the Saudis we would buy arms in the U.S.A. fpr the
Angolans with any money the Saudis might provide. There
were some reservations among some members of the Working
Group against engaging with the Saudis' in such an endeavor:
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(1) Introducing of the Arab factor would compli-
cate Zaire's improving relations with Israel.
(2) Working with the Saudis is frustratingly
slow.
Other members felt the issile should be put As an option
to the 40 Committee.
3. It w eed that
40 Committee w Ic:
a. Described the escalation in the deliveries of
Soviet arms and the arrival of foreign military tech-
nicians and Cuban combat troops to help the MPLA.
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. Other Policy Issues
a. FMS
The DOD/JCS representative distributed a draft
message to Kinshasa regarding the FMS package to be put
together by the field. It was recommended that the
priorities in paragraph S. d. of the draft message be
changed to place the need for vehicles for the mechanized
battalion ahead of equipment for a signals battalion (in
view of the large amount of communications gear in our sea
shipment). The DOD/JCS representative will be the point
of coordination for this draft message.
b. REDEYE
the MPLA have 25X1
employed light aircraft to observe and to bomb UNITA units.
Efforts to knock down such aircraft with machine-gun fire
have not been successful. The UNITA and FNLA forces have
asked for a light, mobile anti-aircraft weapon effective
in defending small combat units against low-flying air
attack.
EYES ONLY.
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EYES ONLyt
c. We anticipate growing pressure for a weapon such
as the REDEYE missile. The DOD/JCS representatives
believe it would be wrong to put the REDEYE in Angola
now because:
(1) It is clearly traceable to the United States
Government. Very few other countries have the weapon.
(The Department of State and National Security Council
Staff representatives share this view of the political
sensitivity of the weapon.)
(2) Machine guns of .30 and .50 caliber should
be able to provide adequate defense against the pro-
peller-driven aircraft which the MPLA now has.
e.
C-47
It was agreed that in view of the difficulties
Mobutu felt he would have in supporting C-47 aircraft in
Zaire, the DOD/JCS representative would notify the USAF
that they need no longer hold C-47 aircraft in Udorn for
possible us,c in this program.
f. APC
In addition to Zaire being able to acquire armored
personnel carriers under EMS to re lace Panhards lost in
Angola,
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5. Operational Developments
a. The FNLA and UNITA delegations to the UNGA have
wound up their initial lobbying effort there, but the
expected arrival of an MPLA delegation may require some
further ENLA/UNITA effort in response. A copy of the
FNLA "White Paper" and other propaganda material was
displayed.
,
I it
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b. The FNLA staged an air attack with a light plane
and explosives which damaged the antenna and transmitter
facilities of Radio Luanda. The MPLA was able to restore
service with some delay and loss of effectiveness by
using other facilities and equipment.
c. The FNLA has also begun a leaflet campaign in
Luanda. The UNITA are using Zambian radio facilities to
broadcast its version of the news and to appeal to Angolans
not to fight for alien Communist leaders etc.
e. Approaches have been made to persuade the Brazilians
and the French Governments to provide military advisors.
(The Government of Brazil later replied that the govern-
ment at the highest level had decided it could not permit
Brazilian participation -- that Brazil could not take any
risk whatsoever regarding the possible discovery of Brazilian
participation in the Angolan situation due to foreign policy
considerations.
f. Efforts are underway to influence governments rep-
resented in the OAU Reconciliation Committee to oppose
MPLA claims.to control Angola. The State representatives
agreed to discuss the subject with the Afro-American Labor
Center leadership to see what they could do in lobbying
with foreign governments on this issue.
g. Funds in the amount of about $400,000,000 annually
are paid by Gulf Oil for exploitation of its Cabindan oil
fields into a New York bank to the credit of the Bank of
Angola. The next payment is due in December 1975. The
MPLA effectively controls the Bank of Angola and has
access to this money. The group recommended that steps
be taken to examine the feasibility of legal action by
the FNLA or UNITA to block MPLA access to such funds in
the United States. (This is a delicate issue in view of
the possible effect of any such action on future oil con-
cessions in Cabinda.)
Ii. The State representatives reported preparation of
a paper to consider various options open to the United
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States Government in the face of a likely claim by the
MPLA on 11 November 1975 to be the legal government of
Angola. Such a claim would probably be recognized by
the Communist countries and some African countries such
as Algeria, Somalia, Guinea and Gabon. Our Consulate
General is accredited to Portugal, and the MPLA might try
to force it out of Luanda if the United States did not
recognize the MPLA-controlled regime in Luanda.
i. Among the options to be considered would be
removal of our Consulate General prior to 11 November.
1975 so as to permit us to avoid the recognition issue.
Withdrawal of the Consulate General would, of course,
j. The FNLA and UNITA are now considering a joint
declaration of their claim. to be the successors to the
Portuguese regime. They may try to set up a government
in Nova Lisboa in response to an MPLA declaration in
Luanda.
k. It was agreed that the current FNLA and UNITA
military offensives are critical. It was also agreed
that efforts should be made to encourage a conservative
consensus within the OAU on the issue of the successor
regime to the Portuguese in Angola.
1. Note was taken of the reports of the arrival of
Cuban combat troops. It was agreed that we would try to
arouse opposition abroad to this escalation through
direct diplomatic contacts and by publicity to be generated
through covert means.
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