CIA ANALYSIS OF CHINA IN 1980-85, AND IN THE YEAR 2000

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-541-1-8-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 23, 2009
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 20, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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ip I ip
MEMORANDUM
[ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLYiE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRETLS *TflrE
INFORMATION
August 20, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PrtzsmEN-T
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER K
SUBJECT: CIA Analysis of China in 1980-85,
and in the Year 2000
3502
At Tab A is a CIA study of politiCal, military, and economic trends in
the People's Republic of China intended to estimate what the country will
look like in the following decade, and at the turn of the century. While
some of the conclusions reached by this type of "futurology" inevitably
are controversial, it is a thoughtful analysis based on our current infor-
mation about the country. Given the importance of China for our foreign
policy, I have summarized the major conclusions of the study and for-
ward it to you as of possible interest.
The analysis reaches the following conclusions:
-- China's major security problem for the rest of the century will
remain the Soviet Union. Probabilities for a Soviet nuclear strike against
the PRC in the coming decade do not seem very high, perhaps no more
than one chance in five. By the end of the century the PRC will have
developed a formidable strategic deterrent force based on a combina
a land based missiles and nuclear submarines.
MORI/CDF
CO2859476 pages
1-2"'
-- While China will probably remain a revolutionary Communist
adversary of the United States, threatening U.S. interests in many places,
its primary enemy will remain the USSR, even if Moscow and Peking
achieve a limited accommodation. It is believed that despite ideological
pretentions and national interests which conflict with the U.S. in many
areas, Chinese leaders are likely to continue to deal with the U.S. and other
non-Cornmunist cotintries in a constructive manner when they consider this
to be of advantage for China. China's interests in dealing with the U.S.
will include using us to offset Soviet efforts to encircle or threaten the 25X1
PRC, gaining access to advanced technology, and seeking to manage areas
of conflict with us through diplomatic activity.
TOP SECRET/SgVITIVE XGDS
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It-
TC)X4' tECR?ET /SENSI'Trv!
e northo'proapetti depend on success in controlling
population growth and stimulating greater food production. It is anticipated
that by 1985 PRC industrial production wilif-have doubled, and the food/
population problem will ease as the turn of the century approaches. At the
same time, in overall economic strength China will remain a big, poor
nation ,whose aggregate economic strength will trail far behind that of the
13. S. and USSR. The country will still not have caught up with Japan and
western Europe by the year 2000.
-- In interna/politics, the study anticipates that after the death of
Chairman Mao and Premier Chou leadership is most likely to
pasttO a collective dominated by career Communist Party men. The
possibility of a military dictatorship is not ruled out, however. It is
assumed that Mao's successors will continue to invoke his "thought" as
a basis for legitimating their own rule, although as time passes the dis-
tance between the Chairman's revolutionary ideas and the practical
necessities of running the largest nation...state in the world will probably
produce a diluted form of Maoism. The Study does assume, however,
that China will costtinue to be more puritanical and combative than almost
all the other Communist states of Europe and Asia.
-- Additional elements Of the study that you may find of interest
include a detailed presentation of the balance of forces on the Sino-Soviet
border (on page 21)11
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MORI/CDF
CO0156640 pages
3-47
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Top Secret
rTS ..40-tv 7 b
China in 1980-85 and
in the Year 2000
25X1
=1=1111111111MMI
Top Secret 25X1
OPR-201
July 1974
Copy
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2
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23:
'You have to contemplate what is called
d prolonged period, in terms of 10 veap-,
,it the very least, or even the entire
balance of 40 yeal!, of the 20th century.
It we are given the 40 yews, the world
,,itudtion will have been greatly changed
by the end 01 the c entury.""
-1\1,10 1 se-tung, 1959.
"You must all bring up some successors ?.
Everyone must prearrange his successors.
One must have three line', of successors
What is needed are determined people who
are young, have little (i.e., not too much)
education, a tirrn stand, and the political
experience tO lake over the work."
-1\lao ,e-tung, 1964.
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?
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH
July 1974
CHINA IN 1980-85 AND IN THE YEAR 2000
CONTENTS
Page
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS
1
INTRODUCTORY NOTES
4
Limitations on the Exercise
4
Chinese Feelings about the Future
4
THE SHAPE OF CHINA'S FUTURE
6
Ideology
6
The Economy
7
*Military Strategy, Posture, Capabilities
9
The Leadership
13
Foreign Policy
18
Some Possibilities
18
The Probabilities
19
ANNEX: SOME LEADERS OF 1980-85
27
FIGURES
Party and government organization (chart)
14
Disputed areas on the Sino-Soviet border (map)
20
Balance of forces on the border (map)
21
Disputed areas on the China-India border (map)
24
Military Regions of China (map)
33
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CHINA IN 1980-85 AND IN THE YEAR 2000
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS
Neither in the period 1980-85 nor even by the year 2000 will China
be a superpower in the class of the US or the USSR. But, barring Soviet
attack, China will have become a great power, probably the greatest in
East Asia.
The most menacing contingency for China is that of a Soviet military
attack. Soviet leaders may be seriously tempted, but the chances of
either a Soviet invasion or a Soviet nuclear strike in the decade ahead
(through 1985) seem to us to be not very high, perhaps no more than
one in five. Furthermore, a Soviet attack will probably be increasingly
discouraged, in the period 1985-2000, by the growth of Chinese
strategic power.
Another threat to Chinese development will be instability in the top
leadership. Peking is already in another period of purges and uncertain-
ty, and a still more serious situation will probably follow the anticipated
departure of both Mao and Chou in the next few years, as divergent
groups compete for position. After a period?possibly prolonged?of
post-Mao or post-Chou instability, the intense nationalism of the
leaders of all groups will probably enable a "collective" Party
leadership, even as it changes composition, to pursue a coherent and
constructive set of policies?although with continuing periodic "course
corrections" to left or right.
Chinese Communist ideology seems certain to continue to play a
critical role in shaping China's programs of political, economic, and
social development. While some of the most distinctive elements in
"Maoism" are likely to be softened in the interests of modernization,
NOTE: This study has been prepared from contributions by the Office of Political Research, the
Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Central Reference Service of the
Directorate of Intelligence, and by the Office of Weapons Intelligence and the Office of Scientific Intelli-
gence of the Directorate of Science and Technology. The Office of Current Intelligence of the Directorate
of Intelligence, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the
Department of State have been consulted in the course of the preparation. The responsibility for the
principal judgments of the study is entirely that of various Offices of CIA. Comment will be welcomed,
addressed to Chief, Asian Communist Staff, OPR, the coordinator of the study
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Chinese ideology will continue to be more puritanical and combative
than that of almost all other Communist states.
Economic prospects depend chiefly on China's degree of success in
controlling population growth and stimulating greater food production.
More likely than not, China will be making progress in these respects by
1980-85, and will have doubled industrial production by 1985. While
everything could go wrong economically in the event of weather dis-
asters or a military defeat, the food/population problem should be
eased by the year 2000, and by that time the industrial base to support
economic development should be about four times the present size.
Nevertheless, in economic strength, China will still trail far behind the
US and the USSR, and, probably, will still not have caught up with
Japan and Western Europe.
By 1980-85, the Chinese* strategic weapons force will probably in-
clude some hardened silos for ICBMs capable of reaching both the
European USSR and the continental US, but the emphasis is likely to be
on a combination of land-based semi-mobile systems (totaling no more
than a few hundred missiles), plus, perhaps, a handful of ballistic mis-
sile submarines. As of the year 2000, even if the US and USSR have in-
creased the gap in strategic capabilities between themselves and China,
the latter's strategic nuclear forces?backed up by immense conven-
tional defense capabilities?will constitute a formidable deterrent.
Throughout this century, Peking's foreign policy will probably con-
tinue to be shaped in large part by hatred and fear of the USSR. In the
short term, China's effort will be concentrated on avoiding a war with
the USSR and reducing the Soviet military presence on the border. To
this end, the Chinese may make the necessary compromises to get a
border settlement, without changing their view that the USSR is their
main enemy.
A broader?though still limited?accommodation between the two
powers will remain a possibility, especially in the longer run: movement
in that direction could be induced by mutual Chinese and Soviet in-
terest in lessening the temper of controversy. Such movement could
have considerable significance for US strategic and other interests, even
though such a Sino-Soviet detente would almost certainly stop far short
of anything resembling the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1949-53. The
Chinese will in any event continue to compete fiercely with the USSR,
worldwide, probably making even more trouble for the Soviets around
the world than they do now.
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Throughout this century, China will attempt to use US influence to
deter the USSR from attacking China and to offset Soviet efforts to en-
circle or contain China. The Chinese will try to avoid direct military
confrontations with the US, and are likely to support some US positions
which cut across Soviet policies. In pursuing these courses, the Chinese
leaders will almost certainly not become pro-American, or seriously in-
terested in an alliance with the US. The chances will indeed be greater
that the Chinese leaders will become more assertive, initiating
challenges to US interests in various countries and situations. The
degree of their assertiveness will depend in large part upon the Chinese
leaders' assessment of the overall value of the Sino-American
relationship in countering the USSR. In any event, Taiwan will be high
on Peking's list of priorities and will remain a painful issue between
China and the US; with the passage of time the Taiwan problem
will?if still unresolved by negotiations?increasingly tempt Peking's
leaders to resort to military force.
Maoist revolutionary impulses will probably sustain Chinese activism
toward various developing countries through 1980-85. China's ability to
exercise its power will remain greatest in East Asia?that is, in the
peripheral arc of Japan and Southeast Asia. Peking's main line in
Southeast Asia will probably be a combination of conventional
diplomacy and subversive support of insurgency, the short-range goal
being to encourage the development of a chain of benevolently neutral
neighbors. With respect to Japan, Chinese leaders will almost certainly
seek to encourage those forces and factors working for a -soft- Japan,
rather than a hostile or nuclear-armed Japan. As of the year 2000, the
Chinese will probably be the dominant power in East Asia and will be
able to compete with both the US and the USSR for influence in the
Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.
As for China's form of leadership, there are real possibilities of either
a military dictatorship, coming after a period of high instability, or a
neo-Maoist dictatorship riding in on a resurgence of fundamentalist
"Maoism." The more likely leadership, however, is a - collective-
dominated by Party careerists. On this view, the Party Chairman will
not have Mao's degree of authority, but?somewhat like Brezhnev's
present situation?will be obliged to rule by consensus. From what we
know of the candidates for the leadership in both 1980-85 and 2000,
these leaders will be hard, dedicated men, determined to make their
China strong and influential, but ready to deal with the West when
they consider this to China's interest.
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INTRODUCTORY NOTES
LIMITATIONS ON THE EXERCISE
Most -futurologists" disclaim any ability to predict, because the larger the time-
frame of the projections, the greater the contingencies. Even doctrinaires like Mao do
not proceed blindly toward immutable objectives, but are constantly monitoring and
periodically adjusting. Even then, they cannot altogether control their own societies,
and they cannot be sure what policies will be adopted by other governments?policies
to which they will be forced to respond. One of the best of the academic specialists on
China (Robert Scalapino) has said: "The big questions that relate to China's future re-
main unanswered, and, more than that, unanswerable."
China has not, however, proved to be totally unpredictable. When the People's
Republic of China (PRC) was proclaimed 25 years ago, US observers were able, by ex-
amining the structure of power and Mao's declared intentions, to forecast correctly
that there was no prospect for the overthrow of the regime, that Mao would continue
to dominate the Party, that he would construct a thoroughgoing totalitarian state,
that he would conduct ruthless collectivization and security campaigns, that Peking
would give important material support to Communist movements in Southeast Asia,
and that China would be a voluntary and reliable ally of the USSR in the short term
but would reject satellite status and might well break with the USSR eventually. It
should be noted that, within this generally accurate picture, virtually all observers failed
to foresee how sharply the Chinese would depart from the Soviet model and how
soon the break would come, And nobody foresaw such critical specific events as the
various challenges to Mao by other leaders, or such extreme ventures as the Great
Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.
It is harder now to make long-range predictions about China. The assumption of
the present exercise is that the well-known senior leaders?Mao and Chou En-lai in
particular? will have left the scene. Not only are we poorly informed about the policy
preferences and interrelationships of younger leaders, but we have already moved into
another period of leadership instability and of uncertainty as to which of the current
leaders?old and young?will survive. Moreover,, the world as a whole is more com-
plex than it was in 1949.
Nevertheless, the effort to make probability judgments must be undertaken. Those
presented in this speculative projection are made with fair confidence, in the belief
that they will give at least some sense of the future Chinese scene.
CHINESE FEELINGS ABOUT THE FUTURE
Even in pre-Communist China, there was a strong sense among Chinese?and
among foreign observers too?that China would always be there, that it would persist
as a nation-state in a meaningful way. It had the largest population: however many
millions might die, millions like them would replace them. It had a great civilization,
with splendid achievements. Its people were of high intelligence, hard-working, cheer-
ful in adversity, and of great endurance. The country could be essentially self-suf-
ficient if necessary. And it could survive any foreseeable military attack or occupation.
The Chinese Communists have taken care to give the Chinese people pride in their
accomplishments and confidence in their future. The leaders believe, and the younger
generation tends to believe, that China will be a great power again, to which other
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states will again defer; that China will be the -moral" leader of the world, and will
have great political influence; that its population can be controlled, and will remain
an asset politically ("one-fourth of mankind") as well as economically and militarily;
that China will have an impressive economic growth rate, not just one step ahead of
the population; and that China will eventually be a military superpower, in the same
league with the US and the USSR, although with a different combination of strengths
and weaknesses.
Thus the Chinese leaders of today, and the young people who will rise to be leaders,
see the China of 1980-85 and 2000 as a strong and stable state, with high morale: lean,
hard, serious, purposeful. The Chinese leadership?the "revolutionary
successors"?will still be dedicated to essentially revolutionary goals. The Party will
have been strengthened by its periodic -struggles" against -revisionist" backsliders.'
The Chinese see the US and the USSR, of 1980-85 and 2000, as still being stronger
powers than China but as declining relatively to China, and most of the rest of the
world as being in bad shape. Although the USSR is seen as "revisionist," bureaucratic,
materialist, corrupt and -degenerate," a -paper tiger" in the long term, the Chinese
do not doubt that?barring nuclear war with the US?the USSR will be strong and
stable, a powerful foe, in the short term. Similarly, while the US (and the West as a
whole) is also seen as a -paper tiger" in the long term, unable to deal successfully with
its mounting domestic problems and increasing external challenges, the US will le
-
main a "real tiger" in the short-term?long enough, the Chinese hope, to be used
strategically to counter the threat from the USSR. The Chinese see Japan as an
economic rival which could become a formidable military threat if it were to decide to
use its economic and technological resources to that end; but they regard such a deci-
sion as unlikely, and they believe that good relations with Japan can probably be
established.
Elsewhere in the world, population trends alone will put much of Asia, Africa, and
Latin America in exploitable turmoil, with large-scale starvation, rioting, rebellion,
and the overthrow of governments. A "unified" (totalitarian) China can move into
some of these situations, supporting new leaders or their competitors (if promising, and
pro-Chinese). In general, the outlook is for convulsive change in much of the world,
change from which China will benefit.
'Not all Party members believe this, but those who expect to be the winners in such -struggles- tend to
believe it.
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IDEOLOGY
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THE SHAPE OF CHINA'S FUTURE
Communist ideology ("Marxism-Leninism?Mao Tse-tung Thought," as Peking
puts it) is certain to continue to play a critical role in shaping China's programs of
political, economic and social development. As a Communist society, it must have an
ideology to provide unity, momentum, and a sense of national and individual pur-
pose. Ideology will continue to perform the indispensable function of justifying the
monopoly of political power exercised by the Party over the people. It will also con-
tinue to be the rationale of policy, and the language in which both arguments about
policy and struggles for power are conducted.
Mao's "thought--Mao's personal vision of the good society and of the way to
achieve it?will continue to exercise a strong influence over Chinese Communist
ideology after Mao's death, but probably in an attenuated or diluted form. Serving
both as the Chinese Lenin and the Chinese Stalin, Mao will almost certainly be
deified and his "thought" canonized after his death. There is a chance that some
successor, by the year 2000, will downgrade him in his Stalinist role, but it seems more
likely that he will remain as unassailable as Lenin has been.
The most distinctive elements in Mao's "thought"?his emphasis on constant
struggle ("uninterrupted revolution"), on mass movements (nationwide, e.g., the
Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution), and on ideological motivation and
control ("thought reform" )?seem likely to be reduced in importance in the interest of
modernization. That is, the leaders who will probably emerge as strongest?including
proteges of Mao?will want to avoid the convulsions of Mao's last years, in order to
have a stable base to build on.
Mao's "thought," like Marxism-Leninism before it, is both comprehensive and flex-
ible, so that Mao's successors can manipulate his doctrine to fit practical needs. There
are elements in Mao's thought that can be used to justify any position or policy, and
Mao's successors can be expected to do this, just as Mao himself has done it.
The national component is certain to remain strong in Chinese Communist
ideology. The Chinese have long regarded their ideology as a -Chinese or Asian form
of Marxism.- Mao has credited the ancient Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu?not Hegel
or Marx?with devising the "dialectical" method of analyzing problems, and has
criticized many of the concepts of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin as having little relevance to
China's special problems. (The post-Stalin Soviet leaders have all been dismissed as
"revisionist" villains.) However, while nationalism may be a part of ideology (and
often has been) and may be the most important driving force in Chinese Communism,
Peking's official ideology will remain universalist in vision.
China's special problems?especially, the basic fact that it is an overpopulated, un-
derdeveloped nation with little surplus available to improve the standard of living?
tend and will tend to shape its ideology. It seems very probable that Chinese ideology
will continue to be, for the rest of this century, more puritanical and combative (i.e.,
more "leftist") than its Soviet and East European counterparts.
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THE ECONOMY
China has the natural and human resources of a superpower. It has the world's
largest hydroelectric potential, coal and iron ore resources capable of supporting a
US-sized steel industry, and large deposits of oil, tin, tungsten, antimony, etc. It has a
sturdy, hard-working, well-disciplined population which is unsurpassed as human raw
material for an economic development process, and a hard-driving, intelligent
leadership determined to make China the dominant power in Asia and, eventually, a
superpower.
It also has, however, grievously high labor/land and labor/ capital ratios. Shortages
of arable land and of modern industrial plant, and the pressure of population, are its
chief economic problems.
The result, thus far, is that China has been widening the gap over other densely
populated, less developed countries (India, Pakistan, Indonesia) but it has not been
closing the gap with the high-technology economies such as those of the US, Japan,
and Western Europe.
The Chinese leadership has recently made some large decisions concerning resource
allocation, the consequences of which will not become clear for some years. The
decisions have four major elements: purchase of huge quantities of fertilizer plant and
equipment from abroad; purchase of large quantities of foreign synthetic fiber plant
and equipment; initial purchases of high-yield variety seeds developed in such areas as
Mexico and the Philippines; and a new willingness to purchase much of this plant
and equipment on credit. Taken together, these measures imply a major shift in allo-
cation of resources toward agricultural development.
The imported plants will begin to produce in 1976. At that time, the greatly in-
creased availability of fertilizer should begin to lift the average annual rate of growth
of grain production well above the current level. If Peking follows through in acquir-
ing and distributing high-yield variety seeds, the rate could be still higher. Moreover,
the fiber-plant program will decrease the burden, now carried by agriculture, of
providing fiber for clothing. Thus by 1980 Chinese agriculture could and should be
producing at rates well in excess of the 2 percent per year required to stay even with
population growth. If so, the leadership will have greater scope than is now the case
for allocating resources into accelerated industrial and military development.
All of this requires the assumption that current policies will be sustained through
1980?meaning, inter alia, that the eased relationship with the US and other countries
will be maintained, and that domestic political campaigns will not be allowed to dis-
rupt agricultural production. The remarkable stability in agricultural policy since
1962 suggests that there is a firm consensus on the fundamental importance of
agriculture. We are less sure that a consensus exists on the magnitude of the resources
now being used to attack the problem and on the means of remedy?imported equip-
ment and technology. The present leadership is pretty clearly moving in the right
direction, and the likely leaders of 1980-85 will remember the "time of troubles- of
1959-61 and will, we think, want to hold to the current direction. (Some observers
doubt this.)
In sum, China is in a transition period in which short-term development of industry
and of defense as well is being subordinated to the laying of a solid foundation for
future agricultural development. The probability is that by the early years of the
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period 1980-85 China will have made progress with its agricultural problems and
will have an impressive array of talent and resources at hand for whatever other
objectives Peking wishes to pursue.
This is not to say that China will be an economic superpower in 1980-85. It will still
be a big poor nation, with the potential of superpower status. Its GNP will have grown
enough to support continued expansion of industrial capacity and output,
maintenance of the population at slowly rising levels of well-being, and the continued
equipping of the armed forces with a growing quantity and variety of strategic
weapons. The impact of population control programs is likely to have been minor by
1980-85, but Peking should be in a position (it has the will, the organization, and the
technology) to make appreciable cuts in the rate of population growth thereafter.
This of course would ease further the pressure of the food/population problem.
(Some observers doubt Peking's ability to make appreciable cuts.)
Over the next decade, industrial production probably will expand at a yearly rate of
about 8 percent, which would mean a doubling of output by 1985. One of the main
features of the expansion will be increased industrial inputs into agriculture, as noted
above. In addition, technology in the metallurgy, electronics, machine building, and
military branches will have made impressive advances. Efforts to modernize the coal
and electric power industries will probably have been less successful. Output of
petroleum will have expanded rapidly from a small base, and petroleum will probably
be a major export. While committed doctrinally to self-reliance, China will continue
to tap the major industrial nations for modern equipment and new technology.
China's need for advanced technology and its efforts to reduce the technological
gap between China and the US and USSR should be an important factor in China's
foreign relations. In selected technologies, such as electronics, China should be able to
compete with other industrialized nations in the sales of conventional products to the
less developed countries. In selected areas of basic research, China may be able to an-
nounce certain developments or discoveries that contribute to the worldwide
state-of-the-art.
The possibilities fan out between the period 1980-85 and the year 2000. For exam-
ple, the population growth rate could drop enough to increase substantially the
regime's ability to support industrial and military growth; and, if worldwide energy
deficiencies become chronic, Chinese self-sufficiency in energy could become a telling
advantage. On the other hand, if everything were to go wrong economically as the
result of a major weather disaster or a military defeat, the economy could be in a state
of near-collapse.
While more pessimistic and more optimistic variants of China's economic prospects
are possible, on balance we believe that growth in output will continue during the
next 25 years at about the same pace as during the past two decades. In other words,
rates of growth will probably be comparable to rates in the US and USSR, leaving
China in the middle group of major powers, with growth rates below Japan's and
above Great Britain's, (Some observers believe that China will not do nearly this well,
or at least that no judgment should be offered with even fair confidence.)
By Western standards, the Chinese will continue to be poor, even in the year 2000.
However, anticipated successes in both controlling fertility and gaining greater
agricultural yields should substantially ease the food/population problem. Thus living
standards can be appreciably higher than they are now, while substantially expanding
resources are allocated to industrial expansion and modernization.
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In the year 2000, the industrial base to support economic development and the
military establishment should be about four times the present size, with great ad-
vances in technological capabilities. Other major nations will also have advanced,
China will still trail far behind the US and USSR in industrial and technological
strength, and, probably, will still not have caught up with Japan and Western Europe.
MILITARY STRATEGY, POSTURE, CAPABILITIES
Chinese strategic thinking derives in part from Mao's old military precepts of the
Sino-Japanese and civil wars?precepts which themselves derive in part from ancient
Chinese strategists such as Sun Tzu?and in part from more recent Maoist
pronouncements looking to the age of nuclear weapons. The latter, like the former,
have had political as well as military objectives and have sought to make the best of a
position of military inferiority.
Mao has called for years for defense in depth against a land invasion, holding that
China's regular armies and regional forces would be greatly aided by China's "vast
militia" (more than 100 million, although a much smaller number has been trained
with weapons). He has also held for years that even in the worst case, a nuclear war,
half or at least a third of mankind?including hundreds of millions of
Chinese?would survive and could rebuild. (Thus the rhetorical flourish that such a
war would be "not a bad thing.")
More recently, looking toward the Soviet threat, he has called upon the Chinese
people to: "Prepare for war . . .; dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere. . . .
China's military programs have clearly reflected a rational desire to deter attack
from any quarter and to be able to carry on protracted land warfare should deterrence
fail.' However, the Chinese have not been forthcoming about their nuclear strategy.
This must be inferred from statements of determination by Mao (e.g., in 1965:
"Yes . . no matter what country, no matter what missiles, atomic bombs, hydrogen
bombs, we must surpass them"); from pronouncements on foreign policy; and?
mostly?from the actual course of weapons development and deployment of forces.
Statements by Chinese leaders and favorable Chinese propaganda treatment of the
French nuclear program made clear that the Chinese regarded a minimum deterrent
as essential. That is, like the French, the Chinese concluded that, lacking the means
for a successful first strike or for massive retaliation, a Chinese ability to "tear an arm
off" the enemy would give him pause. The Chinese are not, however, prepared to
accept such a situation indefinitely. The Chinese need to defend themselves (as they
see it) against two superpowers?the US being regarded as the main enemy until 1969,
the USSR increasingly thereafter. (Actual deployment of strategic missiles has not
followed the shift in thinking as sharply as might have been expected. The Chinese are
still preparing against any contingency, including the possibility?not now ex-
pected?of a nuclear-armed Japan.)
There were also political reasons?perhaps just as important?for acquiring an ad-
vanced weapons capability. Apart from the symbolic rewards of nuclear power status,
zMaoist concepts?emphasis on careful preparation and surprise, the strategic denial of mainline Chinese
forces (i.e., holding them hack from areas where they would be vulnerable to sudden attack), guerrilla tac-
tics supported by the aroused masses, indoctrination of confidence in eventual triumph?would undoubted-
ly be important features of Chinese strategy against invading forces. Situational and technological factors,
however, have led the Chinese to prepare positions which would enable them to carry out a static defense of
some strategic areas.
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111.
the main one was for its use in support of Chinese policy toward Asian non-Com-
munist states, some of which are within the present range. The Chinese have un-
derstandably proclaimed a no-first-use policy with respect to nuclear weapons, in the
face of overwhelming American and Soviet superiority, but Peking's possession of such
weapons is recognized by other Asian capitals as giving the Chinese an option. And
Peking has already "rattled" these weapons toward Japan, India, and Taiwan, and
even the US.3
A few years ago, observers of the Chinese nuclear weapons program generally
believed that China, while deploying medium-range ballistic missiles and in-
termediate-range ballistic missiles, would develop an intercontinental ballistic missile
as quickly as possible, in order to be able to strike anywhere in the Soviet Union and at
least some parts of the continental US. The Chinese have riot in fact, however,
progressed as rapidly as generally expected.'
The Chinese now have about 60 operational TU-16 medium bombers deployed
with operational units (with production apparently stopped). They have recently been
found to have a short-range ballistic missile, apparently designed for targets only
within China's borders, i.e., against an invader. They also have a few dozen of the
600-nm CSS-1 missiles and 1400-nm to 1500-nm CSS-2 missiles in the field. The
CSS-X-3 missile, with perhaps as much as a 3500-nm range, has not yet been
deployed,
1All this is well short of the strategic attack forces once
projected by outside observers for this year.
In sum, what the Chinese have is a respectable start on a nuclear retaliatory
capability against the USSR, holding several large Soviet cities hostage?but not
Moscow; and against US forces and bases in Asia?but not the continental US.
For the foreseeable future, China's strategic military position vis-a-vis both the
USSR and the US will probably riot be much better than it is now. In the period
1980-85, much of China's deterrent force will be vulnerable to a disarming strike,
but some missiles would probably survive. The Soviet advantage with respect to
general purpose forces will be maintained, but this will not make a land war against
China an attractive option. Peking will remain dependent?against the Soviet
threat?on a small nuclear deterrent and a determination to defend the country in
depth against a conventional attack. (Chinese leaders appear to believe, as do we,
that this combination will he sufficient.) Peking by 1980-85 will also have a small
nuclear deterrent (CSS-X-4s and SLBMs) against the US, although this is a capa-
bility Peking does not expect to have to use. The capabilities of China's general
purpose forces will be limited, in offensive actions, to China's periphery; the
Chinese do not seem to envisage any substantially larger capability for these forces
for some years.
'E.g., the then Chinese Foreign Minister made a long-term threat against the US in 1966 and a short-term
threat against Japan (relating to possible Japanese involvement in the Vietnamese war) in 1967.
'The Chinese apparently no longer fear an imminent Soviet nuclear strike, arid in recent years they
have not feared an American strike.
'Moscow might be brought in range by CSS-X-3 missiles from Sinkiang, but Moscow has an ABM system,
and Sinkiang itself is vulnerable to Soviet conventional forces.
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Looking to the period of 1980-85, there is little chance that the Chinese will be able
to make a major technological breakthrough which would affect the strategic balance
vis-a-vis the US and USSR. Some qualitative improvements will probably have been
incorporated into Chinese strategic weapons forces by that time, but not enough to
affect the balance significantly,'
As for strategic offensive forces, toward the end of the period 1980-85, the Chinese
will have some medium-range jet bombers (no long-range jet bombers) and perhaps
some long-range reconnaissance aircraft, but they have apparently decided that
strategic bombers are of limited value, and there seems little doubt that the principal
weapons will be missiles. The question is really that of what kind of missile combina-
tion the Chinese will choose to put together.
The poor prospects for small-force silo survivability suggest that the Chinese will
probably decide to deploy more CSS-2, 1400-mile missiles, which can be transported
and to some extent concealed, The CSS-X-3 could conceivably be deployed in a
similar mode, but this would be much harder to do and is less likely Total regional
missile deploymen still a
small force as compared to those of the US or USSR.
The land-based missile force as of 1985 probably will include hardened
silos- ?for longer range ICBMs capable of hitting both the
European USSR and the continental US. But the emphasis will probably be on a com-
bination of land-based semi-mobile shorter-range systems and submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs), as the best means of assuring force survivability.'
By 1980-85, the Chinese probably will have put considerable effort into the
development of an SLBM system. One of the first applications of solid-propellant
technology will probably have been an SLBM program.
Whatever their missile systems, the Chinese will probably not be a party to arms
limitation agreements through 1980-85. Chinese military strength, however, will not
be so great as to prevent Soviet-American agreements,
As for strategic defensive forces in the period 1980-85, China will continue to face a
much graver threat from Soviet strategic air forces than does the US. In addition, the
Chinese must consider the threat posed to their country by Soviet tactical air forces,
The Chinese defensive problem is similar to that of NATO, and Peking's solution
may come to resemble NATO's; i.e., better interceptors capable of performing both
?E,g,, solid-propellant missiles might form a large part of the force. There should also be some improve-
ment in the accuracy of Chinese missile systems, but not enough to give them a hard target (counter-force)
capability. The Chinese may be able to tnaster the technique of multiple-reentry vehicles (MRV) by 1985,
but are unlikely to be able to deploy missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles
(M IRV) by that time. Of more importance, if they develop adequate early-warning systems and sufficient
force-readiness, they will be able to threaten launch-on-warning (a capability they do not now have)
against any potential nuclear attack. This would, of course, increase the credibility of the Chinese deterrent
without requiring any increase in the size of the force.
'In connection with all types of land-based missiles, the Chinese might make greater use of deception,
scattering empty silos around the country on the calculation that anything which can be considered a
launch-point will be, thus increasing the Chinese deterrent. Some observers believe, however, that such a
scheme would be both provocative and quite expensive (at such a cost, Peking might as well put missiles in
the silos), and is thus highly unlikely.
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41P
air defense and tactical air roles will be deployed, with most assigned to units with the
primary mission of ground attack. However, they may settle for fewer interceptor air-
craft than are now deployed, and missiles of the Soviet SA-2 variety should continue
to be reserved for very important targets, with development priority given to surface-
to-air missiles capable of providing tactical protection to ground forces.
General purpose forces, in the period 1980-85, will have been improved in several
respects and will still play an important role. The Chinese have recognized the ex-
tremely limited mobility of their ground force units relative to Soviet forces, and have
begun to produce more equipment to solve this problem. Air defense forces, as in-
dicated above, may well be oriented more toward the needs of ground field forces,
with a much higher priority given to tactical air capabilities.8 Even apart from the
attention given to ballistic missile submarines, China's navy in the period 1980-85 will
be substantially improved, with capabilities for operations beyond coastal waters.
By the year 2000, assuming the past rate of military and economic development,
China will be virtually secure from invasion by conventional forces. It is also probable
that China's strategic nuclear forces?by this time, perhaps, missile systems which are
quite accurate and equipped with M1RVs?will continue to be a sobering (not ab-
solute) deterrent; i.e., such as to force any potential attacker to accept assured destruc-
tion of a substantial number of -value targets.''
This is expected to be true even if the US and USSR increase the gap in strategic
capabilities between themselves and the Chinese. There is only an outside chance of a
technological breakthrough by the US and USSR so great?e.g., development of an
effective laser anti-missile system?as to nullify any delivery system the Chinese are
able to field.
In sum, China in the year 2000 will not be a military superpower comparable to the
US and the USSR, but it will be an important military power.
It can be argued that Chinese nuclear forces will not in fact play an important role
in the Soviet-American military balance, as targeting requirements imposed by the
growth in Chinese forces can easily be met; and Chinese forces, compared to those of
the US, will have little capability to attack Soviet strategic forces and, compared to
those of the USSR, little capability to attack US strategic forces. The point, however, is
that neither the US nor the USSR could have assurance of fully knocking out the
Chinese retaliatory capability, and the Chinese capability for surprise at-
tack?perhaps unidentifiable attack from submarines?must be a source of concern.
Moreover, if, as is expected, the nuclear forces of the two superpowers continue to
be neutralized by each other, China's large conventional forces will necessarily make
an important difference in the calculations of both. This is especially true for the
USSR, to whom these forces are the greater threat.
In any sense, a tacit Sino-Soviet or Sino-American military alliance (no formal
alliance is in prospect) would be a serious concern for the excluded party, especially for
the Soviets. The Chinese may thus be in a position to make the superpowers bid
against each other for Peking's favor.
'Tart of increasing these capabilities should be provision for delivery of tactical nuclear weapons by air-
craft assigned to attack units. This offers Peking a way out of developing costly tactical nuclear missiles.
Nuclear artillery rounds are another objective.
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? SECRET
THE LEADERSHIP
The leadership in either 1980-85 or 2000 will be determined in part by the character
of the leadership that precedes it, a question which itself is in doubt.
The actuarial probabilities are that both Mao (80), and Chou (75), both of whom
have serious medical problems, should depart peacefully in the next few years. This
assumes that they escape assassination or a coup (marginal threats to both) and that
Chou is not purged (perhaps a bit more than a marginal threat to him).
Chou has played various critically important roles. He has been, and may still be,
the Party's de facto Secretary General, directing the entire Party apparatus (inter alia,
supervising both the Military Affairs Committee, which directs the military establish-
ment, and the political security network). He is still Premier of the State Council,
managing the simplified but still complex government, and carrying out foreign
policy. And he has been in recent years Mao's principal adviser, the most stable
source of a moderating influence on Mao, and probably the principal advocate of the
turn to the US. In the present period of a leftward turn in Chinese policy, Chou has
seemed to be on the defensive, but he has conducted his defense skillfully by espous-
ing policies more leftist than he is believed to personally favor and the recent slowing
of his pace seems due entirely to poor health. (He has been asserting his poor health
for more than a year, has shown signs of hypertension, and is credibly reported to
have suffered at least one recent heart attack.)
Last year's Tenth Party Congress brought up several younger leaders to replace
Chou?if thought necessary or desirable?in his various roles, and Mao has since
"rehabilitated" another possible replacement?Teng Hsiao-ping. Chou's departure
might lead to intense competition for his vacated posts and roles, but the Party should
hold together. (Mao is the main unifying force, it is Mao's -coalition" in there now,
most Politburo members are Mao's proteges, and the security chiefs are almost all men
close to Mao.) National stability would probably not be severely affected by the loss of
Chou.
Mao's departure, ahead of Chou, would surely be a traumatic experience for the
Party and the country. By 1975, he will have been the Party's principal leader for 40
years. However, most Party leaders would probably recognize the imperative of not
allowing China to seem weak and vulnerable (e.g., to Soviet attack) and would try to
present an appearance of strong central authority.
Chou is probably still the best bet to become the Party's Chairman after Mao, if his
health permits. He is now the senior of the Party's five Vice Chairmen, has great
prestige, and is popular with others in strong positions. He could probably win out,
either in backstage maneuvering or an honest vote.
There are probably some members of the present Politburo who are uncongenial to
Chou. While it seems unlikely that Chou as Chairman would attempt a sweeping
purge, certain of the doctrinaire "Maoists" and proteges solely of Mao would
probably be deprived of real power. Others might remain, waiting for their post-Chou
opportunity.
Chou would not be able to dominate the Party to the degree that Mao has
dominated it, but he would in general be expected to get his way in the shaping of
policy. In the name of Mao's "thought," he would probably pursue relatively
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Party and Government Structure
The Chinese Communist Party
Military Atfairs
Committee
Mao Tse-tiin, Chairman
Vice Chairman
Standing Committee
*1 Te-sheag
'Ten Hoino-ping
Chen llsr-llen
Ors
General Political Department
*Li Te-sheng, Director
Party Secretariat
Current Secretary
General is unknown,
and Secretaries have
not been identified.
uneral Office
any Tung-lising, Director
committees and
solitucal officers of
nilitory Ow head-
luartern, provincial
01.0.1 :
Orn
air isits
rtments
known or melts
&cation
liaison
rovincial, Municipal,
and County Committees
-26 provinces'
3 major municipalities
(Peking, Tientsin,
Shanghai);
other municipalities; and
about 2,0N counties
Government of the
People's Republic of China
StateThe
Chao En-lot, Pi
POI Pr
Teng fisiao-ping, Vice
other Vice Preu?rsii
General Office
Kay Ministries, Cam
and Special Gin
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of National Defense
Ministry of Public Security
Ministries 0 Machine-Building
Ministry of fmance
Ministry of Foreign Trade
Ministry 0 Economic liebti
with Foreign Countries
Ministry of Metallurgical-hide-0
State Planning Commission
National Defense Science
and Technology Commission
State Capital Construction
Comnlission
enure! Group of the State
Council
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/23
tntin0 ry and realm! glans
Finance and Trade
*Status in doubt.
*Position not confirmed
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SECRET IP
moderate policies in both domestic and foreign affairs, de-emphasizing "struggle" at
home and -revolution" abroad. His regime would probably hold to the turn to the
US, but might well also seek a limited reconciliation with the USSR, at least defusing
the border situation.
Should Chou decline the Chairmanship, or other Party leaders prove unable to
coalesce around him, there might be yet another period of high instability in the cen-
tral leadership while a new coalition was being worked out. There is a chance that
either the "Maoists- cited above or a combination of military leaders would emerge as
the strongest cohesive group in such a coalition, and that in either case the regime
would halt the turn to the US, but, on balance, it seems likely that the new coalition
would see the national interest served by continuing the policy which Mao and Chou
initiated,
In the period 1980-85, after the presumed departure of both Mao and Chou, the
possible futures for China become more various. Observers have speculated on a wide
range of them.
One possibility is "collapse" at the center, warlordism" in the regions and
provinces. There seems little chance of this, except in the train of a Soviet attack, itself
believed unlikely.
Another is a rapid and strong reaction against Mao's "thought," resulting in a
-revisionist" Communism on the Yugoslav model, or a "non-ideological technocracy"
operated by government leaders, or even a free society. These constructions are very
improbable, we think, for the period under consideration: the Yugoslav model is
too soft for the Chinese (they literally cannot attord it), the Party is and will remain
much stronger than the government, and no totalitarian regime has put itself out of
business.'
Another is the emergence of a neo-Confucian society, highly authoritarian and
hierarchical, expunging the Communist elements of Mao's "thought- but retaining
those which bear some semblance to Chinese traditions. Again, the Communist Party
is sure to repel any threat to its own domination in the period considered.
Yet another is a variant of a situation already noted above as a possibility even
before 1980?that of a period of high instability in which military leaders would be
the strongest group. In extension of that possibility, this fourth possible future is the
imposition of a military dictatorship?a coalition of military leaders at the center and
in the regions. This is a serious possibility, but, just as we see the military as unlikely to
be the strongest group in a post-Mao coalition, so we believe, on balance, that a
military dictatorship in 1980-85 is improbable: civilian Party control of the military is
being steadily restored, the PLA itself would not be unified (there have always been
more "loyalists"), and successful conspiracy and coordinated action against the
civilian leaders would be very difficult?as most notably illustrated in Lin Piao's
failure.
'While Soviet history is not binding on the Chinese, it is instructive. The USSR is still an
"oligarchy"?Lenin's own contemptuous word, before his death, for the Party apparatus he had con-
structed?although it is now one with some restraints on the General Secretary, and there are no longer
massive blood purges of the Party. It is still a society in which the citizen has no rights which cannot be
taken away (therefore no rights) and in which there are no limits on the power of the Party and the police,
although there are no longer many millions in labor camps. And it is still a society committed to the destruc-
tion of free societies, even though interested now in a "detente" with the US. The Ho Chi Minh succession
is instructive also; the character and objectives of the regime have not changed.
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SECRET 11.
One more possible future is also a variant of a situation noted as a possibility before
1980?that of the emergence of the "Maoists" as the strongest post-Mao group. The
extension of this possibility would be the emergence of a neo-Maoist dictatorship un-
der a single dominant figure ("one line, one leader"), with a resurgence of the fun-
damentalist radical, revolutionary features of Mao's thought. This also is a serious
possibility, but, again, just as we think that the "Maoists" are unlikely to dominate
the post-Mao coalition, so we doubt that another Mao will emerge from the
"Maoists."
We believe that the most likely outcome in the short term (1980-85), even though it
may follow a period of instability, is a nationalist, specifically Chinese type of Com-
munism, with a relatively strong and effective central government. The regime, still a
proletarian dictatorship," will probably be dominated by civilians, career Party
cadres, although it will have important military representation and may be subject to
significant regional influences. It will be a more competent and constructive regime
than either a military or a neo-Maoist dictatorship would be. It will be officially
animated by Mao's thought, but probably in a diluted form. We expect a collective"
leadership, with a Party Chairman being approximately in the position of his
predecessor (Chou or whoever Mao's immediate successor is) or of Brezhnev in the
Soviet Party today. That is, he will be the pre-eminent (less than dominant) figure, un-
able simply to impose his will, obliged to consult with others, presiding over and
balancing groups which have somewhat differing interests and predilections but
which manage to work together reasonably well. (The unifying factor will be a com-
mon desire for a China as strong as possible.) We rate this prospect as distinctly better
than that of another Mao, although the latter possibility will become increasingly
strong if comparatively moderate and flexible policies fail to achieve the regime's ob-
jectives. And it must be admitted that some observers regard this outcome as the most
likely.
As of early 1974, the leading candidates for the Party Chairmanship in the period
1980-85 seemed to be the three members of the Politburo Standing Committee thought
likely to be still active in 1980-85. These were: Chang Chun-chiao (c. 62), apparently in
training for the post of either Party Secretary General or government Premier in a
Chou-led regime; young Wang Hung-wen (c. 39), being trained across the board
(political, economic arid military affairs, including foreign policy) for high position;
and Li Te-sheng (c. 60), a career military man, who rose in the Cultural Revolution to
become the regime's second-ranking military leader. However, Li may already have
fallen out of contention.
Wang is clearly Mao's present choice as the Party's eventual Chairman?if not after
Mao himself, then after Chou, or after Chang. However, there is no way for Mao to
make his will prevail after his death. Wang might not long survive Mao, and, even if
he does, Chang might well prove to have a stronger organizational base and more
powerful friends.
Neither Chang nor Wang seems to be an inflexible militant. Both have appeared to
be anti-Soviet and have been personally agreeable to Americans. There is a little
evidence, however, that Wang stands further to the left?more attracted to fun-
damentalist aspects of Maoism?than does Chang.
Li Te-sheng has been the dark horse, regarded as having only an outside chance of
becoming Chairman. If Li has fallen, his successor as the rising military
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leader?possibly Chen Hsi-lien, a Politburo member and Commander of the Peking
Military Region?would also be a dark horse. The support of such a military leader
might be crucial to any contender, however, in which case military influence could
be expected to rise again.
Other current Party leaders (most of them now in the Politburo) who are expected to
remain key figures in 1980-85 include: a group of career Party cadres, almost all
brought by Mao himself into high position; a group of career military commanders; a
small group of career security specialists; and a small group of long-time proteges of
Chou's. (Brief biographies of Chang, Wang, Li, Chen, and other key figures are given
in the Annex.)
The ability of such leaders to work together with Chang and/or Wang and with one
another, in the absence of Mao and Chou, is uncertain, but most of them probably
could. There are sure to be disputes on policy?some genuine; some as counters in con-
tests for position?which will leave casualties. But we do not expect such disputes to
be so bitter and divisive that no coherent set of policies can be followed until some one
group establishes an unassailable dominance.
Mao seems to have been justified in his concern?for more than 10 years
now?that his successors or their successors would lose sight of his revolutionary vision,
both at home and abroad. As he remarked in 1964:
The imperialists have said that there is hope [for them] in the third and
fourth generations [of Chinese Communists]. Will this hope of the im-
perialists be realized?
The "hope" cited is the hope that Chinese Communism in time will go soft: that is,
will become non-revolutionary, will turn its back on "hard and bitter struggle,- will
emphasize personal interest and a higher standard of living instead of the collective in-
terest and the future of Communism. This imperialist "hope" is likely to be fulfilled to
,some degree, but we expect Communist China in either 1980-85 or the year 2000 to be
recognizably similar to what it is today.
It will be mainly the third "generation- that will be in power in China in the year
2000. The Chairman of the Party at that time cannot possibly be forecast with con-
fidence (although young Wang might conceivably last that long), but most of the
top-level leaders will probably be career Party cadres. From what we know of such
men, and of the "struggles" in which they have risen, there is no reason to believe that
they will want their political system to be radically different from what it is
today?but they will want China to be, as in 1980-85, stronger in all respects.
If China "evolves- politically under such men, it will probably settle into
something like the Soviet Union today: the "revisionist- society which Mao fears but
which would by no means be a "soft- society. The changes for China?equivalent to
the changes in the USSR after the death of Stalin?will probably be reached as early
as 1980-85: the absence of any individual as dominant (and arbitrary) as Mao, and
the renunciation of mass campaigns as convulsive and destructive (with casualties in
millions) as the 'land reform" and security campaigns of the 1950s and the Cultural
Revolution of the 1960s.
Even after these changes, life in China will remain harsh, and China's future
leaders will have to be hard men to survive. While living standards can rise a little, the
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leaders of the year 2000 will still be urging and coercing the Chinese people to labor
heroically to retain the status of a great power and to achieve the status of a super-
power.
Nevertheless, the Chinese leaders of the year 2000 will probably be people with
whom the West can deal, in the same way, and for the same reasons, that it is able to
deal with the leaders of China today.
FOREIGN POLICY
Assuming that most of the foregoing is a fairly accurate view of China's future,
China's foreign policy will present the United States with proportionately greater
challenges and opportunities than it does today. This will be true even if China is an
unaggressive" power, neither attempting to expand its present territorial holdings nor
waging wars by proxy. China will probably remain a revolutionary Communist adver-
sary of the United States, threatening US interests in many respects, but it will also, we
believe, remain the enemy of the USSR, even if Moscow and Peking achieve a limited
accommodation.
Some Possibilities
Both in the period 1980-85 and in the year 2000, just as now, China's ability to
assert its power will in general be greatest on its immediate periphery, smaller in
areas removed from the mainland. We consider at this point some possibilities which
we do not, in general, expect, but which represent the kinds of actions that will be
within Chinese capabilities.
In Asia, Chinese territorial claims could be troublesome. Hong Kong is a British
colonial possession which, unlike the -new territories" on the mainland, legally is not
to revert to PRC control in 1997. The Chinese may surface a claim, toward the year
2000, to the unleased areas?Victoria Island and Kowloon?and apply political
pressure on London to withdraw from this "vestige of British imperialism." (Macao is
virtually incorporated already.) Elsewhere, the Chinese could use their nuclear
capability as a deterrent and, beginning anytime, could develop a modernized/
mechanized army of up to eight or ten million men for use in various possible forms
of assertion (as well as for internal purposes).
For example, the Chinese could easily seize additional sections of the Indian border,
parts of Nepal, and all of Sikkim and Bhutan?at no significant military risk. The
Chinese seem more likely, however, to try to wean India away from its military
alliance with the USSR.
A credible nuclear deterrent could conceivably encourage the Chinese to resume
aggressive patrolling on the Soviet border, designed to intimidate a less militaristic
Soviet leadership. It is very doubtful, however, that they could impel Soviet
withdrawals from disputed territory in the Pamirs and from the disputed island op-
posite Khabarovsk; the Soviets would resist. In such a case, both sides would probably
hold the fighting down to conventional-force skirmishes. But escalation into nuclear
exchanges has to be regarded as a possibility.
By 2000, the Chinese will probably be able to contemplate with satisfaction the es-
tablishment of additional Communist states in some of the countries of Southeast
Asia. The Chinese could encourage the North Vietnamese, Pathet Lao, and Cambo-
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dian Communists to move decisively against any non-Communist areas remaining in
Indochina in order to seize state power completely. PLA units could be used in support
of such moves, in the improbable event that the Vietnam Communists felt this
necessary.
Without using their huge army, the Chinese could activate other Asian Communist
movements. There will probably be no major force in the area to deter the Chinese
from persuading?perhaps in some cases, issuing directives to?the Burmese, Thai,
Malaysian, Philippine, and Indonesian Maoist Communists to replace the go-slow
strategy with one of rapid expansion. Such a policy would be designed to cause the
ethnic minority and peasant forces to burgeon into large conventional armies, based in
key rural areas.
For urban support, the Chinese could activate agents in the overseas Chinese
communities in major cities of the target countries. In addition, Chinese advisers
could infiltrate borders, and clandestinely land in island countries, to help guide
and organize local Communist forces.
The North Koreans, continuing the militaristic policy of Kim Il-sung, could be en-
couraged to go further; i.e., to open a war of attrition against the South. This would
mean military probing all along the demilitarized zone on land, and against the
South's northernmost islands on sea. The North Koreans might conceivably send com-
mando teams by sea to begin guerrilla warfare inland (as they did on a small scale in
1966-68, when they dismally failed).
Elsewhere in the world, the Chinese will have the capacity to make considerable
trouble: supporting "true" revolutionaries, opposing "feudal" regimes. The specifics
will of course change from those of the present. It is entirely possible that some of the
governments which are today revolutionary will be conservative and "anti-Chinese"
by the 1990s. But the geographic range of Chinese troublemaking will extend to the
Middle East and to Latin America and will be enlarged in Africa.
The Probabilities
Peking's foreign policy for the remainder of this century will probably continue to
be motivated by hatred and fear of the USSR; by the forces of great-Han nationalism
and Maoist Communism (both of which sustain Chinese feelings of superiority to
other peoples); and by a desire to be the "leader" of a "Third World" against the
superpowers.
The first of these factors has been the most important single factor in Chinese
foreign policy since 1969, at the latest, when the USSR officially became the main
enemy. The conflict all along has been across the board?from fundamental
ideological positions to armed clashes on the border?and in recent years (since the in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968) has posed a question to Chinese national security;
i.e., whether the Soviets would use their overwhelming military superiority to under-
take either a large-scale invasion or a disarming nuclear strike.
Through the period 1980-85, China's main effort will be concentrated on avoiding
a war with the USSR, and, if possible, reducing the Soviet military presence on
China's northern border. Now well aware of Soviet superiority on the border, the
Chinese will behave more prudently than in 1969, when they ran aggressive patrols
against Soviet border forces. In the border talks, a post-Mao leadership may modify
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Disputed Sino-Soviet Border Area
M Areas of so-called "unequal treaties," which were
ceded by China to Tsarist Russia and are now accepted
by Peking as Soviet territory, with the exceptions of the
Pamir tract in the west and Hei-hsia-tzu island at the
Amur-Ussuri river junction in the east.
U. S. S. R.
Baikal
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20 SECRET
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Balance of Forces on the Sino-Soviet Border, Early 1974
Shen-yang
Military Region
420,000 Men
1,000 tactical and
air defense aircraf 111
Sinkiang
Military Region
100,000 men
100 air defense aircraft
?two
Why
Lan-chou
Military Region
240,000 men
210 tactical and air defense aircraft
Peking
Military Region
530,000 men _Piaci
530 tactical and*
air defense aircraft
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*There are another 7.500 men in the airberne division in the
Turkestan Military District that could be used along the border.
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the present unacceptable demand for a pullback of Soviet forces from disputed areas
before serious substantive discussions begin. If so, the Soviets may make concessions
which will induce the Chinese to conclude a final agreement on the border rather than
to continue a dangerous course of stalemate.
The chances of either a Soviet invasion or a Soviet nuclear strike in the near term
(through 1985) are believed to be small. Neither is estimated to be more than one in
five, although some observers rate the second much higher.
At least through the period 1980-85, the USSR being the main enemy, the Chinese
will probably try to avoid direct military confrontations with the US, and are likely,
indeed, to support some US political positions which cut against Soviet policies. These
will be -necessary compromises"?the sort explicitly sanctioned by Lenin?with an
essentially unchanged antagonist.
The current Chinese official line is that the US both contends with the USSR and
colludes with it to `` devour- China, although the focus of Soviet-American rivalry is in
Europe. The most serious threat to China itself is -especially" from the USSR in thc
form of a -surprise attack." While the line may change, it will in fact remain of the ut-
most importance to the Chinese to prevent any Soviet-American detente from freeing
the USSR for military action against China.
Thus the Chinese are most likely to be adaptable and helpful in opposing the Soviet
military presence in Eastern Europe and in supporting the American presence ir
Western Europe, in opposing any extension of the Soviet naval presence on the seas
and acquisition of base rights abroad, in opposing the conclusion of Sovie
military-aid pacts with foreign goveinments, and in opposing the formation of
regional organizations (e.g., Soviet-Indian) designed to exclude American influence.
The Chinese will probably be willing to refrain from military action against Taiwan
for a time (although not necessarily against offshore islands on which Nationalist
troops are garrisoned) after the US completes its withdrawal. Before any assault
against Taiwan, they will also have to feel confident that the US treaty wit-
Nationalist China is, in fact, dead.
In any case, Peking undoubtedly will continue its long-term effort to subve t
Nationalist officials, stepping up this effort in the event of a succession crisis on the
death of Premier Chiang Ching-kuo. Peking will strongly oppose any Soviet effort to
arrange political ties and military-aid pacts with future Nationalist leaders on Taiwan.
Moreover, Peking has been visibly annoyed by the passage of Soviet warships through
the Taiwan Strait, and there may be Sino-Soviet naval incidents.
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At least through the period 1980-85, other major powers will be shown favor by the
Chinese in order to increase the weight of the international power balance on the
anti-Soviet side. West Germany, Great Britain, France, and Japan will be the principal
ones. (China will have the greatest leverage with Japan.) In the course of doing th s,
China almost certainly will profit from their advanced technology.
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As for the factor of great-Han nationalism, in the long tradition of imperial
dominance, this is likely to perpetuate China's territorial claims through 1980-85
and beyond. These claims probably will include the offshore and small deep-
water islands (such as the Senkakus and Spratlys) as well as Taiwan. Moreover,
claims to the continental shelf undoubtedly will be sustained.
In China's two border disputes, the Chinese may eventually drop their demands
that the Soviets withdraw from the Pamirs (in the west) if concessions are made on
river islands (in the east), but they probably will not back down on their demand that
the Indians accept China's control of the Aksai Chin.
Great-Han nationalism is likely also to sustain China's effort to exert dominant
power and influence over the smaller countries on its southern border.
The factor of Maoist Communism, setting forth its unique model of seizing national
power through rural armed insurrection, probably will sustain China's revolutionary
foreign policy toward some undeveloped countries, again through 1980-85 and
beyond. This revolutionary component will combine with great-Han nationalism to
produce a Chinese policy more complex than a pragmatic mixture of power-balance
and realpolitik.
In some cases, the emphasis will be on diplomacy. For example, in South Asia,
where the Soviets have made inroads with India, Peking will probably work for an im-
provement of diplomatic relations and forego support of insurgency. Improvement of
relations with India might well include a final settlement of the border dispute,
provided that Indian leaders accept the Chinese takeover of the Aksai Chin area.
But the main line of policy toward most countries of Southeast Asia will probably be
a combination of conventional diplomatic action and subversive support of insur-
gency. Such support will be either material (Burma and Thailand) or inspirational
(Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia), requiring Communists in these countries
to be loyal to the Chinese Party, The Chinese will probably also assist certain indepen-
dent parties (the Vietnamese, Pathet Lao, and Cambodian Communists) to expand
the territory they now hold?but gradually, without provoking a return of US air
power. The short-range goal (through 1980-85) will be to encourage the development
of a chain of benevolently neutral neighbors which pose no threat to Peking and
provide no bases to the US or USSR. The ultimate goal, in line with the Maoist
world-view, will be to convert countries in the region into a system of independent,
cooperative Communist states oriented toward Peking.
Because China will not be a superpower in the class of the US or USSR in the period
1985-2000, it will have to try to continue to use American influence to deter the USSR
from attacking China and to offset Soviet efforts to encircle or contain China. (The
Soviet aim is simpler: to induce the US to remain neutral in any Sino-Soviet conflict.)
The Chinese will also try to mobilize the political influence of "Third World" coun-
tries?mainly against the USSR?by acting as their leader.- This will be difficult,
however. First, many less developed countries reject Peking's self-image of a pov-
erty-stricken, less developed country; on the contrary, they see the PRC as a major
power trying to use them entirely for purposes of national self-interest. Second, the
Third World- as a unified entity does not exist, inasmuch as each country has its own
interests and goals, often divergent from Peking's; e.g., on disarmament and anti-
Sovietism,
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Disputed Areas Along the China-India Border
International boundany
International bounds y,
indefinite or in disptte
?.x?.x?
Boundary shown on Chinese
Communist maps
Disputed area
?
100
290 30C Miles
4
0
100
200 300 Kilometers
?
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Mao and Chou both fear the emergence of Chinese leaders, following themselves,
who would turn back to the USSR. The Soviets are known to be waiting for this: a
border settlement, then a normalization of relations, Sino-Soviet collaboration with
have-not- countries, other limited cooperation, removal of the Soviet military threat,
and perhaps even resumption of Soviet economic and military aid. A limited accom-
modation with the USSR is a fair possibility even by 1980-85, but a return irk this cen-
tury to the genuine Sino-Soviet alliance of 1949-53 seems very improbable.
Whether or not the Chinese arrive at some accommodation with the USSR by or in
the period 1985-2000, the Chinese leaders cannot be expected to become
pro-American. Indeed, they will probably become more assertive, causing problems
for the US around the world. The degree of increased assertion against American in-
terests will probably depend not only on China's evaluation of its own strength but in
large measure on Peking's assessment of the overall value of the Sino-American
relationship in countering the USSR. Should the Chinese come to decide, for whatever
combination of reasons (e.g., accommodation with the USSR, self-confidence, in-
dicators of US disinclination to use its influence or run any risks for China) that the US
is no longer of great value in deterring the USSR, the Chinese will be that much
more willing to forfeit American good-will.
Even a well-behaved, prosperous, unmilitaristic China would be a problem, as it
would use diplomatic and economic means to keep some Third World" countries in
anti-Western (anti-American) positions and to try to move others into that category.
However, as previously noted, "Third World- countries will probably continue to
have a great diversity of special national interests and will not readily accept Chinese
"leadership."
As we see it, the Chinese turn to the US has been envisaged as a long-term strategic
plan, not simply a tactical manuever to speed Peking's acquisition of Taiwan.
However, Peking means to get Taiwan, either by negotiations or by military force.
This issue is likely to be among the most painful ones, for both Peking and
Washington, and it may well come to a head in the period 1985-2000, if not before. If
efforts to annex Taiwan by negotiations or subversion have failed, and if Peking is
confident that the US-Nationalist China treaty has become inoperative, Peking will
probably use its overwhelming military superiority against the island. Peking's deci-
sion as to how long to wait will probably depend on its calculation of the potential
cost, in terms of its overall interests and strategy, of a military operation against
Taiwan.
The direction taken by Japan will be highly important to China. With its tremen-
dous potential as a highly advanced nation, japan could rearm and take an
anti-Chinese or even Soviet-aligned position, greatly alarming the Chinese. The
possibility of an American-Japanese military alliance, with each partner possessing a
large nuclear force, would be equally alarming, and, if the Chinese were unable to
head it off, could impel the Chinese to reverse their anti-Soviet policy, turning back to
accommodation and even alliance. However, the more likely prospect seems that of a
"soft" Japan, seeking, for economic and security reasons, good relations with the
USSR and better ones with China. (Some observers disagree strongly with this projec-
tion, believing that Japan for various reasons will choose to "go nuclear" before the
year 2000, possibly even by 1980-85, and that this will have profound consequences
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for Sino-Japanese and Sino-Soviet relations; but we have reviewed the evidence for a
"soft- Japan and continue to find it persuasive, )10
Even in the year 2000, despite a probable history of Sino-American cooperation in
some respects, for China the US will remain an enemy?a secondary enemy, or a ter-
tiary enemy if Japan rearms. The Chinese will still want to use the US against the
primary enemy or enemies, and to acquire from the US certain skills and materials to
build Chinese strength. But, of course, so long as China remains Communist and the
US does not become so, by definition there can be no genuine friendship (of, say, the
Anglo-American sort). The Chinese can be expected to continue to work actively
against US interests in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
The question remains of whether Chinese successes of various kinds (some of them
at Soviet expense) will impel the Soviets not to settle for a limited accommodation
with China (as of the year 2000 or thereabouts) but to use their still overwhelming
military superiority to seek a "final solution" of the Chinese problem. As we see it
now, either a land invasion of China or a nuclear strike against China is already dis-
couraged by the Soviet recognition that such action would mean a prolonged war with
China and a condition of permanent Chinese hostility; and we think that such an at-
tack will be increasingly discouraged by the growth of the Chinese missile force, es-
pecially the submarine-launched system. Thus the situation seems likely to settle into
one of live-and-let-live, with varying levels of tension. It would, of course, be reckless
to offer an answer to this highly important question with confidence; this question is
one of those which will require continual monitoring, on into the 21st century.
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China Military Regions
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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