WILL BREZHNEV SURVIVE?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-32-4-2-9
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
i
FROM: William Hyland
SUBJECT: Will Brezhnev Survive?
Three independent assessments from CIA, State/INR and the American
Embassy in MoscoWall agree that Brezhnev seems to be in no political
dan er (Tabs A, B, C). Each assessment is couched guarded language
as usual, but the consensus seems to be:
--Brezhnev has far greater resources at his command than his
critics and has shored up his position in recent months.
--He has been unusually active in preempting more and more of
Kosygin's governmental functions.
--The public deference to his leadership is growing. He was
awarded Party Card No. 2 during the current exchange of party cards.
He receives more and more personal credit (this can be double-edged
of course).
--He seems to be careful to check with his colleagues, and not
challenge the principal of collective leadership.
Now for some of the reservations:
--All' seem to agree that the Soviet economy, and particularly the
next harvest will "complete-I! Brezhnev's position if he does not show
an "average" year.
--He will definitely have to buy grain from the US, even if there is
a good spring sowing.
--This will increase his dependence on the capitalists and may
strengthen some of his critics.
--In any case, the poor state of the economy has precipitated a
debate about future policy; Brezhnev will be in a position of defending a
program that is falling apart.
V ~.
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Nevertheless the Embassy concludes: "There is no serious danger that
his power base will be eroded in the coming months unless he is struck
by an unlikely constellation of foreign and domestic cases." (They do
not speculate on what such a constellation. might be.)
We have noted only one non-governmental source that disagrees with this
estimate, Robert Conqeust interprets events as a leadership crisis.
"The appointment of Dimitry Polyansky as Minister of Agriculture
comes at a time when the political struggle has reached an intensity
not seen since the defeat of the Shelepin faction in the wake of the
Six Day War in 1967. " (Tab C)
This judgment reflects Conge'u,st's feeling that the leadership is aging,
that they pursue too many compromise policies, that personnel changes
reflect increasing fact` -lism -- all aggravated by an economic crisis.
He has a low opinion of all the Soviet leaders, which biases his judgment,
but he is, an extremely shrewd student of Soviet politics..
Now for some speculation.
1. One could interpret Soviet politics as the very early stages of a
succession crisis.
--This is a leadership that is approaching the end of its political life.
Clearly, the five most powerful and influential are Brezhnev, Kosygin,
Podgorny, Suslov and Kirilenko. Podgorny and Suslov are over 70; Kosygin
is 69, Brezhnev and Kirilenko are 67. None are,likely successors to
Brezhnev. If we arbitrarily limit Brezhnev to age 70 he will be gone before-
the. next Party Congress in 1976.
--In the present politiburo of 15 members (with 12 based in Moscow)
there are four who have been downgraded under Brezhnev (Shelepin,
Shelest, Voronov, and now Polyansky). They are a disparate group, and
probably have little in common. But they could be the nucleus of an
anti-Brezhnev coalition.
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--Brezhnev has in effect jumped a generation, promoting several
men in their forties to key positions: Katushev, the secretary with
some foreign affairs responsibilities, and Dolgikh, the secretary.
in charge of industrial affairs rose rapidly. Kulakov, who is in his
fifties was elevated to full politburo membership without even serving
an apprenticeship as a candidate member.
--This rend is more evident in the second echelon of party secretaries
in the republics. It puts enormous pressure on the politburo members to
secure their own position a gainst the new generation. But the age of the
top command means that some key replacements have to be made in the
next year or two.
2. Brezhnev's economic program is a shambles.
--Since 1965 he has had a personal responsibility and stake in agriculture.
His main policy has been to pour in money for mechanization, fertilizers,
etc. But one bad harvest has had enormous repercussions.
--The Soviets may have to buy 40 million tons of grain in the next
three years. They will use hard currencies or credits, the overall hard
currency deficit is forcing them to sell gold -- a policy for which
Khrushchev was attacked. And the Soviets have borrowed so much that
a high percentage of their exports are mortgaged for years to come.
--Wages are virtually frozen despite promises of steady increases of
4-5 percent.
--Potatoes and butter are being rationed. Meat is abundant because
the farmers are slaughtering cattle'for lack of fodder which means a meat
shortage next year. Economic growth has slowed to about 1. 5 percent.
--Key goals of the five year plan will not be met: chemicals, oil, gas
and light industries.
--Brezhnev's promise that consumer goods would grow more rapidly
than heavey industry, the traditional favorite, has been repudiated in this
year's plan. (This is a key political decision given the long history of
struggle over the. priarnacy of heavy industry. )
In sum, Brezhnev has consolidated his power on a program of prosperity
at home and peace abroad announced in March 1971. On the first count he is
very vulnerable.
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It is more difficult to know what the effect of foreign policy is on the
leadership. Many top leaders do not have any responsibilities for
foreign affairs, and probably simply support Brezhnev. Others,
particularly Kosygin, Podgorny and Suslov, share with Brezhnev the
power and therefore the responsibility for past policies. Thus they may
not be eager at their age to start a foreign policy struggle.
Brezhnev is in a position to claim that his peace program has been
successful, but it rests on the German treaty and the May summit. On
both counts he was opposed in some degree by Sehelest, who was decisively
defeated, at a time (the Vietnam blockade) when he could have made a
strong case.
It may follow that no coalition is likely to find as favorable circumstances
in which to attack Brezhnev. On the other hand, the imminence of the
summit may have helped Brezhnev to isolate his opponents.
The major unknown is China. One has the impression that Brezhnev is
taking a tougher line in public. This has not been his record and perhaps
he is being pressed within the leadership. In any case, he is vulnerable
because he cannot demonstrate how his peace program has strengthened
Moscow's hand against Peking.
Indeed, one could claim that Soviet prospects in a five power balance
are poor:
-- their relations with Japan are complicated by the territorial
question, which cannot be conceded without undermining their position on
the Sino-Soviet border controversy. Yet, they need Japanese investment
and technology.
-- Consolidating their gains in Europe looks better, but there is not
going to be any spectacular advance unless Bonn can be split from the EC-
or US.
- - Brezhnev is guilty of mortgaging too much of his freedom of action
to the US. Not only does he need US grain and technology, but he cannot
move in Europe without the US, and the US is scoring heavily in China.
The impression is growing that if the USSR does not attack China, it.will
be because of fear of the consequences with the US -- a very weak image
for a Soviet leader that governs a population of 50 percent non-Russians
and is trying to discipline an increasingly diverse set of Allies in Eastern
Europe.
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one suspects, therefore, that the Soviet leadership situation is more
fluid than, say, at the Party Congress in 1971. Brezhnev has probably
passed the zenith of his personal power, if only because he is. near the
end of his career. Maneuvering for the succession will intensify, which
means factionalism. Inevitabl this or that foreign policy will become
a debating point in factionalA rezhnev probably has no way to turn but.
to reinforce his domestic policies and his foreign policies. He becomes
more dependent on us, but at the same time more vulnerable because of it.
Questions such as MFN therefore will take on an importance all out of
proportion to their value. So will projects such as natural gas. The
summit whenever it occurs, will be pivotal for Brezhnev prospects. And
perhaps more important, to the degree that Brezhnev tilts toward the US
and defers dealing with China, in that degree his opposition must adopt a
conservative platform -- which could mean that the successors will be
obliged to repudiate Brezhnevism, much as he repudiated Khruschevisrn
after serving him loyally for 15 years.
This does not mean that we should "save" Brezhnev, but it does mean
that we are in a more complicated period than we may realize. We have
far greater leverage than he does, assuming the Vietnam ceasefire holds
up. The real question is how to use.that leverage to ensure that Brezhnev
and his successors have no real options but to "coexist" with us and with
China e
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V
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
27 February 1973
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Implications of the Present Soviet Economic Problems
Summary
Faced with slower economic growth and a com-
mitment to meet rising consumer expectations and
having experimented unsuccessfully with economic
reform, Moscow has turned to the West to help re-
lieve its economic problems. Soviet dependence
on Western food and technology has grown substan-
tially.
The bad Soviet harvest of 1972 brought to a
head a growing dependence on the West that the
above-average harvests of 1970 and 1971 had dis-
guised. Srezhnev's program for increasing meat
production and bettering the national diet has
created a demand for grains that cannot be met
from domestic production even in a year of good
weather. In order to fulfill their long-run goals
for meat, the Soviets will have-to import a min-
imum of 40 million tons of grains over the next
three fiscal years in addition to the 29 million
tons already contracted for in 1972.
At the same time, the USSR is embarked on a
program of importing large quantities of advanced
equipment and technology from the West. The So-
. yiets badly need the boost such imports can-give
to their productivity, which has been holding down
their economic growth to a disappointing rate.
.They particularly need Western technology to help
.develop Siberia's oil and gas resources, now that
Note; This memorandum was produced jointly by the
Office. of Economic Research and the Office of Current
Intelligence.
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older fields are rapidly becoming exhausted, and
to increase and improve production in consumer
industries, which are generally in bad shape. They
will probably need considerable help making the new
facilities work. To pay for these imports the USSR
is looking for credits and joint ventures which will
produce exportable goods such as oil, gas, and
timber.
There is no evidence that defense plans were
affected by 1972's dislocations in the civilian
sector or that they will be affected by.similar
dislocations in the future. The production capacity
of the USSR is now so large that even a moderate
growth of GNP can support reasonable increases in
military spending without undue strain.
The USSR can manage its probable trade deficit
of $1.8 billion for 1973 with a combination of credit
and gold sales. Any additional purchases of grain
in 1973, which will be necessary if the harvest is
poor, will create pressures to cut other imports,
particularly consumer goods and perhaps Western
equipment.
Growing economic dependence is uncongenial to
traditional Soviet doctrine. The whole detente
policy has been a controversial one, and there are
some people, like Shelest, who have opposed it and
suffered politically.
Other options, however, are also uncongenial:
(1) The Soviets could try to achieve
greater efficiency and growth through
reforms, especially in agriculture--
but piecemeal reforms undertaken
after 1963 did not work and drastic
reforms-have been politically unac-
ceptable.
(2) They could accept a lower growth
rate for GNP and consumption--but
this would mean slower growth than
in most industrial countries, which
would lead to a disgruntled populace
at home and a damaged image abroad.
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In thee circumstances, the shot un course
the present leaders probably will take is to make
adjustments where pressed---perhaps. some cuts in
consumer programs or some agricultural reforms-
but to try to maintain the broad outlines of cur-
rent policies.
Soviet dependence on the West does not equate
with Soviet dependence on the US. The most critical
need from the US over the next year is likely to be
grain. if the Soviets were willing to pay higher
prices and tap the markets of smaller exporting
countries, the US share of grain purchases could
be considerably reduced. If pressed for-conces-
sions in other areas in return for US grain, they
would be more likely to cultivate other suppliers
especially over the long run. In the field of
technology the reliance on the West is important
and growing, but the dependence on US equipment is
relatively small as the USSR's requirements can be
met for the most part by Western Europe and Japan.
The USSR does need to expand its hard currency
exports to pay for grain and equipment imports, and
the US is a promising large new market for Soviet
products. If certain large joint US-Soviet projects
are not undertaken, this would mean slower growth
of export earnings and hence the capacity to import
Western technology.
The Soviet leadership has already shown itself
ready to increase its economic relations with, and
to some extent its dependence on, the US in all
these areas. This policy is not without its critics.
There is a fear in Moscow that the US, more than
other Western trading partners, is prone to link
economic dealings with political questions. The
Jackson amendment directed at the USSR's Jewish
emigration policy is a current case in point. Those
still wary of US intentions can argue that it is
only good business to develop multiple suppliers,
and that the USSR can get most of what it wants
elsewhere in the world without the political risks.
of concentrating upon the US.
Supporters of the present policy can also em-
ploy extra-economic arguments. They can maintain
that growing economic relations with the US are part
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and parcel of a detente approach which has already
brought the USSR substantial benefits in such areas
as Europe and arms control. They can argue that
any resulting dependence will be mutual, with US
industrialists and farmers coming to rely on the
Soviet market and to lobby on its behalf. They
can also point out that it is useful and important
to develop these relations as a counter to growing
ties between the US and China.
The present leaders will probably consider
that the present pace of developing relations does
not expose the USSR to undue political risks. A
different situation would arise, however, if this
year's harvest were another disaster.. Should a
20-million ton requirement for grain imports arise,
perhaps two thirds of this would have to come from
the US. In an emergency of this sort (which the
Soviets would try to minimize for tactical reasons),
Brezhnev would realize that he was the.supplicant
and that the US might be looking for something in
return. At various points across the range of bi-
lateral relations, he might be willing to meet the
US a little more than halfway if Washington in its
turn made concessions which would save his face.
At the same time, the USSR would move to avoid
future vulnerabilities of this sort by arranging
larger future imports from such other,suppliers as
Canada, Australia, and Argentina. Thus the US ad-
vantage would be short run in, nature.
As a worst case, a disastrous harvest could
put Brezhnev in deep political trouble. Much,would
depend, of course, on how his other policies were
faring. One cannot predict how such a harvest
would affect Soviet policy toward the US; it might
push it forward or lead to a retreat, according to
the exigencies of Kremlin politics. If Brezhnev
were to fall, we are inclined to think that, after
a temporary retreat, his policies would largely
survive him. A total withdrawal into a fortress
Russia does not seem to be a viable alternative
for the Soviets.. But if the US had sought to press
its advantage in the grain trade, the search for
other Western alternatives to US supplies would
become even more intense.
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"Introduction
in 1972 Soviet leaders were increasingly pre-
occupied with economic matters. By the end of the
year, the goals of the Ninth Five-Year Plan were in
jeopardy as problems in industry and agriculture
forced a number of adjustments in economic policy.
From mid-1972 on, the news of a failing harvest was
the major concern, and the impending downturn in
grain production was responsible for the. decision
to import unprecedented quantities of Western grain.
The drought and its aftermath, however, obscured
some of the chronic economic difficulties which
have curbed Soviet economic growth since the 1950s.
The Soviet Union's central economic problem
is that it has passed out of the phase of its history
in which it can rely on "extensive" growth--growth
based upon larger and larger increments of labor and
fixed capital. Since the 1950s the.returns to new
investment have been declining steadily. Other
countries have grown at high rates without increasing
capital stock very rapidly; their growth has been
supported by substantial productivity gains. These
productivity gains--based mainly on technological
progress but also on innovations in organization--
have been much less influential in Soviet growth
during the past 15 years or so. Since the present
Soviet leaders assumed power, they have been trying,
but with indifferent success, to spur the growth
in productivity by internal reforms and foreign
contacts.
A second, continuing economic problem for the
Soviet leaders is the need to improve the lot of
the Soviet population. In so doing, they have had
to alter the traditional pattern of Soviet economic
growth in favor of sectors which are less efficient
and more costly to develop. Brezhnev's commitment
to expand meat production is the most striking ex-
ample of the effect of some consumer-oriented pro-
grams on economic growth. The demand for meat
(and other high quality foods) has been rising at
a very high rate as the incomes of the Soviet pop-
ulation have grown. While the growing demand for
meat is a world-wide phenomenon, the cost of pro-
ducing meat is far greater in the USSR than almost
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.0
anywhere. else. For example, the USSR needs about
twice as much grain as the US to produce a given
amount of meat, and, at existing retail prices,
meat production is heavily subsidized. moreover,
it takes far more grain to feed a population with
,meat instead of bread, and the USSR has always had
difficulty in growing enough grain even for a
bread-based diet.
Thus, the USSR must deal with two separate
economic problems in the coming year. First, it
must overcome the shortages resulting from the
bad harvest of 1972--this is the problem which has
absorbed much of the leadership's attention since
last summer. Second, in the longer term it must
make capital and labor more productive in both in-
dustry and agriculture. If the USSR cannot ac-
celerate the pace of productivity growth, it will
be unable to prevent a continuing slowdown in eco-
nomic growth.
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Selected Indicators of Soviet.l"conomic Performance
Actual average annual increase 1966-1970
Actual average annual increase
Planned average annual increase
Percent
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 a 9
.Gross National Product
1971-75 Plan ? 3
Agricultural Production
1971-75 Plan
Industrial Production
1971-75 Plan
Total Investment
1971-75 Plan
CONFIDENTIAL 554163 2-13 CIA
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1972--A Disappointing Year
In 1972, a poor harvest and an accumulation of
chronic economic problems reduced the rate of growth
of Soviet GNP to 1.5 percent--the lowest rate of in-
crease since 1963.. This compares with an average
annual increase of about 5.5% in 1966-70 and 3.5% in
1971 and must be particularly galling to a leadership
whose main shibboleth is economic growth. Almost
all sectors shared in the decline, but the drop in
farm production and a slower growth in industrial
production were most at fault (Figure 1). The slow-
down leaves attainment of the goal of overtaking
the United States as distant as it was a decade ago
when Khrushchev announced it as imminent.
Agriculture--The Leadirig'Trouble Spot
An abrupt decline in farm output was largely
responsible for the slump in over-all economic
growth in 1972. Net agricultural production dropped
almost 7% below the 1971 level, and grain output
fell by about 10%. Although Soviet leaders have
blamed most of their problems on the weather, it
should be noted that 1972 was a poor agricultural
year chiefly in comparison with the peak year 1970,
a year well-favored by climatic conditions. Even
though the percentage decline in crop production
was one of the largest in 20 years, the total value
of farm output and even grain production were still
greater than in all but one of the years of the
1960s. Grain production was only 10 million tons
or 7% below the level that would have been predicted
on the basis of long-term trends and normal weather.
The drop in agricultural production in 1972
resulted from an unusual streak of poor weather
throughout the growing and harvesting season. First,
a lack of snow cover combined with. extreme cold in _
late January and February killed almost one third
of the area sown to winter grains. These grains
usually provide almost one third of total Soviet
grain output. The USSR planted a larger :than nor-
mal area to spring grains to make up for the winter-
kill, but the "worst drought in 100 years" curbed
their germination and growth in European Russia.
Record crops in the "Virgin Lands" of Kazakhstan
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and Siberia prevented a complete disaster, but the
harvest was late. As a consequence, a good deal
of the grain was gathered in rain and snow, reducing
its quality.
The grain and potato crops, both of which were
down, are the core of the Soviet diet and are also
essential to the production of meat, milk, and eggs.
But the drought also damaged sugar beets and sun-
flower seeds, the country's primary source of vege-
table oil. In fact, the output of all important
crops except cotton fell below the levels achieved
in 1966-70. The output of livestock products failed
to match the vigorous growth achieved in 1971, largely
because of tight feed supplies. There was little
slaughtering of livestock, however, such as occurred
on a massive scale of ter:the poor harvest of 1963
because of feed shortages. By the end of 1972 the
number of cattle exceeded the previous year's level,
while the decline in hogs, sheep., and goats was held
to reasonable proportions.
What made the drop in grain production so criti-
cal was that it came at the same time that the demand
for grain as livestock feed was increasing rapidly.
Use of grain for food has hardly changed for over a
decade, but the use of grain as livestock feed in-
creased by roughly 40% between 1968 and 1971 as a
result of Brezhnev's 1965 program to provide more
meat and other quality foods. By 1969-70, produc-
tion of grain was not keeping up with demand because
of the requirements of the Brezhnev program. Since
imports were low in these years, there were deep
inroads into the government's reserve grain stocks.
In 1969-70, about nine million tons of wheat were
released from these stocks for livestock feed, prob-
ably reducing them to a dangerously low level.
Thus, the fall ingrain output in 1972 left.
the regime only two choices--to cut deeply into
Brezhnev's meat program or to import large amounts
of grain from the West. The decision to do the
latter clearly shows the high priority the present
Soviet leadership gives to improving consumer wel-
fare. The USSR spent roughly $700 million in hard
currency to purchase large quantities of grain,
sugar, and meat in 1971 and early 1972. Even before
the full extent of the damage: to last year's grain
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crop became apparent, the USSR bought $250 million
worth of wheat from Canada and promised to buy at
least $750 million of US grain over a three-year
period (and at least $200 million in the first year).
All told, their purchases. of grain for delivery
by mid-1973 reached about 29 million tons, worth
about $2 billion in hard currency. This amount is
equivalent to roughly two thirds of total Soviet
imports from the Developed West in 1971..
'Industry and Construction Lag Too
While feeling the repercussions of the harvest,
the industrial sector was having problems of its own
last year. Continuing a slump begun in 1971, in-
dustrial output grew by no more than 4.5% in 1972--
the smallest annual increase since World War II.
Although a number of industries slowed, the largest
slowdown. was in the production of machinery and,
consumer goods. The oil industry. did not meet its
production goal for the first time since the early
1950s, largely because of an unexpectedly rapid
depletion of older fields. The gas industry's
production increase last year was the smallest since
1959, and some pipeline construction tasks were not
completed on schedule.
The USSR's agricultural situation hurt industry
by reducing the flow of some raw materials and by
diverting resources away from industry. Industry
in 1972 was already on short rations with respect
to sugar beets, sunflower seeds, milk, and wool as
a consequence of the stagnation or decline of 1971
production. In addition, the above-normal manpower
and transportation requirements of the 1972 planting
and harvest periods probably held down industrial
activity. More industrial workers than usual were
detailed to support the farm work, and industrial
supply must have been interrupted by the roundup of
trucks for agricultural work and especially by the
heavy load that the grain harvest in the east and
the grain imports put on port facilities and the
rail system.
Industrial growth was also held back by the
failure to increase productivity and to introduce
new plant and equipment on schedule in key sectors.
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? W
The plans for 1971-72 explicitly called for an ac-
celeration in productivity growth through the in-
troduction of new technology rather than by raising
the rate of investment. These plans were not real-
ized; gains in the productivity of labor and capital
in both 1971 and 1972 amounted to about 0.5% per
year, considerably less than those required to keep
industrial production in line with the five-year
plan goals. The productivity plans were frustrated
for the usual organizational and political reasons:
inefficient management practices, a. cumbersome
planning system, and the overriding priority given
to increasing the quantity of production as quickly
as possible to the detriment of efficiency and
quality. Introduction of new technology---the key
to increased productivity-has been slow.
The construction lag in 1971-72 was not the
result of a failure to provide enough investment;
almost one third of the nation's gross national
product goes,toward tfiis end. The problem lies
rather in a failure to complete investment projects
on time. New projects readied for use in 1972
fell 5.7 billion rubles short of the planned 93.1
billion rubles, adding another 6% to the backlog
of unfinished construction (10.3% had been added
the previous year). As a result, the growth in
new plant and equipment dropped to about 6% in
1972 compared with an annual average increase of
8% in 1966-71.
In recent months both Premier Kosygin and.
State Planning Chief Baybakov have publicly de-
nounced this investment logjam. In his annual
speech to the Supreme Soviet last December, Bay-
bakov complained of the "lag in the commissioning
of production capacities, especially in ferrous
metallurgy, chemicals, oil, gas, and light in-
dustries..." Earlier, in a speech to-the State
Planning apparatus, Kosygin called for ahalt to
"unwarranted capital investment" and charged that-
too many new projects were begun without fully
using existing facilities. Although construction
lags seem endemic in a "planned" economy, the tend-
ency to start too many projects may have been worsened
by the economic reform of 1965 which allowed more
investment decisions at the local level at the ex-
pense of central control. Decentralized investment
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grew at an average annual rate of almost 13% in
1966-70, diverting resources away from centrally
planned projects and causing "unbalanced capital
development." In an effort-to regain greater cen-
tral control, the growth in decentralized invest-
ment was cut to 8.2 n in 1971 and 2.2% in 19 7 2 .
Nevertheless, the response in terms of project com-
pletions has been unsatisfactory. The construction
sector was not entirely to blame, however. Project
completions in some industries---especially in the
light, food, and ferrous metals industries--were-
delayed by the failure of industry to provide the
necessary equipment on time.
The?Consumer Suffers
Last year must have been disappointing to the
Soviet consumer who has been consistently told since
1971 that his welfare is now the prime concern of
the state. It was small comfort that the leadership
took unusual measures to insulate him from the poor
harvest or that the traditionally favored growth-
oriented sectors also suffered. He was only aware
that his rising expectations had not been met.
In 1972 per capita consumption rose by 3% com-
pared with about 5% per year in the preceding six
years. The poor harvest held back food consumption,
but no one went hungry. There were sporadicrfm d
shortages, but the massive grain per
the West and imports of potatoes and some vege-
tables from Poland and East Germany eased the situa-
tion. The government also maneuvered to extract as
much farm produce as possible from the private sec-
tor. At the same time, the Soviet press launched a
nationwide campaign to save bread, and food sales
were rationed selectively. It also became apparent
that the welfare package introduced at the 24th
Party Congress in 1971 was not being implemented.
on schedule. Plans to raise minimum wages and to
cut income taxes have been delayed, and some of the
more "expensive" features of the package may have
even been shelved.
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ECONOMIC IMPACT
Internal Economic Policy in 1973
As the Soviet planners watched the. discouraging
events of 1972 unfold, they had to decide on the ad-
justments to make in 1973. The Ninth Five Year
Plan had placed unusual emphasis on bettering the
lot of the consumer--that is, consumption and con-
sumer-related sectors such as agriculture seemed
to be on a more equal footing with heavy industry
and investment. Over-all growth was to be main-
tained by rapid assimilation of new technology and
the consequent productivity gains rather than by
accelerating growth of capital stock.
The plan for 1973, announced last December,
revealed that the leadership had decided to retain
the original five-year plan targets and basic pri-
orities while making major revisions in the 1973
goals. The revisions were intended to rectify past
errors and get the economy back on track, although
this would mean a temporary distortion in sectoral
growth rates. This year's GNP growth target is
about 7%, in sharp contrast to the 1.5% achieved
last year. The planned recovery depends mainly on
a 12.6% increase in farm output and an accelerated
industrial growth rate of 6.7%. Goals for oil and
gas, chemicals, and some consumer and machinery
items were cut in recognition of raw material short-
ages or lags in the expansion of production capacity.
The new plan is specifically designed to deal
with the knotty investment problem. First, it calls
for a stringent limit on new construction starts.
Investment resources are to be concentrated on pro-
jects which are already under way and on those
"which are decisive to the fulfillment of the Five-
Year Plan." To this end, the growth in total in-
vestment in 1973 is to be held to 3.5% compared
with the nearly 9% implied in the original plan. ?
Secondly, more investment resources will be allo-
cated to the parts of the economy in which projects
are most behind schedule. Consumer-criented sectors
such as the processed food and light industries and
agriculture will receive an increased share of in-
..vestment allocations.
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Thus, policy statements and investment targets
indicate that there will be a continued emphasis on
improving' living standards. The expected shortages
of agricultural raw materials and the construction
delays which have restricted the production of con-
sumer goods, however, will force.a temporary retreat
in.theconsumer program. In particular, meat pro-
duction is not scheduled to increase appreciably in
1973. The volume of retail trade is slated to in-
crease by 5% in 1973, compared with 7% in 1972.
This slowdown in turn forces a change in income
policy. In order to avoid further inflationary
pressures, wage increases are hopefully to be held
to about half the rate achieved last year.
There is no evidence that defense plans were
affected by 1972's dislocations in the civilian
sector. The military has always been favored and
largely protected from short-run fluctuations in
output. Moreover, the production capacity of the
Soviet Union is now so large that even a moderate
growth of GNP can support reasonable increases in
military spending without undue strain. The an-
nounced 1973 defense budget of 17.9 billion rubles
is unchanged for the fourth year in a row, but this
figure does not include a number of allocations
normally associated with defense. The most signifi-
cant exclusion is military research and development,
which is funded principally from the science alloca-
tion. Soviet science outlays in 1973 are scheduled
to be 7% greater than last year. It is estimated
that total Soviet defense spending in 1973 will be
about 3% higher than in 1972 and will amount to the
equivalent of about $82 billion.
Last year's difficulties in the farm sector
.severely tested the leadership's dedication to its
expensive livestock program, but recent policy state-
ments and the new plan goals indicate that they will
continue the campaign at least through 1973. The
poor harvest last year, however, makes it practically
impossible to fulfill even the modest program for
the livestock feed base outlined in the 1971-75
plan. With average weather, they would still have
to import a minimum of 40 million tons of grain im-
ports over the next three fiscal years to meet the
long-term livestock and meat goals. A number of
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prominent Soviet trade and agricultural officials
have recently admitted to US visitors that the USSR
will require long-term food and feed grain imports
from the United States "even if we have good har-
vests.."
Meanwhile, the 1973 grain crop is off to a
poor start. Last fall, the area sown to winter
.grains was one-fifth less than planned because of
excessively dry soil. Very little snow has fallen
this winter in the major winter grain areas, and
as of the first week in February there was insuf-
ficient snow cover to protect the seedlings from
the low temperatures. It is likely, therefore,
that the winter grains have already suffered an
above-normal amount of winterkill. To recoup
winter losses and make up for the shortfall in
fall-sown area the Soviets must sow more than 100
million hectares to grains this. spring--a record.
If they fail to meet the spring seeding schedule
and encounter only average growing conditions, the
chances are slim for a big increase in production
above last year's disappointing harvest of 134
million tons of usable grain.
The Effect of Another Bad Harvest
If a grain crop of 140 million tons or less
is harvested in 1973 (as opposed to a "normal" crop
of 150 million tons), the leadership will have to
make some disagreeable decisions. With a crop of
140 million tons, they could decide to support the
meat program again with total imports of grain that
could run as high as 20 million tons. At the higher
world prices now prevailing, the total cost of im-
porting grain on such a scale in FY 1974 would equal
the cost of the purchases made for delivery in FY
1973 (about $2 billion). It is quite possible that
the Soviet leaders would not be willing to make this
expenditure. With a short crop, however, a failure
to import sufficient quantities of grain would mean
that livestock would have to be slaughtered--ensuring-
serious meat shortages in the following years. As
the meat queues lengthened, the.leadership would
have to decide whether formal rationing should be
substituted for the hit-and-miss allocations re-
sulting from the queues. Alternatively, they could
raise meat prices to avoid the administrative costs
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5 5
of rationing or the unfairness of a first-come
first-serve system of distributing the available
supply of meat. In deciding how much grain to buy
in the event of a poor harvest, the leadership
would have clearly in mind the civil unrest that
accompanied Khrushchev's decision to raise meat
prices in 1962 and the part that meat supplies and.
prices had to play in Gomulka's fall from power in
Poland in 1970. Very probably, they would not aban-
don the meat program completely; rather, they would
reluctantly accept a lower rate of growth in meat
production.
Foreign Trade and Payments Policy in 1973
One of the consequences of the bad harvest is
a considerable increase in the USSR's dependence on
the West for food supplies as well as advanced equip-
ment and for credit to finance the purchases. As a
result of the massive grain purchases the Soviets
will have a record hard currency trade deficit of
about $1.8 billion in 1973 .compared with an estimated
$6.00 million in 1972. (After the 1963 harvest dis-
aster, the 1964 deficit was only $533 million).
Besides the $1.6 billion represented by contracts
already concluded for grain to be delivered in 1973,
the gap between earnings and outlays of hard currency
will be affected by large imports of sugar, record
acquisitions of Western plant and.equipment, and
possible new grain purchases in the last half of
1973 (assumed to be about six million tons worth
about $500 million.
As in 1972, the 1973 hard currency deficit will
be financed by a combination of gold sales, credits,
and trade adjustments. Up to 200 tons of gold worth
$400 million could probably be sold in 1973 without
depressing its price below the average 1972 level.
Sales of this magnitude would be about equal to
annual production (net of consumption) and would
leave Soviet gold reserves unchanged at about 1,600
tons. The major source of financing, however, will
be credits, and ample amounts are available'through--
out the West. The European money market has a sur-
plus of funds for short- and medium-term borrowers.
Moscow's Western-based. banks also can attract con-
siderable funds at prime rates. In negotiating to
buy grain in the US, the Soviet Union will surely
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1
continue to ask for more favorable credit arrange-
ments than have been offered thus far. The United
States has emerged as an important creditor in 1972
and 1973, extending about $500 million of Commodity
Credit Corporation funds,-and US and Japanese banks
and financial houses are exploring ways in which
they can increase their roles in financing Soviet
trade.
The Soviets have tried to prevent the hard
currency deficit from interfering with their plans
to import Western equipment and technology. There
was no clear evidence of a cutback in 1972. In the
second half of the year, the 'volume of new orders
declined somewhat from the very high level recorded
in the first six months, but large orders for such
equipment continue to be signed. Some of the orders
involve long-term and sel'f'-liquidating credits .(re-
payment in kind) and do not bring immediate pressures
to pay. The proposed US-Soviet LNG project and the
Japanese-Soviet projects for developing natural gas
and oil deposits are examples of exchanges that have
no-necessary impact on hard currency reserves. The
grain purchases put pressure mainly on the USSR's
short-term payments position. In 1973, however, as
short-term indebtedness increases, it will become
increasingly difficult for Moscow to avoid some im--.
port cuts. Although the USSR could finance the en-
tire likely deficit, and perhaps more, solely with
gold sales and credit, it will probably also make
some adjustments in its trade. Imports of consumer
goods and other items that are paid in cash are
likely candidates for trimming. If the harvest is
bad and massive additional grain imports"-are nec-
essary, cuts in other imports are certain.
in any case, even given average weather agri-
cultural imports will continue to be a major balance-
of-payments burden. The indicated grain import re-
quirement might be about 12 million tons a year
(worth more than $1 billion), assuming a continued
priority for the original Brezhnev livestock program.
The prospect of continued imports of grain of such
a magnitude may well occasion a re--examination of
the long-run wisdom of the meat and consumption
programs associated with Brezhnev's leadership.
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Longer-term Economic 'Outlook
Soviet economic growth should turn upward in
1973 because farm output will recover--unless another
streak of bad weather intervenes. If average weather
prevails over the next few years, GNP should grow by
5% to 600- per year. Even so,.the average rate of
growth in the first half of the 1970s--perhaps 4
to 5% per year--would be significantly lower than
it was in 1966-70. This is about average for an
industrial nation, but unimpressive considering
the USSR's comparative economic backwardness and
the effort it is making. The USSR almost surely
would have to abandon many of the agricultural \
goals and some of the important industrial, goals t:
set out in the 1971-75 plan.
In the longer term, the USSR will be hard
pressed to sustain a.rate of growth as high as 5%
per year. The rate of growth of the labor force
has slowed and a growing share of all workers is
to be employed in the service sector. At the same
time, technological progress has not been rapid
enough to offset the declining returns to net in-
vestment, and there is no evidence that the Soviet
Union is finding or will soon find a solution to
this problem.
In both industry and agriculture low produc-'
tivity is caused by organizational factors which
discourage efficiency and inhibit the introduction
of new products and methods of work. Upon assuming
power, the present leadership probably believed
that managerial reforms could bring about larger,
and continuing productivity gains. Then, their
attempts to introduce reforms after 1965 were frus-
trated by the defects of the reform proposals, the
opposition of the economic bureaucracy, and the
fear of decentralization as a threat to party con-
trol. Some careful experimentation with new mana-
gerial methods has continued, such as the applica-
tion of computers to planning, but political con-
trols have prevented public discussion of any com-
prehensive reform programs relevant to solving
economic ills in the near term.
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As the interest in internal reform dwindled,
the interest in economic ties with the Industrial
West increased. The Soviet leaders believe that
the shortcut to technological progress and accel-
erated growth in productivity lies in importing
western machinery and technology while promoting
other technical exchanges. If carried on consist-
ently over a long period of time this policy will
upgrade Soviet economic performance, particularly
in terms of the quality of production. Indeed, the
most dynamic sectors have depended crucially on im-
ports from the West--for example, chemicals and
motor vehicles. Still, the imports will not result
in a marked increase in the rate of growth of GNP
over the next several years because the contribution
of western machinery to total investment is rela-
tively small and limited'by the USSR's ability to
secure a growing volume of long-term credits. In
addition, western technology is not always easy for
the Soviet managerial system to assimilate.
Many industrialized countries would welcome a
steady growth of national product amounting to 4%
to 5% per year, but the Soviet Union would find it
hard to abandon the idea that the socialist model
provides more rapid development than the arrange-
ments of other industrial nations. In the face of
falling growth rates, some officials might be tempted
to rely on a higher rate of investment. In the re-
cent past, however, this policy has not been success-
ful in boosting growth. While some proponents of
industrial growth probably feel that the agricul-
tural investment program, for example, has been too
expensive, a radical shift in priorities away from
agriculture or the production of industrial consumer
goods would be risky from an economic standpoint.
The cooperation and productivity of the labor force
depend on continued progress in living standards,
especially steady improvement in the diet. On. the
other hand, the effort to maintain planned rates of
growth in consumption clearly will involve increasing
dependence on the West, and in particular the United
States, for grain.
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Soviet Dependence on the US
Soviet dependence on the US i.s:considerably
less than its dependence on the West in general.
The most critical need over the next year is likely
to be for grain. The larger the grain requirement
the larger the share that would probably have to
come from the US. If the requirement were around
12 million tons, about half would have to come from
the US; if it were 20 million tons, perhaps two
thirds would have to come from the US. If the So-
viets were willing to pay significantly higher
prices and tap the markets of smaller exporting
countries the US share of grain purchases could be
considerably reduced. Particularly, over the longer
term, the Soviets could encourage substantially
higher production in Canada, Argentina, Australia,
etc. with the help of long, term contracts. To the
extent that the Russians were pressed for conces-
sions in other areas in return for the purchase of
US grain, they would be the,more likely to cultivate
other suppliers.
The reliance of the USSR on the West for ad-
vanced equipment and technology is very important
and growing. However, the dependence on US equip-
ment is relatively small. By far the largest part
of USSR requirements for production equipment can
be met by Western Europe and Japan, often at. lower
prices and with comparable quality. In a few im-
portant cases the US enjoys a?substantial tech-
nological lead: for example, oil production and
exploration equipment, advanced integrated cir-
cuits, high capacity data processing equipment, and
a few specialized types of equipment for truck pro-
duction. In these cases the USSR would prefer to.
buy from the US, but the demands are postponable.
Other than as a source of grain, the. most im-
portant potential role of the US in Soviet eyes is
as a market for raw materials and a supplier of
credit, equipment, and technology to develop them.
The USSR badly needs to expand its hard currency
exports to pay for grain and equipment imports.
The joint ventures to develop Siberian gas offer
the best hope. of dollar exports over the long run.
Barter arrangements--for example, nickel for ma-
chinery--might also become important. There are
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other Western markets for these Soviet materials--
notably Japan--and other sources of credit and
technology. But if joint US-Soviet projects are
not undertaken, expansion of Soviet hard currency
exports will almost certainly be considerably de-
layed. In the long-term this would mean a sub-
stantially slower growth of export earnings and
hence the capacity to import Western technology.
Thus the principal areas of Soviet economic
dependence on the US can develop only in the long
term, and will then also involve a growing US eco-
nomic dependence on the USSR. Substantial US-Soviet
economic links will increase'the Soviet investment
in good political relations with the US; at the same
time, their development requires that reasonably
good relations be maintained for many years. Al-
though the US bargaining position is currently
strengthened by the large Soviet dependence on US
grain, this major US advantage may not continue
beyond the next year or so and its value as a bar-
gaining tool is, therefore, limited.
The Political Outlook
Fundamental weaknesses in the performance of
the Soviet. economy guarantee that, even with an
average harvest in 1973, the leadership will face
difficult questions concerning several inter-
related issues: the goals for economic growth,
adherence to the agricultural and consumer programs-
managerial reform, and economic dependence on the
West and more particularly on the US. Even with
normal harvests, the future needs for foreign grain
that will be necessary to support present programs
should become even more apparent to the leadership
by this summer and the chronic nature of the problem
will focus attention on the wisdom or practicality
of basic policies.
The situation can only complicate Brezhnev's
political life. This is all the more so because he
has so strongly advocated the agricultural and con-
sumer programs that are now beset by difficulties.
For example, although Brezhnev at the Party Congress
justified at length the new policy of. consumer goods
production growing faster than producer goods under
the five-year plan, it appears that this in fact
will not occur.
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There has been political fallout from the poor
harvest. Polyansky was demoted from first deputy
premier to minister of agriculture and the incumbent
minister, Mats:evich was removed. Brezhnev has far
greater political resources at his command than do.
his critics and he seems to have shored up his posi-
tion for the time being through his successful
harvest-boosting trip to the Virgin. Lands and Cen-
tral Asia last fall and through-Pollyansky`s demo-
tion. Nevertheless, Polyansky's demotion means the
slippage of a once staunch ally of Brezhnev's.
Moreover, it leaves an opening for first deputy
premier to be fought over.
The situation favors :a revival of public dis-
of some policy issues. Polyansky's move
cussion
could encourage greater efforts to pare down the
large agricultural investments he has championed
and to press for administrative reforms he has
fought. Advocates of some current experiment and
reforms in managing the industrial economy will
become more active, and institutional reorganiza-
tion, a traditional panacea in Soviet eyes, will
attract more attention.
As the Soviet leaders realize how their depend-
ence on the West for grains and technology is grow-
ing and promises to grow in the future, they will
face two particular questions on the wisdom or ac-
ceptability of the dependence itself. They.must
consider how much to rely on US sources. They must
also contemplate whether they will be pressed to
pay for such reliance wit~dpolitical concessions
should
and, if so, how they
One group will find dependence in general dis-
tasteful and reliance on the US especially so. As
late as 1968 Brezhnev himself spoke in public this group, arguing against over-reliance on West-
ern technology. The continued strength of this
dogmatic school of thought, which Brezhnev has since
abandoned in foreign relations, is shown by the
rigidity that has been maintained concerning in-
ternal policies and controls even as detente has
developed abroad. officials of this frame of mind
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will argue against reliance on US supplies and will
cite the opportunity this will provide the US for
demanding political concessions---for example, the
Jackson amendment. They might also argue that it
makes good commercial sense to bargain multiple sup-
pliers off against each other and that in any event
their needs could be met by Western Europe and Japan.
The majority of the current leadership, while
sharing these concerns, believe that in economic
terms the US is the best source. of certain supplies
wanted by the Soviet Union. Improved. economic re-
lations with the US is popular among many Soviet
bureaucrats and citizens. Some leaders will argue
that the dependence will be mutual since US farmers
and manufacturers are greedy for markets and can
present their case to the US Administration. The
intense interest shown by Brezhnev, Kosygin, and
other top leaders in. the LNG deal is motivated in
part by an assumption that this kind of agreement
will increase mutual dependency. These leaders
will also maintain that concentrating on the develop-
ment of US-Soviet economic relations furthers their
political interests vis-a-vis the US and acts as a
counterweight to growing relations between the US
and China.
Although many economic questions may be up for
debate, an agricultural year that is no worse than
average will make it easier for the top leaders to
maintain ultimate control over the issues and ma-
neuvering and thus to protect their own positions.
Changes, in this case, would more likely be confined
to leaders of secondary or tertiary rank and to eco-
nomic measures of largely internal significance.
As unwelcome as lower growth rates and economic de-
pendence. on the West, and the US in particular,
might be, Brezhnev and the leadership as it now
stands would be loath to abandon the agricultural
and consumer programs entirely, considering the
consequences this would have on their own political
credibility, popular morale, and internal controls.
Given an average agricultural year, they will prob-
ably opt for making compromises in their economic
goals where necessary but retaining at least the
general direction of present policies.
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This outcome would have a double meaning in
foreign affairs. Lackluster economic performance F
should further encourage Brezhnev and other leaders i
to seek "successes" in the conduct of detente pol-
icies abroad and to cultivate economic relations
with the West that promise help in relieving do-
mestic deficiencies. In particular the Soviet
leaders will probably continue to turn to the US
to supply a growing number of economic needs. On
the other hand, serious setbacks in foreign affairs,
particularly in relations with the West, would be
all the more painful to Brezhnev, especially as
they could further call into question the whole
complex of inter-related programs he has pursued.
Specifically how might economic reliance on
the US affect Soviet behavior? The most likely
consequence would be to encourage restraint in the
conduct of foreign affairs that touch the US. Thus,
considering the state of US-Soviet relations, there
are some things that the Soviets :night simply choose
not to do, for example, taking a provocative stance
in support of some allies such as North Vietnam or
Cuba.
While growing reliance on trade with the US
will increase Soviet motives for being conciliatory
on other issues between the two countries, it is
very unlikely that this will lead them to make major
concession in other areas. Economic interest has
been a motive throughout in the Soviet pursuit of
detente. It has been difficult to distinguish, how-
ever, the effect of this interest on Soviet diplo-
macy from the effect of other principal motives, such
as their goals in Europe, their distrust of China or
...the political play inMoscow. This will continue to
obtain even if the economic factor grows somewhat.
Moreover,-the Soviet leaders will resist, as they
have'in the past, discussing linkage between eco-
nomic relations and specific points at issue in ?
other areas. They will do this not only to avoid
a poor bargaining stance but also because they will
be wary of those political forces at home who are
distrustful of detente and especially of this kind
of vulnerability. Finally, the Soviet leaders would
probably..conclude that important political conces-
sions to the US are unnecessary for economic reasons
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i 1P 1P
since they can obtain most of their import needs from
Western Europe and Japan, and that US domestic
agricultural and industrial interests are anxious to
expand their goals in the Soviet market.
Nevertheless, Soviet eagerness for expanded
economic relations with the US will probably con-
tinue to make the leadership willing to accede to
some modification of policy when circumstances create
a direct linkage to economic questions--for example,
the Jackson amendment. The modification of the laws
on the education tax for emigrants last year illus-
trates the type of concession and the general range
of flexibility that may be expected in the future.
Likewise, major advances in US-Soviet economic co-
operation would increase the pressure from the US
to enlarge the scope and freedom permitted business-
men operating in the Soviet Union, and some give
would be likely from the Soviet side on this matter.
in case of a bad harvest, however, the magnitude
of the economic problems and the politically unsat-
isfactory nature of any of the possible measures for
dealing with them would clearly exacerbate tensions
within the leadership. Regarding the populace, the
relative austerity that would obtain for a second;
year in a row would cause a sag in morale and per-
haps even some instances of public unrest. As a
result, among the'political elite, interest in new
policy courses and even new faces at the top would
rise.
This kind of internal situation would naturally
affect the conduct of Soviet foreign affairs. A
loss of self-confidence-in dealing with the West
would tend to deter the Soviets from.making new
agreements, although, for lack of a viable alter-
native, large imports of Western grain and machinery
would continue. A strong challenge to the present
leadership might for a time freeze Soviet policy in
its present course, rendering it incapable of taking
new initiatives or responding flexibly until domes-
tic politics were sorted out.
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Although their economic needs from abroad and
particularly the US would mushroom, the Soviet
leadership would probably not be in a position to
act on them in any comprehensive way, much.less.to
agree to important diplomatic concessions in this
connection. if in fact a political crisis of this
sort arose and then was resolved, the eventual im-
plications for foreign policy---a reconfirmation of
the detente line or a retreat from it--would depend
on who won. in this connection,' the objective need
for fuller economic relations with the West would
be a. powerful though not necessarily decisive argu-
ment on the side of those defending the present
line.
-25-
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 - MAY ICR2 E1aiTION 5ELRL V
GSA FPMR (41 CM) 161-1t.6
UN1TL_No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/04/07: LOC-HAK-32-4-2-9
1U~errcora~dum
NSC - Mr. Sonnenfeldt DATE: January 22, 1973
FROM : INR/RES Kenneth A. Kerst
sUBlEcx: Brezhnev's Power Position Since the May Summit
Since the May Summit, Brezhnev's track record has been mixed. If
the Soviet Union were a truly parliamentary power, his illness last
-fall combined with several policy setbacks could have generated no-
confidence votes and it is conceivable that one may have carried.
.However, available evidence suggests that Brezhnev has further enhanced
his primacy in the wake of the Sumniit. To be sure, this makes him
more responsible for policy failures as well as successes and thus
presumably more vulnerable to criticism, but his performance indicates
that he is an extremely difficult man to back into a corner. Thus,
we conclude that, barring major policy reversals undeniably attributable
to him, Brezhnev will remain as primus inter pares at least for the
immediate future. We suspect, however, that as a careful politician,
he will take more than usual care to assure that he has the concurrence
of his colleagues in future moves.
Brezhnev's Health: A Major Question Mark
Last fall, Brezhnev was unable to exercise fully his responsibilities
for virtually two months because of ill health. The exact nature of his
illness remains unknown. Moscow sources have passed the word that his
loss of weight and difficulty in climbing stairs so visible at the November
Revolution ceremonies, which were delayed several minutes until he arrived,
were due to lumbar problems. The latest analysis based on close
observation points to a hernia operation which was possibly followed
by pneumonia. Judging from reports from the January 11-12 Franco-Soviet
Summit in Minsk, however, he appears to have recovered fully.
Brezhnev's illness was never mentioned in the Soviet press. In
fact, while he was absent, the usual status indicators -- pictures,
citations in speeches, mentions in editorials -- remained at a high
level, suggesting that his colleagues, rather than acting like a pack
of jackals intent upon bringing the wounded down, were instead more
concerned with preserving his image as the leader.
Economic Shortfalls: Imo.act on Brezhnev
The extremely poor agricultural year and the failure-to achieve
unrealistically high productivity, gains in industry resulted in the
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-2-
lowest growth rate of national income since World War II and forced
a major change in next year's plans. In the production area, the much-
.touted consumer program launched by Brezhnev over the explicit criticism
of Shelest and Masherov has once again been relegated to second place
behind heavy industry. Investment goals are being sharply curtailed
except for agriculture, especially in land amelioration which is a long-
time Brezhnev favorite, and, surprisingly, in consumer-associated
industries, which remain at their original rates. Explicit defense
expenditures, another Brezhnev area of specialization, are scheduled to
remain at the current level, and the sharp increase in absolute terms
in the "science" budget indicates that overall expenditures will rise,
especially for research and development. Planned increases in the
retail trade plan were reduced, and. the public was told that food and
consumer goods will be available during 1973 only "in the main."
Even though the economy is not in a recession,. much less a depression,,
the Soviets are being forced to retrench, and the political ramifications
could be far greater than the statistics alone would suggest. Thus
far, however, what criticism has been voiced has been directed against
planning and management officials, not the Party. The Party itself
has been resorting to such hoary standbys as calls for heightened labor
discipline and more socialist competition. Brezhnev, moreover, has been
publicly praised for the results of his barnstorming during the Virgin
Lands harvest. He could cite with some justification the successes
obtained by his detente policy, which enabled the Soviet Union to import
massive amounts of grain from the US.
In sum, while the economic shortfalls can scarcely redound to any
leader's credit, political fallout to date has been minimal and Brezhnev-
associated programs have fared well. It is clear, on the other hand,
that he and his colleagues are probably suffering some diminution of
'self-confidence as well as considerable chagrin over the shadow that
these economic problems cast on their touted image of the Soviet Union
as.an "equal" superpower with the US.
Foreign Policy Pluses and Minuses '
Despite some setbacks in international affairs, Soviet foreign
political achievements area plus for Brezhnev and a factor strengthening
his position. The most intractable and worrisome problem for Moscow now
undoubtedly is China, and Brezhnev recently resorted to the most lengthy
public critique of Peking made by any Soviet leader since Khrushchev's day.
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3-
But this is an inherited problem, not of his making; and the China
issue, because of its intractability, magnitude, and the sensitive
chords it strikes in Russian nationalistic feeling, is probably more
of a unifying than a divisive force in the Soviet leadership.
The setback represented by Sadat's expulsion of Soviet military
personnel from Egypt, rather than a crisis-for the regime, was more in
the nature of an injury to pride and a public humiliation that can be
lived down in time. That is just what. the Soviets appear to be doing.
Of course, there will probably be other disappointments for Moscow in
the volatile Middle East, but the Soviets evidently calculate that
adversities are the worthwhile price to be paid for playing a great
power role in that key area. There,are presently no signs of leadership
differences over Soviet Middle. East ' pol i cy.
The Soviet foreign political achievement that overshadows these
problems is the 24th Congress' "peace program," or more specifically,
detente policies in the West, with which Brezhnev has become closely
identified. In Moscow's calculation, it is achieving long-sought
objectives in Europe, and a modus vivendi with the US. In the process
the Soviet leadership is assuring for the Russian state probably the
greatest degree of security that it has ever known, and the.lessened
possibility of international conflict involving the-Soviet Union is
an accomplishment that will be welcomed in the Party hierarchy as well
as by the citizenry. .
Of course, Moscow is paying a price for these achievements: in
resources expended in attainment of superpower status, and in sacrifice
of revolutionary zeal to make the necessary accommodations to achieve
its objectives in the West. The latter course, in particular, has aroused
some questioning on the part of the politically alert part of the
population. Yet there is little evidence that the Brezhnev leadership
is..facing a significant domestic challenge on this issue. More importantly,
in,seeking improved relations with the West the Brezhnev leadership
is accommodating to political and economic imperatives of the day, and
this alone places Brezhnev in a sound position at home to the extent
that foreign policy is a factor in the stability of his leadership.
Leadership Maneuvering: A Brezhnev Plus but Questions Remain
Changes of assignment within the leadership taken during and after
the Moscow Summit, where identifiable, clearly are manifestations of
Brezhnev's political clout. Shelest now joins the already-demoted Voronov
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-4-
and Shelepin, who puzzlingly remain in the Politburo. Ponomarev was
elevated to candidate membership while Mzhavanadze was dropped. And
a newcomer to the Moscow political scene appeared when industrial specialist
Dolgikh was named a Central Committee secretary.
Shelest. Bounced during the Moscow Summit in circumstances which
suggested that he was opposed to its convocation, Shelest was named
one of nine deputy premiers, evidently with responsibility for transportation
and energy. His successor as Ukrainian Party chief was a long-time
Brezhnev associate, V. V. Shcherbitskiy, who has shaken up the local
Party apparatus but apparently does not hold exclusive sway over Ukrainian
affairs. Shcherbitskiy has rapidly moved against manifestations of
Ukrainian particularism, such as a 'relative tolerance of nationalistic
dissent and economic localism, which strongly indicates that they were
among the policy differences with Brezhnev which led to Shelest's ouster.
On the other hand, Shcherbitskiy's Dnepropetrovsk clique has had to
share the spoils with the established Kharkov grouping, whose foremost
graduate is Podgornyy.
Ponomarev. The elevation of Party Secretary Ponomarev to candidate
Politburo member would appear to reflect. the influence of the 70-year
old.Suslov in his role as foreign policy specialist. Long responsible
in the Secretariat for relations with non-ruling Parties, Ponomarev
has been somewhat more active lately in treating with visiting government
officials from non-socialist countries. At 67, however, his promotion
may be more in the nature of a reward for services performed than a
harbinger of a greater voice in leadership deliberations.
Mzhavanadze. The removal of Mzhavanadze, who was not believed
to be c ose'to Brezhnev, seems to have been due to the unusual combination
of his age, 70, the poor economic performance of Georgia, and the high
rate of official corruption which is now being exposed. His successor,
a.young ex-MO minister, has spoken warmly-of Brezhnev and rose to local
prominence after Brezhnev's close friend, Shchelokov, took over the USSR
MVD.'
Dol ikh. As Party Secretary in charge of heavy industry, Dolgikh
fills t Fe vacancy created in 1971 when Solomentsev was named RSFSR
premier. Only 48, Dolgikh is the second youngest man among the top 25
Soviet leaders; the youngest is Brezhnev-protege .Katushev, 45. It is
difficult to determine Dolgikh's political ties at the moment but while
An his home kray of Krasnoyarsk he met recently with Brezhnev,.who is
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a 49
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-5-
believed to have endorsed his plan for integrated economic development
there. Whatever his links to other leaders,. the promotion of the youngish
Dolgikh is in line with the reported Brezhnev policy of elevating able
young specialists.
Status Indicators Favor Brezhnev. Other political indicators of
Brezhnev's strong standing have been his major addresses to the May and
December plenums in 1972, the publication of his third volume of speeches,
numerous feature-length films devoted to his major travels, consistent
citation in the media (particularly in Pravda), and the reappearance in
December at the 50th anniversary celebration of public endorsements by
high political figures of Brezhnev as "head of the Politburo." Another
was the surprisingly warm homage paid to him by the alleged "Cassius"
of the Kremlin, M. A. Suslov, on the occasion of his * 70th birthday award
ceremonies. Finally, it should be noted that Belorussian Party Chief
Masherov has moved from a position of outspoken opposition to Brezhnev's
announced consumer welfare program to public endorsement of his preeminence
in late May and December. It may be that Masherov felt isolated after
his fellow critic of "consumerism" was removed from Ukraine and decided
it was time to make amends.
Unresolved Problems
Though external signs point to Brezhnev's enhanced status vis-a-vis
his Politburo colleagues, it is always. possible that they may be
misleading, for we know far too little about the inner workings of the
Politburo to reach any.firm conclusions.' Even if our surmise that he
has improved on his position is correct,.this does not mean that he
is necessarily firmly ensconced because a number of real or potential
problems still face him.
Health. Perhaps the most important at this stage is Brezhnev's
health. While it is true that his recent illness does not appear to have
been due to a chronic condition, he does have a history of cardio-
vascular problems, is still overweight, smokes incessantly, and drinks
heavily.' At age 66, signs of physical deterioration are noticeable,
but lack of information makes any prognosis highly speculative. Our
feeling at the moment is, however, that he will probably remain fit
enough to exercise his responsibilities for the next year or two.
Politburo Opposition? There is no good evidence of opposition
within the Politburo to Brezhnev at the present time. On the other hand,
that there:is argumentation over various policies seems quite plausible,
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W' SECRET W
-6-
and, given Brezhnev's mixed track record, we suspect that he has had
to defend policies he has advocated. The greatest danger that he would
appear to face conies from three men he has demoted -- Shelest, Voronov,
and Shelepin -- who nevertheless remain full members.
It is conceivable that they remain only because of the regime's
known penchant not to rock the boat by "wholesale" purges. It appears
to us somewhat more likely, however, that they remain because on this
issue Brezhnev sensed his colleagues would be unwilling to alter the
political balance so drastically in Brezhnev's favor. As long as Shelest,
Voronov, and Shelepin remain in the Politburo, any one of them or a
combination constitutes a nucleus around which'opposition to Brezhnev
could form. Their continued presence, moreover, constitutes a restraining
influence on Brezhnev's initiative.
Domestic Problems. As is the case with virtually all political
regimes, the real :"gutsy" issues are domestic. Of these, the most
immediate one for Brezhnev and Company is the parlous state of agriculture.
As last year's performance demonstrated, the vagaries of the weather
exercise an inordinate influence not only on the agricultural sector
but.on the industrial as well. Although it is still too early to predict
the 1973 crop, it is already obvious that it did not get off to a good
start, and there are indications that the Soviets are already back in.-
the world grain market.
It is moot whether or not the leadership would be able to face
another bad year with the seeming equanimity that it has displayed
thus far. Consumer grumbling probably will mount, as the latest
information from Moscow indicates that the worst shortages are yet
to come. We do not believe that this discontent of the man-in-the-street,
however, will materially affect the leadership equation unless it
permeates upward through a disenchanted Party apparatus and produces
cleavages within the power structure itself -- the Politburo and
Secretariat, the KGB, and the military high command -- which could be
used by ambitious opponents of Brezhnev. At this time, we do not see
evidence to this-effect.
Other major problems include the growing sense of national
identity among the minorities, the lack of ideological elan throughout
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a SECRET ?
-7-
Soviet society, and awareness of the increasing technological gap among
the scientific and technical intelligentsia. Brezhnev and Company have
given explicit recognition to their problems, but the measures adopted
to date appear largely palliative, and they can be expected to persist
if not worsen. Nonetheless, they do not appear serious enough at present
to provoke a challenge to Brezhnev's leadership.
Foy reign Problems. Foreign political issues would not seem for the
immediate future likely to have a debilitating effect on Brezhnev's
status, and may well enhance it. Detente policies in the West -- Brezhnev's
forte at the moment -- seem well established even if, as was the case
with the first session of the multilateral preparatory talks for the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, events do not proceed
as smoothly to Soviet liking as anticipated. Serious setbacks in the
improving relations with the US, especially failure of the USSR to get
MFN provisions from the US and the consequent impediment to development
of economic relations, could possibly reflect personally on Brezhnev...
He might, however, hope to compensate for this loss with intensified
efforts along both economic and political lines in West Europe or with
Japan.
The insoluble China problem is as divorced from Brezhnev's personal
leadership as Soviet policy toward the West is identified with it, and
will probably continue to be a unifying rather than a diversive issue for
the leadership. Ups and downs in the Middle East will probably not
seriously affect the basic thrust of Soviet policy in that area. Serious
turbulence or increasing independence among the communist countries of
Eastern Europe would probably raise the most serious challenge to the
stability of Brezhnev's leadership, but this does not seem a likely
prospect for the immediate future.
Brezhnev's Stle: A Saving Grace.
What we know of Brezhnev's manner of conducting business with his
Politburo and lesser colleagues. suggests that he has taken care to touch
base on all possible subjects. It is true that with his apparently
enhanced-status he could begin to act more imperiously and fail to
"clear" initiatives, in the manner of Khrushchev. We think it more likely,
however, that in times of stress he will be even more desirous of
soliciting the views . of his colleagues in order to secure his political
flanks.
A major difference in Brezhnev's leadership style from that of his
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rambunctious predecessor, which would stand.him irk good stead if
n
` a
'"arithmetic majority" develops against him in the Politburo, is the
fact that': he has taken-pains not to alienate; the republic and 1%
leaders who comprise the majority of the Central Committee.'' His emphasis
on the importance of the Party and government bureaucraciesl, promotion
. from- wi thi n, and lateral transfer of officials out of favor suggest that
he'woul.d have their support if a;challenge to his:l?eadership were carried
to the Central Committee.
All in all, we feel that Brezhnev is perhaps the ablest Soviet
politician who has survived and prospered under the aegis of Stalin,
and Khrushchev. For a man of his bulk, he is very light on his -feet,
and we believe that.his.political Tife expectancy-is good.
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,''k L.'clia2,T772enr or jw.tC
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53
ACTION EUR-25
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02 INR-09
L-03 NSAE-0101 ';SC-10 PA-113 RSC-~01 PR5-01 SS-14 'US I A,. 1 7
Eg. J 1 AGR-2c IC-01 SAJ-171 RSR-011 GA C'aI
TRSE-00 STR-0R OMB-01 COME.. /15s ! ,W
R 191217Z MAR 73-
FM AMEMaASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASWDC 70Q I
INFn AME"MBASSY CONENPAGrN
AMEmSASSY RELCR AOE.
AMEMBASSY 9UCWAREST
AME.ME3ASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY PRASUE'
AMEUI3ASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USMTSSION NATO
AMCnNSUL HONG KONG
AMCnNSUL MUNICH
AMEMBASSY PARIS
NE'A. I O
C 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION I OF 2 MOSC'?W 2608
PARIS', COPENHAGEN FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ
E?C1. 116521 N/A -
TAGS $ 'TNT, PF'UR, UR
SUR.J1 BREZHNF V DEMONSTRATES STRENGTHENE9 POSITION
It SUMMARY. HTUH LEVEL 11F G-NERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV'S
.ACTYVITTES DURING PAST MONT'i, TO c:TLER WITH EXTENSIVE
MEDIA COVERAGE DEVOTE^ TO qIM, HAVE WIGqI-Tr-4Tcn HTS
- POSTTIU'~N AS PRIMUS T-,TER PARES WITHIN DnRTY HIERARCHY.
OOMCSTICALLY, 8REGHh1FV AoPEARS IN FIRM E'ONT7DL; OF PARTY
APPARATUS WHILE IN ~?*LM OF PORE!-IN AFFAIRS HE HAS OPTED
TO CET TONE FOR SUV T C'T onL T CY ON MANY Iv NOT MST OF" {E'Y
ISSuES? FOR REASONS wtICH ARE NOT YET FULLY CLEAR,
CONFIDENTIAL
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PAGE oft MOSCOW g260IFi oil OF 112 1013Z
BREZHNEV IS APPARENTLY INTERESTED IN DEMONSTRATIN, MORE
SELF-ASSURED AND FROMTfE-,'T ROLE IN COLLECTIVE LEAnERSHIP
AT "3RESFNT MOMENT? n'eVERTHELESS, THERE .CONTINUES THE'
APPARENT LIMITATIONS nN 1419 rREFOOM Or ACTION. END SUMMARY.
2? PAST MONTH HAS BEFM! OME OF UNUSUAL ACTIVITY' INCLUDING
INCREASED PUBLIC'?EXP1)nURE FOR RRF7HNEV'. AS eE3RUARY r3EGAN,
BRE7HNE.V'S WAND COULD BE SEEN IN RESHUFFLE 4ITNIN NATION'S'
AGRTCULTUR.AL WIERARCNy WHICH LEO :TO DEMOTION OF FELLOW
POLY'TBURO MEMRkR HLOYANSKIY WHILE AT SAME TIME SIGNALING
INCREASED ROLE` FOR MT'-!ISTRY OF AGRICULTURE'. CHAIN OF,
EVE%!TS LEADING FROM RIEZHNEV' S TO'JR TO SIBERIAN AND
VIR"=IN LAND AGRICULT(-RAL HIERARCUY WAS OVE'RALL' EFFECT OF
SI GII.AL I N!G BREZHNEV ' R 'E;RSONAL CONCERN! ABOUT IMPROV I NG
COU't'TRY'S AGRICULTUOAL PFRf?:ORMANCF WHILE AT SAME' TIME
SHITTING BLAME FOKPAqr FAILURES TO OTHERS.
3. FEBRUARY 19 AWARD CEREMONY HONORING-POLITBURO'
MEMPER AND SUPREME Ft. "It"T CHAIRMAN + OGORNI V ON OCCASION
OF WIS 70TH BIRTHDAY RROVTOED ANOTHER OCCASION FOR PIJBL'IC
E'XPnSUIKr: WHICH WAS AT ' SAME TIME NOTEWORTHY OR PRAISE
WHICH PODGORNIY WEAMEn UPON BREZWNEV. SOEAKIN, OF THE
"'OUTSTA'N'DING CONDITIr),.IS OF COMRADELY TRUST AND UNITY' WHICH
EXISTS AMONG US IN TUT DARTY, IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND
IN ? THE POLI TRURO, " HE SAID, "WE CORRECTLY STE I N THIS THE
SERVICE. OF THE PRESENT COMPOSITION OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE AND THE PDL?TSURO, AND THE GREAT RERSONAL
CONTRIBUTION OF L?Ii aREZHNEV, IN BRILLIANTLY UNIFYING
AND O.RU A N I Z I Nr OUR COt. LECT I VE, OR ENTIRE - ?A RTY' I N
DECIDING THE TASKS CONFRONTING US."
4. aRELWNEV'S TRAVEL YO CZECHOSLOVAKIA (FEB. 21-2'5) TO
ATTEND THE CELEB3PATIrt,'S OF- THE ?5TH ANn!IVERcARY Or TUE
COMMUN1fiT TAKE-O""ERJ mROVIDED YET ANOTHER OCCASION FOR
ENHANCI\'G.HIS PRESTI'tz' AND I-OR HEAVY MEDIA :OV!RA,E.
IT IS PARTICULARLY NniEWORTHY THAT PPE7.HNEV WENT TO
PRAGUE UNACCOMPANIED aY ANY OTHER SENNIOq DA*TY OFFICIALS.
THE TRIPP COMING AT TTMF WHEN CZECHS COULD ASSERT THAT
SIT-IATI^N IN COUNTRY uAn RETURNED TD NORMAL FOLLOWING
DURCEK ADVENTI-KE, HAn EFFECT 'iF PERSONALLY ASSOCIATING
BREyHNEV WITH CORRECT''ESS OF SOVIET ROLICY IN DEALING
WITU CZECHOSLOVAK SITUATION OVER LONG TERM. IN ADDITION
a. I
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE` 03 MOSCOW ?!26VA 01 OF fi2 1Z
TO 'ISUAL MOSCOW DEPAP1'UPF AND ARRIVAL PICTURES, SOVIET
MASc MtnIA DEVUTED NrAVY CfVERAG9: T!) SRET_:iN=VCR ArTIVITIES?
IN rZECUOSLOVAKTA? r?NI FEBRUARY ?4 VIRTUALLY 75 PERCENT OFo
THE SpArE ON THE F Knk!T PAGES OF THE CENTRAL PRESS WAS
DEVOTEU TO aRELWNEV T\! DPA.,UE? FULLY 47 MI'IIATES Or
EVEN'INU TELEVISION a!rYS COV .RAGE '?N F-:RRUARY' ?S WAS
DEV'TEU TO THE' PRAGUr CELEBRATIONS WITH RREZH7V GETTING
CENTRAL ATTENTION.
59 GEQUeNCE OF EVENT SUPROUNDING ISSUAaCE 1F ,EW PARTY
CARDS PROVIDED FUKTHF? IFVIOENCE OF': g EZ-NE'V'S STANDIU1
ON L EAD!RSHIP LA!DEu. ALL CENTRAL PRESS MAP--H ? CARR'IED'
LAR^F., rRONT-PACE, PwnTOS nF BREZHNEV SIGNIN!G CART) NO.
Ovrm 1 ISSUED IN NAME O. LENIN. L!SS PROMIK!=NT1_Y r)Ifi?
PLAYED WAS PICTURE OF MnSCO'W-4ASEr) LEADERSHIP ATTI~NnTNG?
CEREMONY. (IT INTEREFTIN'G TWAT' GRTS4T J, SHEI EST AND
SH .EPIN! WERE NOT ~,n1! ._PI~T.I)?cS a.L~'-In!ara L11STr0 IN
REF'-2I?T5 AS PART IC I PAT r!'C .Ir~1.:-.CE.RE`t0'~Y.) L`OLL')W I UG DAY
(MA'CH ?) CENTRAL PRG^c ANNOUNCED, TN RTLATTVELY LENGTHY
ARTTCLE'z, THAT RPEZLM!Cv RECEIVED HIS NEW ?A.RTY CARD (NO.
00009102) IN PRESENCE nr PARTY SECRETARIES. AL THf)UGH
PHOTOS OF CEREMONY NOT CARRIED IN P?ESS, TVINTNG TELEVISION
NEWS DIr'` HAVE COVERA ^ nr EVENT. ONLY NEXT DAY (MARCH 4)
010 CENTRAL PPESS HAVE RRIEF REPORT THAT'OT-(E"R PARTY.
LEAnERS HAD RECEIVE!) rWEIR NEW CARDR.
CONFIONTIAL
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ACTION FUR-P5
INF!I OCT-0I EA-11 ADP-(AM CIAE-01 DODF-'"C PM-09 H-02 INR-09
L-03 NSAF-00 "'SC- 10 ?A-711 RSC-01 "s-01 SS- 14 USIA- I"
ER-11 AGR-2" *'IC-01 RSR- 1 SAJ-%l GAC-11 NE'A-10
1RSE-00 STR-c a OMF3-01 COME-00 /15.5
020711
R 1012)7Z MAR 73
FM AMEM'3ASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHOC 7M:!?
INFn AMEMBASSY COf'ENWAGEN
AMEMBASSY RELGRA'Th
AMEME3ASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMI3ASSY RUDANESI.
AMEMBASSY PRACUF'
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USMISS1ON NATO
AMCINSUL_ HONG KONG
AMCONSUL MUNICH
AMEMeASSY PARIS
C 0 N F I 0 E N T I .A. L SECTION Or-12 MOSC1W 2608
6? 0REZWNEV HAS ALSO nLAYEO AN ACTIVE p'7LE' IN FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF LATE, SETTtNr THE TO'Jr FOR S7VIEY POLICY ON
MANY IF NOT MnST OF TWE KEY ISSUES? HG' HAS !OE"TIrIE7
141 ELF STRONGLY W I YU .-TWF VIETNAM SrTTL 'ME"!T, UcET I NG
FOR THL F-I RS T TIME V T THrRE!UEmT "ISCO 4 VISITOR LE DUC
TH0 ANU OUTLINING S0V ? ET POSTWAR ATTITUDES !N A BAN ?UF'T'
SPEFCW MN JANUAPY 3.1. WITH THE EXr.EDTION Or THIS DECEMBER
21 ^E13UKE TO THE US nk' RENEWED SOM51N'S, He WAO REMAINED
OUT OF THE LIMELIGHT ^N VIETNAM IrS"c5 !UNTIL THE. OUTCOME
COULD BE BILLED AS A cUCCwSS. IN APneR5NT E=FORT TO
E,RAcE. SCADS LEFT BY LAST JULYS E~'p~Jl_SI'~N 0= SOVYE'.T
MILITARY ADVIgORS ANn InEN'TIFY WIMSELc WITW SEARCH FOR
PEArE IN MIDOLt. FAST, BPFF7HNEV QECEIVEt3 F;JTA SADAT
ADVISER HAFEZ ISMAIL (F'B? 81 AND WAR MINISTER ISMAIL-,
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/04/07: LOC-HAK-32-4-2-9
 V. atir v Va+, ,~,Ib v,&,~' LJ 46'I G
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C~UNIF a
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 026MA 012 OF q2 10134RZ
AL I (FE.Q. 271- SI M I I_ AnLY, nREZHN-Ev MET' WI TW SOt)Tw
YEMENI PRIME MINISTcP (MAR. 81. FACT THAT';?RE7'NEV
SHOULD CHOOSE TO KECCTVF JAPANESE A4BASgAQn~ (MAR. 6)
CARPYIN, MESSAGE' PRIM JAPANESE POTME HI'VTST-R (IN
CONTRAST TO HIS rAI!_,I-,E TO MEET LAST OCTOckER WITH FONMIN
OHIcA1 ALSO IDENTIFY- fPFZH r-V WITH NEW ErrOR7 TO' IMOROVE
HITUL.RTn FROZEN SUVIrT-JA?A'4iSE 4cLATIONS? TNSTDE THE
BLOC, tiREZHNEV HAS YAWEN LEAD TO ROOST' SOLI';OARITY WITH
FRATERNAL CCIUMTRIESt TN ADoITTo TO HIS VISIT TO r_ZECHbS-
LOV4KIA. WE WAS ONLY TOP LEADER TO MEET WIT'-+ NORTH
KORCAN WARTY DELEGATT^.N (F'ES? ?R) AND HIr 'EVAN MET WITH
DEPARTING CUBAN AM9Afi1!AOOR (MAR. 71 IV ME'E'IVG WHICH
COULD HAVE US-CURAN Ac WELL AS FATTY SIGNIFICANCE.
7? ASIUE FROM PERLNrNT nL PROBLEM OP. CWtII , PRINCIPAL
CLOUD ON OREZWNE'V'S H^RTZON CONCrPNS US.SOVTET' ECONOMIC
RELATION'S AND THEIR OnSStstE IMPACT ON RETURN VISIT TO
U*S. IN RECEIVING Ap-1ANf HAMMER
(FEQ? 191, RREZHNEV I..'=NT HIS DERSONAL INFLUENCE, HOWEVER,
To rURRE'NT SOVIET CAMr,AIGN FOR INCREASED TRADE WITH U.S!.
VISIT Or SECRETARY Ru!)LT7 WILL' TEST N'1W FAQ ;?REZHNEV'
WISUES TO GO IN IDENTIFYING HIMSELF WITH MOST VULNERABLE
ASPECT OF HIS POLICY TOWARD U.S.
ZA? DESPITE EVIDENCE Or A PERHAPS STRF VGTHENrD PERSONAL
POSITION, CIRCUMSTANCCS SUET THAT a4EZWNrv STILL DOES
NUT HAVE, AND 0E'RHA04~ RnES NOT ACTIVELY SEE'' ,. COMDLFTE
FREEDOM OF ACTIONIO Ti' IS SIGNIFICANT THAT' 9~E714NEV-
HAS EITWER NOT SEEN A'LE', nR CONSTDE'RE'D IT '}NWISE, TO
TRY To REMOVE THOSE W+ O L OSTOUT I N na.ST POWER PLAYS,
SUCH AS SHELEPIN, VOP^NOV AND SWELEST. WE HAS DEMON-
STH n TEO WITH POLYANIRY T Y A QQU I NTMENT, 40WEVE'''3, THAT- WE
IS AbLL TO PLACE ONE nF YOUNGER, 03LE3 LEAD PS IN
VUL"!ERARL.E POSITION. TRFLUE'NCE Or KOSYGTN AIPAPENTLY
REMA INNS STRONG ('W'IT"'ccS HIS
4E'CEN!T Tn7U1L.~-SHOnT I -.1G
MIScION TO TYI.IMEN' AN'h VFA OIL AND GAS OVOeIIPINr RE'GIONS'
AND HIS ANNOU"'CET VIfiTT TO SCANOINAVTAIt aRcZWYEV WAS
.CHOCEN, HOWEVFR. TO UrET TEAS PAST MONTH WITH DELEGATIONS.
(E.r., S. YEMENI AND JAPANTSE) WHO wF zr, RcCEIVED RY
KOSY(UN LAST YE A4, a' OCCASIONAL MEF:TT,c s :ET4EEN
kOSV jIN AND Ffl ETGNrgc. G.C., OFPARTINt IT.a{?IAV A RASSADOR
(FEgi 1R), ARE GIVE`J MUCH LESS PRIMTNE'NCE T-AN THOSE' WITH
CONFIDENTIAL
lcr
FORM Me. t re:~s
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/04/07: LOC-HAK-32-4-2-9
 far 3 y
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/04/07: LOC-HAK-32-4-2-9
41 Jt
xl`~,1~ ?y'4t J~.
s~"'-res D t
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 026Pst O2 OF p? 101348?_
3REZHNL V. IT IS c)UEcTTONARLE 14WFTt4ER RP HNCV WOULD WISH
TO TAKE: ON BURDEN OF TOFr TIF ICATI')N WITH 4I0V1 SOVIET
INDOSTRY ON TO!' OF Al)ICULTURc. FACT TWAT" ONLY PRAVr)A
UKR4INY REPORTED ^1EET"' 3E'TaN'E'EN UKRAINIAN 'ARTY I_EAr)ER.
SHIai L.FD BY POL? TR'I V PROTEGE' SH"HzRqITSKT 1, AND
BRE7HNEV EN ROUTE' Tr oRA(;UE SUGGERTS THIT OTSCUSSIOV'
MAY HAVP HAD TNTRA-O&PTY IMPLTCATTO"JS 17.11o gT'~ENRTHEVING
SHCWER8 I TSK I Y O S PUS T T T ON V I S- A-V T S g1E'L17ST) WHICH
SREZHNEV PREFERRED E,+!1'1' TO aUt3LICI7E IN CENT-7AL' PRE'SS'.
9? COMMENT: BECAUSE az~EZHMEV IS ASSERTING HIMSELF
MORC TUrAY fJFS NOT MAN THAT 4' 4AR CLEAR AIL-INr
AHEAO. THE INTERNAL O&RTY cITUATI'?N AND THE BURDENS
OF LEADERSHIP OF SO rmr"PLEY A STR'JCTURE AS THE USSR
SUGr E:ST THAT COLLECTt?'E LF'aOEgSHI? 4ILL REMAIN THE`
CORYERSTONE OF PARTY sOL T CY, T--IFRC9Y Im:~OS I NG CDN.
STR4INTR ON S9E!H11E"" r , c EEOOM OF ACTION. AIDITIONALLY,
14E CACLS ENOUGFH T NTFcINAL (Abu I CULTtY c, ,ENE? AL' ECONOMY
AND FOKCI aN POLICY 1r,.,T'1Av MIDDLE EAST, US-C'1VTET
ECONOMIC) PRQRLEMS cn TWAT HE RE'`? 4 I `Nti 01T'NT I ALLY
VULN'.ERAALE TO CRI TICT^M AN11 EVEN CHALLENGE'. H7'4EVER,
OUI ANALYSIS PEMA I Nq 'SSF:NT I ALLY THAT OC LACT CALL'
(MOCCOW 99181. GIVE,! AR! Z4NEV'S AaTLTTY AT TNRTGHTINGo
HE czHOULD MANAGE r0 SnPFAO NESPnNNcI tL 'ITY FIR ANY SETBACKS,
1 AND TWEPE TS "!O RE9Tn,'1S r,ANNGE'4 T'a4T uT !<
WILT, RE ERnD O IN T11c Cf+""I'?1U MONT4S '.JVLE'SS HE IS STRUCK'
14Y AN U'+'LIKELY COMSTE1_LATIOr4 OF FlQvIGN AND DOMESTIC
CRISES. '
O U B c 5 b' vJr, ; tN h'-- E~`~' i~rt uc L
GUNF I DENT T AL
a-
FORM.r.w ratan
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/04/07: LOC-HAK-32-4-2-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/04/07: LOC-HAK-32-4-2-9
Vol. 2 N a. 4
February 15, 1073
'f i-.. \..
A FORT!`1F 3t`d ~ ~ ? 1V !S_1 Ts1?
ie.?' 1,3 F LNtS
POLYANSKY: AGRICULTURAL AND POLITICAL CRISIS
NATIONALITY AND THE POWER STRUGGLE
THE PEOPLES' CAR
NiANPOWER TROUBLES
THEf~~, AND US
r.
ar ~y ~,y',. A .r nit