CIA ANALYSIS OF HANOI'S OUTLOOK ON PARIS NEGOTIATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-285-6-19-9
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2009
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: April 15, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/30: LOC-HAK-285-6-19-9
dr-k
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
3//C
14A
Henry A. Kissinger
FROM:
4f/t5/4
IvIATION
SUBJECT: CIA. Analysis of Hanoi's Outlook on Paris Negotiations
At my request. Dick Helms has had his people prepare an analysis
of Hanoi's outlook on the Paris negotiations which I am forwarding to
you as a matter of interest. The analysis concludes that Hanoi wishes
to seriously explore the possibilities for a settlement, but is not yet
prepared to accept one which does not, at a minimum, provide for
withdrawal of *II U. S. forces and guarantee the VC a fairly clear shot
at political control in SVN. Other principal points in the analysis are
as follows:
I. The determinants of Hanoi's negotiating position are its
calculation of its military position in SYN, the GVH political situation
there, and Hanoi's estimate of the political climate in the U.S.
2. Hanoi is probably satisfied that its forces are demonstrating
an ability to maintain military pressure in South Vietnam over an
extended period. It believes Communist military and political pressure
can prevent the GVN from iignificantly improving its position in the
near future.
3. It also calculates that the U. S.
domestic pressure to get the Paris talks roe
basic change in this assessment, Hanoi is not
coming in Paris.
71 he under mountin
Until there is some
ely to:: be very forth-
4. Signs of allied eagerness or haste in the negotiations will be
at heat is mounting in Washington.
read as indications that the poi
5. Most distasteful to Hanoi would be signs that the U.S. was
politically prepared for a long haul military and diplomatic involvement
in Vietnam.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MORI/CDF
C03234293 pages
3-8
No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/30: LOC-HAK-285-6-19-9
No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/30: LOC-HAK-285-6-19-9
SECRETJSENSttZVZ 4.-
6. The Di&V is nervous about any ladication,that the U. S. might
be able to reduce its role in the war without cutting overall allied
effectiveness. if the U.S. could do this successfully, Hanel would
probably feel impelled to work out a minimal settlement in Paris before
the negotiations become irrelevant.
Secretariat 2
--- HAI< Chron - 1
Presidential Chron - 1
W1-1 file - 1
MAK/DIA/1=lb (4/14/69)
Coord: Richard L. Sneider
Henry A. Kissing'
SECRET/SXNSITIVE
No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/30: LOC-HAK-285-6-19-9
-;?? ?
???
#
No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/30: LOC-HAK-285-6-19-9
SECRET/ SENSITIVE IIPP
4 April 1969
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Factors Influencing Hanoi's Behavior at the Paris
Negotiations
1. The Cornrriunist View of Negotiations. Hanoi is certainly
interested in using the Paris talks to explore seriously the possibilities
of achieving a Vietnam settlement. To Communists generally, however,
and to the Hanoi Politburo in particular, negotiations with non-Communist
governments are fronts of revolutionary.struggle as well as vehicles for
settling disputes. Thus Hanoi is also anxious to exploit the Paris talks,
the fact of their existence, and the manner of their conduct to exacerbate
tensions between Washington and Saigon and to affect the political climate
in South Vietnam, in the United States and in the world at large in a manner
that facilitates the achievement of Hanoi's political objectives. Hanoi is
almost certainly not yet prepared to accept any negotiated settlement that
does not, at a minimum, provide for a withdrawal of all US (and allied)
forces and guarantee the Viet Cong movement a political (and, possibly,
territorial) base adequate to give the Viet Cong a fairly clear shot at
achieving political control over South Vietnam.
?
2. The Principal Determinants of Hanoi's Negotiating Position.
The statements made and proposals tendered in Paris by US and GVN
negotiators in the open talks or, particularly, in private sessions will
certainly be weighed carefully in Hanoi. Such allied remarks or proposals,
however, will be but one of the factors influencing Hanoi's overall negotiating
Postu.te. In general terms, this posture will always be dictated by -- and,
indeed, constitute a reflection of -- Hanoi's overall assessment of the total
Vietnam situation. The principal short run determinants of this overall
assessment probably are, and will remain, Hanoi's calculation of
1 Communist military prospects in South Vietnam, its evaluation of the
political situation in Vietnam (including the state of US/GVN relations)
and, particularly, its estimate of the political climate in the United States
and the impact of this climate on t1;.e policies and resolution of the US
Government.
No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/30: LOC-HAK-285-6-19-9
No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/30: LOC-HAK-285-6-19-9
- 41IP
1 3. At the same time, Hanoi almost certainly is weighing the
costs of prolonging the conflict against the gains likely to be achieved
by this course. These costs include heavy combat losses and physical
and psychological strains on the population in the north, and the weakening
of ideological discipline under the pressures of the war. While none of
these problems is of such magnitude as to force Hanoi to terminate the war,
they will almost certainly influence Hanoi's willingness to prolong the
struggle in the absence of good prospects for success within a reasonable
period of time. Furthermore, Hanoi is probably concerned over its ability
Ito withstand the weight of its Chinese neighbor over the longer term if its
own population continues to suffer the loss of its most vigorous generation
in combat.
c.
4. Hanoi is probably now reviewing the bidding on the Communists'
current phase of military activity in South Vietnam (the offensive that
began on 23 February). Hanoi is probably satisfied that its forces have
given an adequate demonstration of Communist abilities to maintain military
pressures in. South Vietnam over an extended period of time. The Saigon
Government is displaying a degree of toughness, flexibility and cohesion
Hanoi probably finds disquieting, but Hanoi almost certainly still believes
the GVN is vulnerable to various kinds of military, political and diplomatic
pressure and, further, that by political and military action the Communists
can prevent the GVN from improving its position significantly in the near
term future. The new US administration is clearly proving to be more
"stubborn" than Hanoi had hoped would be the case and more obtusely
reluctant to draw the "correct" conclusion that the Vietnam war is inherently
unwinnable and, hence, the US should disengage forthwith. Nonetheless,
Hanoi apparently calculates (or, at least, hopes) that President Nixon's
grace period is rapidly drawing to a close and if Hanoi's negotiators stone-
wall a little longer, the US will be under mounting domestic political
pressure to make the gestures necessary to get the Paris talks moving.
'Hanoi is not likely to show much forthcoming flexibility in Paris unless
or until there is some basic change in its overall assessment of the major
i ingredients of the total Vietnam situation.
5. One other factor almost certainly exerting a significant influence
on Hanoi's negotiating position is Hanoi's reading of the lesson of history.
The Politburo members discussing and deciding Hanoi's current negotiation
strategy are the same people who determined the Viet Mirth's negotiating
position in 1954. In Hanoi's eyes, the Vietnamese Communist Party was
euchred at the 1954 Geneva conference. They settled for half of Vietnam
without insisting on a guaranteed position and status for the Viet Minh
2 -
SECRET/SENSITIVE.
No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/30: LOC-HAK-285-6-19-9
No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/30: LOC-HAK-285-6-19-9
movement in the south that would have given the Viet Minh a clear shot
at political power. In effect, the Politburo took what (in 1954) seemed the
almost no risk gamble of betting on a sure thing. The Politburo
calculated -- along with virtually all knowledgeable observers, Communist
and non-Communist alike ? that South Vietnam was certain to fall into the
Communists' lap either via the 1956 elections* or through anarchy, and
socio-political collapse which would leave the Communists with the only
effective, organized movement south of the 17th Parallel and, hence,
enable them to take power almost by default.
6. The actual course of events in the years following the 1954
Geneva Accords confounded these confident predictions. Instead of collapsing,
Diem's government not only survived but in its early years (1954-1957)
grew progressively stronger. Diem successfully ignored the 1956 election
deadline. Post-Geneva events -- including the effect of the withdrawal of
the bulk of the Viet Minh forces to North Vietnam and the surprising
effectiveness of the early Diem government -- left the Communists'
southern organization in disarray and in serious danger of being wiped out.
By early 1957, the Party Politburo had to face the decision of resuming the
struggle or indefinitely postponing its ambition of gaining political control
over the south. The Party opted for struggle; and now, more than a dozen
years later, the struggle is still going on.
7. Two key and influential Politburo members Le Duan, now
First Secretary of the Party, and Le Due Tho, now Hanoi's senior
negotiator -- were intimately and personally affected by the adverse impact
of the 1954 settlement on the fortunes of the Party's southern organization.
This southern organization was shattered in 1952 in the aftermath of an
unsuccessful general offensive against the French prematurely launched
by the Viet Minh's southern leader, Nguyen Birth, who was executed (on
Politburo orders) for his blunder. Le Man was sent south by the Politburo
to repair the damage, with Le Du.c Tho dispatched to serve as his deputy.
Together these two organized the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN)
and ran the southern organization during the remainder of the Franco-Viet
*Since the 1954 partition divided the country in a way that put the majority
of the population under Communist (DRY) control, the Politburo calculated
that with two years in which to organize its populace, it could almost
certainly produce 99-1- percent of the rnajokty vote in any electoral contest
and, hence, was bound to win. Diem's similar calculations led him to refuse
to commit political suicide by participating in an electoral contest whose
outcome was foreordained by the facts of demographic and political life.
3 -
No Objection To Declassification 2009709/70 : LOC-HAK-285-6-19-9
No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/30: LOC-HAK-285-6-19-9
glIP SECRET/SENSITIVE W
Minh war. There is a considerable body of evidence suggesting that Le
Duan remained in command in the south until late 1956 or early 1957, when
he assumed first the function and then (some months later) the title of
Party First Secretary in Hanoi. From this senior position, Le Duan was
probably one of the most powerful and effective advocates of the policy of
struggle.
8. The history outlined in the above three paragraphs is important
because it unquestionably has a profound effect on Hanoi's current attitudes.
In 1954, the Politburo took what seemed an almost riskless gamble ? .and
lost. Hanoi must recognize that the Thieu government of 1969 is much
stronger in every respect than was Diem's government in 1954. Hanoi will
almost certainly be unwilling to gamble again against odds clearly less
?favorable than those prevailing fifteen years ago. Hence Hanoi will
!probably be reluctant to accept any negotiated settlement in Paris that does
n.ot guarantee the Communists a firm political base in South Vietnam.
9; Hanoi's Negotiating Tactics. Hanoi's tactics 'in Paris appear to
be grounded in the belief -- almost certainly still held, but probably rather
less confidently so than was the case in May 1968 7 that the Communists
can stonewall on major issues longer than Washington's negotiators can.
The Hanoi estimate, probably seconded and supported by the Soviets, seems
to be that political pressures in the United States, including internal and
international public opinion, will induce allied concessions ("moves in the
interests of peace") before changes in the Vietnam situation compel Hanoi
to give ground on major matters of substance.
10. In concrete terms, Hanoi seems bent on avoiding insofar as is
possible any positive commitments to specific performance on the Communist
1 side. It also appears to be endeavoring to get the maximum return, in
terms of allied actions, for any Communist "non-concessions" tendered.
For example, Hanoi got a concrete allied action -- suspension of all bombing
of the north ? in return for "understandings" (which Hanoi insists were not
conditions) that the climate which permitted cessation of the bombing would
be prejudiced if the GVN were not permitted to be present in Paris, if the
major cities in South Vietnam were shelled, and if. the DMZ's neutrality
was violated. A GVN delegation is of course participating in Paris, but
the DMZ has been violated and all major South Vietnamese cities have
undergone some rocketing and shelling. Hanoi's present pitch, however, is
that current Communist military activity in South Vietnam is a legitimate
response to a. late 1968/early 1969 allied "escalation" of effort in South
Vietnam.
SECREVSENSITIVZ
No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/30: LOC-HAK-285-6-19-9
? ? ?
No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/30: LOC-HAK-285-6-19-9
SECRET/SENSITIVE. W
11. Allied Actions Likely to Affect Hanoi's Paris Behavior.
Hanoi's present position, and behavior, at Paris is unlikely? to change
materially unless or until there is some substantial shift in Hanoi's over-
all assessment of the total Vietnam situation. Signs of allied, particularly,
US, eagerness or haste will be read by Hanoi as indications that the
political heat is mounting in the Washington kitchen. Hanoi will be
particularly alert to any hints of self-imposed US deadlines or phase
schedules either announced or reasonably inferred from the public
statements of US political leaders (especially key figures in the Executive
Branch). Hanoi's assessment of the pressure it is under to offer serious
compromises will be almost inversely proportional to its assessment of
the pressure on the US Government..
12., On the other hand, developments which shake Hanoi's faith in
its present overall view of the struggle are the ones most likely to prompt
genuine Communist movement in Paris. Hanoi would find most disquieting
any concrete indications that the US Government was politically prepared
for and confident of its ability to sustain a long siege. Oversimplifying
\
somewhat, the more the allies can project a credible image of prolonged
patience, the greater will be the pressure felt in Hanoi to initiate movement.
13. Hanoi seems to be particularly nervous ab out, hence sensitive
Ito, any indication of the evolution of bilateral US/GVN arrangements which
would reduce the US role in the struggle without restricting the activity of
allied forces or reducing the effectiveness of the overall allied effort.
Hanoi's sharp reaction to developments in this field, or even diicussion
thereof, would appear to betray serious concern. Certainly the evolution
of the Vietnam situation Hanoi would least welcome would be a progressive
dirninution of the US role worked out with the willing support of the GVN
(lw
hich did not adversely affect the military or political strength of the Saigon
Government and was developed bilaterally between Saigon and Washington
without reference (or concessions) to Communist concerns and interests,
Should Hanoi see such a development actually in train, it would first attempt
to initiate effective counter-action on the ground. Should its counter-action
fail, Hanoi would probably feel itself strongly impelled to move in Paris
to stop this process and work out a minimally favorable settlement before
the Paris talks became irrelevant.
14. One other area of activity in which effective allied gambits are
likely to improve Hanoi's Paris behavior is the field of propaganda initiative.
One of Hanoi's principal current objectives is to tar the GVN as the primary
, ?
No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/30: LOC-HAK-285-6-1-9-9
No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/30: LOC-HAK-285-6-19-9
SECtitai br.,rimiLv
obstacle to the peace so universally desired throughout the world.
? Gestures such as Thieuts expressed willingness to talk privately with
the NLF make things very difficult for Hanoi. Further moves along this
line that do not cause serious unrest in Saigon (which Hanoi would very
much like to spark) are the type of GVN action most likely to influence
the international climate in a manner favorable to allied interests in Paris.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/30 : LOC-HAK-285-6-19-9