THE FORCES OF AGOSTINHO NETO APPEAR STRONG ENOUGH TO SEIZE THE ANGOLAN CAPITAL AND SURROUNDING AREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 12, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27 : LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINOTON
July 12, 1975
For Jerry Bremer
From Bud McFarlane
Per our conversation.
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27 : LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9
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. SUMMARY
The forces of Agostinho Neto appear strong enough
to seize the Angolan capital and surrounding area.
Mobutu is exhausted economically and can no longer sup-
port Holden Roberto who lacks a countrywide political
following. Savimbi is weak militarily but has political
strength.
1 WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The military balance among ,the three contending
nationalist groups in Angola has recently shifted in
favor of Agostinho Netois Popular Movement for the Libera-
tion of Angola (MPLA), thanks to an influx of arms from
the USSR via Congo.
B. Neto is strong among urban dwellers and among
the Kimbundu tribes which surround Luanda. He has
exploited his newly found weapons superiority to press
his military advantage around the capital. He is pushing
Roberto 's forces back into their tribal lands and is
strong enough militarily to defeat, if he chose the
Savimbi forces around Luanda who are relatively unarmed.
C. The lightly armed forces of the National Front
for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) led by Holden Roberto
do not seem able to cope with the better armed MPLA.
The FNLA has serious leadership weaknesses at the middle
level and, depending as it does largely on the Bakongo
tribes of northern Angola, faces difficulty in building
a following throughout Angola.
D. The National Union for the Total Independence
of Angola (UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi is based on the
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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numerically-large Ovimbundu tribes. UNITA enjoys a
large following in eastern and southern Angola. Its
leadership appears dynamic. Savimbi is recruiting new
forces but does not now have sufficient arms for the
men he has in
training.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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IV. OBJECTIVES AND PROSPECTS
A. Our primary objective is to prevent a Neto talc
over and the establishment of an MPLA-controlled state
with close Communist ties.
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B. We also share the interest of Savimbi and Roberto
in avoiding a protracted civil war in Angola even if it
means that the MPLA remains the third party of a three-
party government. Up to now, together Savimbi and Roberto
enjoy support not only from Mobutu and Kaunda but other
of the non-radical leaders of Africa as well. Savimbi
also appeals to some elements in the new Portuguese regime.
Neither Savimbi nor Roberto can afford to alienate these
other leaders. They need not only their political and
financial support, but also in the case of Mobutu and
'7
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- ?
50 Pk sift Irmo rot:1002 ter risql clo
Kaunda the right to transship supplies through Zaire and
Zambia. A protracted civil war in Angola would reduce
chances for the peaceful solution of the Rhodesian and
South-West Africa issues.
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