TEXT OF THIEU'S RESIGNATION SPEECH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 21, 1975
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5 6v A/
FBI S 6~ It "
TEXT OF THIEU' S RESIGNATION SPEECH
SG211220 SAIGON DOMESTIC SERVICE IN VIETNAMES'-- 1145 Gi9T 21 A-, -)R 73 Sr
(ADDRESS BY RVN PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU--LIVE FROM INDEPENDENCE
PALACE)
(TEXT) MR VICE PRESIDENT , MR PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, MR ACTING
SPEAKER OF THE LOWER HOUSE, MR PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME COURT ,
MR PRIME MINISTER , MR PRESIDENT OF THE INSPECTORATE, DEAR SENATORS
AfV DEPUTIES, DEAR SUPREME JUDGES AND INSPECTORS, DEAR MEMBERS
OF THE GOVERNMENT AND ADVISERS TO THE GOVERNMENT, DEAR BROTHER
ARMYMEN AND POLICEMEN, DEAR COMPATRIOTS, DEAR BROTHER AND SISTER
COMBATANTS AND CADRES:
FIRST OF ALL, I APOLOGIZE FOR ADDRESSING YOU DIRECTLY TODAY
WITHOUT PREPARING A MESSAGE FOR YOU, THE COMPATRIOTS NATIONWIDE
AND THE BROTHER AND SISTER COMBATANTS AND CADRES. BECAUSE THE
URGENT ISSUE REQUIRED AN URGENT DECISION AND MAXIMUM SECRECY,
FOR-REASONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY, I PERMITTED MYSELF TO INVITE
MEMBERS OF BOTH CHAMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, MEMBERS OF THE
SUPRE~;E COURT, MEMBERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND ALL
OF YOU ON VERY SHORT NOTICE TO COME TO A SETTING THAT SHOULD HAVE
BEEN DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF INDEPENDENCE PALACE. THIS IS ALSO TRUE
WITH THE COMPATRIOTS AND THE BROTHER AND SISTER COMBATANTS.
THIS IS A VERY IMPORTANT TALK, BUT IT HAD NOT BEEN ANNOUNCED BEFOREHAND.
FOR REASONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF
THE TALK TO NATIONAL SECURITY, I ASK THE COMPATRIOTS AND THE BROTHER
AND SISTER COMBATANTS, CADRES AND MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL POLICE
TO APPRECIATE THAT.
HAD TIME PERMITTED t I WOULD HAVE CONVENED A PLENARY SESSION OF
BOTH CHAMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WITH THE PRESENCE OF THE
SUPREME COURT AND VARIOUS MASS AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, SO
I COULD DEAL WITH THE SITUATION THAT I AM GOING TO ELABORATE ON
TODAY. MAY I ASK YOU TO GENEROUSLY EXCUSE ME' FOR DEALING WITH THIS
URGENT ISSUE IN A SUCH A WAY THAT , IT IS REASONABLE TO SAY, IS
NOT FULLY CONSISTENT WITH ETIQUETTE.
21 APR 13452 JTC/CAJ " " '
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
 MB I S X62 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
FIRST ADD 60 (THIEU SPEECH)
XXX CONSISTENT WITH ETIQUETTE-
(TEXT) GENTLEMEN, COMPATRIOTS, BROTHERS AND SISTERS:
TODAY, MAY I SUMMARILY REVIEW THE DEVELOPMENTS IN OUR COUNTRY
SINCE THE DAY OF MY ASSUMPTION OF LEADERSHIP. I HAVE GONE THROUGH
TWO PRESIDENTIAL TERMS AND MY SECOND TERM WILL EXPIRE IN 6 MONTHS.
IN 1965, IN THIS SOUTH VIETNAM, WE CONTROLLED ONLY HALF OF THE
ENT IRE POPULATION AND ABOUT HALF OF OUR TERRITORY. THE SITUATION
WAS VERY SERIOUS. THE COMMUNIST AGGRESSORS HAD THE UPPER HAND AND
WERE ABLE TO WIN OVER US MILITARILY WITHIN A VERY SHORT PERIOD
OF TIME.
AT THAT TIME, THANKS TO THE VIGOROUS INTERVENTION AND FIRM
ALLY AND OTHER ALLIES, THANKS TO THE
S
O
R U
.
.
U
DETERMINATION OF
PRESENCE OF HALF A MILLION ALLIED TROOPS FROM SIX ALLIED COUNTRIES,
AND THANKS TO THE EFFECTIVE USE OF U.S. AIR AND NAVAL FORCES TO
PUNISH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AGGRESSORS BOTH IN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH,
WE ADVANCED TOWARD A VERY FINE SITUATION UP TO 196=3.
AT. THAT TIME, COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAM WAS IN A WEAKENED POSITION.
UNABLE TO ENDURE THE BOMBING RAIDS, NORTH VIETNAM AGREED TO GO TO
PARIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THE COMMUNISTS AGREED TO DO SO BECAUSE
THEY HAD A SOLE AIM: TO HAVE THE UNITED STATES END UNCONDITIONALLY
AND PERMANENTLY ITS AIRSTRIKES AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM. ONLY WHEN
THE U.S. AIRSTR IKES HAD ENDED COULD NORTH VIETNAM HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY
TO STAND UP AGAIN AND REBUILD ITS AGGRESSIVE POTENTIAL IN PREPARATION
FOR UNLEASHING A NEW, EVEN MORE VIGOROUS AGGRESSION AGAINST THE RVN.
THUS, THE COMMUNISTS HAD AN AIM. WHAT WAS THEIR AIM? THEY WANTED...
(SENTENCE NOT CONTINUED--FBIS) THE U.S. ALLY ONLY WANTED PEACE TALKS,
ALTHOUGH IT FORESAW THAT THEY WOULD HELP ACHIEVE NOTHING.
FOR THIS REASON, IT ISSS WO[T~IDHEERCO~!^~UNISTOS B1E969
PEACE TALKS .MADE NO PROGRE
STUBBORN, FIGHTING WHILE TALKING AND TALKING WHILE FIGHTING.
THEY SKILFULLY APPLIED THIS TACTIC. THEY SUCCEEDED IN DECEIVING
THE WORLD AND THE UNITED STATES.
IN 1972, WHEN THE COMMUNISTS BECAME STRONG, THAT IS, AFTER THEY
HAD 4 YEARS TO BUILD REGULAR UNITS AT THE CORPS AND DIVISION LEVELS
AND RECETVED ND RED THOUSANDS AND ARTILLERY PIECES FROM THE SOVIET
UNION AND THEY LAUNCHED A GENERAL OFFENSIVE IN THE SUMMER.
THE COMMUNISTS WANTED TO REVERSE THE TREND BY A MILITARY VICTORY.
NEVERTHELESS, WE SUBSE'JENTLY DROVE THE COMMUNISTS OUT OF BINH
LONG, KO NT UM, BINH DINH, AND OUAN, TRI. AS A RESULT, THEY AGREED
TO NEGOTIATE BECAI.ISE THEY WERE SUBJECT TO RENEWED , EVEN MORE
HEAVIER AIRSTRIKES, AND THEIR POTENTIALS DID NOT PERMIT THEM TO
CONTINUE THEIR AGGRESSION. IF THEY HAD NOT AGREED TO NEGOTIATE
SERIOUSLY, THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN PERMANENTLY ANNIHILATED.
21 APR 1357Z PC/CAJ
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
FB I S 75
SECOND ADD SO (T H IE U SPEECH)
XXX BEEN PERMANENTLY ANNIHILATED.
(TEXT) THE COMMUNIST STRATEGY IS AS FOLLOWS: WHEN THEY ARE STRONG
MILITARILY, THEY FIGHT VIGOROUSLY WHILE HOLDING TALKS PERFUNCTORILY.
AND WHEN THEY ARE WEAK MILITARILY, THEY FIGHT THAT WAY BUT COME ON
STRONG IN THE TALKS. THEY AGREED TO RESUME THE PEACE TALKS. BUT
AFTER THE TALKS BETWEEN THE SOUTH VIETNAM-U.S. SIDE AND THE COMMUNIST
SIDE RESUMED AT THE PARIS CONFERENCE TABLE, WE REALIZED THEY WERE
STALLING.
AT THE TIME, THERE WAS COLLUSION BETWEEN THE COMMUNISTS AND THE
UNITED STATES WITH A VIEW TO REACHING THE AGREEMENT OF 26 OCTOBER 1972.
THIS AGREEMENT, WHICH I SPENT MUCH TIME EXPLAINING TO OUR
COMPATRIOTS--I AM SURE THAT MY COMPATRIOTS STILL REMEMBER IT--WAS
AN AGREEMENT BY WHICH THE UNITED STATES SOLD SOUTH VIETNAM TO THE
COMMUNISTS.
I HAD ENOUGH COURAGE TO TELL SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER
AT THAT TIME THE FOLLOWING: IF YOU ACCEPT THIS AGREEMENT, THIS
MEANS YOU ACCEPT TO SELL SOUTH VIETNAM TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
COMMUNISTS. AS FOR ME, IF I ACCEPT THIS AGREEMENT, I WILL BE
A TRAITOR AND SELLER OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND TERRITORY
TO THE? COMYIUNISTS. IF YOU ACCEPT IT , THIS IS FOR U.S. INTERESTS
OR FOR SOME PRIVATE REASON WHICH I DO NOT KNOW ABOUT . IT IS A
SHARING OF INTERESTS AMONG YOU POWERS THAT I DO NOT KNOW ABOUT.
YOU MAKE SOME CONCESSIONS OR EXCHANGES AMONG YOU. YOU WANT TO SELL
THE INTERESTS AND LIVES OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE. AS FOR ME, A
VIETNAMESE, I CANNOT DO SO.
I REFUSED TO ACCEPT THIS AGREEMENT. I OPPOSED THIS AGREEMENT
FOR 3 MONTHS. DURING THESE 3 MONTHS, I STRUGGLED VIGOROUSLY
FOR THREE MAIN POINTS. MY LIFE-AND-DEATH STRUGGLE WAS TESTIFIED
TO BY THE FACT THAT I INVITED TO EACH MEETING
SENATE CHAIRMAN NGUYEN VAN HUYEN, LOWER HOUSE SPEAKER NGUYEN BA
CAN, THE FOREIGN MINISTER , THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME COURT , THE
,
VICE PREMIER, THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, THE VICE PREMIERS AND
SOMETIMES, A FEW POLITICIANS.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
THESE ARE THE THREE POINTS WHICH I SAID COULD LEAD TO THE LOSS
OF THE COUNTRY:
FIRST WAS THE THREE-SEGMENT GOVERNMENT AT THE TOP WHICH
WOULD DIRECT (CHIR HUY) THE TWO GOVERNMENTS OF THE RVN AND THE NFLSV.
AND THIS THREE-S GMENT COALITION GOVERNMENT WOULD EXERCISE ITS
POWER DOWNWARD TO THE PROVINCIAL, DISTRICT, VILLAGE AND HAMLET
LEVELS. IN MY OPINION9 THIS WAS A COALITION GOVERNMENT I COULD NOT
ACCEPT, REGARDLESS O F ITS FORM OR ITS LEVEL.
I DID NOT ACCEPT SUCH A GOVERNMENT 5 OR 7 YEARS AGO. I DID NOT
ACCEPT SUCH A GOVERNMENT AT THE CENTRAL LEVEL--THIS IS NOT TO MENTION
THE VILLAGE OR HAMLET LEVEL. I ALSO REFUSED TO ACCEPT A THREE-SEGMENT,
OR FOUR -SEGMENT , OR TWO-SEGMENT GOVERNMENT. I STRESSED THAT I
COULD NOT ACCEPT IT.
SECOND, THEY SAID THAT THERE WERE ONLY THREE COUNTRIES IN INDOCHINA:
CAMBODIA, LAOS AND VIETNAM. THUS, I ASKED SECRETARY OF STATE
KISSINGER: WHICH VIETNAM? IS IT THE VIETNAM OF THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT
OR OF THE HANOI GOVERNMENT? IF YOU ACCEPT THIS AGREEMENT, THIS
MEANS THAT YOU ACCEPT THE VIETNAM OF HANOI. ACCORDING TO THE
COMMUNISTS, THIS VIETNAM INCLUDES BOTH THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH.
I CANNOT ACCEPT IT. I WANT TO RETURN TO THE GENEVA AGREEMENT
ACCORDING TO WHICH THERE ARE TWO VIETNAMS AND TWO ADMINISTRATIONS--THE
HANOI AND SAIGON ADMINISTRATIONS. I CALL THE COMMUNIST COtfl fRY
THE DRV AND THEY MUST CALL THIS COUNTRY THE RVN. NEITHER COUNTRY
MUST INVADE THE OTHER. THE 17TH PARALLEL AND THE GENEVA AGREEMENT
MUST SERVE AS A BASIS, PENDING THE DAY OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION
THROGH PEACEFUL AND DEMOCRATIC MEANS. THE DATE OF REUNIFICATION IS
UNKNOWN. THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH--THAT IS9 TWO SEPARATE
COUNTRIES--WILL APPLY FOR UN MEMBERSHIP. THE 17t4 PARALLEL
AND THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE WILL BE MAINTAINED UNTIL THE DAY OF
NATIONAL REUNIFICATION.
21 APR 1524Z JTC/CAJ
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
FBIS 81
THIRD ADD 60 (THIEU SPEECH)
XXX OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION.
(TEXT) THE THIRD POINT WAS THAT WITH REGARD TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
TROOPS, SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY HAD THE
RIGHT TO REMAIN IN THE SOUTH LEGALLY AND AS A MATTER OF COURSE.
AS I SAID, THIS WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT POINT. NOTHING WAS MORE
WEIRD THAN THE FACT THAT THE AGGRESSORS 9 AFTER THE WAR HAD BEEN
ENDED AND PEACE RESTORED , HAD THE RIGHT TO LEAVE THEIR TROOPS
FOREVER ON THE TERRITORY OF SOMEONE ELSE.
I SAID THEN THAT A MOST IMPORTANT PREREOUISITE WAS THE WITHDRAWAL
OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS TO THE NORTH. MR KISSINGER REPLIED TO
ME THAT THE UNITED ST ATES HAD NEGOT IATED THIS ISSUE FOR 3 YEARS
WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND RED CHINA, BUT NO AVAIL. THAT WAS WHY
THE UNITED STATES HAD GIVEN UP.
I SAID : AH! THIS IS WHY THE U.S. PRESIDENT AT THE OUTSET RAISED
THE FOLLOWING CONDITION FOR NORTH VIETNAM : THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
TROOPS, AS THE AGGRESSOR TROOPS, MUST WITHDRAW FIRST, BEFORE THE
UNITED STATES WOULD WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS. THIS SOUNDED SENSIBLE
AND LOGICAL. IT SOUNDED VERY RESOLUTE. BUT LATER, THE UNITED
STATES GRADUALLY DEESCALATED ITS DEMAND, SAYING THAT THE U.S.
AND NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS WOULD BE BILATERALLY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY
WITHDRAW. THIS ALSO SOUNDED REASONABLE, LOGICAL AND PEACEFUL.
HOWEVER, WHY WAS IT THAT PRESIDENT NIXON SAID IN A SPEECH THAT
THE UNITED STATES WOULD UNILATERALLY WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS? HE DID
NOT DEMAND THAT NORTH VIETNAM WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS.
I ASKED MR KISSINGER IF THE UNITED STATES NO LONGER DEMANDED
THAT NORTH VIETNAM WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS. HE SAID YES. THAT WAS
WHY I DISAGREED. I SAID : YOU GENTLEMEN AGREE, BUT I DON'T.
NORTH VIETNAM MUST WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS. THIS IS AN INEVITABLE
AND NORMAL CONDITION TO BE MET WHEN THE WAR ENDS, ESPECIALLY
WHEN THE WAR IN THIS SOUTH IS A WAR OF AGGRESSION WAGED BY THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
FINALLY, WE HAD TO REACH A COMPROMISE SOLUTION. I SAID THAT
I WOULD ONLY AGREE TO A SOLUTION WHEREBY THE PROBLEM OF NORTH
VIETNAMESE TROOPS WAS SETTLED. THIS SOLUTION WAS: THE PROBLEM
CONCERNING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES
AND CONCERNING THE ARMED FORCES OF SOUTH AND NORTH VIETNAM SHALL
BE SETTLED BY THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENTS, THE VIETNAMESE ELEMENTS
THEMSELVES, ON THE BASIS OF GRADUAL REDUCTIONS IN THE TROOP
STRENGTH AND DEMOBILIZATION.
I BELIEVE THAT THIS WAS NOT OUR DESIRED SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM
CONCERNING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS AND WAS NOT AN IDEAL SOLUTION.
BUT WE COULD DO NOTHING BETTER* WE COULD NOT DRIVE ALL O F THEM OUT
OF THE SOUTH AT A TIME WHEN THE UNITED STATES HAD STOPPED FIGHTING
AND STOPPED AIDING US. THAT WAS WHY I CONSIDERED THIS SOLUTION
ACCEPTABLE IF NORTH VIETNAM HAD GOOD WILL.
NORTH VIETNAM HAD 300, 070 TROOPS IN THE SOUTH AND WE HAD . 1
MILLION. NORTH VIETNAM SH01JLO SHOW GOOD WILL BY DEMOBILIZING THEIR
300,000 TROOPS, AND WE WOULD REDUCE OUR TROOP STRENGTH TO 703,030.
THE REPORTED 100,000 LIBERATION TROOPS SHOULD BE DEMOBILIZED,
AND OUR SIDE WOULD FURTHER REDUCE OUR TROOP STRENGTH BY ANOTHER
100,030. AFTER THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND LIBERATION TROOPS HAD BEEN
DEMOBILIZED AND AFTER WE HAD DEMOBILIZED OUR OWN-TROOPS, ALL SOUTH
VIETNAMESE WOULD PERFORM THEIR MILITARY DUTY IN THE SOUTH AND ALL
NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS WOULD RETURN TO THE NORTH AND PERFORM THEIR
MILITARY DUTY THERE. THIS WOULD BE A FAIR SETTLEMENT.
WITH REGARD TO THE PROPOSED THREE-SEGMENT COALITION GOVERNMENT,
I CATEGORICALLY REJECTED IT. THAT WAS WHY IT WAS S!$SE9,UENTLY
CHANGED INTO A THREE-SEGMENT NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NATIONAL RECONGILIATION
AND CONCORD, CHARGED SOLELY WITH HOLDING ELECTIONS. IT WOULD HAVE
NO RULING POWER IN THIS SOUTH. THEREFORE, AS I
RECALL, I SAID: OUR GOVERNMENT, OUR CONSTITUTION, OUR REGIME,
OUR ARMED FORCES, OUR POLICE, OUR ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM AND
OUR PEOPLE REMAIN. NOTHING WILL CHANGE.
I ALSO SAID THAT WHEN GENERAL ELECTIONS ARE HELD, WE WILL
STRUGGLE AGAINST THE COMMUNIST POLITICALLY, AND THE THREE-SEGMENT
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD SHALL
BE THE BODY THAT WILL HOLD INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED ELECTIONS.
MY STRUGGLE WAS SUCCESSFUL IN THIS RESPECT.
21 APR 153?Z JT C/CAJ
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
FBIS SS -
FOURTH ADD 60 (THIEU SPEECH)
XXX IN THIS RESPECT.
(TEXT) I ALSO INSISTED THAT THERE ARE FOUR IWDOCHINF-SE
NATIONS, AND NOT THREE, AND THAT THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND THE 17TH
PARALLEL MUST BE RESPECTED.
THREE MONTHS ELAPSED BEFORE MY DEMAND WAS MET. THERE WAS UNTOLD
MENACE AND PRESSURE. WITH REGARD TO PRESSURE, LET ME SAY FRANKLY,
AND LET YOU GENTLEMEN HERE BE WITNESSES, THAT MR NIXON TOLD ME AS
FOLLOWS: ALL ACCORDS ARE, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, MERE SHEETS
OF PAPERS. THEY WILL BE WORTHLESS, IF THEY ARE NOT IMPLEMENTED
AND IF NORTH VIETNAM VIOLATES THEM. THEREFORE, THE IMPORTANT THING
IS WHAT YOU WILL DO AFTER SIGNING THE AGREEMENT, AND WHAT FACILITIES
WE WILL MAKE AVAILABLE TO YOU IF NORTH VIETNAM RENEGES ON AND
VIOLATES THE AGREEMENT AND RENEWS ITS ATTACKS AGAINST THE SOUTH.
SO, YOU SHOULD NOT BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE SIGNING OF THIS AGREEMENT
WHICH, IN MY VIEW, IS THE BEST. THERE CAN BE NO BETTER AGREEMENT.
WE WANT IT TO BE BETTER, BUT WE CANNOT MAKE ANY MORE MOVES VIS-A-VIS
THE SOVIET UNION AND RED CHINA: AND WE HAVE GIVEN UP. FURTHERMORE,
PRESIDENT THIEU, YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT NO MATTER HOW GOOD THE AGREEMENT
YOU DRAFT MAY BE, THE PROBLEM WILL NOT BE FOR YOU TO REFER TO THE
SIGNED AGREEMENT IF THE COMMUNISTS FAIL TO RESPECT IT AND SEND TROOPS
TO ATTACK YOU AGAIN. TREY WOULD NOT BE AFRAID OF THE AGREEMENT.
THE REAL PROBLEM IS: WHAT WILL THE AMERICANS MAKE AVAILABLE TO
YOU, PRESIDENT THIEU, AND THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE SO THEY CAN RESIST
THE COMMUNIST ATTACKS? THIS IS THE REALLY IMPORTANT MATTER.
AND I INVITE YOU TO WASHINGTON TO LAY THE NEW GROUNDWORK FOR THE
RELATIONS BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE POSTWAR
PERIOD, AND FOR THE COMMITMENTS TO PROVIDE MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN
PROTECTING THE FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE OF SOUTH VIETNAM, SHOULD
THE CO4MUNISTS VIOLATE THE AGREEMENT.
I THOUGHT THAT I WAS PRACTICAL AND I KNOW THAT OUR SOUTHERN
COMPATRIOTS ARE PRACTICAL, TOO.
ACTUALLY, IF THE:, CeNIMUNISTS VIOLAT'-D THE AGREEMENT iISIA.!G THE
A"S''NDANT AID THEY RECETI,117-1-5 FROM THE S'OVTET UNION AND RED CHINA AND,
17 WE SHO'ED THEM THE BEA'1TI1;"'.4_1_Y WORDED Airi .-""ti^1T, THEY W01!LD
NOT B'AF';AID OF IT. BUT T. WE RECEIVED ADE'JUATE U.S. 14ILIT4RY AI),
I? THE VIETNA"^.IZATION PLAN AND THE PLAN TO MODERNIZE. THE RVN ARMED
FO!,C'ES E`i 17 C=,1R7RIsED) OUT , AND IF THE AMERICANS RESU"1ED THEIR ASSISTANCE:-
TO U.JSS WITH THEIR AIR FnRC",F. FACILITIES TO PUNISH THE AGGRESSORS,
THIS k OUJLD BE MORE PRACT TCr,l, FOR !JS, I T`i) JOT.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
OUR SURVIVAL DEPENDED ON BOMBS AND AMMUNITION NEEDED ON THE
BATTLEFIELD 9 ON ECONOMIC FACILITIES, AND ON U.S. BAC'(I"IG. THIS
WAS MORE PRACTICAL THAN HAVING A BEAUTIFULLY WORDED AGREEMENT BUT
NOTHING WITH WHICH TO COPE WITH THE ENEMY. THAT SOUNDED VERY
ENTICING AND LOGICAL. AND THE MOST IMPORTANT PRESSURE ON ME AT
THAT TIME WAS THAT IF THE RVN GOVERNMENT REFUSED TO SIGN THE
AGREEMENT, THE U.S. CONGRESS WOULD CERTAINLY AND IMMEDIATELY CUT
ALL U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO THE RVN GOVERNMENT--"AND
EVEN IF LATER ON YOU AGREE TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT, YOU WILL BE
UNABLE TO GET U.S. AID. THAT IS AN IRREVERSIBLE DECISION BY THE
U.S. CONGRESS. AND WHEN THE COMMUNISTS AGAIN LAUNCH ATTACKS
AGAINST YOU, YOU WILL HAVE NO MILITARY AND-ECONOMIC AID FOR DEFENSE,
AND WE WILL NOT INTERVENE. DO YOU THINK THAT THE FUTURE OR THE
PRESENT IS IMPORTANT?"
THOSE WERE THE CONDITIONS AND SOLEMN COMMITMENTS MADE NOT
BETWEEN, I THINK, THE PERSONS OF MR NIXON AND MR NGUYEN VAN THIEU
OR BETWEEN TWO INDIVIDUALS OR TWO ADMINISTRATIONS, BUT BETWEEN
A U.S. PRESIDENT AND A VIETNAMESE PRESIDENT; BETWEEN A REPRESENTATIVE
OF OUR GREAT U.S. ALLY, LEADER OF THE FREE WORLD, AND ONE OF ITS
ALLIES WHICH WAS FIGHTING--THE RVN. THE COMMITMENTS WERE MADE WITH
THE HONOR OF TWO COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THE HONOR OF A SUPERPOWER,
LEADER OF THE FREE WORLD. WHAT WERE THESE COMMITMENTS ABOUT?
FIRST 9 WHEN COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAM RENEWED ITS AGGRESSION
AND VIOLATED THE AGREEMENT, THE AMERICANS WOULD REACT VIOLENTLY
AND IMMEDIATELY TO CHECK THE AGGRESSION.
SECOND, THE AMERICANS WOULD RECOGNIZE ONLY THE RVN GOVERNMENT
AS THE SOLE GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM.
THIRD, THE AMERICANS WOULD PROMPTLY PROVIDE ABUNDANT MILITARY
AND ECONOMIC AID TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO HELP THEM FIGHT
THE COMMUNIST AGGRESSORS IN CASE OF RENEWED COMMUNIST AGGRESSION.
THE AMERICANS WOULD PROVIDE THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WITH SUFFICIENT
ECONOMIC AID TO HELP THEM DEVELOP THEIR COUNTRY.
HE ALSO SAID VICE PRESIDENT AGNEW WOULD COME TO VIETNAM IN
A FEW DAYS AND WOULD PUBLICLY ANNOUNCE THESE THREE COMMITMENTS IN
SAIGON. BUT WHEN MR AGNEW ARRIVED, HE ONLY TALKED ABOUT TWO
COMMITMENTS AND HE FAILED TO MENTION THE THIRD ONE: HE IG NORED
THE ONE DEALING WITH U.S. INTERFERENCE, REACTION, AND VIGOROUS
RETALIATION. I BECAME DOUBTFUL ABOUT THE U.S. COMMITMENTS AT
THAT POINT.
21 APR 1703Z JTC/CAJ
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
 FIFTH No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
XXX AT THAT POINT.
(TEXT) GENTLEMEN, COMPATRIOTS, BROTHERS AND SISTERS:
DEALING WITH THE AGREEMENT OF 26 OCTOBER 1972, I DID NOT THINK
THAT A SECRETARY OF STATE LIKE MR KISSINGER COULD NOT REALIZE THAT
IT WAS AN AGREEMENT LEADING THE NATION AND COUNTRY OF VIETNAM OT
ITS DEATH. I BELIEVE HE REALIZED THIS. I DO NOT WANT TO STRESS
THAT HE ACCEPTED THIS, BUT SINCE EVERYONE REALIZED THIS, HE MUST
HAVE REALIZED IT.
I THOUGHT THERE WAS SOME REASON FOR HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THIS
AGREEMENT. AT THAT TIME, I TOLD YOU COMPATRATIOS THAT THE
SUPERPOWERS HAD THEIR GREAT INERESTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. SINCE
THEIR INTERESTS IN A SMALL AND WEAK COUNTRY LIKE OURS, WERE SMALL,
THEY WOULD DARE SACRIFICE US IN THEIR EXCHANGE OF INTERESTS.
BUT WE HAD NOTHING FOR THEM TO SACRIFICE. WE HAD NOTHING LEFT
TO BE SACRIFICED. WE HAD ONLY A SMALL LAND, THIS SOUTH VIETNAM,
WHERE WE COULD BREATHE THE AIR OF FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY TO LIVE.
WE COULD SACRIFICE NOTHING. THUS, YOU COMPATRIOTS CAN SEE THAT
MY STAND AT THAT TIME WAS TO NOT CUTT OFF A PIECE OF LAND AND YIELD
IT TO THE COMMUNIST AGGRESSORS; TO NOT ACCEPT A COALITION BECAUSE
COALITION IS LIKE A SUGAR-COATED POISONOUS PILL; TO NOT ALLOW THE
COMMUNISTS TO ACT AS THEY PLEASED IN SOUTH VIETNAM; AND TO NOT ACCEPT
A COALITION AS CONCEIVED BY THE COMMUNISTS.
IN MY OPINION, WITHOUT THIS FOUR-POINT STAND, SOUTH VIETNAM COULD
NOT STAND FIRM BUT WOULD BE GRADUALLY LOST. THESE FOUR POINTS
WERE THE ESSENTIAL MINIMUM. WHAT WOULD BE NEXT? BECAUSE OF SUCH
COMMITMENTS AND WITH CONFIDENCE, I WENT TO THE UNITED STATES IN
MARCH 1973.
I TOLD PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND CONGRESS
THAT I DID NOT RE9UEST FROM THEM ENDLESS AID FOR 20 OR 30 YEARS,
BECAUSE THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES OF SOUTH VIETNAM
ARE VERY ABUNDANT. IF THEY WANTED SOUTH VIETNAM TO DEVELOP VIGOROUSLY
WITHOUT NEEDING THEIR AID FOR 20 OR 30 YEARS LIKE THE R O K AND
NATIONALIST CHINA OR ANY COUNTRY AFTER WORLD WAR II0 THEY SHOULD
GIVE US A LOT OF AID FOR 3 OR 5 YEARS SO THAT WE COULD DEVELOP
OUR ECONOMY, AND THEN GRADUALLY REDUCE IT TO ZERO BY 1980.
I CITED AN EXAMPLE. SUPPOSE I WERE A SICK PERSON WHO WAS JUST
RECOVERING MY STRENGTH. IF THEY GAVE ME A PILL DAILY, THIS WOULD
ONLY ALLEVIATE MY DISEASE. I WOULD REMAIN UNABLE TO WORK, TO STAND
UP AND WALK OR RUN, AND TO EARN MONEY. IF SOMEONE HIT ME, I WOULD
FALL . HOWEVER , AFTER RECOVERING FROM MY ILLNESS, IF IT WERE GIVEN
ABUNDANT MEDICINE-SEVEN OR EIGHT KINDS OF MEDICINE--AND IF I UNDERWENT
PHYSICAL TRAINING, I WOULD BECOME AS STRONG AS AN ATHLETE IN THE NEXT
3 OR 4 YEARS, AND COULD THEN WORK AND EARN MY LIVING. AND WHEN
I ACHIEVED SELF-SUFFICIENCY, I WOULD NO LONGER NEED THEIR CARE.
IF THE PATIENT 19 NOT COMPLETELY HEALED 9 HE WILL BE UNABLE
TO PRODUCE ANYTHING. IF HE IS GIVEN MEDICINE FOR 3 YEARS, HE WILL
BECOME AS STRONG AS AN ATHLETE. AT THAT TINE, THE ASSISTANCE CAN
BE STOPPED.
(MORE)
21 A
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
 SIXTH AD No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
XXX CAN BE STOPPED.
(TEXT) HOWEVER, I REGRET THAT LATER ON WATERGATE OCCURRED
IN THE UNITED STATES. THE U.S. POLITICAL SITUATION HAS PREVENTED
ABUNDANT ECONOMIC AID AND THE CONTINUATION OF THE VIETNAMIZATTON
PROGRAM AND THE PROGRAM TO MODERNIZE THE RVN ARMED FORCES. IN
ADDITION, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CHANGES CONCERNING ENERGY AND FOOD
HAVE CREATED DIFFICULTIES AND CONTRADICTIONS AMONG THE U.S. PEOPLE.
THE COMMUNISTS ARE NOT SO STUPID AS TO FAIL TO RECOGNIZE
ALL THIS. THEY ARE VERY CUNNING AND HAVE FULLY EXPLOITED THESE
EVENTS.
U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID HAS DECREASED, THE VIETNAMIZATION
PROGRAM HAS NOT BEEN PROPERLY CARRIED OUT 9 AND THE PROGRAM TO
MODERNIZE THE RVN ARMED FORCES HAS NOT BEEN IMPLEMENTED. WHILE
3009000 NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS ARE STILL HERE q THE ALLIED TROOPS
HAVE GONE. PRIOR TO THE CEASE-FIRE, THE COMMUNISTS HAD STORED IN
THE SOUTH FIVE TIMES MORE MUNITIONS THAN WE HAD. SINCE THEN, THEY
HAVE REPAIRED THEIR AIRFIELDS, BUILT HIGHWAYS, LAID OIL PIPELINES,
AND CONTINUED TO RECEIVE TANKS AND ARTILLERY PIECES FROM THE SOVIET
UNION AND RED CHINA WHILE THE AMERICANS HAVE PRETENDED NOT TO NOTICE
ANY OF THESE ACTIVITIES AND HAVE REMAINED INACTIVE. THEY HAVE
SUCCEEDED IN BUILDING THEIR ARMY IN THE SOUTH TO THE 570,000
MARK; FORMING MORE DIVISIONS AND ARMY CORPS, 'BRINGING IN MORE
TANKS, ARTILLERY PIECES, ROCKETS, AND ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS, AND BUILDING
MORE HIGHWAYS AND AIRFIELDS. THEY HAVE ADDED VARIOUS TYPES OF MODERN
WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT TO THEIR ARESENAL IN THE SOUTH. MEANWHILE,
ALL TYPES OF U.S. AID TO THE SOUTH HAVE DECREASED AND SO HAS THE
U.S.' DETERMINATION TO COPE WITH THE COMMUNISTS.
WE ARE NOW IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION. WE DESIRE TO SHOW THAT
WE RESPECT THE PARIS AGREEMENT SO AS TO PLEASE THE WORLD AND U.S.
PUBLIC OPINION, AND WE WANT TO PROVE THAT WE LOVE PEACE AND RESPECT
THE PARIS AGREEMENT. THEREFORE, WE HAVE KEPT INVITING THE COMMUNIST
SIDE TO NEGOTIATE, ADVANCING ONE PROPOSAL AFTER ANOTHER AND WE HAVE
ADOPTED A DEFENSIVE RATHER THAN OFFENSIVE ATTITUDE. EVEN IF WE
WANTED TO LAUNCH ATTACKS, WE LACK ENOUGH FACILITIES TO LAUNCH
VIGOROUS AND DEEP THRUSTS AGAINST THE ENEMY'S REAR AREA. WE CANNOT
BOMB NORTH VIETNAM BECAUSE WE LACK FACILITIES TO DO SO. IF WE HAD
DONE THAT, THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE CUT AID MORE RAPIDLY. THEREFORE,
THE COMMUNISTS HAVE GAINED THE UPPER HAND.
IN MARCH 1973, WHEN I WAS IN THE UNITED STATES, THE TONG LE
CHAN INCIDENT HAD ALREADY OCCURRED. THE COMMUNISTS ATTACKED
THIS BASE NOT BECAUSE THEY WANTED TO CAPTURE ONE OF OUR FORWARD
POSITIONS. THEY DID IT TO TEST U.S. DETERMINATION, TO SEE WHETHER
THE AMERICANS DARED TO REACT ALTHOUGH THEY HAD SAID THAT THEY WOULD.
THE AMERICANS DARED NOT REACT. THEREFORE, THE COMMUNISTS HAVE CROWN
BOLDER IN THEIR AGGRESSIVE ACTS.
FOLLOWING THE TONG LE CHAN INCIDENT, MANY OTHER REMOTE BASES
FELL TO THE COMMUNISTS ONE AFTER ANOTHER. BECAUSE OF THE POSITIONS
OF THESE BASES, WE WERE UNABLE TO PROVIDE THEM WITH SUPPLIES,
REINFORCEMENTS, AND AIR SUPPORT AND TO EVACUATE THE WOUNDED.
THE COMMUNISTS GRADUALLY ATTACKED AND SEIZED THEM. WE DID NOT HAVE
ENOUGH FACILITIES. WE LACKED HELICOPTERS AND OTHER TYPES OF AIRCRAFT
TO SUPPORT THESE BASES. AND WE WERE UNABLE TO WITHDRAW FROM THEM.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
 FBIS 103
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
-SEVENTH ADD SO (THIEU SPEECH)
XXX WITHDRAW FROM THEM.
(TEXT) IN PURELY MILITARY TERMS, IT IS VERY STUPID TO ESTABLISH
AN OUTPOST IN A REMOTE AREA WITHOUT THE NECESSARY MEANS TO CARRY
OUT SUPPLY ACTIVITIES AND MEDICAL EVACUATION. MILITARILY, SUCH
OUTPOSTS HAD TO BE EVACUATED OR ABANDONED. HOWEVER, WHEN WE ABANDONED
SUCH OUTPOSTS, PEOPLE CLAIMED THAT THEY WERE ABANDONED BECAUSE THE
RVN TROOPS WERE FLEEING, AND NOT BECAUSE THEY WERE UNDER COMMUNIST
ATTACK, AND THAT THE RVN FORCES LACKED THE DETERMINATION TO FIGHT.
IF WE HAD DECIDED TO FIGHT AND DEFEND THESE OUTPOSTS, WE WOULD NOT
HAVE HAD THE FACILITIES TO DO SO. THEREFORE, THE FALL OF SOME
OUTPOSTS TRIGGERED THE FALL OF COUNTLESS OTHER OUTPOSTS AND ENTAILED
THE LOSS OF MANY OF OUR GOOD COMBAT UNITS. THE LOSS OF SMALL
BASES HAS LED TO THE LOSS OF LARGER BASES AND THE FALL OF DISTRICT
CAPITALS.
. THIS REPRESENTED A TEST OF U.S. RESOLVE AND REACTION. BUT THE
UNITED STATES REMAINED SILENT. THE UNITED STATES HAS ALSO REMAINED
SILENT AFTER PROVINCE CAPITALS HAVE FALLEN. THE UNITED STATES HAS
NOT DARED REACT. SUCH AN ATTITUDE HAS INEVITABLY ENCOURAGED THE
AGGRESSORS, WHO HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY STRONGER , WHEREAS WE,
WHO HAVE FOUGHT IN SELF-DEFENSE, HAVE BEEN STEADILY WEAKENED BY OUR
FRIEND. THE BIG BROTHERS OF THE AGGRESSORS HAVE HELPED THEM BECOME
INCREASINGLY STRONGER. DESPITE THIS, THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT
MADE ANY MOVES VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION AND RED CHINA, NOR HAS
THE UNITED STATES DARED TO TOUCH THE HAIR ON THE LEGS OF THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS AND THE COMMUNISTS IN THE SOUTH.
EVEN WHEN PHUOC LONG FELL, THE UNITED STATES DID NOT REACT.
THUS, WHAT HAS HAPPENED? SINCE 1973, U.S. MILITARY AID HAS
DECREASED. THE VIETNAMIZATTON PROGRAM HAS NOT BEEN IMPLEMENTED
AND THE PROGRAM FOR MODERNIZATION OF THE RVN ARMED FORCES WAS ABANDONED
FOLLOWING THE SIGNING OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT.
THERE CAN BE NO MAGIC IN COMSAT. IN COMBAT, THERE MUST BE AN
E?UIL IBRIUM IN THE BALANCE OF FORCES. COMBAT REQUIRES BOMBS,
AMMUNITION AND OTHER FACILITIES.
IN ADDITION TO THE WILL TO FIGHT AND GALLANTRY, WE MUST BE
REALISTIC. WE CANNOT JUST BITE OTHERS TO DEMONSTRATE OUT GALLANTRY.
WE ARE FIGHTING THE COMMUNISTS WHO POSSESS FACILITIES MADE AVAILABLE
TO THEM BY THE SOVIET UNION AND RED CHINA. WE ARE NOT FIGHTING AN
ENEMY POSSESSING JUST PRIMITIVE WEAPONS AND MACHETTES, AS HE DID
IN THE PAST. THE COMMUNISTS NOW POSSESS MORE ABUNDANT, MORE MODERN
AND MORE POWERFUL FACILITIES AND HAVE MORE TROOPS.
THEREFORE, THE TIME HAS COME WHEN THE COMMUNISTS HAVE COMPELLED
US TO USE OUR REGULAR UNITS TO DEFEND OUR TERRITORY. WE HAVE BEEN
FULLY AWARE THAT THE COMMUNISTS WERE LAYING A TRAP. HOWEVER,
BECAUSE WE HAVE THE TERRITORY, THE PEOPLE, THE COMMUNICATIONS,
THE BRIDGES, THE ECONOMY, THE R ICEPADD IES AND THE RIVERS, WE HAVE
HAD TO DEFEND THIS BY SPREADING OUT OUR ARMED FORCES. AND WE HAVE
EFFECTIVELY DEFENDED OUR TERRITORY FOR 2 YEARS UNTIL RECENTLY.
21 APR 1P^^& 'm m ` No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
FBIS 108
EIGHTH ADD 60 (THIEU SPEECH)
XXX YEARS UNTIL RECENTLY.
(TEXT) MEANWHILE, THE COMMUNISTS HAVE STEADILY INTRODUCED INTO
THE SOUTH MORE TROOPS, MORE TANKS, MORE HEAVY ARTILLERY PIECES,
MORE ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS AND MORE ROCKETS. IN CERTAIN AREAS, THE
COMMUNIST FORCES WERE ONE AND A HALF, TWO AND EVEN THREE TIMES
LARGER THAN OURS. IN CERTAIN PROVINCE CAPITALS, DISTRICT CAPITALS
OR MILITARY BASES, IF WE HAD ONE DIVISION, THE COMMUNISTS DEPLOYED
TWO DIVISIONS TO CONFRONT US; IF WE HAD ONE REGIMENT, THEY DEPLOYED
ONE DIVISION; IF WE HAD ONE BATTALION, THEY DEPLOYED ONE REGIMENT;
IF WE HAD 15 TANKS, THEY DEPLOYED 20 TANKS; IF WE HAD 10 HEAVY GUNS,
THEY DEPLOYED 20. THIS MEANS THAT THEIR FORCES HAVE BEEN TWICE
AS LARGE AS OURS. AS A RESULT, THE BALANCE OF FORCES HAS TILTED
TOWARD THE COMMUNISTS. CONSE' UENTLY, A NUMBER OF OUR BASES AND
PROVINCE CAPITALS. HAVE INEVITABLY BEEN OVERRUN.
THE TIME HAD COME WHEN WE HAD TO ASK: WILL THE UNITED STATES
PROVIDE US WITH AID AND WILL IT INTERVENE AFTER ALL? SHALL
WE SIT BY AND WAIT FOR THE UNITED STATES TO PROVIDE US WITH AID SO
WE CAN FIGHT AND LAUNCH COUNTERATTACKS? Ik THE UNITED STATES DID
NOT INTERVENE, WE WOULD AT SOME FUTURE TIME LOSE EVERYTHING.
IF THE PROVINCE CAPITALS, THE DISTRICT CAPITALS AND THE RVN UNITS
WERE LOST , THE HEAD OF SOUTH VIETNAM--THE CAPITAL AND THIS PROSPEROUS
REGION--WOULD BE LOST.
THE TIME HAD COME WHEN HE HAD TO MAKE UP OUR MINDS. REALIZING
THAT THE AMERICANS HAD ADOPTED A DEFEATIST ATTITUDE TOWARD THE
COMMUNISTS' ACTS OF AGGRESSION, WE HAD TO DECIDE OUR OWN AFFAIRS.
THEREFORE, AFTER BAN ME TH!JOT--THE MOST IMPORTANT, PROSPEROUS AND
DENSELY POPULATED AREA OF THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS--CAME UNDER COMMUNIST
ATTACK, WE WONDERED IF OUR FORCES COULD DEFEND KONTUM AND PLEIKU.
OUR FORCES COULD NOT DFFEND KONTUM AND PLEIKU WHICH, WE BELIEVED
AT THAT TIME, WOULD FALL SOONER OR LATER. AFTER BAN ME THUOT HAD
FALLEN, WE WONDERED WHERE WE COULD GET TROOPS TO RECAPTURE IT.
WE CAME TO A POLITICAL DECISION NOT TO INSURE THE LIFE OR DEATH
DEFENSE OF KONTUM AND PLEIKU.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
ON THE BASIS OF THE VIEWS OF THE PRIME MINISTER , THE GENERAL
COMMANDER OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF AND THE COMMANDERS OF THE
MILITARY REGIONS CONCERNED, WE DECIDED TO DEPLOY OUR FORCES
FROM KONTUM AND PLEIKY TO RECAPTURE BAN ME THUOT. IF BAN ME THIJOT
WERE RETAKEN, WE BELIEVED, WE WOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO RETAKE
KONTUM AND PLEIKU.
THIS WAS A TAIT IIAL FECISION AND, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, A
POLITICAL DECISION. IT WAS A MILITARY, TACTICAL DECISION, AS
FAR AS MR II WAS CONCERENED. UNFORTUNATELY, ANY REDEPLOYMENT OF
TROOPS OR ANY WITHDRAWAL IS NOT AN EASY TASK. IT IS A MOST DIFFICULT
TASK FOR AN ARMY. FURTHERMORE, THE COMMUNIST FORCES IN BAN ME
THUOT AND THOSE USED TO INTERCEPT OUR TROOP MOVEMENTS FROM KONTUM
AND PLEIXU TO PHU BON WERE MORE NUMEROUS THAN OURS. WE HAD ONLY
ONE REGIMENT MOVING KONTUM AND PLEIKU TO PHU BON. THEREFORE, IT
WAS ALREADY EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR US TO PRESERVE PART OF OUR
FORCES MOVING FROM KONTUM AND PLEIKU TO TUY HOA AND NINH HOA.
WE DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT FORCES TO CONCENTRATE ON HILL 2F TO
CHECK THE COMMUNIST ADVANCE FROM BAN ME THUOT. ALL HOPES OF
RETAKING BAN ME THUOT THEN VANISHED, BECAUSE OUR FORCES EVERYWHERE
HAD TO CONFRONT THE ENEMY ON A ONE TO THREE RATIO, THAT IS9 THE
COMMUNIST FORCES WERE THREE TIMES LARGER THAN OURS. FACED WITH
THIS SITUATION, WE HAD TO RELUCTANTLY USE OUR AIRBORNE UNITS,
WHICH WERE ALSO OVERWHELMED BY AN ENTIRE COMMUNIST DIVISION.
YOU SEE, GENTLEMEN AND COMPATRIOTS, EVEN OUR SEASONED AIRBORNE
COMBATANTS WERE OVERWHELEMED, AFTER THEY HAD FOUGHT SELFLESSLY
AND INFLICTED HEAVY LOSSES ON TWO OR THREE ENEMY REGIMENTS.
WITH THAT TREND, NHA TRANG, P4AN RANG, AND CAI RANH WERE
THREATENED BECAUSE THEY WERE DEFENED BY ONLY REGIONAL AND MILITIA
FORCES. THIS WAS ALSO TRUE WITH PHU YEN. OVER THE PAST FEW
YEARS, WE HAD MAINTAINED ONE DIVISION IN (DUI NHON AND BINH DINH.
OVER THESE YEARS, HOWEVER, THE COMMUNISTS HAD INCREASED THEIR TROOP
STRENGTH THERE AND HAD OBTAINED MORE WEAPONS. THEREFORE p DESPITE
THE FACT THAT OUR 22D DIVISION FOUGHT COURAGEOUSLY, IT SUSTAINED
LOSSES AND, IN THE END 9 HAD TO WITHDRAW.
21 APR 1903Z JTC/CAJ
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
FBIS 115
SG211826 NINTH ADD 60--(THIEU SPEECH)
XXX HAD TO WITHDRAW.
(TEXT) IN HUE AND DANANG, THE PROBLEM ALSO CONCERNED THE
BALANCE OF FORCES BETWEEN US AND THE ENEMY. I READILY ACKNOWLEDGE
THAT A FEW OTHER FACTORS WERE INVOLVED IN THE LOSS OF HUE AND
DANANG : SPECIFICALLY, SOME COMMANDERS HAD ADOPTED A DEFEATIST
ATTITUDE; SOME DISTURBANCES WERE CAUSED BY THE COMPATRIOTS'
EVACUATION. I AM SPEAKING FRANKLY. I AM NOT TRYING TO LAY THE
BLAME ON THE TROOPS OR THE COMPATRIOTS. I WANT TO SAY THAT SOME
DEVELOPMENTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD WERE FORESEEABLE AND SOME OTHERS
WERE NOT. FACED WITH THE ENEMY PRESSURE AND HIS ARTILLERY ATTACKS
ON DANANG, WE COULD NOT INSURE A PROTRACTED LIFE OR DEATH DEFENSE
OF OUR POSITIONS.
IT IS TRUE THAT WE AT THE CENTRAL LEVEL HAD GIVEN THE LIFE OR
DEATH DEFENSE ORDERS; HOWEVER , WHEN THE FIELD COMMANDERS, WHO
WERE CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE TROOPS AND THE PEOPLE, COULD NOT
FULFILL THEIR MISSIONS DESPITE THEIR DETERMINATION, HE HAD NO WAY
OF HAVING THEM FULFILL THEIR MISSIONS UNLESS WE COULD SEND THEM
ADDITIONAL TROOPS, WHICH WE DID NOT HAVE; UNLESS WE COULD SEND THEM
ADDITIONAL TROOPS, WHICH WE DID NOT HAVE; UNLESS WE COULD PROVIDE
THEM WITH ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT AND BOMBS, WHICH WE DID NOT HAVE;
AND UNLESS WE PROVIDED THEM WITH ADDITIONAL TANKS AND HEAVY GUNS,
WHICH WE DID NOT HAVE EITHER.
IT IS RECALLED THAT THE U.S. TROOPS WERE REGULARLY PROVIDED
WITH MORE B-52 SUPPORT THAN WERE OUR RVN TROOPS. THAT WAS WHY
THE U.S. TROOPS COULD WIN VICTORIES EASILY AND SUCCEEDED IN
FORCING THE ENEMY TO BOW HIS HEAD.
AFTER 1973, OUR TROOPS HAD FOUGHT MANY BATTLES THAT WON THE
ADMIRATION OF THE U.S. GENERALS WHO RETURNED TO SOUTH VIETNAM,
ESPECIALLY SINCE I ORDERED OUR FORCES TO FIGHT THE ENEMY IN
ECONOMICAL VIETNAMESE WAYS. THESE U.S. GENERALS SAID THAT EVEN
U.S. MARINES SUPPORTED BY B-52'S COULD HARDLY FIGHT SO VICTORIOUSLY.
YET , YOUR BAREFOOTED DIVISIONS, THEY SAID , COULD FIGI-IT. THEY
HAD TO EXPRESS THEIR ADMIRATION.
NEVERTHELESS, DURING THAT PERIOD, WHEN WE ASKED FOR $ 1.4
BILLION IN U. S. AID , THE UNITED STATES REDUCED THIS REQUESTED
AMOUNT TO $700 MILLION, AND THE $300 MILLION HAS BEEN HANGING IN
AIR FOR ABOUT 1 YEAR NOW. DURING THAT PERIOD v THE RVN ARMED
FORCES HAVE LOST? SOME 50 PERCENT OF THEIR COMBAT POTENTIAL: IT
IS LIKE A BOXER WHO HAS LOST SOME 60 PERCENT OF HIS STRENGTH.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
MILITARILY, WHEN AN ARMY IS STRONG, IT WILL. REMAIN STRONG,
AND IF IT IS WEAK, IT WILL GET WEAKER IT IS LIKE A PATIENT:
IF A PATIENT REMAINS STRONG ENOUGH, HE WILL RECOVER, AND IF HE IS
WEAK, HE WILL GET WEAKER. WHEN THE UNITED STATES REDUCED ITS AID
TO US AND WE CONSEQUENTLY LOST SOME So PERCENT OF OUR COMBAT
POTENTIAL, YOU CAN IMAGINE WHAT HAD TO HAPPEN. OUR CASUALTIES
HAVE INCREASED MANIFOLD 9 BECAUSE WE HAVE NOT HAD ENOUGH AIR
SUPPORT. FURTHERMORE 9 OUR ARTILLERY HAS BEEN INFERIOR TO THAT
OF THE ENEMY. THE CASUALTIES INFLICTED ON US BY THE ENEMY
ARTILLERY HAVE SOARED. THE FATALITY RATE AMONG THE WOUNDED HAS
INCREASED BECAUSE WE HAVE NOT HAD ENOUGH HELICOPTERS TO EVACUATE
THE WOUNDED. WORSE STILL, AT THE HOSPITALS, BANDAGES HAVE BEEN
USED AND REUSED TWO OR THREE TIMES. THIS IS INHUMAN TO A
WOUNDED COMBATANT: IT IS INHUMAN TO USE A BANDAGE, THEN WASH IT
AND USE IT AGAIN.
BECAUSE OF THE SHORTAGE OF AMMUNITION, WE HAVE HAD TO COUNT
EVERY SINGLE CARTRIDGE. WE HAVE LOST A CERTAIN NUMBER OF OUR TANKS
AND ARTILLERY PIECES. THE UNITED STATES UNDERTOOK IN THE PARIS
AGREEMENT TO CARRY OUT REPLACEMENTS ON A PIECE-TO -PIECE B ASIS,
BUT IT HAS NOT MADE THESE REPLACEMENTS: IT HAS STOPPED PROVIDING
US WITH THESE MEANS.
AS A MATTER OF COURSE, OUR WAR MATERIEL HAS GRADUALLY DECREASED :
THAT IS WHY WE HAVE LOST. ON THE CONTRARY, THE COMMUNISTS AT
THE OUTSET HAD AN AMOUNT OF WAR MATERIEL WHICH HAS STEADILY
INCREASED. THEREFORE, THEY HAVE GAINED A DUAL ADVANTAGE--THAT IS9
THEY HAVE OBTAINED MORE WAR MATERIEL, WHEREAS OUR VOLUME OF WAR
MATERIEL HAS DECREASED.
THUS, NO MATTER HOW BRAVE OUR COMBATANTS MAY BE AND NO MATTER
HOW SKILLFUL OUR COMMANDERS MAY BE, WE MUST SUFFER LOSSES AND LOSE
LAND AND PEOPLE. WE HAVE REALIZED THIS FACT AND WE CANNOT ENDURE
IT. MANY TIMES, WE HAVE SEEN THAT WE MUST RESORT TO AN ILLOGICAL
TACTIC TO DEFEND OUR LAND AND TO PROTECT OUR PEOPLE. WE HAVE HAD
TO FIGHT AN ILLOGICAL WAR BECAUSE THIS IS OUR RESPONSIBILITY.
THE COMMUNISTS HAVE NO RESPONSIBILITY.
SUPPOSE THAT I AM THE OWNER OF A PLANTATION OF 9 OR 10 HECTARES.
TO PREVENT MY FRUIT AND POULTRY FROM BEING STOLEN, I NEED 30 OR
40 KEEPERS. IF A BURGLAR BREAKS INTO MY PLANTATION EVERY NIGHT
AND FELLS A TREE AND STEALS 10 PIECES OF FRUIT , THIS IS SUFFICIENT
TO DESTROY MY PLANTATION. BUT, IN THIS CASE, THE ROBBERS ARE
MORE NUMEROUS THAN THE KEEPERS AND ARE EQUIPPED WITH MORE MODERN
WEAPONS. HOWEVER v THE AMERICANS HAVE ASKED US TO DO AN IMPOSSIBLE
THING .
21 APR 2031Z GE/HH
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
 I cNo f 1'7
Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
TENTH ADD 60 (THIEU ADDRESS)
XXX AN IMPOSSIBLE THING.-
(TEXT) I HAVE THEREFORE, TOLD THEM: YOU HAVE ASKED US
TO DO SOMETHING THAT YOU FAILED TO DO WITH HALF A MILLION
POWERFUL TROOPS AND SKILLED COMMANDERS AND WITH NEARLY
$300 BILLION IN EXPENDITURES OVER 6 LONG YEARS. IF I DO NOT
SAY THAT YOU WERE DEFEATED BY THE COMMUNISTS IN VIETNAM,
I MUST MODESTLY SAY THAT YOU DID NOT WIN EITHER. BUT YOU
FOUND AN HONORABLE WAY OUT. AND AT PRESENT, WHEN OUR ARMY
LACKS WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, HELICOPTERS, AIRCRAFT AND B-52-S,
YOU ASK US TO DO AN IMPOSSIBLE THING LIME FILLING UP THE
OCEAN WITH STONES. THIS IS LIKE A CASE WHICH YOU HAVE
ME ONLY $3 AND URGE ME TO GO BY PLANE, FIRST CLASS; TO RENT
A ROOM IN A HOTEL FOR $30 PER DAY: TO EAT FOUR OR FIVE SLICES
OF BEEFSTEAK AND TO DRINK SEVEN OR EIGHT GLASSES OF WINE
PER DAY. THIS IS AN IMPOSSIBLE, ABSURD THING.
ALSO, YOU HAVE LET OUR COMBATANTS DIE UNDER A
HAIL OF SHELLS. THIS IS AN INHUMANE ACT BY AN INHUMAN ALLY.
REFUSING TO AID AN ALLY AND ABANDONING IT IS AN INHUMANE ACT.
THIS IS THE REASON WHY, ON THE DAY A U.S. CONGRESSIONAL
DELEGATION CAME HERE, I TOLD THE CONGRESSMEN THAT IT WAS
NOT THE PROBLEM OF $300 MILLION IN AID, BUT IT WAS THE QUESTION
OF COMPLYING WITH THE U.S. PLEDGE TO ASSIST THE VIETNAMESE
PEOPLE IN THE STRUGGLE TO PROTECT THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND
FREEDOM AND THE IDEAL OF FREEDOM FOR WHICH THE AMERICANS
FOUGHT TOGETHER WITH OUR PEOPLE HERE AND FOR WHICH SOME
50,000 U.S. CITIZENS WERE SACRIFICED.
.THE UNITED STATES IS PROUD OF BEING AN INVINCIBLE DEFENDER
OF THE JUST CAUSE AND THE IDEAL OF FREEDOM IN THIS WORLD AND
WILL CELEBRATE ITS 200TH ANNIVERSARY NEXT YEAR. I ASKED
THEM: ARE U.S. STATEMENTS TRUSTWORTHY? ARE U.S. COMMITMENTS
STILL VALID? SOME $300 MILLION IS NOT A BIG SUM TO YOU.
COMPARED WITH THE AMOUNT OF MONEY YOU SPENT HERE IN 10
YEARS, THIS SUM IS SUFFICENT FOR ONLY 10 DAYS OF FIGHTING.
AND WITH THIS SUM , YOU ASK ME TO SCORE A VICTORY OR TO CHECK
THE COMMUNIST AGGRESSION--A TASK WHICH YOU FAILED TO FULFILL
IN 6 YEARS WITH ALL U.S. FORCES AND WITH SUCH AN AMOUNT OF MONEY.
THIS IS ABSURD!
GENTELEMEN, COMPATRIOTS AND BROTHERS AND SISTERS:
ALL THIS HAS LED TO THE CURRENT SITUATION IN OUR COUNTRY.
I ACCEPT THE CRITICISM OF THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD AND OUR ALLY
AS WELL AS THE CORRECT CRITICISM OF OUR VIETNAMESE PEOPLE,
I ADMIT THAT SOME 9 BUT NOT ALL t OF OUR MILITARY LEADERS
WERE COWARDLY AND IMBUED WITH A DEFEATIST SPIRIT AND LACKED
THE BRAVERY OF COMBATANTS IN RECENT BATTLES. IN SOME AREAS
OUR COMBATANTS FOUGHT VALIANTLY AND I DON'T THINK THAT OUR
ALLIED TROOPS COULD HAVE FOUGHT AS VALIANTLY AS THEY DID,
WE MUST BE JUST. THEREFORE, I HAVE SAID THAT WRONGDOERS
MUST BE PROPERLY AWARDED. !,!E DO NOT TRY TO CONCEAL THE
SHORTCOMINGS OF THOSE WRONGDOERS. WE ARE PROUD TO SAY THAT
WE SCORED ACHIEVEMENTS IN SOME OF THE RECENT BATTLES THAT
OUR U. S. ALLIED TROOPS PROBABLY (flULn N1T NAUP gr-nPWn 7 THEY
HAD No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
 LET !JS NOW AGAIN TALK ABOUT THE GENERAL STTTTATTnM TM niIR
COUNTRY No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
20'DIVISIONS AND NUMEROUS ROCKETS, ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS, ARTILLERY PIECES AND TANKS. WE REGRET THAT THE SITUATION
HAS CHANGED SO RAPIDLY IN CENTRAL VIETNAM. HOWEVER , AS A
PRESIDENT AND A MAN WITH SOME MILITARY KNOWLEDGE
I HAVE
,
THE COURAGE TO SAY THAT THE CURRENT SITUATION WOULD BE THE SAME
REG
ARDLESS OF THE RATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION
IN THE RECENT PAST. I CAN SAY THIS TO YOU
GENTLEMEN
,
,
AND YOU WILL HAVE A CHANCE TO CROSSCHECK WITH MILITARIST: I BELIEVE
THAT EVEN IF WE HAD NOT WITHDRAWN OUR TROOPS FROM KONTUM AND
PLEIKU WITH THE EXPLICIT PURPOSE OF USING THEM TO RECAPTURE
BAN ME THUOT, KONTUM AND PLEIKU WOULD NO LONGER BE UNDER
OUR CONTROL. WE WOULD HAVE MOST EVERYTHING,
TROOPS, TANKS, ARTILLERY PIECES, AND OUR PEOPLE IN THESE
AREAS. BECAUSE WE WITHDREW OUR TROOPS FROM THEM , WE
SUCCEEDED IN SALVAGING HALF, AND EVEN MORE THAN HALF, OF THEM.
CONSIDERING THE SITUATION AT THAT TIME, QUANG TIN WOULD
HAVE SOON BEEN LOST; EVEN MAJOR GENERAL TRUONG ADMITTED
THAT. NEXT TO THE FALL OF QUANG TIN WOULD HAVE BEEN THE
FALL OF QUANG NGAI, BINH DINH AND QUI NHON WOULD THEN HAVE
BEEN ISOLATED AND COULD HAVE STOOD FOR A FEW MORE WEEKS
AT THE MOST. HUE WOULD HAVE BEEN ENCIRCLED BY FOUR OR FIVE
COMMUNIST DIVISIONS. THE PEOPLE IN THAT CITY WOULD
HAVE BEEN SHELLED.
SINCE WE HAD ONLY THE FIRST DIVISION IN HUE AND MARINE
DIVISION DEPLOYED BETWEEN HUE AND DANANG AND THE THIRD
DIVISION IN DANANG, WE HAD TO WITHDRAW FROM THOSE AREAS,
ALTHOUGH RATHER TOO RAPIDLY.
EVEN IF WE HAD NOT DONE WHAT WE DID, THE RESULT
WOULD HAVE BEEN THE SAME AS NOW, I THINK.
IN PHU YEN AND TUY HOA, WE ONLY HAD REGIONAL AND POPULAR
FORCES WHICH COULD NOT DEFEND THESE PROVINCES. SINCE WE
HAD ONLY 2 OR 3 DIVISIONS TO DEFEND NHA TRANG, WE ALSO LOST
THAT CITY. WE CANNOT SAY THAT OUR COMBATANTS DID NOT FIGHT
IN PHAN RANG AND PHAN THIET. THERE WERE NOT ONLY PEOPLE
FLEEING BEFORE THE ENEMY'S ADVANCE; THERE WERE PEOPLE WHO FOUGHT
VERY VALIANTLY. I SENT MANY GENERALS TO THE AREA. BESIDES
THE GENERAL COMMANDING THE MILITARY REGION, MAJ GEN NGUYEN
VINH NGHI WAS ALSO PRESENT. GENERAL NGHI VOLUNTEERED
TO WORK UNDER THE COMMAND OF ANOTHER MILITARY REGION COMMANDER,
GENERAL TOAN, IN ORDER TO DEFEND THE PHAN RANG AIRBASE.
HE DID NOT BOTHER ABOUT HIS MILITARY RANK OR FEAR DANGER.
HOWEVER, OUR TROOPS WERE IN A WEAK POSITION AND OUR
MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS INADEQUATE. PHAN RANG WAS LOST TO
THE ENEMY IN THE END AFTER SOME DEFENSE AND SO WAS PHAN THIET.
THEREFORE, UNDER THE CURRENT CONDITIONS, WE MUST TRY TO
REDEPLOY OUR TROOPS TO DEFEND MR III AND IV. WE ARE NOW
IN A POSITION IN WHICH WE MUST RELY ON THE VALOR AND
DETERMINATION OF OUR COMBATANTS, THE SUPPORT OF OUR COMPATRIOTS,
AND THE UTMOST SACRIFICE OF OUR COMBATANTS. WE CANNOT
SAY THAT WE CAN DEFEND THESE AREAS BY RELIANCE ON OUR TROOPS'
STRENGTH AND WEAPONS.
21 APR 2 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
FBIS 122
ELEVENTH ADD 10 (THIEU ADDRESS)
XXX STRENGTH AND WEAPONS.
(TEXT) IN THE DAYS AHEAD THE FIGHTING WILL BE VERY PERILOUS,
VERY FIERCE AND VERY CHALLENGING TO OUR ARMED FORCES AND PEOPLE.
GENTLEMEN: TODAY, BEFORE BOTH CHAMBERS OF THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY, BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, BEFORE THE GOVERNMENT, BEFORE
THE COMPATRIOTS AND BEFORE THE BROTHER AND SISTER COMBATANTS AND
CADRES NATIONWIDE, I DECLARE MY RESIGNATION AS PRESIDENT, AND,
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTION, VICE PRESIDENT IRAN VAN
HUONG WILL ASSUME THE POSITION OF PRESIDENT.
ARTICLE 55 OF THE CONSTITUTION STIPULATES THAT UPON TAKING
OFFICE, THE PRESIDENT SMALL TAKE THE OATH OF OFFICE BEFORE THE
PEOPLE NATIONWIDE, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE SITUATION AND BECAUSE
OF ITS URGENCY, MY RESIGNATION TODAY IS NOT CEREMONIOUS VIS-A-VIS
THE COMPATRIOTS NATIONWIDE, AS WELL AS YOURSELVES AND THE BROTHER
COMBATANTS AND CADRES. TIME DOES NOT PERMIT ME TO ANNOUNCE IT
MORE CEREMONIOUSLY IN A MORE SOLEMN SETTING. FOUR YEARS AGO,
I ASSUMED A MISSION ENTRUSTED TO ME BY THE PEOPLE NATIONWIDE.
UPON MY DEPARTURE , I SHOULD HAVE SOLICITED THE VIEWS OF THE
PEOPLE, IN ONE WAY OR ANOT'-TER, EVEN THOUGH THE CONSTITUTION DOES
NOT PROVIDE FOR A REFERENDUM OR ANY WAY IN WHICH THE PEOPLE
NATIONWIDE CAN VOICE THEIR NONCONFIDENCE IN THE PRESIDENT IN
OFFICE. HOWEVER, I DO NOT REQUIRE THAT BECAUSE OF THE SITUATION,
BECAUSE THAT WOULD BE COSTLY AND BECAUSE, I BELIEVE, ONCE I HAVE
TAKEN THE DECISION TO RESIGN, I WILL ASSUME FULL RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THIS DECISION BEFORE THE PEOPLE NATIONWIDE AND FOR THE REASONS I
ADVANCE .
IN LIGHT OF ARTICLE 55 OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE SWEARING-IN
OF PRESIDENT-DESIGNATE TRAM VAN HUONG SHOULD HAVE BEEN HELD IN
A SOLEMN SETTING. HOWEVER, AS I HAVE SAID, THE SITUATION DOES NOT
PERMIT US TO DO SO. ANOTHER REASON IS THAT A DISCONTINUATION
OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE CHIEF OF STATE MUST BE PREVENTED SO AS
TO AVOID POLITICAL INSTABILITY, A POLITICAL VACUUM, AND THE
ENEMY'S EXPLOITATION OF THE SITUATION. THREFORE, I HAVE AN
URGENT RQUEST. I URGENTLcND EARNESTLY ASK BOTH CHAMBERS OF
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE SUPREME COURT TO CONCUR WITH MY
REQUEST THAT VICE PRESIDENT TRAN VAN HUONG BE ALLOWED TO TAKE THE
OATH OF OFFICE HERE LATER, IN ORDER TO AVOID POLITICAL
INSTABILITY AND A POLITICAL VACUUM THAT MAY BE DETRIMENTAL TO
NATIONAL SECURITY.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
 GE N1 No Objection to Declassification in U 1 11 r- 11 14 NLJ Full 27010/06/ 15i:a IOC--~HAK-244-10-4-5
AS YOU KNOW9 I AM NOT A MAN WHO LACKS COURAGE. I CAN PROUDLY
AFFIRM THAT I HAVE AMPLE PHYSICAL COURAGE, BECAUSE I HAVE BEEN
A COMBATANT FOR 20 YEARS NOW. IF I WERE DOOMED TO DEATH, I
WOULD HAVE DIED WHILE I WAS A SECOND LIEUTENANT. AT THAT TIME, WITH
THE BLESSING OF PROVIDENCE, I SURVIVED. I HAVE LIVED TO THIS DAY,
UNDERGOING UNTOLD TRIALS IN COMBAT. IN MY MILITARY CAREER, I
HAVE SPENT LITTLE TIME IN THE OFFICE. I HAVE SPENT MOST OF THE
TIME IN COMBAT. EVEN WHILE I WAS PRESIDENT, NO ONE COMPELLED
14E TO GO TO BINH LONG, KONTUM, OUANG TRI, BINH DINH AND HUE DURING
THE MAU THAN TET HOLIDAYS. SOMETIMES ENEMY SHELLS FELL CLOSE TO
ME, AND ONCE A HELICOPTER FLYING NEXT TO MINE WAS SHOT DOWN.
DESPITE ALL THIS, I BELIEVED THAT M Y PRESENCE AMONG THE
COMBATANTS HELPED THEM FIGHT VICTORIOUSLY, AND THEY DID WIN.
WITH REGARD TO MY POLITICAL AND MORAL COURAGE, LET ME
RECALL--NOT MERELY TO CITE THE MERITORIOUS SERVICE I HAVE RENDERED TO
THE COMPATRIOTS AND THE BROTHERS AND SISTERS--THAT ON 2 NOVEMBER
1965, THE UNITED STATES STRONGLY PRESSURED ME INTO HEADING A
DELEGATION TO PARTS TO ATTEND THE FOUR-PARTY CONFERENCE ON THE
SAME FOOTING AS THE NFLSV. I BALKED AT GOING, AND YOU MAY RECALL
THE SPEECH I DELIVERED BEFORE BOTH CHAMBERS OF THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY ON 2 NOVEMBER 1955. IT IS REASONABLE TO SAY THAT MY
LIFE WAS AT STAKE , BECAUSE THOSE WHO WANTED TO KILL ME HAD AMPLE
MEANS TO DO SO, AND THOSE WHO WANTED TO OVERTHROW MY REGIME
ALSO HAD AMPLE MEANS AND THE EXPERIENCE TO DO SO. BUT I WAS NOT
AFRAID .
IN 1971, WHEN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WAS DESCRIBED AS A
SOLO RACE, I WAS BEING PRESSURED INTO GIVING UP THE SOLO CAMPAIGN
AFTER THE OTHER TWO SLATES HAD WITHDRAWN. DESPITE THIS PRESSURE,
I BELIEVED THAT I I WITHDREW, A POLITICAL VACUUM WOULD INEVITABLY
HAVE ARISEN. I STILL RECALL THAT I TOLD THE COMPATRIOTS AT THAT
TIME THAT I WAS NOT GREEDY FOR POWER AND STATUS. I ALSO TOLD
THE COMPATRIOTS, HOWEVER v THAT THIS POLITICAL VACUUM WOULD LEAD
THE COUNTRY TO AN INCALCULABLE POLITICAL ADVENTURE, AND THAT
THIS POLITICAL VACUUM WAS A SETTING THAT PEOPLE WERE ATTEMPTING
TO CREATE IN ORDER TO IMPOSE A DISADVANTAGEOUS POLITICAL SOLUTION,
CALLED A PEACE SOLUTION, ON THE RVN IN 1971-1972. THEREFORE, I
RESOLUTELY RAN ALONE SO AS TO MAINTAIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
LEGAL POSITION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SOUTH AND TO SUCCESSFULLY
DEFEND OUR POSITION, SHOULD NEGOTIATIONS BE HELD.
WITH MY RESOLVE AND COURAGE, I DISREGARDED UNTOLD PRESSURE AND
THREATS. AT THAT TIME, ALTHOUGH I HAD MY OWN SOLUTION, THEY HAD
ALREADY LAID THE GROUNDWORK FOR ATTAINING A SOLUTION. OWING TO
MY RESOLVE AND COURAGE, A TENTATIVE POLITICAL SOLUTION WAS
REACHED IN OCTOBER 1972. AT THAT TIME, THEY WERE SEEKING A
SOLUTION. THEREFORE, HAD THE OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED
THEMSELVES--NAMELY, INTERNAL POLITICAL DISTURBANCES IN THE SOUTH--THEY
WOULD HAVE IMPOSED THEIR OWN SOLUTION. IF THE SOUTH REMAINED
POLITICALLY STABLE, THEY WOULD TAKE THEIR TIME IN FINDING A SOLUTION.
THEY WERE READY TO SEIZE EVERY OPPORTUNITY THAT WOULD ALLOW THEM TO
IMPOSE AN UNDESIRABLE POLITICAL SOLUTION ON THE SOUTH.
(MORE)
21 APR 21522 DBT /HH
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15 : LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
FBIS 123
TWELFTH ADD 60 (THIEU ADDRESS)
XXX ON THE SOUTH.
(TEXT) IN 1972, ONCE AGAIN, I PROVED TO THE COMPATRIOTS
THAT I DID NOT LACK COURAGE AND CLEAR SIGHT ED NESS IN THE POLITICAL
SPHERE AND THAT I DID NOT FEAR ANY THREAT TO MY LIFE.
I ONLY FEARED THE THREAT THAT THEY WOULD IMMEDIATELY CUT OFF
ALL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID AND THAT, LATER ON, IF THE
COMMUNISTS RESTARTED THE FIGHT, THE U.S. CONGRESS WOULD NOT
CORRECT ITS DECISION ON AN AID CUT AND THERE WOULD NOT
BE A SINGLE CENT IN ECONOMIC AID.
PLEASE EXCUSE ME FOR TELLING THIS: I ONLY FEARED
THAT AFTER SIGNING THE PARIS AGREEMENT IN 1973, THE
SOUTH WOULD BE LOST AND THE AMERICANS WOULD WASH THEIR HANDS
OF THE SITUATION IF THE COMMUNISTS RESUMED THE WAR AND IF
WE DID NOT RECEIVE ANY ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID. I DARED
NOT SAY THIS WAS AN EMPTY THREAT. I THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE AMERICANS TO WASH THEIR HANDS,
BECAUSE THEY SAID THAT I WAS STUBBORN AND REFUSED TO
ACHIEVE PEACE AND TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT WHEN THERE WAS A GOOD
OPPORTUNITY. THEY DESCRIBED THE PARIS AGREEMENT AS VERY FINE
BEFORE U.S. AND WORLD PUBLIC OPINION. THUS, WHEN I DEALT
WITH A POINT, A COMMA OR A WORD IN THE AGREEMENT, THEY BLAMED
ME FOR BEING STUBBORN AND BELLICOSE. IF I REFUSED TO SIGN
AND WAITED FOR SOMETHING ELSE, THIS WAS A PRETEXT FOR THEM
TO CUT THEIR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID AND TO ABANDON US
DEFINITIVELY.
WE WERE NOT ST UP ID . I THINK THAT YOU WERE NOT SO STUPID
THAT YOU COULD NOT FORESEE THAT THE COMMUNISTS WOULD
VIOLATE THE PARIS AGREEMENT. I HAVE BEEN PREDICTING THIS SINCE
THE NIGHT OF 26 OCTOBER 1972 AND I HAVE REPEATED THIS SEVERAL
TIMES SINCE. AS WE HAVE SEEN, THE COMMUNISTS HAVE NOT RESPECTED
THE 1954 AND 1962 AGREEMENTS ON LAOS. THEY HAVE NOW RESTARTED
THE WAR ALTHOUGH A BIPARTITE COALITION GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN
SET UP. AND LAOS WILL BE TAKEN OVER BY THE COMMUNISTS WHO
WILL ESTABLISH A WHOLEY COMMUNIST REGIME. BECAUSE THEY
FAILED IN 1954, THEY DID WHAT THEY DID IN 1962. AND BECAUSE
THEY FAILED IN 1962, THEY ARE DOING WHAT THEY ARE IN 1975.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
REGARDING THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM , THE COMMUNISTS
SIGNED THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENT BECAUSE
THEY
COULD NOT
COMPLETELY DEFEAT THE FRENCH ARMY. THEY
WON
ONLY HALF
OF THE COUNTRY AND SIGNED THE AGREEMENT
WITH
A VIEW
TO DRIVING THE FRENCH TROOPS COMPLETELY
AWAY.
AS A RESULT
OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FRENCH TROOPS, THE SOUTH BECAME VERY WEAK
BECAUSE IT DID NOT HAVE AN ARMY OF ITS OWN, ITS ADMINISTRATION
WAS STILL YOUNG AND THE PEOPLE WERE NOT ORGANIZED. THE
COMMUNISTS RESUMED FIGHTING IN 1955-1956, AND ESPECIALLY
HAVE BEEN FIGHTING SINCE 1963-1964. AFTER THEIR FAILURE
IN 1955, THEY AGREED TO HOLD PEACE TALKS. AND THEN IN 1972,
THEY AGAIN FAILED IN THE FIGHT AND RETURNED TO THE PEACE TALKS,
THEY THOUGHT THEY COULD NOT WIN BECAUSE THE U.S. TROOPS
WERE HERE WITH B-52 AIRCRAFT. THUS, IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR
THEM TO SIGN THE PARIS AGREEMENT. AFTER THE U.S. TROOPS'
WITHDRAWAL, WITH THE AID OF THE SOVIET UNION AND RED CHINA,
THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE OVER THE SOUTH.
I HAVE TOLD THIS TO THE AMERICANS; IF THERE WERE A FENCE
AROUND THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH AND IF THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN
PEOPLES FOUGHT WITHIN THIS FENCE AND WITHOUT FOREIGN AID TO
EITHER SIDE, YOU COULD SAY THE SOUTH HAD FAILED BECAUSE IT
WAS WEAKER THAN THE NORTH, BUT THIS IS NOT THE CASE.
HERE, THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT PROPERLY ASSISTED THE
SOUTH WHILE THE SOVIET UNION AND RED CHINA HAVE AIDED
THE NORTH 10 TIMES MORE VIGOROUSLY. THUS, IF THE SOUTH IS
FIGHTING HERE, THIS IS NOT A FIGHT AGAINST THE NORTH ALONE.
NORTH VIETNAM CAN DO NOTHING BETTER THAN SOUTH VIETNAM,
BECAUSE IT CAN PRODUCE NO BULLETS, WEAPONS, ROCKETS,
OR TANKS. SD, THIS SMALL RVN IS FIGHTING AGAINST THE SOVIET
UNION AND RED CHINA WHILE ITS ALLY FAILS TO PROTECT AND
AID IT. AND AT PRESENT , THE UNITED STATES HAS REDUCED
ITS ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM.
21 APR 22102 DBT /HH
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
FBIS 127
THIRTEENTH ADD 60 (THIEU ADDRESS)
XXX TO SOUTH VIETNAM.
. (TEXT) SOME U.S. PEOPLE AND SOME U.S. CONGRESSMEN HOLD THAT
SO LONG AS MR THIEU REMAINS IN POWER, THERE CAN BE NO NEGOTIATIONS;
MR THIEU IS NOT THE MAN TO AGREE TO NEGOTIATE; MR THIEU IS
BELLICOSE AND REFUSES TO IMPLEMENT THE PARIS AGREEMENT. SO
LONG AS MR THIEU REMAINS IN POWER, U.S. AID CANNOT BE GIVEN IN
FULL BECAUSE SO LONG AS HE RECEIVES U.S. AID, HE WILL CONTINUE TO
FIGHT AND WILL NOT AGREE TO NEGOTIATE.
THIS IS THE U.S. SCHEME TO STOP PROVIDING US WITH AID A"?JD TO
WASH THEIR HANDS OF US. THIS IS A SCHEME OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE
COMPLETELY LOST THEIR CONSCIENCE AND HUMANITY, OR THIS MAY BE
THE OPINION OF PEOPLE WHO MISUNDERSTAND ME. THEREFORE, I RESIGN
TODAY.
WE WILL SEE WHETHER OR NOT NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE SATISFACTORILY
CONDUCTED WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE COMMUNISTS AND SOUTH VIETNAM
WHEN MR THIEU IS NO LONGER IN POWER. IF THE ANSWER IS I" THE
AFFIRMATIVE, IT IS SO:ETHING THAT OUR PEOPLE AND THE WORLD PEOP!_y WO!J GLADLY WELCOI:E. IF, WITH MR THIEU'S U;EP=RTURE, ABUNDANT N.H. AT'O
WILL BE PROVIDED IMMEDIATELY TO HELP THE RVN ARMED FORCES COND!;'rT THE
FIGHT, THIS IS SOMETHING VERY LUCKY FOR US, AND MY DEPARTURE
IS JUST LIKE A GRAIN OF SAND IN THE DESERT.
IT IS AN INSIGNIFICANT ACT ON MY PART, RUT A VERY WELL -WORTHWHILE
SACRIFICE. EXCHANGING A PRESIDENTIAL POSITION FOR ADEQUATE,
AND EVEN ABUNDANT, AID TO HELP THE SOLrrHERN ARMED FORCES AND
PEOPLE CONTINUE THE FIGHT TO DEFEND THEIR COUNTRY AND THEN TO
NEGOTIATE A SOLUTION GUARANTEEING A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC SOUTH
VIETNAM WHICH WILL NOT BE RULED BY THE COMMUNISTS--THAT'S FEYOf1D
MY EXPECTATIONS AND I WOULD BE REALLY GRATEFUL TO THE AMERICANS.
BUT, IF THEY SAY THAT SO LONG AS MR THIEU REMAINS IN POWER,
NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT BE CONDUCTED AND U.S. AID CANNOT BE PROVIDED
AND IF THEY USE ME AS AN EXCUSE FOR THEIR DISENGAGEMENT AND TO WASH
THEIR HANDS OF US IN DISREGARD OF THEIR CONSCIENCE, THEIR SENSE
OF RESPONSIBILITY, JUSTICE AND HUMANITY, THIS IS ANOTHER MATTER
WHICH WILL BE JUDGED BY HISTORY AND THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD.
NOW THAT MORE THAN HALF OF OUR COUNTRY HAS BEEN LOST TO THE
COMMUNISTS, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS SAID THAT THE SITUATION MUST
BE STABILIZED IN ORDER TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT
STABILIZATION OF THE SITUATION AND OUR MILITARY POSITION MUST
PRECEDE THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE CANNOT STABILIZE OUR MILITARY
POSITION WITH SALIVA, BUT WITH GUNS, MUNITIONS AND PLENTY OF
WEAPONS WHICH MUST BE RAPIDLY PROVIDED US IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES.
WE CANNOT STABILIZE OUR MILITARY POSITION] WITH THE DEBATES, WHICH
HAVE LASTED FOR 1 YEAR, OVER THE 11I.S. AID WHICH HAS DECREASED
FROM $700 MILLION TO $300 MILLION. THE AMERICANS HAVE REFUSED TO
ACCORD US THAT AMOUNT AND THEY ARE NOW BARGAINING FOR $340 MILLION,
$350 MILLION, $355, OR $360 MILLION.
THE HONOR OF AN ALLIED COUNTRY AND THE FATE OF ONE OF ITS ALLIES
ARE BEING BARGAINED IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE PURCHASE OF FISH AT
THE MAR*C,IT . I VERY SORRY THAT I CANNOT ACCEPT THAT, I
C"-,NNOT, ON ACCOUNT OF MY PRESIDENTIAL POSITION, DO HARM TO THE
VIETNAMESE P OPL' AND SACRI71CE THE LIVES OF OUR CO'1SATANTS !,,'Ho
LACK MUNITIO"1 WWW'{ILE FTGHTII^. I CANNOT LET PEOPLE BARGAIN THE
DESTI'?Y OF O'_!R P-nPLE WITH OF RS Ow $11 MILLION) $~ 11'I1I Ir'J A'T
$1 r TLLIONI AND CONDUCT DEBATES FOR MONTHS ' HEN] THE RESULTS HAVE
NOT BEj.N DET_R'^INED AND NO GUARANTEE IS TN SIGHT,
THIS IS ONE OF THE REASONS FOR MY RESIGNATION. I WILL SEE IF I
WAS AERELY A PRETEXT OR THE REAL CAUSE.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
FBIS 131
FOURTEENTH ADD 6.1 (THIE!J ADDRESS)
XXX THE REAL CAUSE.
(TEXT) THE SECOND POINT (AS HEARD) IS THAT WE SHOULD
PAY NO HEED TO THE COMMUNISTS' STATEMENTS AND PROPAGANDA.
I HOPE THAT OUR VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ARE MATURE AND WISE ENOUGH
NOT TO BELIEVE IN THE COMMUNISTS' WORDS. THE TRUTH, HOWEVER,
REMAINS THE TRUTH. CERTAIN SEGMENTS OF WORLD PUBLIC
OPINION HAVE BEEN POISONED, BECAUSE THEY ARE NAIVE AND IGNORANT
AND ARE NOT EXPERIENCED ENOUGH TO REALIZE THE NATURE OF
CO!J'^UNIS1 . SOME SEGMENTS OF U.S. P1 .18LIC OPINION
HAVE BEEN POISONED. SOME PEOPLE WHO PROFESSED TO BE
Oiff TANDTNG WORLD POLITICIANS HAVE ALSO BEEN POISONED.
THE-RrFORE, TwL CO.^.1'~NI STS HAVE CLAIMED THAT AS LONG AS
MR THIEU REMAINS IN OFFICE, THERE CAN BE NO NEGOTIATIONS AND
PEACE; THAT AS LONG AS MR THIEU REMAINS INJ OFFICE, !.WE WIL I:.
CONTINUE TO FIGHT ; AND THAT AS LONG AS MR THIt U REMAINS
IN OFFICE, THE SOVIET UNION AND RED CHINA WILL CONTINUE
TO PROVIDE AID TO NORTH VIETNAM, WHICH WILL FIGHT TO VICTORY
BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT PROVIDE AID TO SOUTH
VIETNAM.
I AM NOT AFRAID OF WHAT THE COMMUNISTS HAVE SAID,
BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT THE OVERWHELMINIG MAJORITY OF THE
VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ARE KNOWLEDGEABLE AND EXPERIENCED.
HOWEVER, I MUST READILY ADMIT THAT THE FACT THAT CERTAIN
SEGMENTS OF PUBLIC OPINION HAVE BEEN POISONED HAS ADVERSELY
AFFECTED THE WORLD'S ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID AND GOOD
WILL FOR SUPPORTING THE RVN. THIS. IS BECAUSE CERTAIN SEGMENTS
OF PUBLIC OPINION HAVE STUCK TO THE ALLEGATIO`J THAT IF
MR THIEU STEPS DOWN, THERE CAN BE A SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT,
THE WAR AND DEATH WILL BE ENDED, AND WORLD PEACE WILL BE
RESTORED.
THE THIRD POINT IS THAT WITHIN THE INTERNAL RANKS OF
OUR SOUTH, SOME RELIGIOUS GROUPS, SOME SEGMENTS OF THE
POPULACE, SOME POLITICIANS AND SOME POLITICAL GROUPS--WHO ARE
EATING NATICNAL RICE AND ARE BEING PROTECTED BY THE ARMED
FORCE i AND THEE COMF2ATA,"7S, WHO ARE SACRIFTCIPJG THEIR BLOOD
A:~'.D SO^~ :S DAILY--H, VE ACK"'OYLEDGED THAT EVE') IF I STEP
a ~,1"! T'1: CO, . 11';ISTS !lnin_D '','CT INEGCTIATF A";") IT WOULD BE
Uf_TKF.LY Th-T TH,: 1_I11ITED STATES WOULD PROVIDE THE SOUTH
WITH 911%19ANT AID. THEY BELIEVE THAT PREARRANGEMENTS
H_VE ALREADY MADE, THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS DECIDED
TO !!ASH ITS HANDS OF '.-S , AND THAT MR THIEU HAS BEEN
F'RT''":' ;RILY BY THE COMM1U;JISTS, AS A '11EPE PR TEXT. THEREFORE
T':: Gw"JTLE'nE'! HA~IE CLE:ARSTGHTEDLY AND FAIRLY POI'T1~'D
O'!T T HAT T P,E RE AL PROBLEM IS NOT MR T HI E!U , ~~! {n IS ONLY A
VICTIM ON WHOM P,:nPLE HAVC PUT THE BLAME IN ORDER TO FIND
op T'?;'YT Tn A 2APnnt] UTF'TMAM _
p
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-244-10-4-5
oN THE OTHER HAND , SOME RELIGIOUS GROUPS , SOME
POLITICIANS, SOME MASS ORGANIZATIONS AND SOME WELL-KNOWN
SAID : MR THIE-.l SHOULD STEP DOWN AND LET 11S
,1:.GnfI~T WITH THE COMMUNISTS. SOUTH VIETNAM WILL CERTAINLY
~? 7O? A~'.D DEMOCRACY AND THE COMM-1NJIST3 4JIL1. HAVE
_1) TO THAT. THERE WILL BE "JO COALITIONI. THE CCU NISTS
AID Oi: IJS AND RESPECT +!S. ALTHC!JGH 4;E DO NOT SHARE
C a- THE CO^i"1 U'J ISTS '' ILL RESPECT US a"JD ACCEPT
O WE WILL SCORE ACHI` 'J: MEUTS I1ITHC'JT A FIGHT.
T'+ GE PEOPLE AND GROUPS ARE NOW VIGOROUSLY VOICING THEIR OPINIONS.
1 DO,J'T KNOW WHETHER THEY HAVE SAID THIS BECAUSE THEY ARE
'Ion 3,'1.r -CONJ>+IDEvT , BECAUSE THEY SUFFER ILLUSIONS, OR
BEC".US.E THEY WERE COMPELLED TO SAY SO BY SOME MOTIVATING FORCE.
T_1+-'Y HAVE SAID THAT SO LONG AS MR THIEU REMAINS IN
PC'.c _? , THERE CAN BE NO NATIONAL UNITY AND , THEREFORE,
"J0 VICTORIES CAN BE EXPECTED AND THAT THE COMMUNISTS WILL
?10T -' DEFEATED. THEY HAVE SAID THAT SO LONG AS MR THIEU
REMAINS IN POWER , THE COMMUNISTS WILL CONTINUE TO FIGHT
AND 14ILL CONQUER ALL THE SOUTH AND THERE WILL BE MANY MORE
DEATHS AND MUCH SUFFERING FOR OUR PEOPLE. THEY HAVE SAID
THAT SO LONG AS MR THEIR REMAINS IN POWER, THE AMERICANS
WILL NOT PROVIDE AID TO US AND OUR ARMY WILL BE UNABLE TO FIGHT.
EVEN SOME OF OUR BROTHER ARMYMEN, EITHER BECAUSE THEY ARE
RATHER CREDULOUS OR VICTIMIZED BY PROPAGANDA--A VIGOROUS
PROPAGANDA DRIVE IS BEING LAUNCHED TO PUT ALL THE BLAME
ON MR THIEU JUST AS MR DIEM WAS THE ONE BLAMED
FOR EVERYTHING IN 19S3. GENTLEMEN AND COMPATRIOTS, YOU PROBABLY