SYRIA-THE NEXT STEP?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-237-4-3-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 3, 1975
• Content Type: SNIE

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/16: LOC-HAK-237-4-3-1
SPECIAL
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ESTI MATE
Syria-The Next Step?
Secret
SNIE 36.7-1-75
3 November 1975
Copy N2 6
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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Contractor/ Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Onlyh
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to...
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S N I E 36.7-1-75
SYRIA-THE NEXT STEP?
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THIS ESTIM
INTELLIGENCE
TE IS ISSUED BY
HE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
THE UNITED
AS NOTED IN
The following int
the Estimate:
The Central Intl
of State a
STATES INTELLIGEN
THE TEXT, AS FOLL
Iligence organizations
Iligence Agency, the intelli
E BOARD CONCURS, EXCEF T
WS:
articipated in the preparation ~f
ence organizations of the Departments
d Defense, and the National Security Agency.
Concurring:
The Deputy Dir
Agency
actor of Central Intelligent
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Director, D fense Intelligence Agency
The Director, N tional Security Agency
The Acting Dep ty Assistant Administrator
and Devel pment Administration
representing the Central Intelligence
representing the Department of Stu 'de
National Security, Energy Resear h
Abstaining:
The Assistant D rector, Federal Bureau of I
The Special Assi tant to the Secretary of the
of the Tre Bury
vestigation
Treasury representing the Departme t
Also Participating
The Assistant C lief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Depart ent of the Navy
The Assistant Chi f of Staff, Intelligence, Dep rtment of the Air Force
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SYRIA-THE NEXT STEP?
PRECIS
Despite Syria's increasingly intransigent public position on future
peace negotiations, we believe President Asad is still interested in
talks concerning a second-stage Israeli withdrawal on the Golan
Heights. The Syrians, however, are likely to continue to insist as a pre-
condition that the PLO be recognized in some way as a party to the
negotiations before they will engage in such talks.
Meanwhile, Damascus will exert maximum pressure on the US and
Israel, hoping thereby to underscore an urgent need for diplomatic
movement and to force concessions to Syria's negotiating demands.
Between now and November 30, Asad's strategy will be to increase
military tensions in order to create concern about Syria's military in-
tentions and whether it will agree to the renewal of UNDOF. If neces-
sary, however, Asad will go beyond mere posturing and this will
lend further credibility to his "war of nerves."
The Syrians have few, if any, good diplomatic moves to play. They
do, however, have a range of military options that include:
-- additional troop movements, exercises, alerts, overflights, re-
serve call-up;
- military "incidents," including firing across the UN buffer zone
at Israeli patrols, short incursions into the Israeli disengage-
ment area, and the facilitation of fedayeen terrorist and sabo-
tage operations on the Golan Heights;
I
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-some fo m of "war of attritio
- major m litary operations with
specific
- resumpt
We do not
He may, howe
pressure camp
Under these cir
objectives;
on of major hostilitie
elieve Asad will deli
er, take military acti
ign fails to produce
umstances we believe
- Syria
vember
ably oc
- If this
there i
even f
contin
Israeli
mosph
- At thi
canno
retali
- The s
in Sy
The Israeli
initiatives co
military imp
that would
erately resort to full-scale w r.
ns short of war if his curre t
acceptable diplomatic resul s.
hat:
ill continue to step a its pressure campaign as
30 draws nearer. So roe serious "incidents" will pr
ur during this period
a good chance that
rther by letting the U
ing to abide by the
isengagement agree
re without provokin
point, however, lim
be ruled out and the
ion and a general es
uation in Lebanon co
an and Israeli forces.
uld rapidly spread to
not produce diplomatic results,
Asad will increase the press re
mandate run out, perhaps w ile
ilitary limitations of the Syr'a v-
ent. This would create a crisis at-
an Israeli attack.
ed military operations by Syria
e would run a high risk of Is aeli
alation of the fighting.
Id deteriorate in a way that ew
Fighting between them in L ba-
the Golan Heights as well.
, for their part, are reluctant to take any new diplo atic
cerning the Golan H ights both because of the a ea's
rtance and the very d fficult domestic political prob ems
raised. They will be even less interested in doing o in
increased tension induced by Syria.
2
S CRET
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DISCUSSION
THE IMPACT OF SINAI II
1. The recent Egypt-Israel agreement on Sinai
has left Syria's leaders frustrated. They feel Presi-
dent Sadat misled them and seriously undercut their
own negotiating chances by making far-reaching po-
litical concessions and by not insisting that the im-
plementation of the Sinai agreement be linked to
negotiations for further Israeli withdrawal on the
Golan Heights.
2. The Syrians insist they will not pay the po-
litical price Sadat did simply to regain another small
slice of the Golan and that they will not abandon
the Palestinians. Consequently, they profess to see
little hope of obtaining anything at present from
the Israelis through negotiations. This pessimism
stems not only from their belief that Egypt has
left them in the lurch but also from their concern
that the US has expended what leverage it had over
Israel to obtain the Sinai agreement. They do not
take Israel's offer to negotiate seriously and believe
the Rabin government would try to drag such talks
out indefinitely.
3. Out of frustration and anger, therefore, Da-
mascus has lashed out with increasing vehemence
at the Sinai accord and Sadat. Initially, this criti-
cism was somewhat restrained and was designed
primarily to protect President Asad's flank from
attack by the Iraqis and his internal opponents while
he reevaluated the prospects for negotiations with
Israel. But since about mid-September, there has
been a progressive hardening of Syrian public
opposition to the Sinai accord that apparently re-
flects a growing conviction among Syrian leaders
that their chances of obtaining anything satisfactory
soon via negotiations are poor.
4. The current strident propaganda assault on
the accord shows no signs of abating. Numerous
rallies and protest demonstrations have been staged
in Damascus and other Syrian cities over the past
several weeks. In addition, Syrian leaders have kept
up a steady stream of attacks on the accord, echo-
ing with increasing frequency Foreign Minister
Khaddam's demand that Sadat renounce the agree-
ment.
5. President Asad has also adopted a tough, un-
compromising public stance on future Syrian-Israeli
negotiations. He stated flatly in a recent televised
speech commemorating the 1973 war that Syria
would not engage in negotiations for a further sepa-
ration of forces accord unless the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization is involved in the negotiating
process. By not specifying who would have to talk
to the PLO-the US or Israel-Asad may have
intended to leave open the possibility of some form
of new Golan arrangement without the PLO but
with no political strings attached. Nevertheless, he
appears to have consciously reduced his room for
maneuver in order to indicate that he is not pre-
pared to make any political concessions for an in-
terim step toward peace.
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LITTLE LEVERAGE
6. Given Syrian pessimism,
lieves he has nothing to lose
public posture for the time
Syrians have few, if any, gooq
they know it.
7. Damascus, for example
little help from Moscow in aq
breakthrough. Although the
viets as arms suppliers, they
especially helpful in promot
the negotiating table. Moreo
that the Soviets have very lit
Israelis and believe they are
Soviet-American relations by
on Washington.
8. The Syrians seem to rea
dependent than ever on the
sions from the Israelis. Yet
US intentions and are skel
ability to exert pressure on
in earnest. Asad, for instance,
the US wants to "anesthctizi
area until after next year's 1
Asad probably be-
by assuming a rigid
being. Indeed, the
I moves to play and
apparently expects
hieving a diplomatic
yrians value the So-
ave not found them
ng their interests at
Ter, the Syrians know
de influence with the
nwilling to jeopardize
ratting direct pressure
ize that they are more
US to extract conces-
:hey are suspicious of
tical of Washington's
Tel Aviv to negotiate
has said that he thinks
the situation in the
residential election.
9. Nor have the Syrians b
response of other Arab lead
ment. Many of the more in
maincd silent, probably hop
that has erupted between
will somehow go away. Mos
who have criticized the Sinai agreement in private,
have so far gone along wi
have even tried to encourag
relations with Cairo. Thus,
en encouraged by the
rs to the Sinai agree-
uential ones have re-
ing that the quarrel
important, the Saudis,
h Sadat publicly and
Asad to patch up his
ie Syrians probably do
not harbor high hopes of p,rsuading the Saudis to
use their oil as a diplomatic weapon any time soon
on behalf of Syria and the Palestinians.
MILITARY OPTIONS
10. The most important
presently holds is his pow
extension of the mandate of
on the Golan Heights, w
newal again on November
threatened not to approv
mandate and only reverse
moment, hoping to obtain
diplomatic card Asad
r not to agree to the
ich comes up for re-
0. Last year the Syrians
an extension of the
themselves at the last
ome quid pro quo. This
follow through on such
threat. His obvious aim would
ons in a dramatic way in order to
rgent need for diplomatic mov
ances of an armed clash betw
nd Israelis. Although the Syrians
at the Israelis might use the r
andate as an excuse to attack, A
he implementation of the Sinai ac
11. Asad could go even further
eginning another round of artill
united ground skirmishes as he
o spur negotiations or by trying
ortion of Israeli-held territory.
xert military leverage at all, we
pt for something limited in scot
ope could be contained. The o
to such a tactic is that it would i
punitive retaliation. The Syrians' r_
with the current Lebanon crisis in
fear of provoking Israeli militar}
12. In addition, of course, Asad
of starting major hostilities on the
objective in that case, as he rece
off-the-record remarks, would b
pitted the two superpowers, the
Union, against each other and
to employ their oil weapon in
the US to put more pressure on
up Arab lands.
13. We doubt, however, that
full-scale offensive as an acce
certainly recognizes that such
without the initial help this tim
armed forces-could bear a heav
risk the certain destruction of
forces, serious economic disloca
cupation of more Syrian territo
leaving Syria in an even weake
tion. Neither the Soviets nor
support Damascus needs, appe
derwrite such risk-taking at p
Syria count on much military h
the crucial first few days, fro
Jordan, which would try to stay
if Syria started it.
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underscore the
increase the
en the Syrians
feared last year
vocation of the
ad might calcu-
id jeopardizing
ord with Egypt,
t some point by
ry barrages and
id in early 1974
to seize a small
f he decides to
elieve he would
that he would
vious drawback
isk strong Israeli
straint in dealing
part reflects their
reprisals.
etains the option
Syrian front. His
-tly said in some
the same as it
S and the Sovie
order to compe
the Israelis to giv
table option. H
a gamble-take
of the Egyptia
penalty. It woul
ions, and the o
y by the Israeli
negotiating pos
he Saudis, whos
r prepared to u
lp, at least duria
Egypt or eveji
out of the fightir
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/16: LOC-HAK-237-4-3-1
STANDING PAT
14. Because negotiations appear to offer so little
hope of success at present and military action is
risky, Asad could choose to stick to his present hard-
line posturing and bide his time. This would offer
him an acceptable way out of his present dilemma
and could hold a certain attraction for the Syrian
leadership. While sustaining a controlled state of
tension on the Golan Heights, they could turn their
attention to consolidating their position at home
and staking out a stronger claim to Arab leadership,
which they believe Sadat has forfeited. They would
especially seek closer political and military ties
with the PLO and Jordan and even try to resurrect
military cooperation with Iraq to strengthen their
bargaining position in any future negotiations.
15. The Syrians are deeply concerned about Leba-
non and have monopolized the mediation role
between the warring factions. Syria is not inclined
to intervene militarily but would probably feel
constrained to at least keep such a decision under
consideration and might threaten to restore order in
Lebanon if things get much worse. At a minimum,
Asad would not feel comfortable about pursuing
a policy of brinksmanship on the Golan while civil
war raged next door. In a worst-case situation,
such fighting could compel Syrian intervention
with its attendant high risk of confrontation with
Israel. Fighting between Syrian and Israeli forces
in Lebanon could rapidly spread to the Golan
Heights as well.
16. From all appearances, Asad can afford to
wait awhile if he chooses to do so. He does not
appear, from what few sources of information we
have available, to be under the kinds of pressure
Sadat was this summer to resort to military action
if he cannot obtain something soon through ne-
gotiations. With the Egyptian front "frozen," we
believe Asad could probably resist any internal
pressures on him to fight by arguing that Syria
needs more time to strengthen its armed forces and
its position generally in the Arab world.
drawal on the Golan presents Tel Aviv with even
greater problems than the recently concluded Sinai
agreement. Strategically, the Golan is important to
Israel because of its proximity to . Israeli popula-
tion centers. This, plus the fact the area under
Israeli occupation is only about 12 miles across at
its widest, has led Tel Aviv to take the position that
it has almost no room to make territorial conces-
sions as part of an interim agreement without en-
dangering the security of Israel proper.
18. The 22 Jewish settlements in being or under
construction on the Golan are another major com-
plicating factor. The opposition of Jewish settlers
in the occupied territories to any diminution of the
Israeli presense there gives the government a power-
ful domestic political incentive to put off serious
negotiations. The settlement issue cuts across party
lines and the Golan settlers, although only about
2,000 in number, have considerable political clout.
Every party in Rabin's ruling coalition sponsors
at least one Golan settlement. Many of the settle-
ments, furthermore, were built to strengthen Is-
rael's claim to the area. Several lie almost athwart
the present disengagement line, further diminishing
the government's room to maneuver.
19. Nonetheless, Tel Aviv recognizes that there
are some benefits to be gained-principally in sta-
bilizing the Sinai agreement-in early negotiations
with Syria. The Israelis, moreover, are interested in
keeping the northern front quiescent and favor an
extension of the UN forces' mandate on the Golan
when it expires on November 30. In early October,
Defense Minister Peres said that Israel would prob-
ably make a minor unilateral gesture on the Golan
to encourage Syria to renew the mandate. It is possi-
ble that the Israelis might still attempt such a ges-
ture if the Syrians do not resort to any hostile mili-
tary action. They are reluctant, however, to take
the initiative on negotiations, especially in a situa-
tion of increasing tension. Rabin will look to Wash-
ington to get the ball moving.
THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE
17. Although the Israelis have offered to negotiate
with Syria, Tel Aviv is reluctant to begin early ne-
gotiations for anything less than a final peace ac-
cord. Negotiating for even a limited Israeli with-
20, In the short term, Asad can be expected to
step up his "war of nerves" This could include some
limited military action, such as artillery fire and
low-level incidents. The Syrians will over the next
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month in particular raise th diplomatic and mili-
tary temperature in the area s the time approaches
to renew the UN mandate in rder to improve their
bargaining position.
21. In fact, Asad has alrea y begun this process.
His remarks to Newsweek i September about the
possibility of Syria resuming hostilities on its own,
the recent shift of Syrian arm red and infantry units
back to the Golan front, an his recent comments
to a Kuwait newspaper that he UN observer forces
do not constitute an obstacl to military operations
are all calculated to create u certainty about Syria's
military intentions. There ve also been reports
of reserve call-ups.
22. One unsubtantiated
Syrians may be planning a
port claims
tion of short duration to sa
territory held by the Israeli
disengagement line. Such
would be designed to force
to contain the fighting and t
imited military opera-
off a small chunk of
somewhere along the
move, if undertaken,
e US to move quickly
refocus its diplomatic
efforts on obtaining a Syrian-Israeli accord, pre-
umably one that also contained s
palestinians. The possibility of a li
grab operation cannot be ruled out,
of such action may have been pla
Syrian effort to keep the pressur
Israel to make some concession to
the UN mandate runs out.
mething for the
ited Syrian land-
although rumors
ted as part of a
on the US and
amascus before
23. If the "war of nerves" does not produce re-
sults, there is a good chance that Asad will up the
pressure even further by simply let
date run out while continuing to
tary limitations of the Syria-Isra
agreement. If however, he deci
harder by engaging in limited mil
the mandate lapses, he risks p
Israeli response.
resort to full-scale war. He kno
not have the military capability t
Heights and that any Syrian offe
ably result in a smashing Israel
Syria in an even worse bargaini
SEIRET
ing the UN man-
bide by the mili-
I disengagement
es to push even
tary actions after
ovoking a major
will deliberate!
s that Syria doe
regain the Gola
isive would prob
victory and pu
g position.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/16: LOC-HAK-237-4-3-1
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Secret
Secret
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