COUP IN PORTUGAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-206-1-25-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: April 29, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Coup in Portugal
they gave rise.
Thomaz and Prime Minister Caetano on April 25, 1974 was triggered by
Lisbon's African policies and the divisions within the military to which
The virtually bloodless coup that toppled the government of President
The leaders of the rebellion, who called themselves the "armed forces
Lisbon and, according to the Portuguese radio, has been proclaimed
accepted the call, reportedly received an enthusiastic public welcome in
an initial proclamation that called for both a liberalization of Portugal's
colonial po,'~lcies 4.ad a restoration of domestic liberties, the rebel junta
promptly called on General Spinola to head their movement. Spinola
movement,'' are virtually unknown, but they are almost certainly middle-
level officers devoted to General Antonio de Spinola. After broadcasting
"Head of Portugal. "
by surprise. Loyalist forces offered only token resistance, and after
fleeing to the headquarters of the national guard, Thomaz, Caetano, and
several other ministers agreed after a few hours of negotiation to go into
exile in the Madeira Islands. Thus far the new Government appears to be
Superbly organized and well-led, the insurrectionists took the government
in complete control.
In a speech to the nation on the evening of April 25 Spinola promised to
restore power to constitutional institutions once a president of the republic
has been elected. Spinola can be expected to run for the post.
Portugal. The book created a. sensation in Portugal when it appeared last
the African territories is impossible and a political solution must be
found. Spinola also called for a new Portuguese constitution to provide
civil liberties and democratic institutions in all areas administered by
Portugal's most decorated war hero, Spinola is also the author of a book
which dared to say that a military solution to the problem of insurgency in
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elements, may be ready for some modest movement toward change at home
he may be able to keep them fully under control. The country, despite the
influence of the ruling oligarchs and the radicalism of some of the opposition
apparently was unaware of the magnitude of the coup threat it faced.
As "head of government, " Spinola appears to be off to an auspicious start.
His prestige is such that, despite the divisions within the armed forces,
moves earlier this month to arrest various oppositionists, the government
and left the country gripped in coup fever ever since. Despite Lisbon's
-2-
February. It led to a small but abortive "march on Lisbon" in March,
and abroad.
A reorientation of Portugal away from Africa and toward Europe could be
traumatic, although many African and European countries would welcome
such a change and allow time for it to take place. Assuming the new govern-
ment settles fully into power, we do not expect to delay full relations with
the Svinola regime. At present, the coup would seem not to have put US
interests in danger, and it could possibly provide some near-term benefits
for the United States -- for example a possible lessening or end to Portuguese
pressure for U, S. weapons for use in the African territories.
Thus far there is little reaction to events in the metropole from the
Portuguese territories of Africa. The Governments there are urging
business-as-usual, The rebel movements have not reacted publicly.
They will take a cautious approach to developments and to General Spinola's
announcement he will seek a political rather than military solution to
Portuguese African questions. The rebels consistently have demanded
complete independence, something they will not give up lightly. White
settlers, particularly in Angola, will be increasingly .concerned about their
own security. Rhodesia and South Africa will face basic policy reassessments
since Portugal's continued military effort against Mozambique insurgents
has been seen as a buffer for their own internal security.
SECRET (GDS)
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER
A. DENIS CLIFT
RICHARD T. KENNED
Coup in Portugal
for his information a review of the April 25 coup in Portugal.
Your memorandum, which draws in part on the CIA assessment
forwarded to you by Director Colby (at Tab B), reviews the situation
not only in terms of internal Portuguese impact but also the likely near-
term effects to be expected in terms of U. S.-Portuguese relations, the
future of the African territories and Portuguese-European relations.
The memorandum for your signature to the President would forward
Harold Horan concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab A.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/05/19: LOC-HAK-206-1-25-4
 Office of the Director
Of Central Intelligence
DATE: 26 April 1974
TO: Major General Brent Scowcroft
SUBJECT: Portugal
The attached memorandum presents an initial
assessment of the military coup in Portugal. It
is set against an analysis of the differences over,
Portuguese African policy which precipitated the
crisis.
The new government has announced its intentions
to pursue the more liberal policies toward the
Portuguese African provinces recommended by General
Spinola. It has also declared its intentions to
restore civil rights and to move toward popular
elections. It is too early for a confident assess-
ment of how far and how fast the new regime will
move in these directions. It is also unclear
whether the new regime will be able to keep events
in the provinces from getting out of hand, as the
basic insurgency problem will not go away and
may even increase if the rebels take heart from
disarray in Lisbon.
It does seem that a new Portuguese policy
toward Africa would break the link established
by the Caetano government between US base rights
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V
Office of the Director
of Central Intelligence
in the Azores and Portuguese desires for modern
weapons for use against African insurgents. A
Portuguese turning away from colonial preten-.
sions in Africa and toward greater political
freedom at home would also unblock Portuguese
relations with Europe and lead to progressively
closer economic and political ties with individua
European states and the European Community.
. 25X1
Acting ,ationa Intelligence ficer
for Western Europe
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MEMORANDUM FQR THE DCI
SUBJECT: The Coup in Portugal
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The Coup in Portugal*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PRECIS .. ...........................................
PORTUGAL IN AFRICA .. 1
Rationale .......................... 1
Advantages .......... ............................ 1
Costs ......................................r.... 2
Pressures to Get Out ..... .................. 3
The Crisis ...................................... 4
CHANGING ATTITUDES ................................... 5
Military Divided ................................ 5
The Oligarchy ................................... 6
The Church .. .............................. .... 8
Other Groups in Society ......................... 9
Caetano's Past Role ... .................... 10
THE NEW QUESTIONS ........................ .......... 12
This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National
Intelligence Officer for Western Europe. It was drafted by
CIA (OCI).
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26 April 1974
SUBJECT: The Coup in Portugal
A. The virtually bloodless coup that toppled the government
,of President Thomaz and Prime Minister Caetano yesterday was trig-
gered by Lisbon's African policies and the divisions within the
military to which they gave rise. Superbly organized and well
led, the insurrectionists took the government by surprise. Loyalist
forces offered only token resistance, and after fleeing to the head-
quarters of the national guard, Thomaz, Caetano, and several other
ministers agreed after a few hours of negotiation to go into
exile in the Madeira Islands. Thus far the new government ap-
pears to be in complete control.
B. The leaders of the rebellion, who called themselves the
"armed forces movement," are virtually unknown, but they were al-
,uos:G c.erLa.inly widdle-levei ufiicer,s .ciev.oted to uiitu-di Antonio de
Spinoza. After broadcasting an initial proclamation that called
for both a liberalization of Portugal's colonial policies and a
restoration of domestic liberties, the rebel junta promptly called
on General Spinola to head their movement. Spinola accepted the
call, reportedly received an enthusiastic public welcome in Lis-
bon, and according to the Portuguese radio, he has been proclaimed
"head of Portugal."
C. in a speech to the nation last night Spinola promised to
restore power to constitutional institutions once a president of
the republic has been elected. Spinola could be expected to run
for the post.
D. Spinola's accession to power is a remarkable demonstration
of the power of both pen and sword. Portugal's most decorated war
hero, he is also the author of a book that dared to say that a
military solution to the problem of insurgency in the African ter-
ritories is impossible and that a political solution must be found.
Although perhaps not wholly out of line with Caetano's own thinking,
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the book created a sensation when it appeared last February. It.
led to a small but abortive "march on Lisbon" in March, and left
the country gripped in coup fever ever since. Despite Lisbon's
nervous moves earlier this month to arrest various opposition-
ists, the government apparently was unaware of the magnitude of
the coup threat it faced.
E. As "head of government," Spinola appears to be off to
an auspicious start. His prestige is such that, despite the
divisions within the armed forces, he may be able to keep them
fully under control. The country, despite the influence of the
ruling oligarchs and the radicalism of some of the opposition ele-
ments, may be ready for some modest movement toward change at
home and abroad. Spinola can probably expect better relations
with the rest of Europe, his NATO allies, and international critics
of Portugal's overseas policies. He may be a less-demanding nego-
tiator in the Azores base renewal talks.
F. However, it is also very possible that Spinola's victory
may be the beginning of his troubles. Having ridden into power
on the African issue, it is very doubtful that he has any real
solution to it. The kind of commonwealth he has in mind is not
i i i ~ v t ^ T i_" insurgents and it is far
J. accept a a. t.c 1.hc Aa 5'. -...way ...,,
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from certain that he can carry Portugal with him in the long
process of achieving an honorable escape for the army from the
African swamp.
G. The paragraphs that follow provide additional background
on the events that led to Spinola's apparent triumph and what
may lie in store for him.
ii
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PORTUGAL IN AFRICA
Rationale
1. For more than a decade Portugal has been fighting
insurgencies in Angola, Portuguese Guinea, and Mozambique.
Lisbon bases its commitment on its presence for some 500 years
in the African territories and its treatment of them as integral
parts of Portugal in the Portuguese constitution. Lisbon
believes that it has built a multi-racial society which is
quite different from that of the former colonial powers and from
the white minority governments of the Republic of South Africa
and Rhodesia. The Portuguese stress that the overseas territories
are a national heritage which they cannot honorably relinquish.
The Portuguese also believe that they need the overseas provinces
and their potential wealth and strategic location to maintain
Portugal's international status and its economy.
Advantages
2. Except for Portuguese Guinea, the African provinces do
in fact offer significant immediate and long-term economic
returns..to certain economic groups in Portugal. Large corpora-
tions in the metropole, owned by a few powerful families, control
virtually all aspects of the territories' modern economic sectors,
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including local industry, commerce,. banking, and plantation
agriculture. The metropole receives preferential trade treat-
ment, and it controls the territories' sizeable foreign exchange
receipts.
Costs
3. Thus far, however, the overall returns have not, been
sufficient to offset the expense of economic development and of
fighting the insurgents. Only Angola comes close to paying. its
own way and may now be contributing as much as 60 percent to
its development and war costs.
4. Military operations have been costly in manpower and in
money. When the rebellion began in 1961, Portugal's armed forces
numbered 84,000 men of which "less than 30 thousand were stationed
in Africa. As the insurgencies spread, the total figure rose
accordingly and leveled off at around 216,000 in 1973 with more
than 150,000 serving in Africa. Although some 60 percent of
these forces are from the territories -- many of them black --
military service has caused a manpower shortage, aggravated by
the emigration of young workers from the metropole to Western
Europe. But the situation has been bearable because the number
of soldiers killed in action has been relatively low in recent
years, amounting to about 400 in 1973.
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5. The military effort has also been a heavy financial
burden. In 1960 Portuguese defense spending totaled only
$105 million. By 1973, the figure had increased almost five-
fold, amounting to more than $521 million. As a percentage
of the Portuguese national budget, these defense expenditures
represented 27 percent in 1960, 45 percent in 1966-1968, and
30 percent in 1973. As a percentage of GNP, defense costs have
increased from 4.2 percent in 1960 to a high of 7.4 percent in
1968, leveling off at around 6 percent since 1970. This is
almost twice the figure for the principal NATO countries.
Pressures to Get Out
6. These costs have been high enough to raise serious
doubts about r 7 t .. t : the ,
doub s a,~vuL. a . a , i . 5 b o n s long- ~c1.m chances o retaining wac prv v;wnces.
An upsurge of attacks by black insurgents in Mozambique last
January and February caused concern in Lisbon that the internal
security problem there might be getting out of hand. But the
real concern is over the stalemate in Portuguese Guinea. There
the Portuguese control the towns and principal roads, but the
guerrillas control much of the hinterland with neither side able
to oust the other. The'situation is discouraging enough to have
led some military leaders, such as General Spinola, to declare
that a military victory is impossible and to urge a political
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solution, such as a plan for federation. But such alternatives
appeal neither to the far right, nor to the insurgents who of
course want immediate freedom.
The Crisis
7. The crisis that led to the coup dates from February 22
when General Spinola, then vice chief of staff of the armed
forces and former governor and commander in chief in Portuguese
Guinea, published his book Portugal and the Future. Spinola
called for a new Portuguese constitution to provide civil
liberties and democratic institutions in all areas administered
by Portugal and to create a federation of sovereign states
between Portugal and its overseas possessions. Plebiscites
to determine if the Africans want to remain with Portugal would
be allowed.'. Spinola. acknowledged that this policy would risk
the eventual severance of all tiEs between Portugal and its
overseas territories, but he accepted this risk in the belief
that continuation of past policies would virtually guarantee
such an outcome anyway.
8. Rightists were outraged by the public airing of such
views and demanded Spinola's removal along with?"that of his
chief, General Costa Gomeswho supported Spinola. Prime Minister
Caetano, who initially resisted this pressure, gave in and
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removed Spinola and his chief. The very conservative General
Luz Cunha, was appointed to Costa Gomes' post and some officers
sympathetic to Spinola were reassigned. In response, some
petitions were circulated in favor of Spinola, and on 16 March
a 200-man army unit near Lisbon, led by young officers sympa-
thetic to Spinola and Costa Games, attempted to march on the
capital. However, they were intercepted and arrested by troops
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CHANGING ATTITUDES
Military Divided
9. The military was deeply divided by these events. Most
of the senior officers, led by the new chief of staff of the
armed forces, General. Luz Cunha, are opposed to General Spi.nola's
ideas which, in their opinion, would lead to the loss of the
African provinces. 'These officers participated in a public oath
of loyalty to the government, and the refusal of Costa Games
and Spinola to participate -- on the grounds that. the military
were not supposed to be involved in politics -- was the ostensible
reason for their being sacked.
10. On the other hand, some high ranking officers supported
General Spinola, especially his thesis that a military victory
is impossible. They do not want the army to become a scapegoat
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for giving up in Africa and saw Spinola's proposals as an
honorable way out. Until the coup, however, it did not appear that
these moderates were interested in an attempt to overthrow
the government on African policy. indeed it was not clear that
Spinola and Costa Gomes wanted to do that either. Neither
had any known contact with the military regiment that marched
on Lisbon, and Spinola said that he was awaiting another military
assignment.
11. A number of junior and middle grade officers also
supported Spinola's ideas. Some of these were angered enough
over his firing and the arrests and reassignments of his
supporters to circulate protest petitions, and some participated
in the small scale march on Lisbon. There were also reports
in March and April of dissent among the military in the African
provinces, that apparently aroused the concern of the Directorate
General of Security.
The Oligarchy
12. In the context of the authoritarian system that has
prevailed so long, these stirrings of dissent were, of course,
unusual. Since Salazar's time a group of perhaps 40 families
who control most of the country's wealth have played a decisive
role in the exercise of political power. Their position is
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derived from their control of the economy., ownership of news:
media, representation in the legislative bodies, and their close
connection with top government officials. Consequently, govern-
ment policy has reflected the conservative political, economic,
and social views of this group. Their business interests in
Portuguese Africa are immensely profitable, and hence they have
long opposed any loosening of Portugal's overseas ties even
though this has meant the continuation of a large and expensive
military force to combat the African insurgents.
13. The Portuguese oligarchs are nevertheless astute
businessmen, and probably would in time adjust to a new Portuguese
relationship with the African provinces. Many of them favor more
th and ~ : it, Euro, e , and
rapid GCCa1G1i4~G g,rtrvv.t.,a and closer association w-LL.44 p
most have already diversified their investments so that their
wealth is not dependent on their African holdings.
14. Portugal's economic ties with Western Europe, which in
recent years have developed more rapidly than its economic links
with the African territories, provide an alternative to the
African ties. This factor would make it easier than before for
Portuguese commercial interests to consider alternatives in Africa
if the cost of fighting the dissidents became too great. Thus
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if the oligarchy came to feel that Portugal's cause in Africa
were lost, its members probably would opt to get out and cut
their losses, thereby protecting their larger interests in the
metropole and worldwide. There have in fact been reports that
some of the influential families were impressed by Spinola's
thesis that the present overseas policy is unrealistic.
The Church
15. The church has been circumspect about criticizing
the Caetano government, but in recent years individual priests ---
speaking against the lack of civil rights -- have strained
relations between church and state. A peace vigil held in a
Lisbon church on New Year's Day last year in which a priest
read a strong statement condemning Portugal's wars in Africa
led to the arrest of several priests and militant Catholics.
The episode increased public awareness of internal opposition
to the African wars, and the arrest of the priests almost caused
a church-state clash.
16. Last July the Portuguese bishops issued a pastoral
letter which called for greater personal freedom and increased
political participation by the laity. Although they avoided the
question of the war in Africa, the Conference of Bishops in the
Metropole in October expressed solidarity with the bishops of
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Mozambique -- an action indirectly critical of the government's
restriction of civil rights there. Last month a petition
circulated in Nampula diocese in Mozambique that was critical
of the church hierarchy for collaborating with Lisbon in
maintaining a repressive system in Mozambique. The government
responded by ousting the bishop and six of the priests who
signed the petition. Prospects, therefore, are that should
yesterday's insurrection lead to a more liberal-minded govern-
ment, it would find a substantial number of allies in the church.
Other Groups in Society
17. Labor, intellectuals, students, and illegal opposition
groups have had little or no voice in Portuguese policy for
years. Some small ,terrorists groups have set off occasional
protest bombs, but these have been of no consequence to the
government. Nevertheless, the unrest in the military that
surfaced after the firing of Spinola and Costa Gomes last month
apparently worried the government that dissident groups would
use the resulting situation to demonstrate. Premier Caetano
warned in a speech that any such demonstrations would only lead
to a crackdown, and in early April the police arrested some 50
oppositionists, most of whom were attending a meeting to form a
consumer cooperative.
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Caetano's Past Role
18. Although sparked by the Spinola book,'the underlying
causes of crisis were therefore building for some time. During
the past four or five years Caetano had explored -- or at least
tried to open a dialogue on -- the possibility of a loosening
of Portugal's tight grip on its African territories. During
the 1969 legislative elections, Caetano proposed a debate on the
overseas policy. When the opposition candidates responded,
however, the military took alarm and forced a ban on the subject.
Caetano's constitutional amendments approved in 1971 -- which
provided for local autonomy in domestic affairs -- were permitted
only after he gave assurances to the ultras that he had no
intention of weakening Lisbon's control.
19. Caetano's strength heretofore had been his ability to
balance pressures from ultra rightists and moderates, and to
know when to draw back. As the rebellion dragged on with no
end in sight, Caetano continued to make cautious moves to reopen
the subject of more local autonomy for the Africans. These
moves reportedly caused a right wing group to make an effort
last December to pressure President Thomaz to replace the Prime
Minister with an ultra conservative. But their plan was thwarted
when some high military officers who supported Caetano, brought
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counter pressure to save him. When Spinola's book was
published -- evidently with Caetano's approval -- this was
too much for the ultras, however. Caetano was unable to
resist their demands that the general be fired, and in doing
so the Prime Minister made his survival more dependent
on the ultra right than before. This upset the political
balance Caetano had tried to maintain, and since mid-March
Caetano had seemed at pains to try to redress it.
20. In his speech to the nation on March 28 after the
abortive military revolt, Caetano reassured the rightists
by pledging that Portugal would never abandon the African
provinces. But he also sought to reassure the moderates by
dealing gently with the rebels who marched in Lisbon, and by
refraining from criticizing Spinola and his federal solution.
The Spinola book continued to be sold in Lisbon.
21. Thus what Caetano's long-range strategy was is still
obscure. Some observers believe his increased autonomy policy
was in fact intended to lead to eventual independence for
the overseas territories. Another view is that Caetano had no
specific end in view beyond holding on in the hope that events
would give Portugal time to develop its multi-racial society
linked to Portugal. He often emphasized that Portugal must
assure the position of the whites in its African territories.
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Experience in other African newly freed states has taught,
he said, that this is possible at present only through
continued control by Portugal.
The New Questions
22. Whatever Caetano's intentions, his failure to achieve
them has in any event left a great many unanswered questions.
Foremost among them is of course the further evolution of the
political situation in Portugal itself. The coup has thus
far come remarkably close to being a peaceful change of
government. The rebel forces appear to have been exceedingly
well-organized and competently led, while the forces loyal to
the government have chosen -.. so far at least -- not to resist.
General Spinola,.having accepted the call to leadership,
commands a respect that might be sufficient to keep the
situation within the armed forces fully under control. In
due course they could possibly begin to put into effect the
domestic and overseas policy reforms that they and the
insurrectionists espouse.
23. Working against this scenario of essentially peaceful
change, however, will be a number of hazards. The divisions
that had developed within the armed forces are real and deep,
and the new regime will thus have to move with some caution.
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Although the Portuguese oligarchy has been looking more toward
the future, they remain for the most part rigidly conservative.
in their views of society. Some of the opposition elements
that have been operating more or less sub rosa in Portugal will
be willing to operate within a liberalized governmental
machinery, but some of the more radical ones may not. With
President Thomaz apparently exiled by force, some question
of the government's legitimacy will linger.
24. By far the greater hazard to the new government,
however, will be what now happens in the overseas territories.
The basic insurgency problem remains, the wait-and-see
attitude that civilian and military elements in the territories
have taken may be short-lived, and the insurgents may take heart
from Lisbon's disarray. General Spinola's ideas of increased
autonomy within a Lusitanian commonwealth does not meet the
insurgents' requirements, and any movement in that direction
will perforce require time and the continued Portuguese
military presence. The colonial forces might be willing to
accept a fairly prolonged period of transition if such a
policy seems to have some chance of extricating the army with
its self-image intact. But if the policy falters, Spinola
will be in trouble. Meanwhile, Rhodesia and South Africa --
never sure of Portugal's staying power -- will likely feel they
have no choice but to increase their military establishment.
- 13 -
SEC:I.Z.El'
NO FOItI?1GN 1ISSE\-1
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/05/19: LOC-HAK-206-1-25-4
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
25. So far as Portugal's external relations are otherwise
concerned, there is good reason to believe that a new and
more reformist regime in Lisbon would in several ways be
helpful. Portugal's African policies have made it a pariah
among its European allies and a target of anti-colonialist
criticism in the international community at large. Its
prospects for closer relations with the European Communities
would be considerably improved if its overseas policies seemed
to be moving in a new direction -wand, looking much farther
to the future, the colonies themselves might find a closer
association with the EC an advantageous prospect. Finally,
since he modern weapons hat Fo 4.ugal has ibeen . eek .n
from the US in the Azores base negotiations have been largely
tied to the insurgency problem, it is quite probable that
the new government will moderate its demands.
SJ C;REI'
NO F()Iu:I(.N I)ISSI?\1
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/05/19: LOC-HAK-206-1-25-4
1697
Retype BS:mb
4/26/74
SECRET INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Coup in Portugal
The virtually bloodless coup that toppled the government of President
The as and Prime Minister Caetano on April 25, 1974 was triggered by
Lisbon's African policies and the divisions within the military to which
they gave rise.
The leaders of the ebellion, who called themselves the "armed forces
movement," are vittually unknown, but they are almost certainly middle-
level officers devoted to General Antonio de Spinola. After broadcasting
an initial proclamation that called for both a liberalization of Portugal's
colonial policies and a restoration of domestic liberties, the rebel junta
promptly called on General Spinola to head their movement. Spinola
accepted the cal4 reportedly received an enthusiastic public welcome in
Lisbon and, according to the Portuguese radio, has been proclaimed
''Head of Portugal.
Superbly organized and well-led. the insurrectionists took the government
by surprise. Loyalist forces offered only token resistance, and after
fleeing to the headquarters of the national guard, Thomas, Caetano, and
several other ministers agreed after a few hours of negotiation to go into
exile in the Madeira Islands. Thus far the new q ernmeut Mears to be
is complete control.
i.~wrwrrrw r wr
In a speech to the nation on the evening of April 25 Spinola promised to
restore power to constitutional institutions once a president of the republic
has been elected. Spinola cn be expected to run for the post.
Portugal's most decorated war hero, Spinola is also the author of a book
which dared to say that a military solution to the problem of insurgency in
the African territories is impossible and a political solution must be
found. Spinola also called for a new Portuguese constitution to provide
civil liberties and democratic institutions in all areas administered by
Portugal. The book created a sensation in Portugal when it appeared last
SECRET (GDS)
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/05/19: LOC-HAK-206-1-25-4
w
February. It led to a small but abortive "march on Lisbon" in March,
and the country has since been gripped by coup fever. Despite Lisbon's
moves earlier this month to arrest various oppositionists. the government
apparently was unaware of the magnitude of the internal threat it faced.
As "head of government, " Spinola appears to be off to an auspicious start.
His prestige is such that, despite the divisions within the armed forces.
he may be able to keep them fully under control. The country, despite the
influence of the ruling oligarchs and the radicalism of some of the opposition
elements, may be ready for some modest movement toward change at home
and abroad.
A reorientation of Portugal awa from Africa and toward Europe could be
traurrraatic, al o h maa--African and European col tr ess w wea come
such a change and allow time for it to take place. Assuming the now govern-
the
for th
the Unit
Porto.
uses p
y full relatiow
inola reg ime. a r t sent, t e r coula would-seem seem not to 940-ii pu
as eer, and it could posslay- rov a some near-term
e States -.-for examp e, a possible lessening or en to
ressure or U. S. weapons rar use in the r
Thus far there is little reaction to events in the metropole from the
Portugese territories bf Africa. The local governments there are urging
business-as-usual. The rebel movements have not reacted publicly.
They will take a cautious approach to developments and to General Spinola's
announcement he will seek a political rather than military solution to
Portuguese African questions. The rebels consistently have demanded
complete independence, something they will not give up lightly. White
settlers, particulakly in Angola, will be increasingly concerned about
their own security. Rhodesia and South Africa will face basic policy
reassessments since Portugal's continued military effort against
Mozambique insurgents has been seen as a buffer for their own internal
security.
SECRET (GDS )
nt settles fully into power. we do not expect to
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/05/19: LOC-HAK-206-1-25-4