THE PRESIDENT ASKED THAT I SEND YOU A COPY OF THIS PAPER WHICH WAS RECEIVED IN THIS OFFICE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
LOC-HAK-2-7-27-2
Release Decision:
RIFLIM
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
17
Document Creation Date:
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date:
October 5, 2009
Sequence Number:
27
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 16, 1969
Content Type:
MEMO
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Body:
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EXCLUSIVELY /EYES ONLY
C Nk'll ' (Tarn .L October 16, 1969
The President asked that 1 send your a copy of this paper which was
received in this office. He would appreciate your comments on it
by Novomber 6.
Henry A. Kissinger
This same memo sent to: The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
HAK:TL:lds:1O/ 16/69
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
EXCLUSIVELY /EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/11/03: LOC-HAK-2-7-27-2
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/11/03: LOC-HAK-2-7-27-2
EXCLUSIVELY /EYES ONLY
CkiNYIDENTIAL October Z2, 1969
The Director of Central Intelligence
Per our conversation attached is the paper,
"The Modern World, A Single 'Strategic
Theater"'.
Retry A. Kissinger
HAK:JTH:feg:10 /21 /69
CON i ENTIAL
EXCLUSIVELY/EYES ONLY
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/11/03: LOC-HAK-2-7-27-2
W !
THE WHITE HOUSE
October 14, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR
This is to return your memorandum to the President providing
a strategic overview of world relations.
Please note that the President wants you to send this, together
with a note from the President, to Secretary Laird, Secretary
Rogers and Attorney General Mitchell. They should be asked to
comment on it and to have their comments to the President within
a two-week period, due date November 6.
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/11/03: LOC-HAK-2-7-27-2
CCNFF.' a)EN IAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDE N \
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: A Strategic Overview
Attached is a memoran duzn written by an acquaintance of mint.
which provides a rather comprehensive assessment of the Units
States t position in the wor d. Although I do not agree with its
every last word, it does define the problem we face -- the
gene rally deterioratin strategic position of the United States
during; the past decade,
Many analysts have written about the problems faced by the
Con-irn\ nists. But I do not believe that the world situation, as
viewed from MOSCOW, provides great cause for Communist
pessimism.
Andrei. Zhdanov's "two-camp" speech in September 1947 referred
Only tOi Bulgaria, Pol.land and Romania as relatively secure Cor-
munist,states and allies. He saw no real possibility in the Middle
East and no hope in Latin America. He considered China to be
imperialist. But Zhdarov's pessimistic outlook has not been
justified by subsequent events -- certainly during the last decade.
In the Middle East, Russiar_ influence is spreading and
moderate Arab governments are under increasing
pressure.`
In Latin America, the potential for guerrilla warfare
grows, and the outlook for future Nasser-type (if not
Communist), anti-American governments improves.
-- In Europe, NATO is in a state of malaise, accentuated
by our shifting policies over the last 10 years. Europeans
are increasingly concerned about isolationist currents
within the U. S. (particularly within the liberal community).
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CONFIDENTIAL -- 2
In Asia, as you saw on your trip, leaders are concerned
about the future U. S. role there.
You inherited this legacy of the past decade. The lesson one can
draw from, it is not that we can fight this trend on every issue. But
foreign policy depends on an accumulation of nuances, and no opponent
of ours can have much reason to believe that we will stick to our
position on the issues which divide us. When Hanoi compares our
negotiating position on Vietnam now with that of 18 months ago, it
must conclude that it can achieve its goals simply by waiting.
Moscow must reach the same conclusion.
These are dangerous conclusions for an enemy to draw, and I believe
that we therefore face the prospect of major confrontations.
Hence, my concern about the gravity of the situation, of which I
thought I should let you know.
Attachment
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W W
CONFIDENTIAL
September 29, 1969
The Modern World, A Single "Strategic Theater"
1. It is one of the truisms of our time that because of the
sensational development of communications and transportation, the
globe has shrunk with distances between formerly far-away countries
having been reduced to mere hours of flight time. We all pay continuous
lip service to the axiom that the hallmark, today, of relations among
States, even among continents, is interdependence rather than inde-
pendence. But while every political writer and speaker belabors this
point ad nauseam., we actually deal with the Mideast, Latin America,
the Atlantic Region, Eastern Europe, NE Asia, and SE Asia as if we
were still living in the WW-II era when it was realistic and feasible
to speak of a European, an India-Burma-China, a Pacific "Strategic
Theater" as essentially separate and autonomous.
2. In theory, people may understand the phenomenon of inter-
dependence rather well and be quite aware of the fact that the whole
globe, by now, has become a single strategic theater. In practice,
however, near-unavoidable bureaucratic compartmentalization has led
to specialization among experts and decision-makers; Those who are
knowledgeable regarding the strategically more and more important
Trucial Oman, know little or nothing about Canada, and those who are
experts on Berlin have no eyes for, or interest in, the issue of Okinawa.
The man who daily struggles with the agonizing problem of Vietnam
can hardly be expected to pay special attention to the latest coup in
Libya, and the person concerned with US aid to Latin America has
little time or inclination to consider recent political developments in
Czechoslovakia.
3. Since, by chance, it has kiecome my speciality to be a generalist,
let me draw for you a sketch of how seemingly isolated developments
in specific areas are deeply interconnected in fact, how the single
stones of the mosaic actually form a clearly recognizable overall
tableau. -
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CONFIDENTIAL - 2 -
1. It might be helpful to start out with a remarkable, largely
unnoticed, passage in Senator Mansfield's Report to the President,
on his recent Pacific tour. Having stated that the leaders of the Asian
countries visited by him "agree" that the role of the US in Asian
affairs should shrink, the Senator remarked that there was also
"some uneasiness" among those leaders "that the pendulum will swing
too far from [US] over-involvement to non-involvement." Mansfield
is not a "pessimist," because -- as, you may remember --- he had on
the very eve of the invasion of Czechoslovakia reported to President
.Johnson that, on the basis of his analysis of the situation in East
Europe, he considered a reduction of US forces in Germany not only
appropriate but even desirable. Actually, the Senator's wording - -
"some uneasiness" in non-Communist Asia about the US moving toward
a stance of non-involvement --- constitutes a "diplomatic" understate-
ment which barely hints at, but does not really reflect at all, the over-
whelming fear of such countries as S." Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore -- and even Indonesia, the Philippines
and Australia -- to have to face potential future aggressors essentially
with their own military forces.
2. . Your country specialists will tell you, if you ask them, that the
Indonesian leaders -- despite the size and relative geographic pro-
tectedness of their island nation -- have informed us of a need for the
US to "stay" for at least 3 more years in Vietnam, so that they might
peacefully consolidate their country without fear of Communist direct
or indirect aggression.
3. It also deserves to be noted that GEN Romulo -- unwaveringly
pro-US and anti-Communist -- nevertheless remarked in a public
speech, some time ago, when he took over the position of Foreign
Minister at Manila, that in view of the impossibility to rely henceforth
on US protection it would be necessary to "adjust" Philippine Foreign
Policy. He remarked, in this connection, that, as of that day,
Philippine Foreign Office references to China would no longer be to
the "Chinese Mainland" but to the Peoples Republic of China, the
country's official designation adopted by the Mao regime. In an
interview given by Romulo at the UN in N. Y. he expressed a wish
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(see NY Times of September Z2, 1969) "that the UN, in its peace-
keeping efforts, would consider [General] MacArthur Is suggestion
that borders threatened by guerrilla infiltration or possible enemy
invasion be sealed off with a belt of radioactive materials." The
suggestion of so strong, and innately unpopular, a measure by a SE
Asian Foreign Minister does reveal more than mere "uneasiness" in
the face of coming dangers.
4. The Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee, who proudly calls
himself an Asian Socialist, shocked the anti-Vietnam War Swedish
Social Democrats last year, when he declared in an address to that
party's annual Congress, that the US was fighting in Vietnam for the
independence of Singapore and that this independence was predicated
on US willingness to continue the fight.
5. You also remember that Sihanouk of Cambodia -- certainly not
a friend and even less a tool of the US -- has explained again and again
over many years that but to accommodate to China the
ha.r~ n choice b.___~...~_~.-__._._._~__._.
powerful, because one day,___rcgardless of LS_ protestations to the conf-
tray , Washington would move its forces out of SE Asia and he,,__as..-a.~
convinced Cambodian nationalist, deemed it his t sk tv .. tablisl --- such_,
relations 'it-i the Communist victors of tomorrow that, at least CoinrY~ti~ist ~aeovex ~vo`ulcl~be "peaceful. " in._a very dramatic, typically
Sihanou-k%ari-l eftei to tlie- ecTitiors'-of -NYT --tle Cambodian Chief of State
asked his US readers not to consider him naive regarding Communist
intentions. I know very well, he wrote, that, although they [Communists]
are friendly to me now, "they will say 'Sihanouk down on your knees, '
once they are victorious and oust me without ceremony. " I do not have
to point out to you that, by now, the Cambodians are actually trying to
cooperate, tacitly and secretly, with the hated S. Vietnamese in a not
very successful attempt to prevent expansion of de facto Communist
control over still further areas of their small country.
6. You are also, I believe, fully aware of what Souvanna Phouma
of Laos, the leaders of Thailand and those of Malaysia -- to say nothing
of Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan -- tell us in confidence as regards their
true feelings; i. e. , naked fear, concerning a US military withdrawal
from SE Asia.
1. The preceding paragraphs have been devoted to SE Asia not only
because -- by chance, or due to some inherent geopolitical necessity
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that. region of the world happens to be at the moment our most obviously
active area of preoccupation, but also because, for that very reason,
it must be these days the center of your own attention and deepest
worries. The world, too, focuses its attention on Vietnam, as an
indicator of the direction in which US policy and strategy in general are
likely to move. You know more, of course, about US future plans and
intentions than anyone else, except the President of the US and his
Secretary of State, but I venture the assertion that anY objective analyst --
be he in Peking or Bonn, Moscow or Paris, Ottawa or Cairo -- simply
cannot help reaching the conclusion that, so far, all the indicators point
in one direction only: an ultimate pull-out, a radical reduction of military
commitments, a withdrawal of US military power not simply in, hotly
contested Vietnam but on a worldwide scale.
2. It can hardly be questioned by now that we are on the verge of
restoring the Ryukyus, our great stronghold in the NE Asia region, to
Japan. And even such bases as we may retain on those islands will be,
more likely than not, under the same restrictive regime now applying
to our troops and military installations in the Japanese homeland (in
accordance with the US/Japan Status of Forces Agreement), That South
Korea -- already shaken and frightened by the meek US reaction to the
capture of the "Pueblo" and to the shooting down of our EC-121 -- is
deeply worried by this development is well known and more than natural,
especially since Seoul is afraid, not entirely without justification, that
in the ''post-Vietnam" period we might thin out, or even reduce greatly,
the US forces now stationed in that country. Less well known is the
fact that the Japanese themselves -- although Tokyo, for obvious reasons,
cannot publicly admit it -- feel less well protected with the US military
strength on Okinawa diminished or newly restricted. It is generally,
and somewhat superficially, assumed that this heightened sense of
insecurity may have the salutary effect of spurring Japan into making a
greater defense' effort of its own. But one must ask, whether it would
really be in the US interest, if the Japanese followed this line of thought
to its logical conclusion; i. e. , to the establishment of a purely Japanese
nuclear weapons arsenal. Moreover, the leftist opposition, and pacifism
in general, are sufficiently powerful within Japan to create such internal
upheaval, if the government were actually to embark on any large-scale
rearmament, that there would be a lengthy period of instability and
weakness in the country, before it could actually become militarily
more self-reliant. In the meantime Japan could hardly fail to seek an
accommodation with Red China or the USSR or, "ideally, " both. In any
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event: The simultaneous US trend to reduce its power position in
North as well as in South East Asia, is bound to have. a profound effect
on the political and strategic thinking and planning of an Asian
country which in the ultimate analysis - - willingly or reluctantly ---
has to rely on the US as a protective shield against the potential super
power: China. New Delhi, for example, cannot very well assume that
the US is prepared to come to its rescue, when it observes Washington's
eagerness to move out and away in regard to Pacific areas (such as
Indochina and Okinawa/Japan) in which the US has long had an infinitely
more pronounced and direct interest than in. India. The Indian leaders,
in addition, would have to be influenced by the stark military fact that,
in the event of a Communist takeover in SE Asia, their country would
be outflanked in the East, with a pro-Chinese Pakistan constituting at
the same time a (real or imagined) threat in the West.
1. As regards the Mid East, it is customary to think, to the
exclusion of almost any other consideration, of the Arab/Israeli con-
flict. No doubt, the present Administration is engaged in a superhuman
effort to make the two sides see reason and prevent a "fourth round,"
but in view of earlier US performances, it must be decidedly difficult
for Arabs or Israelis to rely on anything but their own brute strength.
A US role as an effective guarantor of any future compromise solution
is simply not credible, because of our obvious past and present reluctance
(with the one exception of Lebanon in 1958) to back up diplomatic agree-
ments or political friendships with a US military presence.
2. Cynics used to believe that, because of the Jewish vote in the
US, Washington would necessarily have to intervene in Israel's favor
in any "real emergency. " Actually, the historical record proves other-
wise. In 1956, we turned against our French and British allies and our
Israeli proteges and impelled the latter to evacuate the Sinai peninsula;
while in 1967, when Nasser threatened war with remarkable frankness,
we tried in every way to dissuade Tel Aviv from reacting to the Egyptian
blockade of the Straits of Tiran by non-peaceful means. Israel then
started military action on her own, strictly against our wish and will,
and won so quickly and overwhelmingly that our readiness to come to
its rescue no longer had to be tested. I do not, as you know, consider it
an a priori US task and mission to protect Israel, but it so happens that
in the eyes of the world that small Western enclave in a non-Western
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environment is considered our "client, " and conclusions must be
drawn, of needs, everywhere (not only in Moscow and Tel Aviv but in
other capitals as well) from the fact that the US is obviously disinclined
to support even its own client, if that would mean military involvement.
3. Those Arab regimes, on the other hand, which have struggled to
stay relatively pro-West can be even less trustful as regards our active
he .than the Israelis, since there is no Arab constituency in this country.
4. We have in the past been unable to protect the pro-US royal regime
in Iraq. We did not help Saudi Arabia against the Nasser-supported
Republican Yemen. We tolerated the establishment of a radically leftist,
pro-Peking rather than pro-Moscow, Republic of South Yemen, when the
British withdrew from Aden and the Aden Protectorates. We showed no
interest, when the moderate government in the Sudan was overthrown by
revolutionary radicals; and we obviously will do nothing, if after
complete withdrawal of the British from the Persian Gulf area, the
present rulers of the various Sheikdoms there should be thrown out by
wild-eyed Arab nationalists with Marxist leanings. From the point of
view of the moderate Arab leaders it must appear that friendship with
the US does not offer protection and does not pay. Only a few weeks
ago,- King Idris of Libya was ousted by a group of officers leaning
toward the Iraqi type of Baathisrn, one of the most fanatic and anti-
Western forms of Arab radicalism. We seemed grateful that, for the
time being, the new rulers declared their willingness to tolerate our
base at Wheelus and promised not to nationalize the US and other Western
oil companies. For King Idris, however, we were either unwilling or
unable to do anything. One of the results of the Libyan coup -- apart
from the fact that roughly one billion $ in annual oil revenues has now
passed into the hands of avowed Revolutionaries -- is the ominous
deterioration of Tunisia's position. Long one of the "most reasonable"
and most enlightened among Arab countries, Tunisia, still led by the
distinctly pro-Western Bourguiba, suddenly finds herself surrounded
by two hostile neighbors: Libya and Al geria. Bourguiba can hardly
help feeling that with his moderation he has betted on the wrong horse.
Small moderate Lebanon, too - - which in 1958 was still able to call on
US military help -- is currently being forced to abandon its traditional
policy of neutrality and to tolerate, despite surprisingly courageous
counter-efforts by its President Helou, the takeover of its southernmost
border areas by Arab Commando groups composed almost exclusively
of non-Lebanese. Considering the lack of any physical outside support
-for Helou, it seems only a question of time, when he, too, will be replaced
by regimes of the kind now governing neighboring Syria and Iraq.
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CONFIDENTIAL - 7
5. Under the circumstances, even those Arabs who used to maintain
a degree of friendship with the US cannot possibly place great trust in
Washington's declarations of amity. It may be a paradox, but must
nevertheless be understood, that, precisely because we have shown
ourselves so peaceful and patient, so obviously unwilling to intervene
with force anywhere or against anyone, it will now be virtually impos-
sible for either Arab or Jew to see in the United States the great power
that would actually protect one side against the other and maintain any
agreed upon peaceful order by forceful means, should that prove
necessary. If a country is so clearly shying away from physical involve-
ment, it is difficult to believe that it will ever permit itself to become
so involved.
6. It has widely been assumed that the USSR would restrain the
Arabs, as we might restrain the Israelis, out of a fear of a direct
US/USSR confrontation. It should be observed, however, that the Soviet
interest to exercise such restraining influence is bound to decrease to
more or less the same degree to which Moscow's fear of a direct con-
frontation of the two super powers diminishes. The more the Soviets --
looking at US actions and inactions around the world -- become convinced
that the US remains unbendingly resolved to negotiate rather than to
confront, the smaller their incentive to restrain their clients; i. e. , in
the Mid East case, the Arabs.
1. In Latin America, too, the US has demonstrated such extreme
unwillingness recently to use "power" that we actually seem to have
placed a premium on hotheaded and undesirable ventures by extremists.
We have let Ecuador, Peru, and others, arrogate to themselves
exclusive fishing rights in a zone of 200 miles from their coastlines,
and we have permitted US fishing boats found in those zones to be shelled
or brought to port by foreign naval vessels, whence they have been released
only against payment of arbitrary "fines. " We leaned over backwards not
to apply the Hickenlooper Amendment as a sanction against Peru for
uncompensated expropriation, by a revolutionary Officers Junta, of
hundreds of millions worth of US property. The example was quickly
followed by Bolivia where few da sago, another revolutionary group,
likewise led by a general, enacted certain measures, on the very first
day of its, existence, foreshadowing expropriation of US oil companies
in that country.
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2. The Latin temperament is rather volatile by nature and the
colossus-to the North is not necessarily popular among Latinos. It is
dangerous, therefore, and does not promote peaceful developments, if
-th'Z a`mpression is create that irresyonsible - or even narxna~lY qu%te ~~~
--re-spoxx-sibl-e--wx-elemeri s, can act wildly a.nd_illegally wi.thaut having
napping of the US Ambassador in full daylight. But it is doubtful,
whether our concern for a single diplomat's life, our clearly manifested
"hope" that all the kidnappers' demands be fulfilled speedily to save
one man, was as humane as it seemed: Since it has become all too
clear now that the host country of a,US representative can be black-
mailed with such surprising ease, it must be feared that there will be
further kidnappings of US diplomats in the foreseeable future.
e" r Ii n-.gouernme t resjs Bsr " :e .owe recent unprecedented kid-
1o fear an serous ye action on our part. We certainly could not hold---'
where in Latin Americaa any time.
pears to be the case today, at the^11S- will no longer intervene any
desirable, in the very interest of peace, to let eve ry oodyas-sume, as
of course, would like to repeat a similar venture. Yet, it is not
3. . It is no longer seriously doubted today that the Balaguer regime
in the Dominican Republic with all its deficiencies, is, nevertheless, the
best administration that country has ever had since 1865 (when Santo
Domingo gained its final independence from Spain). The regime was
established after order had been restored in the Republic by US military
intervention, which at the time was bitterly criticized by many, even
well-meaning people as an act of US ''imperialism. " No US President,
tI"
1. When Czechoslovakia was invaded in August 1968, the experts,
and large segments of public opinion, found one consolation in the
mournful event: It would re-awaken the Western World to the danger
from the East and revive the somewhat lethargic NATO. The prediction
(which, as you may recall, I contradicted at the time) was wrong. The
lasting impression that finally resulted was that of NATO's and the US
virtually total non-reaction, except in words, and the capability of brute
force (applied in this case by the Soviets) to impose its will.
2. The Germans, as you know only too well from frequent and direct
observation, have -- after two World Wars lost, with five totally
different regimes following each other within 50 years, and with their
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W
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country still divided -- by no means regained. their self-confidence.
I transmitted to you the other day a report containing the remarks of
a German leader-who, upon his return from an official visit to Moscow,
while admitting that the Soviets had remained totally rigid and offered
absolutely nothing, concluded nevertheless that W. Germany had no
choice but to come to terms with Moscow "because, IT he said, "I have
twice recently been in Washington and found there such a trend toward
isolationism that I am certain the Americans will sooner or later pull
their forces out of Germany. " The individual in question may have been
objectively wrong, but the fear he expressed is actually shared by
virtually all Germans who do have opinions on foreign and world affairs.
3. After having visited Washington and signed the Offset Agreement,
Chancellor Kiesinger thought he had obtained a US undertaking that
current US force strength in Germany would be fully maintained during,
at least, the two years covered by said Agreement. You are far better
aware of the fact than I am that his impressions were overoptimistic.
4. It is sometimes asserted that the very threat of US troop
reductions would bring about a greater defense effort by the united
Europeans themselves. In actual fact, however, Europe -- though
united it would be a Great Power _ - is not yet united, and Italians,
Germans, Frenchmen, Beneluxers, and Scandinavians think of them-
selves as small, in terms of military strength, and in need of protection
by the only super power that happens to exist in the non-Communist
world: the US. When big brother even appears.to falter, the little
brethren will not move forward courageously -- as we seem to think --
but, on the contrary, they will anxiously take several steps backwards.
5. By coincidence, I happened to be in Italy at the end of August,
when the fact leaked out that our very small garrison there (in the
Verona/Vicenza area with a logistic base at Leghorn) would be cut in
half for "economy reasons. " . The Italians guessed, more or less
correctly, that no more than a total of about 1, 500 men would be involved.
Not a single Italian, whom I heard discuss the matter - regardless of
whether he stood politically on the right, left or center -- accepted that
explanation. Everybody assumed, as a matter of course, that this was
simply the first installment of a total US military pull-out from Italy.
6. The Canadians, incidentally, encounter the same disbelief
throughout Europe, when they adduce economic motives for withdrawing
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roughly one-half of their small European garrison. Unaware of
Trudeau's marked sense of independence, many Europeans actually
believe that Canada could not very well take such a measure without
the, at least tacit, approval of Washington. This, then, leads to the
further conclusion that the entire North American continent is beginning
to turn inward and intent on ultimately withdrawing all its forces still
stationed on foreign soil. .
1. You will not expect in this sketch any analysis of the complex
issue of US/USSR relations. But one comment deserves to be made in
the general context I have chosen: The Soviets are developing some
genuine fear of Red China and its intractable leaders. They might, there-
fore, feel impelled by self-interest to seek a genuine Kremlin/ Washington
detente, and even make certain concessions to the US as a conceivable
future ally, semi-ally or at least friendly "neutral" in a Soviet-Chinese
confrontation. The entire Soviet assessment, however, of the weight
and value of the United States as a friend or foe, will depend very largely
on their considering us either strong-willed or else weak in purpose and
esoIve. The realists in the Kremlin may now be "taking our measure, "
and a US yielding, and reluctant to act on all fronts, will appear less
interesting and important to them as a factor in the international power
struggle than a superpower obviously able and willing to use its strength.
1. This then is the overall image of the US as a reluctant-
-giant-seeking peace and reconciliation almost feverishly, wit hdx.awing._#orces
not in one ut in many parts :of the world tired of using. .. its... physical
po era a-Tir`m-Ty` esooTvecT-to cu existing commitments and keep out.,
or a v ery`To-Dg itxa-e--to--eo se;--of any confrpn_tafion that might lead to
2. This picture appears to be confirmed by a flow of US governmental
statements on military budget cuts, temporal sension of the draft,
overall eductionn_oLio_r.c-es, .A activation of units, and rnothballhilg of
naval vessels. Although in reality these various measures,sso far, are
not earth-shaking in themselves, they_.do:p.roduc_e. tIhIe impression of an
irrrsible 4-r liberat t steps on the road toward a
liquidation of very_mAny on.g-held power positions, o a systematic
retreat into an inner shell. Even though we do not want it, we do appear
to friendly as well as. hostile observers as intent upon descending from
a stage to make room for new actors whom nobody can fully see as yet,
but who cannot fail to appear to take the spaces we are leaving empty.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/11/03: LOC-HAK-2-7-27-2
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/11/03: LOC-HAK-2-7-27-2
CONFIDENTIAL 11
1. Anyone with a sense of history will grasp the tragic elements
in this situation. The President by training and instinct knows, of
course, exactly what is at stake. So do you, a historian and a man
with a pronounced sense of power realities. The policy on which we
seen! embarked is very obviously dictated by a conviction that "public
opinion" demands it and that, accordingly, the government is essentially
helpless to act otherwise. This pessimism about the public might be
unwarranted. Results of a Gallup poll, published in today's NYT (see
Annex) indicate that 3 out of 5 persons polled consider US intervention
in Vietnam justified. The votes lie not with those professors, students,
and other particularly visible and audible protesters, nor with the
writers and readers of our few great (or perhaps only big) newspapers.
2. The votes lie with the masses, and I have the truly frightening
suspicion that these very masses -- which today do not even care very
much about foreign affairs and foreign problems -- will be the first
ones to yell for retribution and stampede forward over our bodies,
howling that we have betrayed them, when a year or two from now it
becomes clear that our well meant policy, allegedly attuned to public
opinion, will have led to defeat, and to crises infinitely more terrible
than that Vietnam war we have to face now. Lincoln used artillery in
the streets of New York against rebellious "copperheads; " about 1100
people were killed in two days as a result, He was considered, however,
not only a great man but a great humanitarian, when it turned out,
subsequently, that he had been "right." "The ppeeoalee" are not _very just,
they forgive the victor but always make scapegoats of their own leaders
oa not victorious, The Dolchstos slegende ( ~ propaganda-tale of
the "stab in the Sack' oaf the fighting troops) unfortunately can be invented
in any country and at any time.
CONFIDENTIAL
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/11/03: LOC-HAK-2-7-27-2
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/11/03: LOC-HAK-2-7-27-2
'r, /! ~ ~?1 I
err
1IJ11 FS REr Ui4
Gallup Finds Middle Class
Resenting Negro Gains
White, middle-class Ameri-
cans are basically pessimistic
about the country's future and
resentful of gains made by N.c-
groes, according to a special
Gallup poll made for NewsweekI
magazine.
The conclusions, based on re-
sponses from 1,321 white peo-
ple With family incomes of
$5,000 to $15,000, are sum-1
marized in the issue of News-
wmel- that conics out today.
Some 46 per cent of the white
,j
middle class, the poll indicated,'
believe that the United States
has changed for the worse in
the last five years, and there'
is an almost even split- on!
whether the nation can solve
its problems at all.
Vietnam War Cited
When asked for a list of
America's at?3t 7_"r?jt ,ri3,
64 per cent cit2d the ..war in
Vietnam. But three out of five
elr t'r!at~tl:? _L'n=t.'c, S[.?tes ~cas
rg_._IgtE, tion
there;
Racial unrest was shown to
be the No. 2 problem, with the,
answers indicating resentment.)
The poll indicated, for example,`
that only one-fourth of.middle-
integration of schools.
Other beliefs held by a ma-
jority of the middle class :r sites
polled included the following:
that Negroes get preference in
unemployment benefits, that
the danger of racial conflict is
rising, that Negroes are to
blame for their unemployment
rates, and that they "could
have done something" about .
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/11/03: LOC-HAK-2-7-27-2