HENRY OWEN'S LETTER ON HISTORY AND CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-15-5-15-3
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: August 4, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-15-5-15-3
MEMORANDUM 0
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
LA TIMER
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
Henry?Owents Letter on History
and Classified Documents
Attached is a letter to you from Henry Owen calling your attention
to a recent column he wrote in the Washington Post on the subject of
good history and classified government records. He is championing
Ernie Mayt s proposal that all classified records, except for "those
few" whose disclosures would directly, surely, and powerfully pre-
judice national security be opened after a set period of time to qualified
professional historians. Those historians would launch a major effort
to produce scholarly histories of U. S. post..?ar fcrcign policy
e
The idea is basically sound but, of course, there are the always present
hookers. For example:
How could we open the files to some historians but
not others?
-- What fixed period of time should we choose? State now
operates on a 30-year time frame. President Nixon
told the NSSM 113 Ad Hoc Group he thought most docu-
ments could be released after 10 years. Professor Langer
has suggested 8 years.
-- Mr. Owen did not mention cost. The Archives estimates
it will cost over $6 million to completely review and
declassify the bulk of World War II material still classified.
chosen and at that point a decision could be made as to
whether or not any particular item can or cannot be
avoided by letting historians look through the files for
what they want, then submit for review what they have
-- The administrative burden of pre-screening could be
released.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-15-5-15-3
be better for you to host the meeting and invite who you want.
what is a reasonable time frame for keeping sensitive files classified,
i. e. intelligence assessments, diplomatic correspondence, internal
government working papers and memoranda, etc. ? You could tell them
what we are doing to open up the files and what we plan to do to make it
easier in the future to declassify material.
Henry Owen suggests that he get a group together but I believe it would
-~ It is doubtful that CIA, among others, would surrender
to any group of academicians the right to look through
classified files which might contain still sensitive
material.
Moreover, who could be sure that some historian
(what was Ellsberg?) will not take notes or somehow
reproduce what he wants and use it even if denied
permission?
Henry Owen suggests that you might meet with a few historians of wide
repute--himself, Ernie May, Bill Langer, James McGregor Burns
to discuss the idea of a series of studies on postwar foreign policy
utilizing now-classified records. Good, sound historians deserve a
boost, God knows, and you ,rnight well want to meet with such a group.
You might also consider including in the meeting some men who have
served in the White House and who are or were members of the acaden c
community; for example, Eric Goldman, John Roche, Arthur Schlesinger,
Walt R.ostow, and McGeorge Bundy.
Among the subjects such a group might discuss are when and under
what circumstances presidential papers should be opened to historians,
W
The disadvantages to this proposal are obvious.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve your staff setting up such a meeting.
if you disapprove, you should sign the simple thank you note
to Henry Owen which is attached.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-15-5-15-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-15-5-15-3
W
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASIIINC'DON
Dear Henry:
Thank you for your letter and the copy of your
thoughtful article in the Washington Post. As you
may be aware, the President is very interested in
making more classified material available to his-.
torians and the public in general. He has personally
taken an interest in the release of the bulk of World
War II material which is still classified. In addition,
we will soon have some recommendations on ways
to make much more classified material available
after a much shorter waiting period than at present.
T recall Ernie May's proposal for a series of his-
tories of postwar foreign policy. I believe the steps
we will be taking shortly will open up a great volume
of material which will make the task of the qualified
professional historian much easier.
Warm rega
ds,
Henry A. Kissinger
Henry Owen
Director
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington D. C. 20036
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/e?
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
August 3, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR TOM LATIMER
rPh Y
FROM /
~A-
SUBJECT Henry " Oceen I s" Stigges t.11ohis
on Declassification...
Will you please take this in tow and prepare a
reply for Mr. Kissinger'ssignature.
For control purposes we have logged it "in/out".
Thanks.
art" k
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-15-5-15-3
 -` w
The -Brookings Institution LWJ
1775 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE N,W./ WASHINGTON D.C. 20036 /CABLES: BROOKINST/ TELEPHONE: 2O2 HUDSON 3-8919
Foreign Policy Studies Program
July 30, 1971
Dr. Henry Kissinger
Special Assistant to the President
for. National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20505
Dear Henry.
I know that you:have.:mo 'e pressing matters.:than history,:to,,woriy.about.
-=_
but '-that' won 't` stop' te` from sending you a copy of the attached column, which
was published while you were away.
You may remember that, in a brief conversation some months ago, you
expressed interest in Ernie May's proposal for a series of histories of
postwar foreign policy. As the attached column points out, what Ernie
has in mind are histories based on full access to government archives
(except for those documents whose disclosure would seriously damage US
security), to be done by respected historians in riversities. The same
notion has also recently been championed by Bill Langer and James McGregor Burns.
In present circumstances, the advantages of this proposal seem even more
evident. Whatever may have been the risk of damage to national security in
publishing the Pentagon papers, the risk of our being subjected to bad
history is surely vastly greater. The best assurance against bad history,
and against the recrimination which is all too likely to follow in its wake,
is to develop a procedure for getting expert and disinterested historical
treatment of US foreign policy into the public domain within a reasonable
period of time. Ernie May's proposal still seems to me the best way of
doing this.
I have no doubt that if the President were to move in this direction,
his action would be greeted with loud hosannahs in the academic community.
I'm also clear, from the soundings I've taken to date, that unless the
President moves, the idea will get nowhere in the executive branch.
Which is why I'm writing you. If you find the idea of interest, we'd
be glad to bring together a few historians of wide repute -- such as Ernie
May and Bill Langer, among others -- to discuss the idea with you.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-15-5-15-3
 July 7, 1971
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-15-5-15-3
A Deaime Deeiassiiieauon,
Open Files -Reveal the Co nz.plicated. Truth
By Henry Owen
es
conflict (save Hitler's war) in the last con- e
tury has been marked by three successive One remedy was suggested by three noted
phases: Phase 1, when the wartime official historians before the current storm broke.
. view was readily accepted; Phase II, when In 1969 Professor -Ernest May of Harvard
a spate of memoirs and other secret docu- aroposed that all classified government roe-
ments persuaded people that it was largely ords, except for those few whose disclosures
Id ii ectl = surely and powerfully
w o
c r
The current furor over secret Vietnam the reasons why such men as George Ball
documents fits into a familiar pattern. The and Averell Harriman have warned againstiew of the origins of each major th
trying to di-mw sweeping conclusions from
documents
shoved the_.truth to he a lot more compli-
cated than any of these "devil" theories
would suggest. We are now in Phase II on
Vietnam; the need for moving as soon as
,Voss bl ? to IlL can. be. better under,
e
.
stood if we look-to past experienc
CASK ON : In 1914-18, the view that the
Kaiser had single handedly brought on the
war was universal outside Germany. Then
came postwar memoirs and the publication
of Austrian. German and Russian secret
. documents; this led such revisionists as the
late Harry Elmer Barnes to suggest that the
war was largely the fault of Poincare and
the Russian military. Finally, serious his-
torians got to work, While they differed
anio g themselves in distributing the blame.
a succession of ,.-loded in a burst' wou'id teavvc the ? classroom with' somewhat
Il
'
h t t
Bested that he had tempted and provoked that the color of truth is often gray."
005e14
1'CS:dellt
I
commentary, which sub; more awareness than now seeds oeuand ?
of revisionist
h orld is a complicated place and
Government, in a burst of candor, gave two
eminent scholars--William Langer and Ev-
erett Gleason-the `ritn of its archives and
invited them to form and write their own
view. Phase III, which began with their two-
voluine work in the early 1950s, has been re-
flected in a succession of scholarly studies
ever since. These studies have reached vary-
ing conclusions, but no one who reads all of
them is likely to return to the simplistic
theories of the 1940s: The failures of last-
minute U.S. and Japanese efforts to avert
war are, as John Toland points out in his
recent work, too tragic and complicated a
business to be explained by seeking out
llvluu~
In light of current events, they warrant seri-
ous exploration. The President might appoint
a mixed commission of eminent American
historians and government, officials to study
the matter and report back to him with spe-
cific recommendations. This would be a dif-
ferent operation from the inter-agency study
on declassification which is already under-
way in the U.S. Government.
In the meantime, private studies can make
a modest contribution in pointing the way.
Leslie Gelb, who coordinated the compila-
tion of Pentagon documents, is embarked on
a three-year analytical history for the Brook-
ings Institution of how five successive U.S.
administrations perceived and acted on U.S.
interests in Indochina from 1940 to 1965. His
,. tQn Vietnam, ?we .axe.-now in. Phase 1L.Se,. object is not to figure out who struck whom
?'
t:......: 9~,,.,.,ar.
JiY.? but to ?ah^w'{she .iiit'ra'el tion'be../
' ----._____.:r..;l...
h
r
v
vealed documents are inevitably a partial
record: They do not include White House
files; and they do not indicate either the con-
'text in which, or the tactical purposes for
which, the memoranda they cite were writ-
tell. cannot fully reflect the doubts and
complete nor balanced. These are some of turns.
p IS
with the participants; as indicated in these Whatever may be the verdict of history in
volumes' preface, they sometimes lacked the Vietnam, one thing is sure: It will differ
research experience required to assess evi- from many of the verdicts now being pro?
deuce which was necessarily, as a Washing- .. pounced with such speed and enthusiasm on
ton Post editorial has pointed out, neither the basis of a scattered and incomplete re?
and domestic environment in which they
were taken. His research is based on public
sources; the first published results, pub-
lished recently in Foreign Policy and the
"Outlook" section of The Washington Post,
suggest that his conclusions will be both
torments of officials reaching for decision- more balanced and perceptive than those
which are, by the very nature of the govern- now being widely drawn from the Pentagon
ment's operations, rarely committed to documents often by people who haven't even
paper. The authors who analyzed these pa- read them, but have heard of them at see-
- not able to conduct interviews and or third hand.
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W ?