VIETNAM ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-13-6-4-6
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 8, 2009
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 13, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

MEM~DRANDUM ~ ! ~ ~
NATIONAL SECURI'T'Y COUNCIL
INFORMATION
May 13, 1971
SECI~.ET /SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM ~'OR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:.. K. Wayne Smith /~~~ _ FOR FtLt:,
O~~t _..~.......__._
ent ~~ iN131CAY1~~ Of QRtG1f1r1tiQR OR ADpRLSSE~'~ ?~
SUgJ'ECTs Vietnam Assessm NQ P R~I10~. D1SI'~~.pR plS~Rl~~~1Q.I'~
F011.OW ~
Pu_~
This memorandum reviews the status of the Vietnam assessment
studies and. summarizes the results of CIA's xxiexxxorandurn revising
their earlier estimate. of the manpower requirements far alternative
enerrxy strategies.
Status of Studies
......
In your April 15th and April 28th memoranda (at'Tab A), you laid
on a comprehensive list of study requirements. In addition, in your
April 1st memoxandurn, you requested a separate assessment, due
May 1, 1971, which to my knowledge has not yet been received.
There has been good progress on the studies to date, and by the end
of next week (May 21st) all of the studies exce t the or.e sou ht on
air interdictions will be ready for 5RG consideration:
__ Best, Worst, and Most Probable 1972 Enemy Strate ies
Analysis of manpower and logistics requirements completed
by CIA' with CIA revisions requested at 1as~`xneeting at Tab B
and reviewed in detail below. xC5 estimate, also requested
at last SRG meeting, will be completed early next week.
.~~ Pro`ected MR Main Force Sur fuses and Deficits
Cbxr~pleted and considered at last meeting.
w Caxnbncl.ia MR Study
DOD team back. Report due and expected early next .week.
SECRET /SENSITIVE
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/08 : LOC-HAK-13-6-4-6
 No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/08 : LOC-HAK-13-6-4-6
SECRET/SENSITIVE
-- RVNAF Improvement Packages
My best information is that .this report is a.ll but carxipleted.
and will be .available early next .week.
-- Ceasefire Study
Study completed and being considered by VSSG Working Group
on Friday, May lath. Paper looks good and can be considered
at any time.
Economic Stabilization Projections
Paper completed. To be considered by VSSG Working Group
on Fra.day. Ready for 5RG next week. We need to use this
paper to: (a) .address the possible implications of the 20% to
30% inflation expected in the next twelve moths and possible
policy measures to cope with the situation, and fib) force State,.
AID and the Mission to come to drips with the development
~...~
problem.
-- Air Interdiction
To my knowledge DOD has not produced such a paper.
-- North Vietnam's Potential to Continue War
This paper will be available on Monday or Tuesday.
The foregoing tasks were to be completed undear VSSG auspices.
In addition the Vietxiaxn Ad Hoc Group was assigned studies on the
.political situation, TC.C (ROK) farces, regional cooperation, and
police and anti-VCI programs. Dick Kennedy and John Holdxidge
axe handling these.
CIA's Manpower Revisions
Y3a:sic Analysis - as requested, CIA revised its earlier manpower
estimates to reflect the impact of U. S. redeplaymen.ts. What we have
axe a series of estimates that represent CIA's step-wise movement
to the one that takes into account all the factors. These are Shawn
a.n the three columns in the table below;
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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 No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/08 : LOC-HAK-13-6-4-6
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Force (Infiltration) R.eguirexnents
....
Thousand 1VLen.
Basic Analysis
US Withdrawals to
US Withdxawals
Based on 1 q6$
43, 400 mid-7Z w/
and 30%
Rec(u.irerrxents
ROTC Remaining
Decrease in KIA
(1)
(Z)
(3}
Strategy/Offensive
Fxotracted War
115
IviR 1
135
115
S 0
MR 2
125
129
90
MRs 1 and 2
145
129
90
Cambodia
135
~ 135
94
MR 1 /Gambadi.a
155
135
q4
GVN/ Ganzbodia.
175
143
100
The first column has na meaning. Based an 1868 data it is simply a
building black a.ri the analysis.
The second column estimates the requirements on the assumptions that:
(a) the U. S. farce level reaches 43, 400:.` by midw7Z and (b) the ROKs remain.
The last column, takes rota account the effect of U. S. xedeployments on
enemy Kl'A. Although CIA did not calculate this column, it did estimate
(p. 13) that U. 5. redeployments would cause KIA to drop 30%. Our
intrepxetations of this :finding, which we confirmed with CIA, is that
it should be reflected i.xi the manpower requirements estimates, causing
them to drop by 30%.
Issues and Questions
-- (1) The first issue is whether CTA can come up with one table
that considers all the factors as they are likely to play out. In
you~^ talking; points you ask CIA' if they should not have cranked
in the 30% decline in K7A into their estimates.
-- (2) These new estimates, with a peak requirement of 104, 000
are surprisingly low. You should ask CTA how they account far,
South Laos, whi eh was not a factor in 1968. Of the $7, 000
infiltrated in the 1970-71 dry season over 2$, 000 were destined
SEC1tET/SENSITIVE
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/08 : LOC-HAK-13-6-4-6
 No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/08 : LOC-HAK-13-6-4-6
SECRET/SENSITIVE
for Snuth Laos. Ts CIA really -saying that next year, considering.
U. 5. txoog withdxawals, the ixxfiltration of 100, 000, only 13, 000
more that: this year will give Hanoi the capability to mount a
countrywide offensive?
-- (3) What do these estimates ixx~.ply about success ox failure?
Are these ten day offensive spurts that end in defeat fnr Hanoi?
What do we mean by offensive? Will it succeed?
-- (4) How do these requixexnents estimates compare with Hanoi's
manpower pool and .capability to infiltrate rnen without. drawing
it down fuxther? Does 100, 000 draw it down ar does I50, 000?
-- (5) CIA's force xatio analysis is very xudixnentary. On page l0
we have calculations on the farce xatios, but no whexe in the
paper is there a definition of tlxe enemy threat. The earliex
DOD/N5C analysis specifiedtlnee levels of threat: (aj that posed
by NVA/VC forces currently in SVN, (b) that posed by NVA/VC
forces nova in SVN' plus corxibat forces in South Laos and the DMZ,
and (c) that posed by forces in SVN plus all dual threat forces
ixa Laos and Cambodia. The entire force xatio business is
liot:cheti:`by'CIA. ?We are "better off using the eaxlier'DOD/NSC
paper (at Tab C).
(6) The CTA data on p. l3 provides an interesting view of the
effectiveness of U. S. versus ARVN forces.. We see t$at enemy
KIA per 1, 000 maneuver troops has dropped for U. S. troops
from over 250 in 1969 to less than 100 in the last half of 1970.
Meanwhile, ARVN's performance, as measured by this standard,
has stayed near 100. This means: (a) ARVN is doing as well
in this departxxxent as U. S. units, and (b) neither U. S. or ARVN
maneuver units are killing very many enemy troops. This cannot
be attributed to the enemy's strategy which hays not changed over
the 1969-70 period.
-- (7) Tt is instructive to note that the field judgments on ROK. forces
(see cable at Tab D) assume "continued protracted war" (p. 2).
No wander they conclude we don't need the' ROK's. Is MACV
fighting the same war Washington is fighting?
'Your talking points are provided sepaxately.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/08 : LOC-HAK-13-6-4-6