NIE ON SOUTH VIETNAM'S PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-13-5-22-7
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 8, 2009
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: May 6, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/08: LOC-HAK-13-5-22-7
GP
SECRET/SENSITIVE INFORMATION
May 6, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: TOM LATIMER/9/
SUBJECT: NIE On South Vietnam's Problems
and Prospects
This is a balanced, well-reasoned Estimete. It concludes that the
outlook in South Vietnam for the remainder of 1971 is reasonably
good. Prospects for 1912 are less clear, however, and looking
ahead into the mid-1970's, it concludes that it is impossible now
to offer a clear cut estimate. It does reach the judgment that the
longer term survival of the GVN is by no means yet assured.
The judgment that things look pretty good for the rest of this year
is based on the "considerable forward momentum" observable on
the part of the OVN and on the obvious difficulties the Communists
are having both militarily and in the political action field. The
Estimate notes, however, that the war is far from over and that
the Communists retain important military capabilities as well as
a tightly disciplined party organisation in South Vietnam. It notes
too that as the U.S. withdraws, existing weaknesses in the South
Vietnamese government and society will tend to surface.
The Estimate judges that Thieu will probably win the October
presidential elections but that even if "Big" Minh should be elected,
he might not depart significantly from existing policies. A key factor
in the elections, the Estimate points out, will be the South Vietnamese
perception of the US attitude. If the South Vietnamese came to believe
that the US was truly neutral in the election or favored someone other
than Thieu, Thies's chances of election would probably decline.
In 1972 the Estimate sees the Communists attempting a step-up in its
military activity to help generate domestic pressure on the US
SECRET /SENSITIVE
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No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/08: LOC-HAK-13-5-22-7
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government to disengage from the war and to affect the outcome of
the presidential election. It concludes that the Communists will not
be able to reverse the military balance in South Vietnam in 1972.
The Estimate makes a number of other points worth noting. One is that
the Communist leadership is not likely to view the problem of South
Vietnam its terms of whether to continue the struggle but rather in terms
of how and at what level. It also raises the question of whether the
younger generation of North Vietnamese shares the same unswerving
dedication to the reunification of Vietnam as their elders. It says that
that question cannot be answered yet.
FYI: No where near enough effort is being made by the
intelligence community to try to identify the younger
Communist leaders and what attitudes they may have.
It is a time-consuming and trying task, one which most
intelligence analysts and collectors try to avoid in favor
of the more dramatic, current types of information.
The Estimate also points out that we have trained the South Vietnamese
array to rely on tactical air support and on extensive helicopter support.
It will be many years, however, before the South Vietnamese military
acquires the technological and managerial skills needed to handle the
complexities of maintaining and supporting a modern fighting force. The
South Vietnamese will require US assistance to maintain s.nd to provide
modern equipment.
The "revolution of rising expectations: on the part of the South Vietnamese
people and the CVN's inability to satisfy the demands already generated
will be another factor affecting the Saigon government's long term stability.
the Estimate points out.
-- But, above all *lee, the estimators assert, the key to the future of
South Vietnam is the matter of will. It was the loss of will in 1965
that led the South Vietnamese to the brink of disaster and it was the
rediscovery of that will at Tet 1968 that helped deal the Communists
such a setback. The Estimate concludes that there is no way to
determine how tenacious the South Vietnamese will be a few years
hence when the US is much further along the road to disengagement.
SECRET/ SENSITIVE
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/08: LOC-HAK-13-5-22-7