MEMO TO DICK KENNEDY FROM PETER RODMAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-122-4-3-8
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 3, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR DICK KENNEDY
FROM: Peter Rodman IT_
October
Attached is the public record on Cienfuegos.
USG Statements
Tab A:
Tab B:
Tab C:
Press Comment
Tab D:
Tab E:
Tab F:
Tab G:
Tab H:
THIS DOCUMENT MAY CONTAIN
congressional equity
It includes:
HAK Chicago Backgrounder, September 16
Friedheim Announcement, September 25 (notes)
HAK Trip Backgrounder, September 25
C. L. Sulzberger, September 25
R. D. Heinl, September 28
Tad Szulc, September 30
Orr Kelly, September 30 (two versions)
Chalmers Roberts,. October 1
Congressional Comment
Tab I:
Tab J:
Tab K:
Tab L:
Tab M:
Goldwater and Mansfield, September 26
Fulbright on Issues & Answers, September 27
Mendel Rivers, September 28
Dante Fascell, September 30
Frank Church, October 1
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EXCERPT FROM KISSINGER BACKGROUNDER, CHICAGO, SEPT, 16, 1970
? MR. TODD: BillTodd, Rockford Star. Dr. Rissinger,
speaking of off shore islands, and closer to home, I saw
a report recently that the Soviet Union seems to be sneaking
into Cuba. Is there anything to that'report, and if so, how
serious does the administration view it?
1DR. KISSINGEi71.3 The Soviet Union of course, is
very heavily established in Cuba as it is. It spends about
$1 million a day there, just to keep the island's economy
going. that the reports are probably referring to, the
r6ports that you mention is the visit of the fleet units
of the Soviet Union.
That in itself is not inconsistent with any under-
standing we have, certainly not against the 1G:tter. If they Start
operating strategic forces out of Cuba, say Polaris type S-115-
marines :and use that as a depot, that would be a matter we w6-uld
very carefully.
What the Soviet Union has to decide is this: Really, the
principles that Joe Sisco advanced for a Middle East settlement apply
to .tis. too. As you look around the world, both sides, simply by
the logic of events, have innumerable opportunities to take small
gains and to harass the other, or they can ask themselves what is
required for a more permanent settlement? In which case, they have
to forgo some tactical advantages for the sake of an agreeable
atmosphere.
For example, if we put the polaris submarine into the Blacl
Sea, we have every right to do it. There are many newspapers who
would say that is a prow4cative. thing to do. 'Why operate so close
to the Soviet border?
X am not saying everyone would hold that view. If one 1
...signi-ficantly---eizanges the deployment oft:Mr:1S strategic fois-T-tHat
is something the other side is bound to notice.
Therefore, both sides have to decide whether they want
to restrain measures which they have a legal right to take, in the
interest of some longer term settlements, or whether they want to
press every advantage they have a legal right to take.
?
We are watching these events in Cuba and it isn't yet clea:
what, exactly, the Soviet Union is doing there. The fleet is rotating
in and out, and we are watching events very carefully.
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?-
[11-fr, Friedheinliznade these general points in response to press queries
at la :30 p.m.,-Triday, September 2.5, 1970. ?
(This is not a verbatim transcript, and must not bused as direct quotes,
The paper is prepared from notes which contain the sense of the answers
only.)
? We have bad several queries during _recent days and today cduccrning
what the Soviets are doing in Cienfuegos. Al45o, if their activities had anything
to do with submarines.
?7-1,Ve?know-that'Soviet Ships aii-cl'zilfcraft.haVe made severat visits
to Cienfuegos in the past few months. There have been three Soviet Fleet
vtsis to?Cuba.in the last,year -- July/August 1969, May/June 1970, -and this
month.
We are keeping a close Watch on the current Soviet activities.
They are under close Surveillance.
you know, in Mr. Henkin's speech last M
8oviet Union is demonstrating an appare-nt intention to
for sustained surface and submarine operations in t1-1
our shores.
4
onclay he said that 'the
achieve a capability
Caribbean, close-by
We have Eicen, the printed reports that the SoViets are conducting
activities in Cienfuegos in association with a subnlarine base. There are
some new naval fa.cilities in the Cienfuegos area within the past several
months. Some, of the Soviet support ships have visited there. There are
ao subrvarines there at the px.esept time.
.
We do not know exactly what the facilities avo intenaed to be
n or whether they are intended to be bases. We are not suz:e that they are
building a submarine Support facility,
Wo fly 1.172. flights and still do.
. The ?LIST ? we have talked about in recent w.eeks carried three barges
?
whiChNvere offloaded,- possibly at Havana, and towed, as you know,. to
Cirifueaos. We listed for you ..ycsterday the ships in .Cienfuegos,'
. ? .
We are following very closely these developments, butNve can't.
?
sure yet what they are intended to be.
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ATTRIBUTABLE?TO WHITE NOUSE
SPOKESMAN, DIRECT QUOTATIONS
NOT PERMITTED
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
.(Soviet Presence in Cuba)
AT THE WHITE HOUSE
WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
3:20 P.M. EDP
FRIDAY
SEPTEMBER 25, 1970
Q To what extent --'combining that with the
missile violations, the general build-up in the Mediterranean
by the Soviets and this announcement today that possibly they
are building a submarine base in Cuba are we fearful
generally at this time of Russian military activity increasing
around the globe and, if so, is the President's trip at all
related to these Russian actions?
DR. KISSINGER: No, the President's trip was basically
planned before these actions occurred. It was planned after
the cease fire and these violations began to be obvious,
but before they became acute.
The reasons for the Presidential trip I have
essentially indicated.
-
As for the events that you have mentioned, they are,
of course, matters which we have to look at with concern.
With respect to the Soviet naval activity in
the Caribbean, we are, of course, watching the development
of Soviet naval activity and of possible construction there.
We are watching it very closely. The Soviet Union car be
under no doubt .thataweawouldaviewatI5eae7:S7teSITgliMent
of a strategic baspain the Caribbean withathe utmest periousnesa.
would like perhaps to call attention to a press
conference statement that President Kenaedv made on
November 20, 1962, in which he said the following:
"As for our part, if all offensive weapons are .
removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future,
under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is
not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes,
there will be? peace in the Caribbean.",
? The operative part, of course, is here: "If all
offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of
the Hemisphere in the futureu
This, of course, rehains the policy of this
Government.
MORE
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2 -
O Does that imply that a submarine with
missiles aboard would be carrying offensive weapons and
therefore ---
DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to go any further
than what I have said, And I have related it to the
reports to which my attention was called about the possible
construction of a naval base. All I want to point out
it that we, are watching it and we want to see for what
type of weapons it would be suitable, and similar matters.
I have stated our general view with respect to it
While the activity is now in an early stage.
? Do I understand that there is some doubt
? that this base could accommodate Polaris Submarines?
DR. KISSINGER:. I will go no further than what
I have said. Obviously, a Polaris typesubmarine is an
_ _ _ _ _
offensive weapon. _
Q Dr. Kissinger, do you agree with the thesis
that now the Russians are achieving parity in the military
force with the United States around the world and also
in the Mediterranean, that this will lead to peace?
DR. KISSINGER: We have trouble enough worrying
about our side of the military equation. Our concern,
our belief, our policy is to maintain a military
establishment on the basis of the doctrine of sufficiency,
and we believe that in the field of strategic weapons this
is adequate to achieve the security and foreign policy
objectives of the United States.
We do hone and we have made it clear to the Soviet..
Union in many exchanges, and we have done so in the
SALT negotiations, we do hone that the two superpowers
recognise their special responsibility for maintaining
the peace, and also the need to recognize that both sides
must be willing to subordinate possible tactical advantages for
benefit of the greater interest of humanity in peace.
This is why some of the events to which the
preceding question alluded require us to study Soviet
actions with particular concern..
4 4 # # # #
Q Dr. Kissinger, with the possible establishment
of Soviet submarine bases in Cuba, isn't this a bad time
to be taking a foreign trip?
DR. KISSINGER: Let's be careful about what has been
said. ye_are_watching the events in Cuba. We _are not at
this moment in a position to say exactly what they mean.
i;I:e7will'continue to observe them and at the right moment we
will take the action that seems indicated. We are in
excellent commueication.thing very rapid and dramatic
_
is likely to occur, and we are going to be in very close
touch with the situation.
END ###
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NEW. YORK TIKES 25 SEPTE?IBER 1970
Ugly Clouds in the South
By C. L. SULZBERGER
UNITED NATIONS, New York?As
if the United States were not suffi-
ciently beset by problems in South-
west and Southeast Asia, it is about
to enter a new time of troubles in
Latin America. Already two points of
possible and probable danger are dis-
cernible.
The possible danger could come in
that old familiar crisis area. Cuba.
where reports that a Soviet submarine
base is under construction are being
quietly investigated. It must be
stressed that there is not yet any
confirmation of these reports.
Initial information suggests, how-
ever, that a naval installation is being
built atCiaLifu_tw on the southern
coast, and that it is designed to serv-
ice "?" class submarines. Moscow's
eqtavalent of tile American Polaris-
launching vessels:
In a sense, if proven, this would be
the equivalent of installing land-based
missiles as Russia attempted in 1962,
then touching off a dramatic confron-
tation. However, there is a quintessen-
tial difference.
Were the U.S.S.R, to contemplate
surprise attack against the U.S.A.. its
submarines could fire their missiles
from the open seas. A Cuban base
would therefore not materially change
the prevailing situation. But any new
facility designed to improve offen-
sive Soviet striking power, would not
(if confirmed) be well-regarded.
The probable danger, although not
military, could ultimately prove far
more important. The great likelihood
is that Senator Allende. a Marxist-
socialist, will be formally chosen
Chile's President by Congress on Oc-
tober 24.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Dr. Allende may well lie low, stress
his moderation and international re-
spectability, and only perhaps proceed
with more drastic aspects of a revo-
lutionary program once his govern-,
rnent is firmly established.
Yet there are signs that such logic
may not prevail and that the Chilean
Communist party, which dominates
the Union Popular ,(a front that sup-
ports Allende) is already using tough
intimidation tactics against its oppo-
sition.
The immediate objective of this tac-
tic appears to be an effort to gain
control of Chile's principal news-
papers, television and radio stations
prior to the electoral session of
Congress. Anti-Communist journalists
and commentators have been threat-
ened with physical violence if they do
not yield, and communications work-
ers' groups are demanding "popular"
control of mass media.
Many editors feel openly harrassed.
The UnionS Popular (composed of Com-
munists, Socialists and Radicals but
primarily guided by the first) demands
direction of facilities and wants its
own members to be promoted to top
positions.
Some organizations have already
begun to cede to these pressures. The
program director of one television
channel, still officially under govern-
ment supervision, has received so
many personal threats that he has
decided to leave the country and plans
have already been made for Union
Popular to take over.
Chile's largest afternoon paper will
_
soon be sold for a modest down pay-
ment to a group believed to be repre-
senting the popular front. Last week
the owner told his staff he had been
warned that the paper would be taken
over by a workers' cooperative if it
did not switch its support to Dr. Al-
lende.
Both he and the owners of El Mer-
curio, the leading conservative daily,
have been menaced. El Mercurio,
strongly opposed to Union Popular,
belongs to a very wealthy family with
widespread investments and which has
long been engaged in a feud with Dr.
Allende. The paper's staff indicates a
fear it will be taken over by a coopera-
tive dominated by Communists and
even more extreme Popular Action
groups.
The , role of the press in South
.American ideological turnovers is
seen as crucial by a hemisphere which
remembers PerOn's seizure of the prin-
cipal Argentinian newspapers as a
major move to consolidate his power.
What now happens to Chile's freedom
of expression will be a striking
indi-
cation of Dr. Allende's ultimate inten-
tions.
There is slight doubt that a strongly
anti-U.S, regime is about to take over
in Chile and it could Well be tempted
to employ totalitarian methods to
achieve its aims. The consequences, as
reflected in neighboring countries like
Bolivia and Peru, are unpredictable.
But what can be predicted is an era
of growing difficulty in relations be-
tween Washington and some of its
southern neighbors, If a legally in-
stalled hostile regime in Chile were
even inferentially backed up by any
kind of Soviet military installation in
Cuba, the entire effort to arrange a
global detente between Washington
and Moscow could be jeopardized.
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DETROIT NEWS ?
r -7'73
fri
71 17
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28 SEPTZ1141.t. 1970 (2 OCTOBER)
11
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Ly 0L. et. D. HE1NL JR.
:aces Military Analyst
WASHINGTON?Russian establishment of a
nuclear submarine base at Cienfuegos on the
south coast of Cuba confronts the United States
with the 'gravest Communist challenge since
the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.
In terms of U.S. vital interests the sem
ritv of continental United States, the security
and inviolability of the Western Hemisphere,
the essentiality of unthreatened lines of com-
munication through the Caribbean ? the pres-
ence of an unfriendly naval base (especially
for missile submarines) in Cuba represents a
more frontally dangerous and brutal Russian
provocation than Nikita Khurshchev's installa-
tion there of medium-range ballistic missiles in
1962.
This naked thrust of Russian seapower anti-
nuclear missile power into what has been an
American .lake comes against the backdrop of
two other truculent and conspicuous exercises
of Soviet military muscle at American expense
during the last two months:
Russian deployment in August of SAM-2 and
SAM-3 surface-to-air missiles into the Suez
cease-fire zone (after having lied to the. United
States in the bargain) is one.
? The other, of course, was the unleashing of
Syria's 300 Russian-made T-54 and T-55 tanks
into an attack on Jordan, our nearest Arab
In direct implications for the security of the
United States, neither of the foregoing (nor
Russia's brutalization of Czechoslovakia, for
that matter) approaches the Cienfuegos sub-
marine base by several orders of magnitude.
The Russians only three months ago opened
a now "Y ankae "-c I ass missile-submarine
station off Greenland. ("Yankee" is the desig-
nation for Russia's Polaris-type submarine
which they are now building at the rate of one
a month. We have not built a Polaris stabrriar-
ine since 1966.) ?
When their Cuban base is complete and oper-
ational, the Soviets will have still another
Yankee missile submarine station, this one in
tke Caribbean underbelly, able not only to
reach targets throughout our South, Southwest
real Midwest, but, also the Panama. Canal and
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much of South and Central America.
Incidentally, neclear missiles fired against
the United States from a Caribbean launching
area would of course outflank our multibillion
dollar landlocked anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
offenses sitting in Montana and Dakota wheat-
fields, and again raise the question some-
what more urgently now ?as to why we do
not immediately put part of our ABM defense
at sea in the Navy's mobile SABIVIIS system
that the Pentagon has stifled for several years.
13ut the threat of Russian submarines in
Cienfuegos is by no means limited to that ?
posed by Yankee-class boats, deadly as they
are.
The Caribbean is our principal highway for
transportation of South American strategic
raw materials to the United States, which is no
longer the plentifully endowed mountain of
natural resources. and raw materials it was
even 30 years ago.
The Caribbean also is the Atlantic approach
to the Panama Canal and tho route that
tankers muet traverse to move Venezuelan oil
to the United States and Europe. ?
Those old enough to remember World War II
will never fotget the fiery carnival of blazing
tankers and torpedoed 'merchantmen that a
relatively few German submarines were able
to produce in the Caribbean and its Atlantic
gateway, the Windward Passage between Cuba
and Hispaniola.
With no Western IferniSphere base (such as
the Russians are now building at Cienfuegos),
German submarines in 1242 sank 285 American
"merchant ships in the Windward Passage
alone. ?
The submarine threat to our Caribbean Om-
municetions was so great between 1242 and
1945 that the U.S. Navy had to convoy more
ships through the Windward ssage than
through any other sea area except the
approaches to New York.
Because of the sickness of our democratic
Society at war with itself, our New Left,
peace-at-any-price Senate, our war-weariness
end nee-isolationalistre we may except that
the direness of the Cienfuegos development
will be minimized and at first even denied,
as with the Suez missile cheating and lies
by the Russians.
For public consumption, Pentagon spokes-
men are saying ? "we are not sure" what is
developing at Cienfuegos. Others ore saying,
well, there aren't any of the Yankee sub-mar-
ines there ? yet. Still others, apologetic, are
already laying out the fallback line: How an
we blame the Russians for this while we have
Polaris submarine bases in Scotland (Holy
Loch) and Spain (Rota)?
One short answer to the latter question is
that Holy Loch and Rota are a thousand miles
from metropolitan Russia while Cienfuegos is
150 miles from the United States.
The pretense that our intelligence and recon-
naissance machinery isn't "sure" what it
happening at Cienfuegete is misleading rubbish.
It can be stated on high authority that the
Joint Chiefe of Staff have a disturbingly clear
picture of what the Russians are' up to and are
deeply concerned as to what, if anything, we
can do about it.
Once and for all, as we ought to have learned
from 1962 if nothing else, the only thing the
Russians respect is power..
Rine Cuban missile crisis, wehad, depend-
ing on how one recognized it, strategic missile
superiority of anywhere from 5-1 to 10-1 over
Russia. ?
Today, due to Robert S. lekNamara's hide-
ous misjudgment of the 1960's, the Soviets have
more ICBM's than we have. At the time of
Cuba in 1952, we had a fighting Navy in its
prime and Russia had virtually no Navy at all.
Today the new, tough Russian fleet cruises the
Gulf of Mexico thumbing its nose at our over-
age, rust-bucket fleet with no surface-to-sur-
face missiles at all, the World War If submar-
ines such as Russia junked a decade ago.
To expel Russian missiles from Cuba in 1962,
President Kennedy had to go to a general
mobilization and point every one of our nuclear
weapons down Klirushchey's throat.
In 1970, since it appears we have neither the
heart nor any longer the strength to do what
Kennedy did, the country may have to recon-
cile itself to living with Russian submarines
tied their nuclear miscues targeted at our
cities from a base en what we once called an
Aatcricen lake.
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NEW YORK TIME:3
30 SEPTEMBER 70 ID6
WARNING ON CUBA
PUZZLES U S. AIDES
White House Data in Report
on Base Termed Old
By TAD AZULC
SPeclal to The New 'fort Tlattli
WASHINGTON, Sept. 29 ? ?
American officials said today
that the United States had
only dubious and dated infor-
mation to indicate that the
Soviet Union might be planning
to build ?a strategic submarine
base in Cuba.
?For this reason, these officials,
who include members of the
intelligence community, said
they were at a loss to explain
why the White House chose
last week to warn Moscow
against the establishment of
such a base.
Officials and diplomats have
suggested the possiblity that
the White house acted for
broader policy motivations in-
cluding the Middle East crises,
or that an alleged Soviet threat
in Cuba was being used to
signal dangers that might de-
velop if Dr. Salvador Allende,
a Marxist, became Chile's Pres-
ident In November as ex-
pected.
The whole question of the
reported Soviet _ plans _ for . a
? naval base is delicate because
in. the Administration are in-
hibited from commenting on
? background briefings ?by the
? White House.
? ? Source of Embarrassment
The practice of background
? briefings, by officials who can-
not be publicly identified, has
often turned into a source of
embarrassment to the State De-
' eiartment.
:While Latin-American diplo-
mats wondered why the United
States chose to create at ? this
time what appeared to be an
artificial crisis- in ? the Carib-
bean. American officials ac-
knowledged that the ? uncon-
firmed reports of construction
of a Soviet base in the Cuban
? port of Cienfuegos had been
? available since early this year.
. The officials said that little,
if any, new information had
been obtained in recent months
that would account for the
warning on Friday that "the
Soviet Union can he under no
doubt that we would view the
establishment of a strategic
base in the Caribbean with the
utmost seriousness."
Hearings Are Recalled ?
It was recalled that virtually
all the information on the re-
ported Cuban base had been
presented to the House Sub-
committee on Inter-American
Affairs during hearings be-
tween July 8 and Aug. 3.
The possibility that the So-
viet Union might seek to build
a base was raised in the closed-
door hearings by Adm. E. P.
Holmes, commander in chief of
? the Atlantic Fleet, and by G.
Warren Nutter, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for In-
ternational Security Affairs.
. Mr. Nutter's remark that the
establishment of a Soviet base
? "cannot be discounted as long
as Castro's hostility to the
United States persists" was
? partly deleted from the trans-
cript for security reasons. But
no witness reported actual evi-
dence of base construction.
Officials said there was still
to evidence of suspicious con-
struction activities, despite
flights by surveillance
planes.
However, reports from refu-
gees from Cuba indicated that
a section of Cienfuegos Harbor
had been closed to visitors, ex-
cept Soviet personnel.
? In what may be a related
effort, the Cuban press agency
? Prensa Latina reported Sept. 17
that an eight-lane highway from
Havana to Cienfuegos, a sec-
tion of the new southern coast
superhighway, was being built
under the supervision of a So-
? viet _engineer.
Officials commented the nor-
'mat automotive traffic in Cuba
did not seem to justify an eight-
lane highway, unless it was in-
tended for military use.
These were the possible ex-
planations offered for the White
? House respense to these re-
ports:
Olko,r0
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/-S-1 A
t- ) .Cte; tly C
Excerpt from NYT ticker tape article on Cuba naval construction.
These were the possible explanations offered for the White
House response to these reports:
The White House may have wished to relate, for the benefit
of American public opinion, the dangers inherent in Communist
Cuba with the dangers in Chile if Allende is confirmed by the Chilean
Congress as President. It may have wished to impress upon Moscow
the U, S. determination to discourage further Soviet naval activities.
Soviet war ships have been increasingly active in the Mediterranea.
the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean. Officials said the public
warning had not been followed up by any diplomatic communications
to Moscow. They said also that no meeting had been held on the
subject in the State Department. The Administration may have wished
to emphasize the dangers of a Soviet naval buildup to persuade Congress
to authorize addi tional defense funds. The House Inter-American.
Affairs SubComrnittee plans to hold a closed hearing tomorrow with
Defense intelligence officials to ascertain what information is available..
on the reported base construction.
No Obiection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-122-4-3-8
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-122-4-3-8
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-122-4-3-8
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-122-4-3-8
WAS ilINGTO1 STAR
S ?
o o
e
r! r;??;
U Li Lit.,..,05L-J
By ORR KELLY
Star Staff Writer
The White House issued its
;tern warning to the ;.zoefiet
Un-
.on about establishing a strateg-
ic base in Cuba because equip-
ment associated with C12, Rus-
sian Yankee class nuclear mis-
sile submarine was being in-
stalled at Cienfuegos, on the
south shore of Cuba, according
to informed sources.
Pictures taken Toy high flying
U2 airplanes reportedly show
the Russians installing a more
elaborate shore-based station
than that used in support of the
American Polaris' submarines.
Almost all the support for Po-
laris submarines at such sta-
tions as Holy Loch, Scotland, is
provided by a floating drydock
and a special submarine tender
equipped with cranes to lift mis-
siles out of the submarine and
set them back down in special
holders in the tender.
Same Setup in Cuba
The evidence now available
here reportedly shows a shore
Station loein; set up at Cienfue-
gos to provide the same kind of
support for the Yankee class
submarines.
Because the Russians main-
bin submarines on station off
the American Atlantic Coast and
could support them from float-
klg submarine tenders, the ap-
parent intention to establish a
permanent shore installation
seems to U.S. officials to be
more provocative, especially
since it comes in the midst of
the strategic arms limitations
talks.
Public statements by U.S. offi-
deli indicate that work on a
Yankee class submarine base
30 September 1970 P3
s
El
r ? 0
began?or at least was discos-
: ered?quite recently, since the
arms talks recessd in midsum-
mer. ?
The establishment of a sub-
marine base in the Western
Hempisphere, either with a
shore station or supported by a
tender, has certain advantages.
? A base in Cuba will permit
the Russians to keep more sub-
marines on station or to get by
? with fewer boats and to operate
them more easily close to U.S.
shores. In this sense, the estab-
? lishment of a base may be a
? simple matter of economy.
? A base close to the continental
United States may also require
? the American Navy to spend
? more money and use more man-
power to keep track of the poten-
? tially hostile submarines.
Such a base could permit the
Soviet submarine force to get
into position quickly for a sur-
prise attack on the United
? States.
Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, 0-S.C.,
. chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee, said in a
? speech Monday that, "We must
take every diplomatic, and, if
necessary, military step to ce-
? cise this cancer from the body of
? the Western Hemisphere."
The diplomatic effort appar-
ently had begun Friday when a
? White House official told report-
ers the United States views the
establishment of a strategic
base "with the utmost serious-
. ness."
There is no indication so far,
? however, that the administration
is considering the use of any-
thing as drastic as military ac-
tion against the base.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-122-4-3-8
1
WASAINGTON STAR 30 SEPT 1970 (10CT 1970) P-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-122-4-3-8
eaa
n N. '?
r ? r
I
p
6.1
,ann
? By [nail KELLY
? . Star Staff Writer
? Equipment specifically aaso-
.clated with the new Yankee
class Soviet nuclear missile sub-
marine is being installed at
Cienfuegos on the south shore of.
? Cuba, ? according to ? . informed
sources.
?? This specific information,
which goes . well beyond the
!guarded references to .possible
construction made by. the Penta-
ti Z-Z) tL.
a
1/4", ;.;
i; .
J
than that used in support of the
American Polaris submarines.
gen and White House. on Friday,
led to the stern weaning by the
? White House to the Soviet Union
that the installation of a strateg-
ic base in this hemisphere would
. be viewed' with the utmost seri-
ousness by the United States.
The Yankee class submarine,
'which is very similar to. the
American Polaris, is designed to
deliver nuclear-tipped missiles
?and is ? . considered a strategic
weapon, like an intercontinental
ballistic missile, rather than a
? tactical weapon, such as an at-
tack submarine.
'Pictures taken lay high flying
112 airplanes reportedly allow
the Russians installing a more.
elaborate shore-based station
? Almost all the support for Po-
submatines at such sta-
,tions as Holy Loch, Scotlard, is
;provided by a floating drydock
land a spealal subirarhie. tender
'?
;equzpped with cranes to lift mis-
siles out of tile submarine and
"set them back down in spacial
holders in the tender.
? Same Setup in Cuba
? The evidence now availaele
here reporlocily shows a shore
station being set up at Cienfue-
gos to provide the same .kind of
support for the Yankee class
submarines.
Because the Russians main-
lain submarines on statien off
the American Atlantic Coast and
could ? Support them from float-
ing submarine tenders, the ap-
parent intention to establish. a
permanent 'shore installation
seems to U.S.. officials to be
more productive. ?
The firm informatient hat led
. to the White House 'warning ap-
parently became available only
during the last two treel:?s. of
September since the recess of
the strategic art-M limitations
4
talks ?and more than a ?montn
and a half after the conclusion of
hearings on Cuba and tha Card-
bean by the House subcommit-
tee on inter-American affairs.
aalaailleant Development' ?
On Sept. 2, Defense Secretary
Melvin R. Laird told newsmen a
Soviet task force of five vessels
was moving toward the Carri
bean. Without saying why, Laird
described the .movement of the
task fore? as "significant devel-
opment." ? ? ? ?
On Sept.. 14, Pentagon press
spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim
mentioned for the first time pub-
licly that three barges were
being towed toward .Cienfuegos
by two of the Soviet vessels.
Two days later, a high-ranking
Nixon adaniaistratiort. official,
speaking to a group of editors in
Chicago, mentioned the Soviet
fleet visits and made a careful.
distinction ? between them and,
the operation of. Polaris-type
submarines out of the Cuban de,
pat.
The United States, he said,
would ? study that. very carefully.
.Paaning Overlooked ?
Although the significance. of
his words was Overlooked when
the transcript of the briefing
aas made public, it is now ob-
aous that the start of construe-
at Cienfuegos was what he
had in mind.
The establislment of a sub-
marine base in the Western
Hernpisphere, either with a
shore station or supported by
tender, has certain advantages.
A base in Cuba will permit
the Russians to. keep more sub-
marines on station or to get by
with fewer boats and to operate
them more easily close to U.S.
ishores. In this sense, the estab-
lishment of a base may be a
.simple matter of economy.
i A base close to the continental
United States may also require
the American Navy to spend
more money and use more man-
power to keep track of the poten-
tially hostile submarines.
Such a base could permit the
Soviet submarine force to get
into position quickly for a sur-
prise attack on the United
States.
Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, D-S.C.,
chairman of the Home Armed
Services Committee, said in a
speech Monday that, "We must
take every diplomatic, and, if
necessary, military step to ex-
cise this cancer from the body of
the Western Hemisphere."
The diplomatic effort appar-
ently had begun Friday when a
White House official told report-
ers the United States views the
establishment of a strategic
base "with the utmost serious-
ness."
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-122-4-3-8
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-122-4-3-8
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-122-4-3-8
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-122-4-3-8
WAS14'...o
1",1
r ,
r4
? ???-'S
? , ? f
? Ey Chalmers M. Roberts
z.f.! VJter
Almost lcst in the Liddle
.East ? crisns was last Friday's
?seeming enc-lay wood:oo a
tough American y.'arning to
the Soviet Union about the
possbie construction by the
Russians of a .strategic base
in Cuba.
- Yet the Cuban affair does
bear a 'close relationship 10
?the Middle East, specifically
to :Moscow's role there, and
to such .other Soviet-Amen-
tan ? points of ? interest as
Berlin and The strateoic
arms . limitation talks
(SALT). .
The ? timing involved in
what was said last Friday
is .of . more than passing
hi-
terest. Hints of the possibil-
iLy that the Soviets planned
to ? build a ?naval base at
Cienfuegos on ?Cuba's south
.shore first appeared in print
as far back as several weeks.
The. Economist of London,
for instance, Ilan such 'a re-
port in its Sept. 19 issue.
. pentagon reporters began
asking for information. ? A
column Friday morning in
the ? New York .Times by C.
L. Sulzberger, stating that
reports of ..a base under con-
stractian were being investi-
gated, added to the pres-
sure. The Pentagon then
told newsmen that three So-
viet ships had moved three
heavy barges and other? .
etluipment into Cienfuegos
harbor in ?- the past few
weeks.
This', said spokesman
Jerry W. Fricdheim, "makes
feel that they. may .be
seeking. sustained .eapabili-
ties in the area." lie added
that the Pentagon was "not
sure that they are building a ?
submarine p.?,rt. facility."
Such statainents, on top of
Pentagon reports of Soviet
ileot activities ? of tate in the
:Atlantic . and Caribbean
?areas, wottld be enough to
worry military ? hawks in
Washington hut hardly.
enough to . 4o more than
bolster .Navy ..claims . for
more Money from Congress.
Yet at 3:20 that Friday aft-
? eamoon, during the course of -
a* briefing in the White
st-Zooro.,,_eri Presi- -
lent Nixon's theiv-4104k=
ing ?European trip, the
Cuban base Issue was drasti-
cally escalated.
it s'nould be said here that
up . to that hour no get:ex:11
alarm bells had beeo rung
within the Nixon administra-
tion, ocoording to several
specialists ? whose 'duty is to
follow. such matters. Indeed,
the ?Eureau of .InterAracri-
can ?Affairs still claims it
knows nothing ebout .Cien-
fucoos .since that is the re'
t:;?nonsibility of officials.
ban-
UGTUaai. 1970 P-,15
'
7 ?
t? .
o?
diing Soviet affairs.
1%-: when the, While
House Loiofor, may not
be nomcd hut who this time
vo,ot allowed to be directly
quoteci a atici emphasis, Was
asked abli,ut the reports, he
had in hand a statement
made by President Kennedy
at the close. of the 1062
Cuban missile crisis.
As has been reported, the
White House ? official, as he
may be desinnatcd, stated
that. "the. Soviet Union can
be under no doubt that we
would ? view the establish-
ment of a strategic base in
the Caribbean with the tit-
Most seriousness." ?
He tailed attention to the
? Kennedy ? statement that
there would be peace in the
Caribbean "if all offensive
weapons are. removed from
Cuba and kept . out of the
hemisphere in the future." ?
That, he added, of course
remains the policy of this
government. He avoided an-
swering questions as to what?
was going on at Cienfuegos
? but he did ? say that "ob-
viously, a Polaris-type sob-
marine is an offensive
weapon." The Soviets are
cbuilding a. fleet of such subs.
Finally, when pressed, the
White House spokesman
said:
"Let's be careful . about
what has been said. We are
watching the events in
Cuba. We are not at this mo-
ment in a position to say' ex-
actly what they mean. We
will . continue to observe
? them and . at the right mo-
ment we will take the action
that seems indicated."
That latter phrase, cou-
pled with the "utmost sari-
ouzLess" reference earlier,
constituted a startling esca-
lation of verbiage. It
amounted to an American
threat to forcibly prevent
the use "Of Cienfuegos as a
'Soviet base for missile sub-
marines, a threat of 3
an-
tore not uttered by. Wash-
ington to Moscow since the
? Cuban crisis eight years ago,
. ...retrospact,' there are
? ? tv,a3.1inc:s.of explanation now
heard in Washington.
One. is political. The
White HOUSC appears ? to
1,1:aya. -taica,r tbc
:Keating, it is said. This is a
. reference to the ? former Re-
publican senator from New
York, now the U.S. ambassa-
dor to India, who in P.3t32 an-
noyed and eiviharrad the
? Kennedy administration
with repeated statetnents -
that the. Soviet Union' was
emplacing missiles in Cuba,
?loog before .ProoLlent
confirmed that act. Of
course, 1.952? like lf;10, was a
congressional.election.year..
The other -explanation is
711! 1 rra .e71
. ? .
? rt
? "7", .eln'?:177
* ? 1'
more stibstantive and a clue
to it can be. found in other
remarks by that same White
House spokesman last ? Fri-
day afternoon. .
? He said in response to a
question: "We do hope and
we have made it clear to the
Soviet Union in mahy ex-
changes, and we have done
so in the SALT. negotiat ions,
we do .hope that the two su-:
perpowees 'recognize, their
special responsibility for
tactical advantages for the
benefit of the ? greater inter-
est of humanity in peace."
In short, Cienfuegos could
be a case of Moscow press-
ing . Washington for tactical
advantage in the arms race.
The spokesman did not say
?so but he might well have
added; just as they have
done in ? cheating on the
standstill cease-fire in
Egypt.
On Sept. 16 in Chicago the
same spokesman ? had . ex-
pressed puzzlement .at that
cheating and raised -? the
question of ? whether it
meant the Soviet Union was
moving generally to a hard-
line policy all across the.
board.
Thus as of now the gen-
eral conclusion in Washing-
ton is that the surprising es-
calation of White House lan-
guage over what is going on
at Cienfuegos was less a
function. .of that particular
item than a rellaction of. a
growing .administration con-
cern over Soviet policy in
general; ??
As to Cienfuegos itself,
military experts ? generally
scoff at a comparison to the
Cuban ? crisis of 10G2. For
one thing no 'missiles are
being land-based. Submarine
use of that .port would ease
Soviet crew and otherprob-
lems and probably permit
more ships to remain on sta-
tion in the Atlantic. But it
also would . aid U.S. Navy
tracking of such.submarines,?
possibly a point of balancing.
value. ?
Soviet 1h:ion:Scorn;
At Reports on Cuba
Ily .7:77,rry Trimborn
Soviet Union today scoffed
at repolts it may he build-
ing a submarine base in
Cuba, calling them a Nixon
administration propaganda
ploy to secure votes in the
?
November election: ?
The oWciat Communist
Party newspaper Pravda de-
clared that such reports
were part of an effort to
"treacherously fan the mill-
--kJ\ci
C 721
0 fi
L..)`\u/
tary psychosis (in the .
United Stotcs) with the ?aid
of hastily concocted invert.
tions."
It was, said Pravda, a new
"otto lotion- propaganda
campaion mounted by the
administration to cover the
bankruptcy of its own poli-
c:es ? by raising "another
racket of another 'Soviet
threat'." in Cuba, .the Mid-
dle East and elsewhere.
The comments were the
first Soviet public reaction
to last week's reports from
Washington of intelligence.
"indications" that a base
capable of housing nuclear
missile ? submarines was
being built at Cienfuegos en
the southern coast of Cuba.
Pravda did not mention
specifically t h e ? reported
submarine ? base 'construc-
tion. It referred only to re-
ported Soviet "military
moo ement" in Cuba and
elsewhere. But there we slit-
tie doubt that it had the re-
ported base in mind_
"It is Clear," said Pravda,
. that the racket about.
preparations in Cuba 'sup-
? madly threatening the
United States' security has
is e e a ro.i.scd for perfectly ,
definite -purposef"
?
These
purposes, said: th
newspaper, ore aimed at cre-
ating "a favcrable al.mos- ?
p:aere. Zor the eleet!o7is to
Congress and the United.
StateS Presialenfs visit us
Eta rora.e." ?
The Soviet pr-ss has %cell
attacking Mr.Nimeies
jeum-
rey .as atr..fer-rPa
? den-A.:instratl,aa of ArNa:ican
noilitany aught
`17.12. Pm'. cia .1.71.ieit
this to what .
a nxsti.
tort to "c...-aa!ie 'an atmi-57-
phare of r,tiitary
among -crriloary !,..z.naJizans
and ? exerting political pres-
sure upon the capitals . of
? some other capitalistic coun-
tries." .
Pravda ? viewed .this effort
as an attempt to rerive."the
had old -4he? cold.
, . .
y reviving. old .ttlittAftiet
antagonisms, the Nixon ad-
ministration hopes to gother
votes among the natioo's "si-
lent majority, that is, from
the right wing section of the
electorate," Pravda said,
adding:. ? ?
There .are also other .
sons--"the fortheoraina; vot-
ing for military apl)rei!ria-
lions in Congress which pro-
ceed most successfully with
the fair wind of the cold .
war."
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-122-4-3-8
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-122-4-3-8
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-122-4-3-8
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-12-4-3-8
(CJ3P)
-.SAIGTON-7.SEN.??3ARRY...M.LAI-IL_J:21-,I0 TODAY HE. ,..INDS EVIDENCE.
OF H Sr7RI3US R'ISSIAN "BID .FOR WORLD DOrTNATION7 IN THE. WHITE HGUSE'S
DISCIaSURE THAT., THE .$OVIETS.XAY?sE.BUILDING.A .STRATEGIC SUBMARINE ?
??iASE IN CJA.. . ? ??
? Dt:.?...CCERN.VAS ALSO .EXPRESSED SENATE. DEnCRATIC LEADER MIKE
Fli:TSFI'EpiOF'KONTANA., ? . ? . . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? .?
? "1.-":A VIE1!j IT .WITH ALARM,".. MANSFIELD TOLD AN INTERVIEWER._
? ."11' RAISES ?THE. MDST :SERIOUS QUESTIONS,' HE SAID, IN LICHT OF
PRESIDET ti.OHN F. .KENNEDY'S .STATEMENT AFTER THE 1362 CUBAN 'MISSILE.
'CRISIS THAT OFFENSIVE .VEAPONS MST SE KEPT OUT. OF THE WESTERN .
?HEISPAERE TO ASSURE "PEACE IN THE CARIBBEAN!" ? ? ? ? ?
-3OLDWATER SOUGHT TO. ATTACH ELAME TO SENS. J. WILLIAMFUORIGHT,?
DARK., AN) GEORGE S. CGOVERN, AND OTHER LEADERS OF THE
ANTIIJAR MOVEMENT FOR THE RUSSIANS'. "BOLDNESS."' ? ???.
'I ',3ELIEVE?THE LEADERS .IN .THE. KREMLIN .HAVE?BEEN .LISTENING ?
SERIOUSLY TO THE FULBRIGHTS AND THE. MCGOVERNS AND THE PEACENIKS . ?
AND .THE ADVOCATES 'OF UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT IN THE JJNITED STATES AND???
HAVE?DECIDED.?THAT NOW IS THE TIME TO 'FIND.?OUT?JUST HOW STRONG IS OUR.
DEDICATION TO FREEDOM AND. OUR DETERMINATION?JO-DEFEND THE?
.ARINNA. RZPUBLICAN SAID. . ?
REHADOED'IN?A STATEMENT ISSUED BY HIS OFFICE:. .
'THEHCONSTRUCTIO1 .OF ?A ?STRATEGIC SUBMARINE BASE?IN.CUBA WOULD-BE
IN?????KEEPINGHWITH CURRENT RUSSIAN MOVES AIMED AT SHIFTING. THE.. WORLD ?
BALANCE OF POWER .AWAY. FRO THE. UNITED STATES. . ? ? ?
'THESE NOVESI?COUPLED.WITA SOVIET MILITARY.ACTIVITY"IN THE 'MIDDLE
EAST AND RUSSIAN-SUPPORTED MILITARY ACTIVITY IN INDOCHINA; ALL ?
SjPPORT.THE C3NCLUSI3W.THAT- THE SOVIET UNION IS?NOW ENGAGED. IN ITS
BOLDEST BID FOR WORLD. 'DOMINATION SINCE THE CUBAN ?MISSILE CRISIS.. OF ?
I62." ? ? ? ..???? . ? ? ?
MANSFIELD. SAP) 'HE WAS AWAITING.. FURTHER INFORMATION FROM THE WHITE ???
HOUSE BEYOND FRIDAY'S STATEMENT BY AN ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL WHO...
ASKED THATHIS. IDENTITY NOT BE REVEALED. ? . ? . ? .?. ?
THE OFFICIAL.. TOLD REPORTERS OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS INDICATING
.TT THE -SOVIETS MIGHT BE BUILDING A BASE FOR....MISSILE7-CARRYING
SUMARINES?ON CUBA.:! SOUTH COAST. . .
iYiANSFIELD" NOTED THAT INTERNATIONAL LAW GIVES THE. .SOVIETS THE
RIGHT TO DEPLOY THEIR. ?SUBMARINES ANYWHERE ON THE HIGH _SEAS BUT HE?
SAID? CONSTRUCTION., OF A.:CUBAN .BASE FOR -THEM WOULD.. 'ADD A' SERIOUS .
OG;-2j3ION" TO AMERICAN DEFENSE PROBLEMS...
9,72S--Jj1229PED
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-122-4-3-8
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-122-4-3-8
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-122-4-3-8
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-122-4-3-8
? !LITJ...,!1)TiY,
FULLIP.
Mit. SCZTJ; .,SQ:nz?,_Lor u 11) 17 cy. <
sEToR c..t) ?
" h e r
'211!
t ? j?__i? f'???
1A).1.k2:., ?I .
t e+ e 01.;o1.1,_n r!)
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-122-4-3-8
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-122-4-3-8
?
L-.
i-,,i,?In;,.: -,.,..- -;e-
-?':7-1.L(21. '..11-:;- ,...-5 Ts-...:a.1.....cLi;?.:-!-,-, ve.ry e.f.