SIHANOUK REVEALS DISCOURAGEMENT IN LE MONDE INTERVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: October 27, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
IV:. 30Oct73 CAMBODIA
SIHANOUK REVEALS .DISCO BAt ffiiEMT IN LE MONDE INTE*VAW
[Alain Bouc interview with Prince Norodom Sihanouk, entitled "I Will Not Return to
Cambodia; I Will Remain in Peking Until I Die," and subtitled "The Head of RGNUC
Criticizes Hanoi and the Khmers Rouges"l
[Text] Peking--The hour of clarification has come for RGNUC [Royal Government of
National Union of Laid odial, the Khmers Rouges, and Prince Sihanouk. The.,prince,-
who had a long interview with us in his residence on Anti-imperialist Street, gave
evidence eimultaneoutly of anxiety, irritation, and even a hint of sadness. His
remoteness from his country weighs on him, victory is slow in coming, and he is no
longer sure of what the future and the resistance hold for him.
"Let us admit frankly, our weakness is patent; it can not be hidden. Despite all
our victory bulletins, the Lon Not regime is still there, If it is weak and we
can not overthrow it, we are even weaker still. If, on the other hand, it is still
powerful, why kill it?" The truth, as confirmed several times by the head of the
RGNUC, is that the resistance cruelly lacks arms and ammunition, "Of course, we
serve in the opposite camp, but there is such a disproportionate balance compared to
what Nixon sends to Phnom Penh every day!"
Last January's Paris agreements resulted in the disruption of supplies from North
Vietnam. The sending of aid from the DRV was blocked--not completely, but almost.
In any case, the resistance did not have the means to occupy Kompong Cham and keep
it. The prince tried to explain the Hanoi leaders' movements,
"In my opinion, the United States is seeking to stabilize the situation in Cambodia
by awaiting a settlement of the whole Indochina question. It informed North Vietnam
that if Hanoi aided the Khmers Rouges to the point of their being able to overthrow
'-Lon Nod,, it [the U.S.) would be obliged to intervene again. This is understandable:
If we win, all their construction in Southeast Asia is liable to collapse.
"The second reason is that Hanoi cannot endanger the payment of America's war
debts--what the United States calls reconstruction aid for Vietnam.
"Finally, it should be known that Hanoi and the NLF have drawn up a plan for the
country's reunification, which requires time. They consider that a new confrontation
with the Saigon regi It inevitable. The impeit.nt thing for teem is that the
United States does not participate directly in the new conflict, in any case, that
it does not resume bombing North Vietnam. To obtain a complete American withdrawal,
some time must be allowed to pass so the United StiANO will get used to peace, and
it will be'eome iIpoassib a Nixon to again i*unah country into war. You may
note,. =e'oxiti. z+:a `the .tt i, :a i ger o - 'tie I*p, '*that the transport of arms
between the two Vietna*S does not require the taking of Phnom Penh: The No Chi
Minh trails pass through regions to which Lon Noll$ troops do not have access."
The disruption of the Worth Vietnamese channel is thus apparently behind the
resistance's main difficulties, "Kim I1-song, the North Korean chief of state,
proposed supplying us with as much as we wanted, but to what good, since this
materiel could not be transported once it arrived at the M16 borders? The same
problem exists for 0hintse aid, with the addition that Peking does not wish, in
its negotiations with America, that it be reproached by the United States for adding
fuel to the fire in Indochina; therefore, China does not show any enthusiasm for the
idea of sending arms,"
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
IV. 30 Oct 73 H 2
Peking Must Court Washington
"M reover, China is obliged somewhat to court Washington to prevent the formation of a
hostile American-Soviet coalition."
However, in this delicate situation there appears an elemeht of comfort: the RGNUC?
recent diplomatic successes. The prince is completely satisfied with the Soviet lea e s
change in attitude. "Their position is very clear. They recalled their charge d'af a r s
and all. their diplomats, leaving in Phnom Penh only three persons who are not of dip o a is
quality to guard the buildings,. The GDR left only one, The Bulgarians repatriated 1
their personnel. The Mongolians recently recognized us. Of course, as a matter of
dignity, they cannot all follow Moscow, one after the other, They allow a few days 0
pass between their respective initiatives. But, in the end, there is no doubt, the h 1
bloc is coming our way. We now have all the socialist and nonalined countries with s
It is a very great victory for the RGNUC which Lon Nol will not be able to minimize.
"We must still ask ourselves," said the prince, perplexed, "what were the reasons wh c
led Moscow to revise its attitude. Was it, as some people say, to annoy the Chinese h
have not.yet broken off relations with Chile? Or rather, does it know that a large t a k
is being prepared and did it decide to repatriate its men? When the Russians arrive is
always because they think that a solution is close; they are generally shrewd. The
wish to push us toward a political solution." Then the prince outlined on the map s v r 1
hypothetical divisions of territory which would permit the Soviets to be present and
limit Chinese influence, They are still talking, though only to reject them, about
tripartite or bipartite governments which would leave the heads of the Phnom Penh regime
some of the power.
"However, the idea cannot be dismissed that Peking, Moscow, and Hanoi may agree with t e
Khmers Rouges, without conferring with me, to prepare a massive attack in the dry se s n
But certainly, we asked, you would be informed, in such a case?
"That is not certain," replied the prince, "I do not have intimate relations with th 1 ers
Rouges, I have no more, I have almost no relations with them, yes, it is true, I ha e
already said that I found them Stalinistic, with their daily indoctrination instruct o ,
the language they employ, their methods," lll
The prince talked on these ticklish subjects with the same ease. But his extreme
sensitivity prevented him from hiding a deep-seated sadness: "You know, there are u d
which cannot be healed. I tell you, I will not return to Cambodia, I will remain in
Peking until I die. ftyy mother, the queen, is going to come here and we will both remain
in China, But, meanwhile, I will aid the Khmers Rouges. To sweep away imperialism, tiler
can count on me."
The prince remained discreet regarding the reasons for these disagreements. But it 0 1
be felt that in the end it was a problem of authority: Who will make the decisions,9 lbe
solidly united Khmers Rouges group, or the prince, or even Prime Minister Penn North I
is obvious that in Peking the young members of the Cambodian resistance prefer the
efficient pozde.rousness of collective decisions to the prince's charm and sparkle,
RGNUC head has no desire to lose his freedom of action and speech in the meanderings o
democratic centralism. He has the impression he is being held aloof.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
 ``" No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
IV. 30 Oct 73 H 3
"I am fighting to be allowed to live in Cambodia with them: There is no danger any
longer, now that the bombing has ceased; this old argument is no longer valid. And
even if they. feared my influence with the masses, I would agree to live without
contact with the peepla;, but at least on the.na.Gional territory. I have asked them
to destroy this reputation of 'government-in-exile'. The ministers must be sent
to Cambodia. from Peking, or at least their portfolios transferred to people in the
interior. Why keep this, whole team abroad? We only have four ministers and six
deputy ministers in, the interior; the others, the majority, are in the four corners
of the globe. This pp tion,is untenable,. If they do,no.t agree to this request,
I might gn res.i n. MereoNer, what. do they want to'.:make the RGNUC; w~g_9bsti. tely.:
k%q k i~ -, l? t. a 'ie, ? ,y rea,erYi for. me? I want to know what my
status is in. theAr filer:. A I simply an employee or the chief of state?
Envisage the Same Goal
"However, we envis*g.e the same goal. For the moment.,, due. to a lack of munitions,
we can not end the war, but we can continue it. I want to help the Khmers Rouges
realize their dream of taking power in Phnom Penh,. of'set:ting up their socialist
regime there, because, you know, between the Blues and the Reds, there is not even
a question of choice; between corruption and the pure and strong regime they want to
set up, there is nothing in common."
NUFC RADIO CARRIES: ARTI.CI.$ ON EFFORTS TO IMPEACIF NIXON
Voice of the Nat~gnal United Front of CamVpdia [,Clandestine] in Cambodian to Cambodia
0400 GMT 30 Oat 73 D
[Article: "Nixon Is Being Forced by the Ameri.can? People To Quit the Presidency"]
[Text] Nixon Is, badly entangled in pambo.Aia.. He, is also deeply bogged down in the
Middle aAt. Tb.e Arab V.rples are rising,up a dtheightening their solidarity to
struggle agai)pst Non's aggression. Now4 In the?United States itself, Nixon is
under fire from the American people who are getting together to drive him o?t of the
Presidency.
in order to win reelection Nixon committed innumerable crimes to defeat his opponents,
including the break-in of the headquarters of the U.S. Democratic Party. The filthy
Watergate affair that broke 6 months ago has unearthed and exposed Nixon's corrupt
activities before the eyes of the American people. Many of I,is employees at the White
House, who were invelved in this wrongdoing, Wire firr si tl gir duties by Nixon
because he was afraid that his foul activities would be exposed.
However, this step was in vain, for the American p e are well awarjp of the truth.
They are vV4W p xlali ?d are v ? 'o)jsly denounc .They even. demanded that
thepra ;d4}d"t;~1~tih 11#i.. N +? $e t het. an inVestitr
committee to look into the matter. Panic-stricken, Nixon appointed one of his
confidants, namely Richardson, to the post of attorney general. Likewise he named
Archibald Cox special prosecutor 9 us he expected that Cox could prevent this
Watergate scandal ,from worsening and that he, Nixon would escape unscathed.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
However, the truth remains the truth. Contrary to Nixon's expectation, his filthy
scandal has become even more stigking,. Both the Senate's investigating committee
and the court. refused to compromise with him and requested that he hand over all
secret tapes relating,to the. Watergate scandal. Neither Richardson, the attorney
general, nor Archibald Cox, the .'special prosecutor, could save him. Nixon was
furious over their failures. He"'fired both Richardson and Archibald Cox as well
as the under secretary of justice. He. still refuses to hand over the secret
documents on the Watergate affair to the court.
Such behavior cannot be tolerated by the American people. A wave of indignation
against Nixon is sweepii:g the'Uni.tedStates. In Miami, Florida, the multimillion-
strong CIO-AFL voiced ite:~ protfstarnd demande4: that Nixon resign-from the Preside
of the United States I he etpai ed stul ol*n.i, the lion organization:,wo ld
demand that the U.S. Congress p 11 .b outR, o4;, 40 ,pest, The people Is movenent to
drive Nixon from the White House as become itb a teverish and turbulent, Ninety
members of the House of, Representatives have peitiexued ?or Nixon's impeachment,
while six senators who were attending conferences abroad have hurriedly returned
home to take part in the drive againist Nixon. Several other senators have publicly
denounced him. Many of them issued press statements condemning Nixon for blemishin
the American people's honor in this scandal. Not a"single senator or member of the
House of Representatives dares to step in to overtly support Nixon, and even
the chairman of his own Republican Party has condemned him.
We recall that Spiro Agnew, Nixon's vice president, has just been sentenced to a
3-year jail term for corruption and larceny. He is the first U.S. vice president
to be sentenced to jail while in office.
Such is the fate of the Phnom Penh traitorous clique's masters. The Lon Nol-Sirik
Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh-In Tam-Cheng Heng-Sosthene Fernandez traitors, their Phnom
Penh lackeys, are sure to experience an even worse destiny. Both the masters and
lackeys will certainly be overturned by the Cambodian People and the American
people as well as the peace-loving peoples of the world,
Down with Nixon, the international thugs' ringleader!
Down with his Phnom Penh lackeys, the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh-In Tam-
Cheng Heng-Sosthene Fernandez traitors!
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 OCTOBER 1973
SIHANOUK, SPOKESMEN SOFTPEDAL NEED FOR "ARMED STRUGGLE"
At a time of military stalemate, recent pronouncements by Prince
Sihanouk and other Front spokesmen have been marked by notable
restraint. They have moderated previous persistent calls for
uncompromising armed struggle and have avoided authoritative
criticisms of Phnom Penh leaders. The change was particularly
apparent in Sihanouk's 29 September National Day message to PRC
leaders which merely promised to "wage a struggle" until the
objectives of the five points are achieved. Last year's message
emphasized the resolve to carry out a "war of resistance"
"without retreat or compromise, whatever may be the sacrifices and
duration of the war." Unlike last year, the message sidestepped
criticism of the Phnom Penh government leaders by name and failed
to assail "Saigon and Bangkok lackeys." Another exercise in
restraint has been the Front's failure so far to comment on the
Phnom Penh government's 24 September reiteration of its 6 July
settlement proposal. When the plan was first proposed it was
greeted by harsh invective.
Sihanouk's moderation comes at a time when Peking, his major supporter,
has shown sustained reserve in regard to the Cambodian situation.
Peking continues to replay Front pronouncements, to press strongly
for the entry of Sihanouk's government (RGNU) into the United
Nations, and to feature Sihanouk prominently in reports of celebrations
in Peking. However not since early July, not even on his .return
from the nonalined conference last month, has Peking feted'him.at
a banquet, an occasion requiring a major Chinese speech on Cambodia.
Sihanouk, in discussions with. Western newsmen,: last month complained
that PRC and DRV arms aid had been halted.
At the same time, Moscow has seemed to be gradually moving toward
recognition of Sihanouk's government, although it still maintains
its embassy in Phnom Penh. According to an 11 October TASS report
published the following day in PRAVDA, Soviet ambassador to China
Tolstikov paid a visit to "head of state" Sihanouk on an,unspecified
date in Peking and voiced support for the Cambodian struggle under
the leadership of FUNK and RGNU. According to Sihanouk's statements
to Western newsmen, the meeting took place on 9 October and Moscow had
acknowledged his regime as the legal representative of Cambodia.
A more forthcoming Soviet attitude to Sihanouk's government had been
indicated in August when a TASS report of a RGNU statement included
its references to Sihanouk as "head of state" and the RGNU and FUNK as
the "sole legitimate representative" of the Cambodian people.*
* See the TRENDS of 22 August 1973, pages 1-3.
CONFIDENTIAL
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 OCTOBER 1973
CPS ! SL0GAI!S
DETENTE DIPLOMACY. EVENTS IN CHILE. MIDEAST REFLECTED
The CPSU Central Committee's October Revolution anniversary
slogans this year continue the recently established practice of
deemphasizing the broader contentious issues in East-West
relations and international communist relations in these
semiannual statements but responding to specific trouble
spots that have developed around the world. While registering
Moscow's concern about events in Chile and the Middle East,
the slogans, published in the central press on 14 October,
also incorporate new themes that have emerged in Moscow's
detente diplomacy in the six months since the May Day slogans
were issued in mid-April.
+ The two Middle East slogans, abbreviated in May to a call
for "elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression,"
now call upon the world to "demand an end of Israeli aggression
against the Arab states" while reactivating language used in
previous years calling for "the liberation of Arab lands."
+ The slogans carry on Moscow's recent rhetorical concern
about the military coup in Chile in adding greetings to the
"working people and all democrats in Chile, who are waging a
courageous struggle against the campaign of terror by
reactionary fascist forces."
1- A slogan directed specifically at Asia as a whole was added
for the first time since the foreign affairs section of the
slogans was shortened considerably in 1967. The slogan calls
for "collective security in Asia," reflecting Moscow's recently
reinvigorated campaign in support of this now well-established
plank in its foreign policy platform.
+ Moscow's general satisfaction with international developments
over the last six months and its continuing interest in detente
diplomacy were registered in a new slogan reiterating the April
1973 plenum's call for steps to make the relaxation of inter-
national tension "irreversible" and to place the principle of
peaceful coexistence at the basis of relations between states
with different social systems.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
Statements By
Prince Norodom SIHANOUK
1965 - 1973
1. Statements on the Cambodian Communist Movement
1965-1970
2. Statements on Cambodian Communist Leaders
(Hu Nim, Hou Youn & Khieu Samphan)-- 1970-1973
3. Statements on Who Controls the Cambodian
yrla-argcntc. 197 7 (]7a
4. Statements on His Future Role -- 1970-1971
5. Statements on DRV/PRC Assistance -- 1970-1973
6. Statements on Effect of Bombing --- 1973-
7. Statements on Negotiations -- 1972-1973
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
970
SIHANOUK Statements on Cambodian Communists 1965-1
AST month I wrote . . . I have never had the slightcst
illusion about the fate that awaits me at the hands of
L
the communists, as well as that which is reserved for "thy"
government. after having removed froin our region the
influence, and cspccially the presence, of the "free world"
and the US in particular I conccdc again that after
the distil>pcaraocc of the US from our region and the via
tory of the cotnnuutist camp, I thyself and the People's
Socialist Contmunit; that I have created would inevitably
disappear from the scene. j>at.r. 1965
As for such socialist countries as the Democratic Republic
of Victnani, the Natiottal Liberation front of South Vietnam
or the 1?ernocratic People's Republic of Korea, we support
than politically and diplomatically without reservation.
But tvc cannot support certain among than in their
efforts to ncocolortialisc Cambodia and turn it into a satellite
by using Khmer Rcds as Oicir trojan horse. MAY 1967
If the Khmer people find that Siltanook and the Sattglcum
arc good for nothing or arc traitors ar have done something
had, ar.d if the Khmer people therefore want to expel
Sihanouk and the Sangl:um froth the country, v:c will have
nothing; to say about it because it is the xvill of the .Khmer
lI(A)lv. I;.,t we let the KI,nwr Reds sly that
Sihanouk and the Sangkum must be replaced by China. We
cannot accept this because China has no right to conic and
rule over Cainhodia.
Ssi'?rti?tnt:tt 1967
1 will step down and turn the country over to General Lon
Nol . . Out of indignation with the Khmer Reds who
do nothing 'but call others US lackeys, I ani inclined to
say that I want to 'side truly with the Anmericatts. Out of
indignation I want to submit tcally to the Americans bc-
causc these people never stop speaking of my submission
to the Americans. As to them, they tvlto arc lackeys of the
Chinese and the Victnatttesc, they have not said anything
about that. MARCtt 1968
I ant planning to ask the Russian and Chinese leaders to
urge time Vietcong to leave us alone. I will always defend
the neutrality of my country. I do not want it aligned to
the \Vcst or the East. Neutrality is the condition. for the
survival of the Cambodian people . . . the rightists do
not need to stag;c a coup d'ctat against use. I am not really
attached to power. 'if the people and the army wanted to
1;r1 to the right, I would certainly let tltcnt go to the right.
1111 Paris, just before leaving for ,sk,scoty]
.
MAttclt 12 1970
"They launched -these attacks because they
want to create civil war...
"If we fail in our operations against them
and if the Khmer [Carnbodian] Vic' Minh
emerge victorious,, they can transform
the nation into a Communist country. If
not they must continue to accept Indcpcnd-
ence and neutrality ... .
"The masters of the Khmer VietMinhare
the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong."
May 9, 1967:
"Concerning the Com munists, dear com-
panions, we say that the trust the'Chincac
and Vietnamese. But when ttte moment
comes what will happen between us and
the Vietnamese? '
"I must tell you that the Vietnamese
Communists and the Viet Cong negotiated
with us three or four times bat blast ab-
solutely nothing comes out of the negotia-
tions, They did not sign a pledge of respect
for our present frontiers. That is the
first problem. The second problem is the
fact that the pro-Viet Minh Khmer [Car=l-
bodian] have had the habit of pcrn-iittir:b
the Viet Minh to come into our cou.ntry..
Formerly, after I had expelled the French
and after the French troops left Cambodia,
the Viet Minh remained in our country in
order to conquer it. How can we have con-
fidence in the Viet Minh? Will we be able
to escape falling into their hands once we
turn Communist?
"...If we side with the Viet Minh, we will
..~~
lose our independence.
m1 y. 9, 1967
rXn LAStt.1W rCO11054'K: r"610
~(ryl1L 1rr. 11170
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
SIHANOUK Statements on Cambodian Communist Leaders
Hu Nim, Hou Yo" i and Khieu Samphan - 1968-1969
"Today there are about 10 persons being tried by the military
court, and some of the Khmer Reds who found this out have taken
flight into the forest, such as Flu Youn, Khieu Samphan and
Hu Ninz, who have sold their country to foreigners -- the Viet
Minh, the Viet- Con; and the People' s China. And now these guys
who are plotting withthe Viet Minh and the Viet Gong must leave
the country at once for Vietnam."
[February 1, 1968 - Sihanouk Speech - Radio Phnom Penh]
"Then the Prince discussed the disappearance of Hou Youn and
Khieu Samphan [Khmer Red leaders] who fled to a foreign country.
He said: Their master had sent them here to stay. "
[February 5, 1968 -- Sihanouk Speech - Radio Phnom Penh]
"Sihanouk read a letter from a Khmer intellectual who had just
re-turned to f:nrnhordin from thr. TTn;tr4ri .States in which he praised
the Sangkum's development. Sihanouk then commented on past
events, recalling the time when Cambodia was infiltrated by the
Viet Minh, the masters of Hu Nim. "
.[October 14, 1968 - Sihanouk Speech - Radio Phnom Penh]
"Sihanouk said he will again offer his sympathy and paternal and
brotherly feelings to the Khmer Red leaders -- such as 1lou Youn,
Khieu Samphan and Hu Nim -- whenever the latter change their
attitude and again become nationalist, royalist, Buddhist, or
socialist Buddhist. He said that as long as they remain enemies
of the nation, he is obliged to counterattack them."
[September 24, 1969 - Sihanouk Speech -- Radio Phnom Penh]
"Sihanouk then called on the families of Hu Nirn and Hu Youn,
Khmer Red leaders, to try to convince the two men to stop creating
trouble and insecurity. Sihanouk said: It's just like they [Khmer
Reds] have opened the door for the Vict Cong and the Viet Minh .
to enter and stay in the country. There are so many of them now.
When I asked our Royal Armed Forces, how many Viet Cong and
Viet Minh were in the country, I was told 40, 000. "
[October 13, 1969 - Sihanouk Speech - Radio Phnom Penh]
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
SIHANOUK - Statements on Who Controls the Insurgency 1970-1973 (a)
"H,e said that the strategy and tactics of the "peoplf s. forces" were
worked out in Cambodia itself by Khieu Samphan, Deputy Prime
Minister. of the Cambodian Royal Government of popular union and
his general staff, and nowhere else.
"As for eventual negotiations between himself and the United States,
Prince Sihanouk toughened his position .in declaring that even for
preliminary contacts before any negotiations the decision rested
with the "interior resistance" and not with himself. "
[Sihanouk Interview - AFP - April 28, 1972]
,,If they (the U. S.) attempt to contact me, I shall consult Khieu
Samphan and let him make a decision. "
[April 28, 1973 Reuters from Peking]
"...Inside Cambodia, he added, Khieu Samphan, I-Iou Youn., I-iu Nim
and Prince Norodom Phuressara are leading this government and
running the country collectively. "
[April 13, 1973 - Press Conference - Peking NGNNA_]
"Sihanouk commented: I-Iere are the three men (Khieu Samphan,
Hu Nim and Hou Youn) who according to Lon Nol's propaganda
have been shot by Sihanouk... It is they who are leading today' s
Cambodia and it-is they inevitably who will lead the Cambodia of
tomorrow. "
[April 13, 1973 - Sihanouk Filming Conference - AFP Peking]
"The RGNUC is not a government in exile, because the RGNUC
means the leadership of Messrs. Khieu Sarnphan, Hou Youn and
Hu Nirn and, first of all, the people's power that has already
been solidly ins.talled.in 90 percent of Kampuchea.
[April 9, 1973 - Sihanouk Speech in Hanoi - VNA]
"That is why its government, even if it is composed of a majority
of 'Red Khmers,' is called and will always call itself a 'royal
government.' But as a regime, it is and will always be-. pure
people's democracy. It is the people and the people alone that
exercises, and will exercise, all the powers, and not any
'sovereign, ' be he called Sihanouk. "
[April 10, 1973 - Sih;uiouk Speech - VNA]
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
SIHANOUK - Statements on Who Controls the Tnsur ency (b)
"Sihan.ouk stressed that the 'last word' onthis matter (DRUNK
reevaluation of war policy) belonged to Khieu Samphan. "
[Sihanouk Press Luncheon Speech - AFP - January 31, }.973]
Sihanouk cabled the New York Times: "If they (Interior Resistance
leaders) refuse to let me return to Cambodia within 2 months at
the latest, I will offer to them my resignation from my present
position and will retire to France."
[January 31, 1973 - New York Times]
" 4'Vith regard to the managing of the country (education of the people,
organization and defense of national territory, administration of
the liberated townships, districts, provinces and cities, etc. ... ),
I have entrusted it entirely to the patriotic persons who are now
'I th --on a stance the coun?ry par icul rly Yr1mr:.r~n4
Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon and Hu Nim. Thus, all of you who par-
ticipate in the struggle are fighting for the motherland, for yoursclves
and for your families."
May 12, 1970 - Sihanouk Message to Armed Forces - Peking NCT\TA]
Sihanouk was quoted as saying to a European television correspondent
that he was "frankly ... out of touch" and lacked 'direct control of.
the situation in Cambodia.
[October 1970]
"Prince Norodom Sihanouk said today that the majority of the Roy al
Cambodian National Union ' Cover nment is now Red Khmer, and the
power already belongs to the Carnl.. odian Communist Party.
"I am giving everything to the Red Khlners. They are pure. They
will do what is necessary for the poople. They are patriots. They
will keep Cambodia indopcndent. '.'
[Septen]Ler 26, 1970 - Interview with Sihanouk in Peking]
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
SIHANOUK - Statements on His Future Role
"But if Igo on as chief of state after victory, I run the risk of
being pushed out the window by the Communists, like Masaryk,
or I might be imprisoned for revisionism or deviationism...
It isn't that I lack physical or moral courage, but what I have to
do is to rehabilitate myself and retire in beauty, in an exit that
it is, if not triumphant, at least honorable. Obviously, it is
possible that I might go on for a few years after liberation as
chief `of state. Even the Communists have asked me to. During
the reconstruction period, Cambodia may still need me to repre-
sent the nation, to accept credentials from ambassadors, to do
public relations. But I shall have nothing to do with domestic
politics. That has cost me too much already.
"I am struggling for the liberation of my country. I have the
strength to do that. But to fight to keep myself in power? No,
I won't fight."
[Interview with Tribune De Geneva, December 10, 1971]
.
"In an interview given. in Peking to M. Alexandre Casella, an
interview broadcast by the French Swiss radio station, Prince
Norodom Sihanouk reaffirmed his intention of retiring from the
polit:i.ra1 gr?enr- mire (;,~nar~1 T,nn Nnl'q Pl-innm Penh C=nvrrrnment
is overthrown. 'I shall hand over power to the young, ' he said,
'and settle in France-' Will Prince Sihanou.k's departure mean the
end of Cambodian monarchy? 'Undoubtedly,' the Prince replied,
'but, you see, we can do nothing about it. Assuming that Cambodia
turns Red, it will be a Yugoslavia or a Romania at the most, but
I believe that J will be rather pink than red..
[Paris LE MONDE, December 5, 1970]
"Sihanouk reaffirmed that he would resign as head of state after
the liberation of Cambodia, and retire to Moujins, in southern
.France. He said: After the liberation, there will be problem
of the Communists and non-Communists now assembled in the
United National Front of Kampuchea (Cambodia). Will the front:
then hold together? I do not know, but I do not want to have to
deal with the Conununi.sts after the liberation. That will be a,
"
problem for the young, generation.
[Paris AFP, July 3, 1970]
"I only wait for the day of complete victory of our people to
tender them my resignation as the legal head of state and transfer
there the legitimate power of the state given to n-w by the people:
in 1960. Moreover, I shall be able very soon to entrust all the
responsibility of state affairs to the qualified representatives of
our progressive people and youth who make up the new government
of national union.
Pnkins* NCNA. April 21, 19701
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
"Last month I wrote in the monthly review Kambuja, published
in Pnompenh: ' I have never had the slightest illusion on
the fate that awaits me at the hands of the Communists, as
well as that which is reserved for my government, after
having removed from our region the influence, and especially
the presence, of the 'free world, ' and the U, S. A. in particular.
In an editorial which will appear shortly in this same review,_
I concede again that after the disappearance of the U. S. A. +
from our region and the victory of the Communist camp, I
myself and the People' s Socialist Community that I have
created would inevitably disappear. from the scene.
I know the Chinese well enough to understand that. they cannot
.be'boug.ht' and that it is perfectly useless to bend before
them, or to play their game occasionally in the hope of
extracting some ulterior advantage. If I acted thus, I would
be despised, and rightly so, by the Chinese people, who would
not alter their plans one iota so far as my country is concerned.
Trom a letter to the New York Times dated May 16, 1965, published
June 4, 1965
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
SJ;iANOUK - 5atements on DRV/PRC Assistance (a)
"He said the only North V,.ctnamese and Viet Cong in the ranks of
his forces were there on liaison missions. He said these North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong dealt with such questions as getting
supplies in the 'liberated' zones of Cambodia. He said his forces
occasionally authorized the passage of Vietnamese units through
Cambodian territory in the region near the border with South Viet-
nam but-that these transit units did not take part in the fighting in
Cambodia. "
[April 28, 1973 -- Sihanouk Interview - AFP]
"This great victory is also yours, that as of all the glorious Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam which, in a very fraternal manner, has
taken upon herself the very heavy responsibilities of organizing
and realizing my historic trip, a realization of the most heroic of
all peoples, the Vietnamese people, through the travel was a very
perilous one in view of the ill intentions of U. f he rs aismaande.
the constant, incessant and impudent violations of
of January 27, 1973 by the Nixon government."
"Your new, historic and decisive aid adds to the innumerable aids
you have accorded to our people and our national resistance. It
confirms in a most convincing manner in the eyes of the whole world
that your s t2ort of the NUFC, the RGNUC, the CNPLAF and Norodom
Sihan.oul .fecti?I ..... Nothing and nobody in the world
r^ _
` is total and indc~
can ever separate us from one another. We have always intimately
shared weal and woe.
If Respected and beloved Mr. Prime Minister, of the DR the most
.are one of the greatest heroes of our Indochina, noble supporters of Kampuchea andnof
and myself. admired,
of your
affectionate friends of the Khmer people words toward us and each of you estures bear the highest signi-
ficance."
"With regard to weaponsand munitions, I can affirm that on the
one hand our great and indefectible friends -- the People's Repub-
lif of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam -- had helped
us, prior to January 27, 1973, to build upa very important stock
that enables us to carry on our armed struggle all by ourselves
until 1975. "
[Sihanouk Speech in Hanoi, VNA Hanoi, April 10, 1973]
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
SIHANOUK - Sta'bements on DRV/PRC Assistance (b)
... We have just concluded anew military aid agreement with
China and shipments are already on route. " (Two agreements
for military and economic aid were in fact signed in'Peking on
January 13, 1973)
[January 21, 1973 - Interview with AFP in Pekingl
"Our troops sometimes launch combined operations with our
friends the ...... North h forces
e___...~.Y._._ ..,tom '? Vietnamese and national liUr_rata.onan'
-- along the Cambodia-Vietnam borders. But our armed oxces
assume sole responsibility for all military operations within
Cambodia. We grant to the troops of our North Vietnamese and
national liberation forces friends the right of passage across our
national territory, but these friendly Vietnamese troops do not
have any permanent base within- our country. The question of
their evacuation from Cambodia is not posed and will not be.
[October 29, 1972 ' Sihanouk cable to Indespress Correspondent-
Answers his Questions Broadcast by AKI]
"Prince Sihanouk on October 4 told an AFP correspondent that he
had recently received assurances from Chou En-lai and Lc Due 'frxo
that wren if a separate cease-fire took place in Vietnam or Laos,
Peking and Hanoi would continue to furnish arms and logi sti.cal sup-
port to the Cambodian cornbattants. Sihanouk said that Le Due The
told me that.. if you fear that we will achieve peace before you, plk; _se
be assured that we will always continue to. give you our support...
[October 4, 1972 - Sihanouk Interview - AFP]
"On September 4, Sihanouk told an AFP correspondent that 'the
March offensive in Vietnam did away with dependence on the lie
Chi Minh Trail for the transport of material for South Vietnam, and
Cambodia.. weapons and material now come directly from the
North to the South through Quang T ri Province.
[AFP, September' 4, 1972]
"Sihanouk stated on July 3, 1972 that China and North Korea gave
equipment and medical supplies but that the Vietnamese supplied
the instructors and that 'our instructor-in-chief is General Giap...
It is true," he said, 'that there are Vietnamese in Cambodia."
[July 3, 1972 - AFP Interview]
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
SIHANOUK - Statements on DRV/PRC Assistance (c)
'China is giving us all kinds of aid, which cnal~les ustoexist as
a state.
"Before, there were a great many Vietnamese units helping us, but
now our units are overwhelnhigly Cambodian, and we don't even
have any more Vietnamese advisers or instrucf-ar=_-
[December?10, 1971 Sihanouk Interview with Tribune De Geneva]
"1-le added that heavy artillery had been supplied to Cambodian
'reactionary forces, ' while his own side had no heavy guns, only
rockets and mortars. It is difficult for us to transport heavy
artillery from China through North Vietnam and down the Ho Chi
Minh Trail, said the prince, who once spent two years as a
student officer at the French tank and cavalry school. "
[October 19, 1971 - Phhom Penh Domestic Service]
"Our regular troops are entirely equipped by China, including
p mend-, and Our n~,;,1.iti dire err innPti by (No th) Korea.
c.ay.y cqu, ;
i
[September 26, 1970 - AFP Sihanouk Interview]
"Sihanouk said: It is true that there are Vietnamese in Cambodia.
But why should'anyone be astonished that the Indochinese unite?
In Vietnam, the Americans erased the line of demarcation and they
have turned the Vietnam wear into an Indochinese war. Henceforth,
Indochina must be considered as a single batt"lefield, and the Indo-
chinese will remain united until final victory.
[July.3, 1970 Paris AFP in English]
* -;c , ):C
"We renew to the DRV, to its respected President, its respected
leaders ... the assurance of our ... gratitude for their... backing,
their total support and precious assistance to our government.
Our people's struggle in inseparable from the struggle of the Viet-
name=se people... together we are fighting, together we shall win.
Together our peoples will fight until all their countries are liberated.. .
after our cornxnon ya..etory~ we will always remain inseparable
brothers...' and... our three countries will cooperate closely in
conformity with the resolutions of the Indochinese peoples summit
conference. "
[May 27, 1970 - Sihanouk Speech - VNA]
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
SIHANOUIC - Statements on DRV/PRC Assistance (d)
Sihanouk also told Norman Webster of the Toronto Globe and Mail
in July 1970 that he had been tempted to call in North Korean tronpE
to help liberate Cambodia and that Kim 11 Sung has urged him to
accept 'volunteers' but that a 'majority of the members of his
in exile felt that the Jo b cou be donnee. b by Cambo
'government' ..._...ld .W. ...dia-
'resistance fighters from the North Vietnamese, the Viet Cong
and the-Pathet Lao.' These statements of Sihanouk earned a
rapid r3butt:'.1 from NCNA which on July.13 quoted a GRUNK state-
ment 'refuting the distorted report ... of Norman Webster.'
The GRUNK statement nevertheless did not exclude all mention
of the VC/NVA, but referred to 'Khmer forces and the U:gaited
Front of the Indochinese peoples as being' sufficient for the fighting.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
SIHANOUK - Statement on Effect of Bombing
"-I am surprised that in spite of the U. S. wanton bombings and
the drought of last year, the liberated zone is very prosperous
economically."
[Sihanouk Press Conference, April 13, 1973, Peking NCNA]
"The towns in our hands are not being bombed but only the bridges
and airports giving access to them are being bon-Lbed."
[Sihanouk Press Conference, April 13, 1973, Peking (AFPC printed
Washington Post, April 14) ]
"Ile added that the B--5Z bombings are not causing many casualties
in the liberated areas."
[Sihanouk Press Conference, AFP from Peking, April 17, 1973]
"Asked about his own forces rocket attack on Phnom Penh`-s Pochentoi~7
airport earlier this week, in which a number of civilians living in
makeshift homes were killed or injured, Prince Sihanouk said: 'That's
war. n'
"The Prince cited two main reasons forthe decision not to launch
a final assault on Phnom Penh at this stage. One was the possible
massive response to such an attack by the United States Air Force.
[Interviewv with Reuters in Peking, April 28., 1973]
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
SIHANOUK Statements on NeZotiatians (a)
He added, I can assure you solemnly that neither Peking nor
Hanoi will ever lead us toward negotiations, they are wary,
of it and on our side. We have told them, and they well know,
that we will not budge one inch.
"We will never negotiate with LenNol nd his band. Their fate
is the gallows.
[April 28, 1973 - Sihanouk Interview - AFP]
"I have four times expressed willingness to speak with either
Nixon or Kissinger during their visits here. But it was rebuffed,
he said.
"If they attempt to contact me, I will consult Khieu Samphan (the
Khmer Rouge guerrilla leader in Cambodia) and let him make a
decision.
"But such an approach would mean the Americans knew they were
beaten and there would be no Purpose in talking with them. "
[April Z8, 1973 - P euters]
"He said that there was no question of his resistance move-
ment negotiating or reconciling itself with 'the traitors' in
Phnom Penh. 'All we expect them to do is to resign,' he
said....
"Sihanouk said: '1 tell you solemnly that the leaders of the
interior will never accept any compromise with the Phnom
Penh clique. It is completely illusory for countries like the
United States, France or the Soviet Union to count on a
compromise solution.' "
[April 20, 1973 - Peking - AFP]
"We have proposed reconciliation with the USA but maintain that
the USA must put an end to this military involvement in Cairibodia,
end aid to Lon Nol and cease interference in our affairs....
"We will never accept cease-fire or compromise.
"When we speak of negotiations with the USA, we mean to negotiate
the question of ending U. S. interference, not the question of cease-
fire. They are different questions. Cease-fire means splitting
our country, means recognition of the Lon Nol-controlled zone. "
[April 13, 1973 - NCNA]
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
SIHANTOUK - Statements on Negotiations (b)
"in this conI'.CCtio , I have just had a direct contact with the (,-1\TP-
IA.F and, the RGNUC back home. They asked me to let the. whole
world know that they will never accept-, in any case or any circurn
stance, a~co j omise whatsoever with the regime of the traitors,
any cease-fire whatsoever, any 'peace conference' whatsoever.
They are not bellicose, but they will only accept a peace with. the
installation of the RGNUC in Phnom Penh and with the rehabilitation
of the independent and non-aligned Kingdom of Cambodia, that
elimination oil U. S. neo-(:oloraialislxl fror)a T'}arner ter:. itory.
[April 19, 1973 - Sihanouk Speech in llano'
>1i arc * *
"Prince Norodom Sihanouk announced in Hanoi yesterday that
the policy of the United National Front of Kampuchea had been
revised following the conclusion of the Vietnam cease-fire
Agreement.
"The head of the RGNUC said that this new policy included an
ovC:rture to the United States, a decrease of the military activities
of the Cambodian resistance fighters, and provision for a general
amnesty in Cambodia.
"He said: If the United States is willing to play the game of
friendship with an independent and non-aligned Cambodia,, we
will be able to arrive at a quick reconciliation with the Washington
Government. Prince Sihanouk added that he envisaged the
resumption of a dialogue with the United States in two stages.
He said: 'First, a meeting without any condition to see what
each has up its sleeve, and the negotiations.' Prince Sihanouk
added that the Cambodian problem co'ild not be settled without
the definitive retirement from political life of LonNol and his
clique of traitors. He said: 'We do not want to capture them.
They have sufficiently well- stocked bank accounts in Switzerland.
They rnu st leave. "'
[February 1, 1973 - Press Interview - AFP]
"...We must adopt to the changes. We are doing as the Vietnamese
do. That is the reason for our 'new look' in our policy. But we
will also maintain our principles .... Sihanouk emphasized that
the purpose of the new policy was to avoid inconveniencing Cam-
bodia's neighbors who must observe the cease -fire. He said:
This is why on the military level we are going deliberately to
temporize, lowering the tone of air operations and not launching
offensive actions."
[February 1, 1973 - Hanoi - AFP]
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4
SIHANOUK - Statements on Negotiations W
"Sihanouk said that the American Government had not made any
more offers to him since he rejected its offer for the estalblisl-i-
ment of a government of reconciliation in Phnom Penh of which
he hizns::ff wautd Have"Liven head. _ The U. S. had suggested this
solution to him last year through the Chinese Government. He
had rejected the offer because for one thing it prescribed the
winding up of the Cambodian Royal Government of National Union
and the Phnom Penh Government in favor of a Government of
National Reconciliation that would have existed until general
elections were held in Cambodia. "
[January 21, 1973 - Interview with AFP Correspondent Peking]
"On October 4, Sihanouk told an AFP Correspondent that Senator
Mansfield's suggestions for a peace settlement in Cambodia was
unacceptable to him (e. g. Sihanouk's return to Cambodia as the
head of a Vietnam Government of'National Union with the partici-
.'p Lion. of Lon Nol's Government representatives).
[October 4, 1972 - Interview with AFP Correspondent - Pelon]
"Sihanouk said his forces were opposed to such an arrangement
(e. g. cease-fire/partition) and would fight until the Lori Nol
regime is completely eliminated. He said: We refuse the Nixon
solution -- a cease-fire with international control. We do not
accept either a Cease -#ire or partition or international control. September 4, 1972 AFP]
"They (and Britain and others) are proposing to us the formation
of a government of national reconciliation or of national coalition.
To sum up the matter, these governments would have three heads:
one left, whic:: would he we resisters; one right, which would be
the pro-Americans; and one center, which would be the people
who were not' engaged in this war and whom I will call the cowards.
"Now a government with three components is necessarily a
weak government, for there is no monolithic bloc. What will
happen is clear: one will find on one side the patriots who form
one-third of the government, and the other two-thirds will be
formed by traitor:, and cowards. The result is that the minority
third will be forced back into the buch, as is the case in Laos
with the Pathet Lao. "
[July 25, 1972 - Interview with Le Solcil
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-26-4