DOUGLAS PIKE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-1-3-14-1
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2009
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: April 8, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/01 : LOC-HAK-1-3-14-1
April ti, 1969
MEMORANDUM VCR Di\. iC SlNO R
GM: Dean Moor
I.HROUGH: Richard Sneider
iIP~J Douglas Pike
Miss Rebecca McGovern of MIT Press has sent you a copy of
Douglas 'like's latest book "War. Peace and theViet Cong" which
will be published in May 1969. (Tab B) Rolf Druge and riven
Craemer have prepared a brief summary of the book for use in
your forthcoming meeting with Pike. ("lab C)
That you sign the attached reply to Miss McGovern at "Tab A.
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
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i e*r Miss McGovern:
hank you for your letter of March 31, 1969 and
the copy of i)ouglais Ptke"S forthcoming book, Y arm
eaCe and the Viet Spr . I am looking forward to
r1i cussh~g; it personally with. Mr. Pike.
Beat regards,
Henry A. :Kissinger
Iles i .ebecca M. McGovern
Sales and Promotion N"nager
'I he M.1..1. 'F'rasa
"ssachuseits i titut+ of Technology
Cambridge, ?iaasacbueetty OZ 1.42
2 - Secretariat
1 - HA .LC Chron
1 - WH File
WH/DM/SFK (4/8/69)
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4/1
Douglas Pipe the writer of this
is scheduled to see HAK on Friday.
Joan tells me, however, the meet-
ing will no 'doubt be cancelled and
rescheduled for another time due
to Prez plans to Fla. Suggest D.
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MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS, 021.42
3969
Dr. Henry Kissinger
The V/b to TIouse
Washing ton., D. C
Dew? I)r. Ki_ssira"cr:
Enclosed please _C.ind_ an advance valley of
Dou J.n,s P i.3-:c, I s 'orthco rainE, book, V/Ml[;, P' ,ACE
AND THE V_C T CONG, which we w_1.7 publish on
May uth. 11'0 w?rouI.c1 tirelcr'1'.u your corrim.ents on
the boob.
(Miss) Rebecca M. McGovern
Sales and Promotion Manager
RIiitI/s j"
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DOUGLAS PIKE'S
WAR, PEACE AND THE VIET GONG; to be published in May 1969
Douglas Pike, in his second book on the Viet Cong, presents an analysis
of Vietnam's internal political anatomy, placing into the perspective of
Vietnamese traditions, experiences and attitudes, prospects for
settlement and three alternative strategies in contention among Hanoi's
leadership today.
The Contenders -- Eight contenders in the situation are: the NLF, the PRP,
the Alliance, the DRV, Communist China, the Soviet Union, the GVN, and
the U. S. (Their basic objectives are described in Chapter One in generally
familiar terms. )
Politics and Society--- South Vietnam's social and political milieu in
which the struggle is being fought is deeply influenced by traditionalism,
divisiveness, organizational malaise, clandestinism, and the problem of
legitimatizing the distribution of power.
The Continuum --- Without attempting to predict the future a continuum is
described to suggest several paths toward peace in Vietnam; within the
peace via accommodation possibilities, the paths of formal public
accommodation are contrasted with informal private methods.
of PAVN
Negotiated
settlement
.0111, 01-
~rti ~~ ya~.r
DECISIVE Orb ~ti`? G~
VICTORY
(OR DEFEAT) 4
Figure 3-1 The Continuum
dr'o mod'
0
CL+ ea, r
ACCOMMODATION
OF NLF
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Public Accommodation -- Between 1960 and 1967, the wording and the
precise terminology of the NLF position on coalition government appears
to have changed into the present frozen demand that no members of the
present GVN could be considered as participants in such a coalition.
Private Accommodation -- Accommodation between individuals appears
far more likely to be the path which the Vietnamese could use with skill
and with the conviction that the winner-take-all/loser-lose-all dilemma
could be avoided. The Malayan amnesty program is relevant to the
Vietnamese situation. The GVN's National Reconciliation Program
;(Doan Ket) promises to become more important in permitting individual
NLF members to reenter Vietnamese society.
A strategy combining Military pressure on the battlefield and an
accelerated and well- coordinated National Reconciliation Program (NRP)
could significantly reduce NLF strength. One possible scenario: -- mutual
withdrawal of PAVN and U. S. forces reduce the war to pre-1965 level;
defections of NLF supporters (not true believers) reduce the war to 1961
level; further competition, attrition and defection reduce the NLF hard-
core to a hold out band fighting ion some areas of the countryside while
the general population of South Vietnam is occupied with nation-building.
Communist Strategy 1960 - 1969 -- The Communists organizational weapon
of struggle was based on faith in the Khoi Nghia (General Uprising) theory
applied in conjunction with the Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare experiences
of the Viet Minh's anti-French effort. From 1963 to 1965 this theory
appeared able to bring victory, but the U. S. response to South Vietnam's
near collapse severely altered Communist prospects.
Following massive U. S. involvement, the search for a revised strategy
produced the Interim Guerrilla Warfare concept as expressed in the Winter-
Spring Campaign of 1967 - 1968. Insisting that the war must be won on the
battlefield General Giap pushed for a quick and decisive strike. Yet the
South Vietnamese army fought well, South Vietnam did not collapse and
Communist forces suffered great losses.
Today the Communist debate on strategy is three-fold.as follows:
Regular Force Strategy -- Regular Force strategy (advocated by Vo
Nguyen Giap) maintains that victory is to be achieved by the rapid
application of regular military forces in South Vietnam with top priority
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W W
assigned to weapons and logistics. This strategy's main weakness lies in
its cost and in the fact that it has not worked. Its main strength lies in
the fact that nothing better has been proposed providing an outcome which
would guarantee Communist victory, unification and political power in
the South.
Neo.-revolutionary Guerrilla War -- (advocated by Truong Chinh) stresses
belief that time is on the side of Hanoi and that protracted war will increase
problems and contradictions for the U. S. The strategy's main strength lies
in pressures it puts upon the U. S. Its main weaknesses lie in fact of U. S.
involvement and in the strategy's inability to guarantee U. S. abandonment
,of Vietnam.
Negotiated Settlement Strate --- (advocated by Nguyen Duy Trinh and
younger elements of the Lao Dong Party) proposes that diplomatic and
political efforts can achieve what the two military strategies discussed
above cannot: i. e. the withdrawal of U. S. forces from Vietnam; once U. S.
forces are gone, they will not return. This strategy's main strength
lies in lack of success and high cost of present Communist military efforts.
Its weakness lies in fact that it cannot be proven that the U. S. would not
return, and in fact that the conference table path has not been a happy or
productive one in North Vietnam's past experience and is risky especially
with today's added Sino-Soviet uncertainties.
The Hanoi attitude toward negotiations is influenced by the relative degree
of ascendancy these three strategies gain in the internal Hanoi Lao Dong
Party policy debate. The first strategy would not rely on the conference
table. The second would use the conference table as part of a talk-fight
approach and the third would rest its major hopes on the negotiation gambit.
Pros ects -- Short-range: a gradual shifting of effort from military to non-
military activities, reduction of warfare, intensification of diplomacy
abroad and politics in South Vietnam. The military disengagement will
shift the emphasis to political confrontation within South Vietnam. A
broader.base for the GVN and a more coinpetive capability among the
various social organizations could severely erode the NLF organizational
strength and influence if the National Reconciliation/Amnesty effort has
been attuned to the genuine growth of a viable and increasingly participatory
political system which bridges the gulf between the rural and urban areas.
(The South Vietnamese society today is nearly one-half urban and this
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trend is expected to grow more rapidly under conditions of peace and
development. )
Long range: regionalism will predominate and North and South Vietnam
will play roles in a new Federation of Indo-China including perhaps
Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos. Prospects for broader Southeast
Asian development along the lines of ASPAC or ASEAN are stronger
today than ever before.
Dolf M. Droge
Sven F. Kraemer
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TABLE 4--r W W
Stkniinary Comparison of the Three Strategies
Regular Force Strategy
Description Quick victory, using small-
of strategy scale and guerrilla war tech-
niques. Great emphasis on
logistics. Sudden, massive
offensives.
Protagonists' A quick victory can be won
arguments by launching an ever-greater
momentum of attacks, which
are militarily and
psychologically devastating.
Antagonists'
arguments
i
In a toe-to-toe slugging
match the enemy's firepower
will decimate our strength,
because it is impossible to
match his mass and
movement.
Relevancy of a itain maximum effort
logistics and to sustain highest levels;
outside match the enemy. Major
support outside logistic
assistance required.
View of time Time not on our side.
Must compress events
in time.
View of Negotiate only a diminu-
negotiations tion of the enemy's military
advantages (in firepower or
manpower). Tactical
negotiations permissible.
Advocates Vo Nguyen Giap; Ho Chi
of strategy Minh; Van Tien Dung,
Le Duan; "hardliners" in
NLF.
Neorevolutionary
Guerrilla War Strategy
Protracted conflict. Win at
Stage Two with modernized
guerrilla war tactics.
Gnat-swarm warfare.
To outlast, outwear, out-
endure the enemy by
military actions that never
give him an opportunity
to use his vaunted
advantages of mass
and movement.
This is a no-win policy.
It permits our fo-ces to
continue to survive and exist,
but it dooms us never to go
through the gates of victory.
Slow down a typhoon,
and it breaks up.
Opposed to symmetrical
escalation; keep logistic
demands to a minimum;
be self-contained, self-
supporting. Minimum out-
side assistance required. - ?
Time is our best ally.
War is a test of wills,
a dimension of time.
Negotiate to diminish the
level or magnitude of the
war. Tactical negotiations
permissible.
Truong Chinh; Le" Thanh_
Nghi, Phan,-Hung, Le Due
Tho (?) certain professional
(nonmilitary) PAVN gen-
erals; the Chinese Commu-
nists; the few remaining
original NLF cadres.
Negotiated Settlement Strategy
Achieve victory at the
conference table and
through political activities
in South Vietnam. Guerrilla
war makes a contribution.
It is impossible to drive out
the Americans, but it is pos-
sible to negotiate them out,
or get their out by example
of withdrawal of our troops.
Once out, they won't come
back; once out, whatever else,
our prospects will be
brighter.
It is impossible to win at the
conference table what cannot
t e won on the battlefield.
The conditions imposed by
the enemy for a political
settlement would be disadvan-
tageous, if not disastrous.
Logistics and manpower "
demands low; less strain
on all systems as a result.
Time inevitably will be
with us; the force of haste
will chiefly be in the other
camp.
Negotiate all, chiefly at
strategic level.
Nguyen Duy Trinh, Hoan
Van Hotn, Tran Quoc Hoan;
the "younger elements" of
Lao Dong Central Com-
mittee; Southern elements
of the NLF.
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