MEMO TO HENRY KISSINGER FROM WALT ROSTOW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-1-1-3-5
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 22, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/12/08: LOC-HAK-1-1-3-5
JWary ZZ, 1969
TO: Henry Kissinger
FROM: Walt Rostow
Henry,
Some such seven points as these could be stated on Saturday,
since they do not, in themselves, settle certain issues of timing
and. sequence which may be the subject of debate within Washington
and between Washington and Saigon. Nevertheless, there would be
great advantage in some such Nixon-Lodge seven points :
-_ First, because it would meet the general desire around the
world that the new Administration say something positive on Saturday;
Second, as I have drafted these points over the telephone, the DMZ
and Laos appear at the top and lay the basis for the doctrine and approach
we discussed at lunch;
_.> The points are so structured that they are consistent with the
Kissinger article and would be regarded, therefore, as something
contributed by the new Administration, even though, as we are both
aware, the two-or three-track approach has long been common among
all of us.
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/12/08: LOC-HAK-1-1-3-5
In short, I think it is possible to have, by Saturday, Nixon's Seven
Points For a Peace Settlement even though, in fact, you are buying
time for more homework and jamming the DMZ and Laos Accords
in their face;
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W V
(1/22/69)
We have now come to the critical phase in the search for peace.
It is now the time to address the substantive issues.
As a first contribution to the earliest possible achievement of a
stable peace in Southeast Asia, we propose the following seven principles.
First. The DMZ should be promptly and completely re-established
as envisaged in the negotiations which led to the cessation of acts of
force against the territory of North Vietnam. At the present time, the
DMZ is not being fully respected as envisaged in those negotiations.
Therefore, we propose that all military forces promptly withdraw from
the demilitarized zone; that all military movementsa rc oss the DMZ
cease; and that all firing from within or across the DMZ should cease.
It was earlier made clear that a failure to observe these provisions
might interfere with the progress of substantive talks. Now that those
talks have begun, we should, as first order business, re.-establish
the DMZ. This would be evidence to each other and to the world that
;e intend to honor the agreements into which we enter around this table
and towar- constitut&4g an important act of good faith.
A
Second. The Geneva Accords on Laos should be fully. honored.
we all know
governments have taken varying formal positions
with respect to the Geneva Accords of 1954. But there is no ambiguity ti*~c~e:?~e?1
about the responsibility of various governments with respect to the Geneva
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Accords of 1962. The honoring of those Accords is, evidently, essential
to peace in South Vietnam and in Southeast Asia as a whole. We propose,
therefore, tha,: we turn promptly to the reestablishment of the Geneva
Accords of 1962.
Third. Mutual troop withdrawals. It is basic to the achievement
of peace in Southeast Asia that the, forces of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam withdraw from South Vietnam as well as from Cambodia and Laos.
This must include members of those forces who are now operating with the
units of the Viet Cong. Since the presence of those forces beyond the
borders of North Vietnam is the cause of the presence in South Vietnam
of United States and other forces allied to the Government of the Republic
of Vietnam, we are prepared at the same time to discuss the implementation
of the Manila Declaration of October 1966 as it bears on troop withdrawals.
We believe it would be wise for us around this table promptly to prepare a
schedule of troop withdrawals and their subsequent monitoring, looking
'to the total removal from South Vietnam and the two neighboring countries
df forces that ought not to be there under the Geneva Accords of 1954
and 19 62.
Fourth. Monitoring the agreements. It must be bluntly stated that
i
the frontiers of Southeast Asia under the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962
have been very inadequately monitored by the International Control Commission.
This unfortunate result was not necessarily the fault of the three governments
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which agreed to serve on. the International Control Commission. The terms
of the ICC arrangements did not permit the kind of effective monitoring
of frontiers which stable peace in Southeast Asia requires. Too much
blood has been spilled on all sides for us to repeat the errors of the past.
We shall seek, therefore, effective means for monitoring the frontiers
involved in a settlement of the Vietnam question. It is our hope that nations
of Southeast Asia, including some nations which have not beer directly or
indirectly engaged in hostilities, will be prepared to play a part in assuring
the stability of a settlement as it applies to theMMMMM of crossing of
international frontiers with arms or men contrary to the provisions of
the agreement.
Fifth. We would hope that men who can speak for those SoLt h
Vietnamese who have been engaged in hostilities against the Government of the
Republic of Vietnam would be prepared to meet with representatives of the
Government of the Republic of Vietnam at the earliest possible time to
achieve, in a spirit of reconciliation, an end of violence and a settlement
of political differences on the basis of self-determination for all the
people of South Vietnam and the rule of one-man, one-vote. This is
evidently a matter for South Vietnamese to settle themselves and not an
appropriate subject of negotiation around this table; but it is also clear
that the earlier such an agreement can be reached by South Vietnamese
the sooner stable peace in all its dimensions can be brought about.
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Sixth. We would hope that the Government of the Republic of
Vietnam and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
would in the course of these negotiations be prepared to meet to discuss
an amelioration of relations between the two parts of Vietnam looking
towards unity when and if the people of both North Vietnam and South Vietnam
express their wish to achieve that result. We would, of course, emphasize
that this is not a matter for the Government of the United States, but for
the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Government
of the Republic of Vietnam.
Seventh, In the course of these negotiations the United States
would be prepared to discuss with the Government of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam its hopes for rapid reconstruction of all of Southeast
Asia from the ravages of war, including North Vietnam, and to receive
the views of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on post-
war reconstruction of the area and its future rapid development.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/12/08: LOC-HAK-1-1-3-5