THE UNDERSTANDINGS ON THE BOMBING HALT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-559-14-1-5
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 2, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
2 December 1970
SUBJECT: The Understandings on the Bombing Halt
. Summary
1. During the sununer and autumn of 1968, US
and North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris worked
out a series of-, unwritten, -but fairly well defined
"understandings" about what we expected to happen
if the US stopped the bombing of North Vietnam.
The US specified that a bombing cessation could not
be maintained unless Communist forces refrained
from certain actions in the area of the DMZ and
against major cities. The North Vietnamese and
Soviets indicated that they understood what the US
had said in this regard.
2. The understandings also included explicit
agreement that representatives of the Republic of
Vietnam and of the Communists' Liberation Front
would participate in post-bombing talks. Finally,
the understandings included a mutual commitment to
begin post-bombing talks as soon as possible. The
North Vietnamese were certainly aware that we in-
tended to conduct aerial reconnaissance over North
Vietnam after the bombing stopped, and they raised
no objection until after it actually was stopped.
The subject was never covered in any detail, how-
ever. We have no record of any explicit discussion
of what might happen if the North Vietnamese fired
on reconnaissance flights or if the US retaliated
for such action.
MORI
C05077056
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The Military "Facts of Life"
3. In the plenary sessions and in 12 secret
meetings with the North Vietnamese between June
and October 1968, the US indicated that under
certain "circumstances" it was prepared to stop
the bombing and other actions "involving the use
of force" against North Vietnam. The specific
"circumstances" and the ways in which we presented
them to the North' Vietnamese changed during this
period. Eventually, in an attempt to get around
Hanoi's rejection of "conditions" or "reciprocity,"
a formula was worked out during A ibassador Vance's
consultations in Washington in early October. The
formula became the basic statement of the US posi-
tion and it was delivered to North Vietnamese
politburo member Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy at a
secret meeting with'Harriman and Vance on 11 October
1968. The North Vietnamese asked about conditions
and reciprocity and the US replied as follows:
"In responding "to your question,
it is very important there be no mis-
understanding between us. It is very
important to understand that we are not
talking about reciprocity or conditions
but simply a fact that after cessation
of all bombardment the President's
ability to maintain that situation would
be affected by certain elemental considera-
tions.
"We do not took on them as-a condi-
tion for stopping the bombing but as a
description of the situation which would
permit serious negotiations and thus the
cessation to continue. You will under-
stand, therefore, that the circumstances
we have discussed in our various private
meetings about military activity in and
around the DMZ are essential to the main-
tenance of that situation. And, of-course,
you know from our various discussions that
indiscriminate attacks launched against
major cities would create a situation
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which would not, permit serious talks and
thus the maintenance of a cessation. "
4, The US had specified, clearly at earlier
meetings what was expected of Communist forces
regarding the DMZ and attacks on cities-
--The DMZ The US position was
that there wpuid be no firing of
artillery, rockets, or mortars from
across and within the DMZ; there would
.be no movement of troops from across
and within the DMZ; and there would
be no massing or movement of troops near
the DMZ in a manner threatening to the
other side.
--Attacks-on Cities; The US posi-
tion was that there would be no indis-
criminate attacks against major cities.
Major cities were defined at least once
as being Saigon, Da Nang, and Hue.
5. The basic US position was repeated to the
North Vietnamese in forceful, explicit terms on
several occasions. During a secret meeting on
16 October, Yuan Thuy noted that Le Duc Tho was
on his way back to North Vietnam and that he would
report to Hanoi. Thuy noted that Tho "fully
understood" the content of previous US-DRV meet-
ings. He added that the North Vietnamese in Hanoi
also understood the US position, but that with Le
Duc Tho present they would understand even better.
6. The Soviets were given our position several
times and they assured us repeatedly that Hanoi
understood it. Ambassador Dobrynin, for example,
told Mr. Rostow on 25 October that he was sure
Hanoi understood the "facts of life" to which the
US referred because they had been made clear "many,
many times."
7. For about three months after the bombing halt,
Communist forces generally played by the "rules"
we had laid down regarding the DMZ and the cities.
There was some minor military activity in the DMZ,
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of course, and dozens of "incidents," but no ma j o.r.'
Communist units moved across. ti, ,e line into South
Vietnam for more than two months after the bombing
stopped. Moreover, some large units were moved
far north of their normal positions just above the
DMZ. With regard to cities, the Communists rocketed
Saigon on 31 October, the eve of the bombing halt.,
but not again until 23 February 1,969 when the enciny
launched a so-called post-Tet offensive in South
Vietnam. flue was hit once by a light shelling in
early February.
8. The "rules" were, in effect, scrapped by
the Communists when they launched their post-Tet
offensive in February 1969. Regimental-sized units
moved into the area north of the DMZ and finally
into South Vietnam .itself. There were repeated
shellings across and from within the DMZ, and all
three major cities were shelled indiscriminately.
There has not been a consistent pattern to Com-
munist military activity since the spring of 1969.
Major cities are shelled from time to time, and
Communist forces continue to move across the DM.Z,
even though their present low-profile tactics do
not include extensive use of the zone as in the
past. Thus, the extent to which the Communists
now feel constrained by the military terms of the
understanding is unclear.
Other Aspects of the Understandings
9. There was explicit (but unwritten) agree-
ment, not just an "understanding," on two non-
military matters--who would participate in post-
bombing talks and the need for a prompt meeting
of all the participants after the bombing stopped.
The US had always insisted that the Saigon gov-
ernment would have to take part in any negotiations
involving the political future of South Vietnam.
The North Vietnamese were equally insistent that
only the National Liberation Front, and not Hanoi,
could speak on matters concerning South Vietnam.
. 10. By September 1968, much of the conversa-
tion in Paris was concentrating on the question
of GVN participation. We had made it clear that
we were prepared to stop the ~ombing on the
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to do" regarding the DMZ and attacks on major
cities But we insisted that the bombing could
not actually stop until Hanoi explicity agreed
to the participation. of the GVN in post-bombing
talks.
,assumption that the Communists "would know what
political as well as military, should be discussed
bilaterally by US. and North Vietnamese negotiators.
13.' The Communists may never have been ready
to carry out the part of the understandings calling
for "serious" discussions involving the GVN. We
cannot be positive on this point, however, since
the prompt post-bombing talks for which the US
delegation had been pressing were not held because
the Saigon government refused to send its repre-
11. The Communists initially stonewalled
on this issue. The ice was finally broken on
12 October when the Soviets informed the US
delegation they "had reason to believe" that if
the bombing stopped, Hanoi would agree to GVN
participation in talks on a political settlement
in Vietnam. The North Vietnamese confirmed this
at the next private meeting on 15 October by
saying explicitly several times they "agreed that
if the bombing stops there will. be serious talks
including representatives of the Saigon adminis-
tration.
12 In a government statement after the
bombing halt, North Vietnam hedged this commitment
by noting that it would carry on discussions with
the US "with a view to finding a political solution
to the Vietnam problem." Regarding the GVN, how-
ever, the statement said only that the DRV would
"participate in a conference" involving the
"Saigon administration.. Moreover, soon after the
bombing actually stopped, the Communists began
calling for a "peace cabinet" in Saigon. This
call gradually evolved into the present Communist
position of refusing to do-business with the Saigon
government until changes are made in its top leader-
ship. Hanoi now privately insists that all matters,
sentatives to Paris. The North Vietnamese were
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clearly dismayed when we were unable to bring
along what they regarded as our "puppets, " espe-
cially when they had rushed their Liberation
Front people to Paris only three days after the
bombing stopped. One can speculate that Saigon's
balking and the ensuing weeks of haggling over
the shape of the table had a marked impact on
Hanoi's attitude. The Communists might have been
ready for negotiations in the autumn of 1968
because, with the Johnson Administration on the
way out and with Saigon shaken and out of tune
with US policy, they calculated that our side
was an easy mark. When it became clear that
allied concessions were not going to come easily,
the Communists stiffened their terms and shunned
"serious talks" with GVN representatives.
The' Matter of. Reconnaissance
14. The North Vietnamese had always couched
their demand for a bombing halt in language that
included "all other acts of war," which they pub-
licly insisted covered reconnaissance flights.
The US met this problem in July 1968 when Vance
first used the formula that we were prepared to
stop the bombing and all other actions "involving
the use of force" against North Vietnam. This
precise language was stressed because it was
intended to allow for reconnaissance, but we did not
make the point explicit or raise the possibility
that North Vietnam might fire on such flights.
There was no discussion of such "details" until
after the bombing stopped. In effect, both sides
finessed the reconnaissance issue.
15. Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese indi-
cated more than once that they knew the meaning
of our formulation. During a meeting on 21 October,
when the negotiators were trying to devise language
for a statement announcing a bombing halt, the
North Vietnamese agreed to describe the cessation
as an end to "all acts involving the use of force
against North Vietnam." The US delegation inter-
preted this to mean that Ilanoi was not going to
use the issue of reconnaissance as an excuse to
break off the talks. In the actual North Vietnamese
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statement on the bombing halt on 2 Noven er, Hanoi
acknowledged that the US had stopped the bombing,
but it noted that the US had yet to "give up for
good all encroachments on the sovereignty and
security" of North Vietnam. Thus, while the North
Vietnamese never raised any specific objections to
our formulation, neither did they agree to accept
reconnaissance flights passively.
16. In the autumn of 1968, before the bombing
halt, the US concern about reconnaissance was
focused on the issue of whether Hanoi would use the
the North Vietna-
mese did not intend to use reconnaissance as a
reason for disengaging from negotiations. Very
soon after the bombing stopped, . however, Hanoi began
citing reconnaissance flights to counter US charges
that the Communists were violating the terms of
the understandings.
17. This first happened on 11 November 1968
when Vance met with Ha Van Lau to protest Communist
shellings from the DMZ. Lau sloughed off the DMZ
matter and complained for the first time about
reconnaissance activity. He used the argument
that the US commitment to stop all "acts of force"
included reconnaissance flights and he insisted
that North Vietnam would take preventive measures.
Vance vigorously asserted the flights would con-
tinue. Lau eventually dropped the subject by
saying he disagreed with the US view and urged the
US to stop such flights.
18. As far as we can tell, US measures to
protect reconnaissance flights did not come up until
the US broached the subject with the Soviets both
in Paris and Washington on 13 November. Soviet
diplomats were told that our planes would defend
or even break off the talks.
continuation: of such flights as an excuse to stall
themselves if the firing against them continued.
In Washington, Ambassador Dobrynin responded that
it was his "personal impression" that firing on
reconnaissance flights had not been discussed
earlier and that we were making an ex post facto
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19. Following the first shootdown of a US
reconnaissance aircraft, Vance told Lau on 24
November that such an action is wholly unacceptable
to the US. "Our preference," said Vance, 'would
be for North Vietnam to comply with a clear under-
standing of our point of view and, to leave our
reconnaissance aircraft alone." Lau responded
by saying that "ht% was now instructed to reject
completely the position of the US Government in
regard to reconnaissance flights over the terri-
tory of the DRV. " Despite subsequent shootd.owns,.
torrents of charges and countercharges, and the
passage of two years, Hanoi has stuck to this
position.
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