CABINET MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-283-10-7-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: September 28, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-283-10-7-9
MEMORANDUM
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
CABINET MEETING
DATE AND TIME:
PLACE:
Tuesday - September 28, 1976
9:46 - 11:13 a. m.
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
President: The last meeting we focused on politics. We are switching
the format and I thought it would be appropriate for Secretary Kissinger
to bring you up to date on our African initiative.
As I said earlier, when we have to take actions in foreign policy, we will
do it regardless of political benefit or detriment. On this issue it was
our judgment that time was of the essence, and that there would be worse
chaos and bloodshed if we didn't move. It was a high risk option, but it
was the thing to do.
George, will you give us the intelligence background against which we
made our decision.
Bush: [Described the estimate of events if no action had been taken.
Kissinger: This intelligence assessment shows why we couldn't delay and
why we started in April, which some considered ill-timed. After the rainy
season started, the war would escalate, with raids into Mozambique and risk
of foreign intervention.
Further, the future of Africa is involved. If the movement is toward radical-
ism supported by outside intervention, the future of Africa is bleak. Conversely,
if we can demonstrate that moderation works, that there is a peaceful route,
that has profound implications for Africa.
Even if you want the white community to continue living there, this is the way to
go -- otherwise they would inevitably be driven out. We had to move before
November 1, the rainy season.
[Compares these negotiations with the Middle East.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECI.ASSUWATIOX
SCIUI',DULE O E\ i . , U'1'IVE ORD . I ((,)2
EXfi1I,'ION CiVfl`i(;01;Y 5_C1b~__ 1,-3)
AUT04NIATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. ON Imp, to det.
? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-283-10-7-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-283-10-7-9
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
The problem in dealing with the blacks is the gap between what they say
publicly and what they say privately. The rejection you read on Sunday
was not a rejection. They told us to get the Conference going, that they
had no preconditions, and that they were ready to move.
We put together a plan with the British and presented it to the blacks to
put forward. They bought it but said Smith would never agree. So we
turned it around and went to Smith first. We first had to convince him to
accept what all the intelligence estimates -- including his own -- said. He
then wanted to put forward just a general concept. We rejected that because
we thought things would then get bogged down. We thought we had to nail
him down, so the plan he put forward was ours, not his, and largely -- not
in every detail -- accepted by the blacks.
The radicals are interested in a protracted negotiation, because the guerrilla
war would continue and the takeover mo uld be by the men with the guns rather
than the civilians.
We won on that point. The Constitutional Conference will follow the setting
up of a transitional government, thus getting the government in place rather
than having things dragged out forever in a Constitutional Conference.
The key now is to.get the British to call a conference. They are moving
in a stately, bureaucratic fashion, but we have to get them moving.
Another issue is Namibia, where the situation is the same as Rhodesia but
two years removed. Last summer the Africans asked us for conditions,
on Namibia. We have in fact produced 150% of their conditions, but those
in the meantime have escalated. There is a split among the African leaders
now. We think it is not too good to have the two issues boiling simultaneously,
so we are marking time for a month or so to get Rhodesia moving.
What is at stake is for the moderate governments all over Africa to see whether
the U. S. can have an impact through its moderate approach. If not, there will
be a sweeping trend toward radicalism, with a profound effect, at least since
Africa has so many states.
It is too bad it comes during an election year because we need a united people
to put this through
President: We had a leadership meeting and I was very encouraged by the
lack of opposition by the Democrats. A few questions of information, but
no objections or reservations.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-283-10-7-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-283-10-7-9
SECRET/NODIS/XGPS
Kissinger- I met with the news editors, including from the south, and there
were no objections.
President: I found the same in my trip south.
Kissinger: Bill Coleman suggested I meet with the Black Caucus, which I
am doing today.
Coleman: This is very important. but
there is also an element more important. We have had a lot of liberal 25X1
Secretaries of State but Henry is the only one with the guts to step up and
take this one on. I think it is admirable.
Klepper Can't we do it without the British?
Kissinger: One thing I forgot was the Soviets. Theyare frantically opposing
us in every way.
Scranton: In the UN they are scared to death by our initiative and they're
doing everything possible to kill it.
Kissinger: So if we played a role in the conference, the Soviets would demand
one. Besides, Britain has the Constitutional role to play here.
The way I would do it is to call both sides in, listen to them for a couple of
days and then say this is our understanding of what you all said (whether it
is or not) and put out a paper. Then the blacks can accept a British plan
rather than one from Smith.
The British don't work that way, and it may be that we will have to get back in
before the conference gets sorted out.
SECRET /NODIS /XGDS
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-283-10-7-9