RECENT ZUMWALT IDEAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-536-19-1-5
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/05/09: LOC-HAK-536-19-1-5
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: . Recent Zualt Ideas
FROM: A L HAIG
As you know, Admiral Zumwalt left several papers for you in Paris
outlining his concerns and suggestions on a variety of issues following
his recent trip abroad. The following is a brief summary of his
observations and suggestions.
1. NATO Northern Flank. In the papers at Tab A Admiral Zumwalt
provides an interesting political /military comparison of Scandinavian
perceptions and stresses that:
--Norway sees itself as increasingly isolated because of
intensified Soviet fleet exercises, the decreasing Finnish-
independence from the Soviet Union, and Sweden's move
ward a USSR-biased neutrality.
--The important strategic position of Iceland. (See maps at Tab B, )
He recommends inter alia:
--Strong efforts `to reverse the drift of Iceland.
--Measures to convince the Faroe Islanders to take a more
pro NATO posture. (See map at Tab B.)
--Greater NATO infrastructure expenditures in Northern Norway
as a sign of NATO resolve, more frequent exercises off Norway
and basing of U. S. ships in the UK and Netherlands.
Comment: Admiral Zumwalt has identified an important trend of
erosion in the northern flank which needs careful examination. I have the
following recommendations:
NSS, DOS, OSD,
JCS reviews
completed
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TOP SECRET 2
--Although we have a NSSM on Iceland, the problem of reversing
the political situation in Iceland and the Faroes should be given
early imaginative consideration in the 40 Committee.
Approve Disapprove
--I have asked Hal Sonnenfeldt to evaluate the possibility of a
NSSM to examine political/military trends in Scandinavia with
particular emphasis on the growing isolation and vulnerability of
Norway. The NSSM should'consider the value of increased fleet
exercises, U.S. basing and other measures which could be taken
to shore up Norway.
2. JCS'Views on FY-1973 Budget (Tab C). Admiral Zumwalt-reports
that the private view of the JCS is that the U. S. has lost both strategic
and conventional military superiority to the Soviet Union. He recommends
that the President talk to the Joint Chiefs while he is considering the
Defense budget for FY-73.
Comment: As you know this is a serious issue, with important
political as well as security aspects, and I strongly recommend that the
President give the Joint Chiefs a hearing while budget issues are being
considered rather than in a cosmetic meeting after he has already made
the Defense budget decisions. 1 do not believe that the depth of our
examination of budget issues thus far or assessment of the threat justifies
ignoring the Joint Chiefs and it would be valuable for the President to have
their views.
3. SALT (Tab D). Admiral Zumwalt cautions that in working toward an
offensive freeze we must maintain "freedom to mix." He suggests in.tez
alia, an i`automatic provision to occur two years after an interim
agreement.
Q
Comment: As you know, we are now seeking a simple freeze and
have not made a detailed assessment of "freedom to mix"
provisions which pose a difficult verification problem. I will
ask Smith/Sonnenfeldt to give you a detailed assessment of this
issue.
4. Indian Ocean (Tab E). Admiral Zumwalt reports that the Australian,
New Zealand, UK and U. S. Navies have agreed to exchange information
about visits to the Indian Ocean so that there will be more continuous,
friendly coverage of the Indian Ocean.
TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET
Comment: This is a useful development.
5. Moroccan Revolution -(Tab*.". Admiral Zumwalt feels Libya's
immediate support for the Moroccan coup attempts may reflect the
Soviet hand. He suggests a sophisticated campaign to exploit the
possible Soviet/Libyanrole as part of our save Malta policy.
Comment: Malta should receive early 40 Committee consideration.
Approve Disapprove
6.. Rules of Engagement in DMZ (Tab G). Admiral Zumwalt indicates
that General Abrams and JCS requests for authorities to operate within
and above the DMZ are not being approved.
Comment: I am unaware of any current great JCS dissatisfaction
with the rules of engagement. As you know Admiral Welender is
looking into DMZ authorities. When JCS submitted their request for
authorities beyond April 30, 1971 there were three denials associated
with operations above the DMZ:
--pre-emptive strikes against SAM/AAA installations within
19 miles of border
--retallaa.tion for up to 72 hours against a SAM site which
actually fires a missile
--attack any enemy aircraft operating below 20 degress
North.
I will review this whole situation quietly with Admiral Welender.
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/05/09: LOC-HAK-536-19-1-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/05/09: LOC-HAK-536-19-1-5
MEMORANDUM .-
THE. WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: HAL SONNENFELDT
FROM: A L HAIG
SUBJECT: Norway and Scandinavia
There have been reports recently concerning the increasing
strategic vulnerability of Norway due to political developments
in Sweden, Finland and Iceland and the increasing Soviet Naval
operations off the coast of Germany. It may be time to take a
long-range look at trends in Scandinavia with particular
emphasis on possible political and military erosion of the
NATO Northern Flank. Would you please give me your tiFitews
on whether you believe a NSSM on this subject might be
worthwhile.
TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET
JCS VIEWS ON PY-73 BUDGET
1. Problem. The private view of the JCS is that the U.S. has lost both
s;.rstegic and conventional military superiority to the Soviet Union.
The significant new factors are that the Soviet ground forces and Air
Forces, which have probably always been superior in Europe, are now
joined by superior strategic nuclear forces (with resultant psychological
advantage,, albeit little useful military advantage) and by maritime
superiority as a result of the reductions in the FY-72 budget which will
be imposed by the Congress.
2. Recommendations: As part of making a Judgment as to how much
influence he shall put into holding the line on the FY-72 DOD budget
and on the hize of the FY-73 DOD budget, the President ought to see
personally and hear the views of the JCS.
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1. The President should be aware that a freeze on offensive systems
without "freedom to mix" means that current invulnerability of POLARIS.
and POSEIDON boats will disappear, after Soviet nuclear attack submarines,
being built at the rate of 10 to 12 per year, become progressively quieter.
They will be able constantly to trail POLARIS/POSEIDON boats, something
they have not been able to do to date and the long invulnerability of
the maritime part of the triad will end.
Recommendations:
a. "Walk back the cat" on "freedom to mix" in terms of reference for
SALT.
b. This can be done by providing for "freedom to mix" as an automatic
feature to occur within two years from the time of the interim agreement,.
if a permanent agreement has not been achieved which protects the
invulnerability of the sea based deterrent.
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/05/09: LOC-HAK-536-19-1-5
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3NNDIM OCEAN
1. The Australian, New Zealand, UK and U.S. Navies have agreed
informally to exchange information about visits to the Indian Ocean
in order to make it possible to spread the coverage of the ships
of their several navies more appropriately throughout each year.
SECRET
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ATTEME".VED 14DRROCOAN REVOLUTION
1. Saturday's attempted assasJ nation of the King of Morroco revealed
the continued pattern of Soviet indirect exploitation of the Arab
revolution to penetrate the south littoral of the Naditerranean.
2. Libya's almost iumaediately announced support maJds her complicity.
3. Libyan financial support of P&tNTOFF in the recent Malta election is
becoming generally well known, may have been subsidized by the USSR,
and certainly was encouraged by the USSR.
4. Recommendations: A czar should be set up to propose for Presidential
approval a "Save Malta" policy and have authority to marshall governmental
and private resources for a spphisticated campaign rapidly to seize
the opportunity to exploit with MINTOFF the nature of the game that
Libya abbetted by the Soviet Union is playing--"He who lies down with lions."
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/05/09: LOC-HAK-536-19-1-5
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RULES OF ENGAGENENT IN DML
1. Problem: General Abrams1requested authorities to operate within and
above the DIN in order to contain the growing IV'N threat in I Corps are
not being approved. Failure to do s6 will, in the judgement of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, have a serious impact on the prospects for successful
V'ietnamization, in I Corps at least. Similarly, through various devices,
the amount of tactical air support and B-52 support requested by General
Abrams as part of his requirement for supporting the current troop with-
drawals are being eroded in various vays.
2. Recommendation: Obtain a full report on the status of all authorities
requested for DMZ, NVN, Laos and on DOD plans for the continuation of air
support requested by General Abrams.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/05/09: LOC-HAK-536-19-1-5 .