MEMO TO HENRY A. KISSINGER FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-536-15-4-6
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 18, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/06/12: LOC-HAK-536-15-4-6
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
MEMORANDUM INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE March 18, 1.974
DOS, NAVY, USAF,
OSD, USAID
Reviews Completed
MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT'/'
The attached list. of subjects for breakfast with Schlesinger are all
worthy of raising.
With respect to the Thailand force levels, Schlesinger is very insistent
that this not go through the formal interagency system. He was very
concerned when he thought I had scheduled a WSAG to deal with the paper
(as it turns out, there is nothing in the issue which would warrant the
convening of a meeting).
The whole issue is one of timing. Schlesinger wants a
major withdrawal between the end of the dry season and
fiscal year (about 60 days). He says he is concerned to.
show some early movement so as to relieve pressure on
the Hill to force worldwide withdrawals. I suspect there
is also a budgetary aspect to it, although Defense stoutly
denies this.
I am inclined to believe that a somewhat more deliberate
withdrawal would be better, although Kissinger is likely
to say that Defense's contacts with the Thai military indicate
that his is .the way to go.
I suggest that, after some discussion of the subject, you
say that you will get a decision from the President right away.
With respect to the Suez Canal clearance, the only point I?would make
is that you should not take seriously any legal arguments Schlesinger
may make about Defense not being able to do the mine clearing except
as an agent of AID. Buzhardt says we can interpret the law to suit
the policy in this matter.
You had also indicated that you wanted to talk with Schlesinger about.
aircraft carrier levels (Defense apparently intends to drop from 15 to 12)
SENSITIVE
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
and also about NATO naval deployments. I think we badly need to get
into this area, but it is one which Schlesinger is likely to think is his
own private preserve unless it is done on a broad national strategy basis.
You may also wish to mention the provision of military equipment to
Egypt through Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, etc. You have already broached
the subject to him, but you may want to get a little more specific now
that. we have an Egyptian shopping list (which I will have with me).
It may also be useful to talk a bit about SALT, especially in the. context
of the NSC meeting. If you take the approach that your Moscow trip
will be to try to elicit from the Soviets whether there is any chance of
pursuing a MIRV agreement, you may help in. avoiding a hassle over
SALT positions at the NSC meeting. That approach may also serve to
deflect Schlesinger from trying to get Nitze on your trip.
Schlesinger may raise the following issues:
Attachment
Diego Garcia.. He will urge that you talk to Mansfield and
Symington. [FYI, your new stalwart, Holton, apparently
argued at the last LIG meeting that we should fall off on our'
efforts on Diego Garcia. ]
Israeli Aid. He may ask where we stand on the exotic
equipment (standoff weapons, etc.) which Eban has raised.
European Developments. He will probably express his
concern that the President's statements jeopardize our
troops in Europe. I have point ed out that the opposite
could be true, but he is obviously concerned.
- Graham Martin. He is upset at the press briefing which.
Graham Martin gave last week intimidating that our Vietnam
problems wok4A focus more on economic than military aid.
TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/06/12: LOC-HAK-536-15-4-6
SECRET GDS
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
March 18, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: Jeanne W. D
SUBJECT: Talker for Breakfast Meeting with
Schlesinger, Tuesday, March 19
The staff suggests the following items for your breakfast meeting with
Secretary Schlesinger on Tuesday, March 19:
1056
Withdrawal of U. S. Forces from Thailand
Secretary Schlesinger raised this subject with you two weeks ago,. saying
he wanted to get a decision on our troop levels in Thailand, and will
probably raise it again. He has also asked for your approval of a new
DOI) plan to withdraw about 8, 000 men (9, 300'spaces) along with a
number of aircraft (6 tactical. air squadrons and 33 B-52's) in sixty days,
by June of 1974. This. would bring our actual military personnel level
down to about 28, 000.
-- Kintner'.s Views. Kintner has expressed his desire for with-
drawals in a "steady and orderly manner": he has said that he opposes
sudden unilateral withdrawals taken without previous consultation. He
thinks the Thai want us to withdraw but believes that a level of 32, 000
by the end of June could cope with expected pressures from the Thai
election campaign which will be in full swing by early summer. During
the next fiscal year, Kintner thinks we should be down to about 25, 000
by next December and down to below 20, 000 by June 30, 1975.
-~ The Thai Prime Minister told Mr. Rush two weeks ago that his
caretaker government could not make final decisions or engage in
definitive consultations on our troop disposition. That, would have to be
done by the next government.
-- Our view is that we can and should reduce our forces (starting
in late May) by something like the magnitude that Schlesinger proposes,
but that we should.stretch out the withdrawals over a six month period
because:
SECRET GDS
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-- We must discuss with the new Thai government to be elected
late this summer or early fall the question of re-entry rights for
some of our B-52's and tactical air squadrons in the event of need
in Indochina.
-- We should give the new governs ent some of the credit for
the withdrawals.
-- We should avoid a sudden, massive reduction that could
raise questions as to our basic intentions and could cause serious
economic dislocations.
As regards withdrawals over the longer-term, we believe Defense and
State should address our long term military presence in Thailand.
We are preparing a NSDM on.this entire question for 'your and the
President's consideration.
Jordan
General Bin Shaker is here this week. You may want to reinforce with
Secretary Schlesinger that the President promised King Hussein that
every effort would be made to give Jordan the best possible value for
its military assistance dollar. The President wants not only a package
totalling $100 million ($70 million in grant and $30 million in credit)
but also an opportunity to review a package totalling $130 million.
Israel
If you have not had a chance to do so previously, you may wish to
explain to Secretary Schlesinger your thibking on holding up a final
decision on the mix of grant and credit in the $1. 5 billion package.
Suez Canal Clearance
An issue has arisen of how to pay for the US contributions to the
reopening of the Suez Canal. There are two projects: (1) clearing
mines and removing unexploded ordnance and (2) raising sunken
ships. The mine clearing will be performed by the US Navy, which has
estimated costs at about $10 million although not all would be spent.
this fiscal year. We have offered to help train Egyptians to remove
unexploded ordnance along the Canal. The removal of ships will be
done by, a civilian contractor and should cost approximately $7 million,
which Fahmi has asked us to pay for at $7 - $10 million. AID should
pay for the ship-raising; the issue is whether Defense or Security
Assistance should pay for the mine-clearing. ' There are arguments
both ways.
SECRET GDS
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SECRET GDS -3-
You will receive a separate memo on this. For purposes of this talk with
Schlesinger, it is suggested that you say the following:
-- Would Secretary Schlesinger please take a hard look at Defense
paying for the mine-clearing and unexploded ordnance operations?
If Schlesinger finds serious legal reasons for not doing so,
could he pare the Navy's costs to an absolute minimum? (The estimate
is $10 million, but most people feel that could be cut at least in half if
the normal overhead and administrative costs were not charged. )
SECRET GDS
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/06/12 : LOC-HAK-536-15-4-6