STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-511-6-13-3
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: July 9, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Obiection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/04: LOC-HAK-511-6-13-3
WASHINGTON
July 9i 1970
National Security Decision Memorandum 69
.TO: The Members of the National Security Council
The Attorney General
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
After considering the report of the Delegation on the talks to date and
the recommendations of the Verification Panel, I have made the
following decisions with respect to the U. S. position in the. Strategic
.Arms Limitation Talks:
1. It apparently being impossible to reach agreement along
the lines of either of the two approaches I authorized in NSDM-51, the
United States will attempt to reach an initial agreement concentrating
on imposing numerical limits on the most important strategic weapons
systems, with the collateral constraints necessary to make such limits
adequately verifiable.
2. - The U. S. proposal for such an agreement will have the
following main elements:
. A -- The aggregate total of ICBM launchers, sea-based
ballistic missile launchers and strategic 'heavy bombers would be
ry limited to an agreed number. We would initially propose 1900 as this
number.
B -- Within this aggregate total, launchers deployed after
1965 with a volume greater than 70 cubic meters would be limited to 250.
(A separate limitation of this nature is absolutely essential.)
C Within the aggregate total, ICBM and sea-based ballistic
missile launchers would be limited to an agreed number. We would
initially propose 1710 as this number.
TOP SECRET i ISM
MORI/CDF
C00245744
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/04: LOC-HAK-511-6-13-3
 E `.p. To enhance confidence in verification by national
means, corollary constraints would be imposed on offensive systems,
including a ban on relocation of existing ICBM silos or their modifica-
tion in externally observable ways and a ban on construction of new
H There would be no limitation on substitution of new
strategic heavy bomber types nor would there be other qualitative
limitations on such bombers or their armaments.
as` United States positions, could be" agreed for limitation on deployment
of anti-ballistic missile systems:
Either of two alternative provisions, of equal status
"NCA" level. Deployment of ABMs would be
limited to a. system appropriate for defense of the Nation Command
Authority on each side. (Moscow and Washington). One hundred fixed
ABM launchers and one hundred deployed ABM interceptors would be
7--p.e'rinitted each side together with associated radars. The Soviet Union
. i:.!. would retain its present Try Add and Dog House type radars and ABM
launchers operational and under construction, and could add up to 36
additional launchers with associated Try Add radars around Moscow to
TOP SECRET/NODIS
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/04: LOC-HAK-511-6-13-3
1W .
D Within these numerical limits sea-based ballistic
missile launchers, 'land-based ICBM launchers, and strategic
heavy bombers could be substituted for, each other on a one-for-one
basis.
silos for IR/MRBMs.
F -- In addition we would initially propose a ban on land-
mobile ICBMs and on other land-mobile ballistic missiles and
launchers not externally distinguishable from them and a ban on all
new ICBM silos (after a transition period for reaching agreed levels).
(In the, event the Soviets are unwilling to accept a ban on both land-
.mobile.ICBMs and new ICBM silo construction, one or the other must
be banned to avoid creation of substantial verification uncertainties. )
47 r G -- The substance of the definitions, proced'dres, and
other more detailed corollary constraints and additional limitations
,c: Vin connection with limits on offensive forces, as set out for Option D
r,v.,_in the April 9, 1970 Memorandum on "SALT Options" attached to
NSDM 51 would apply, in so far as they, are consistent with these
elements.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/04: LOC-HAK-511-6-13-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/04: LOC-HAK-511-6-13-3
w
TOP SECRET/NODIS
serve a total of no more than 100 interceptors. The United States
would be allowed to deploy a roughly equivalent system, comprising
up to 6 PAR faces at no more than two sites, 4 MSR faces at no more
than two sites, and 100 ADM launchers and interceptors. On each?
side, deployment of ABM acquisition and detection radars (PAR-and
Dog House-type) would be limited to an area within 200 kilometers of
the center of the capital city, and deployment of ABM launchers,
interceptors and engagement radars (Try Acid and MSR-type) would
be limited to an area within 100 kilometers of the center of the
capital city.
"Zero" level. Deployment of ABM launchers
and -iiterceiptors 'and radars would be prohibited. Existing ABM
launchers and associated radars would be dismantled.
J -- Under either of these alternative ABM levels
limitations would be placed on radars suitable for an ABM role.
Soviet Hen Hoti.se-type radars configured for tracking of ballistic
missiles" would'be limited to those currently operational or under
construction.. We' -would inform the Soviets that we regard the
continued existence of these radars as tolerable partly in view of
their =pxe'sent.v~~lnerability, and that we would consider increased
SAM defense of such radars as inconsistent with an agreement. The
U. S. would have the. right to build additional early warning radars to
pxovide equivalent capability to that provided by the Soviet Hen Houses.
K -- The provisions of Option D of the MLmorandum on
"SALT Options" with respect to consultation on future radar needs,
upgrading of -S,A.Ms to give them ABM capability, ABM R&D,procedures
for required- destruction, mobile, ABMs and definitions would apply.
3. In such an agreement, there would be no limitations on
forward-based aircraft, bombers of less than intercontinental range,
submarine--launched cruise missiles, or intermediate or medium
range. ballistic missiles, except for-those limits on Di. and MRBMs
which are necessary to insure adequate verification of the limits
imposed=on 'ICBMs. -The Delegation is to take the position that any form
of "comiiensation" for excluding forward based aircraft in the form of
permitting the Soviets additional missiles of intercontinental range,
TOP SECRET/NODIS
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/04: LOC-HAK-511-6-13-3
 II `
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/04: LOC-HAK-511-6-13-3
TOP SECRET/WW.'
sea-based ballistic missiles or strategic heavy bombers is wholly
and absolutely tuaacceptable to the United States. .lf the Soviets
raise the question of an exchange of statements or assurances
with respect to systems excluded from an initial agreement, the
Delegation is to seek further instructions.
Option D as set forth in the Memorandum on "SALT Options" should
apply to the new position as ..well;" except where inconsistent with
the elements outlined in paragraphs (2) and (3). However, they
shotild be revised wherever "appropriate to increase precision,.
specificity and clarity. This detailed statement is to be prepared
on an urgent basis and is to be available for my consideration by
7 days after the date: of issuance of this Memorandum.
Appropriate consultations with the NATO allies on the
ne*zposition should be carried out as soon as possible.
6;w Pending receipt of the detailed statement of the new
position; the Delegation is auth"oiized'to present the main elements,
as 'autlizied in paragraphs. (2) -and- (3),: to the Soviets. After
consultation with Washington, the Delegation may, in making such
presentation, use a formal statement or less formal means, and
may present all the elements at once or present them in stages,
as 'it -deems most advantageous from the negotiating point of vi.: .'.
4. The Verification Panel is to prepare a statement of the
detailed provisions of a position embodying the elements outlined
in paragraph (2) and (3). In- general, the substance of the provisions
on-definitions, procedures, corollary constraints, space and other
? launchers, and verification, consultation, and duration, etc. of
In making any such presentation, however, and particularly in
...any -presentation of the elements in-stages, the Delegation must
emphasize that the acceptability to the United States of each individual
provision is contingent on agreement .on the other elements of the new
position, including particularly corollary verification provisions and
sub-limitations within the overall aggregate.
TdP. SECRET %NODIS
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/04: LOC-HAK-511-6-13-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/04: LOC-HAK-511-6-13-3
TOP SECRET/NODIS
7. ' The Delegation is to make it. clear. that the United
States continues to support a comprehensive agreement, along
the lines of either of the approaches already outlined and that
we will seek to have an initial agreement followed by further
agreements, including if possible controls on multiple independently
?targetted re-entry vehicles, major mutual reductions in the principal
forms of strategic weapons, and limits on IRBMs, MRl3Ms and sub-
marine-launched cruise missiles.
cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
.The Senior Members, U. S. Delegation to the
Strategic Ari-ns Limitation Talks
TOP SECRET/NODIS
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/04: LOC-HAK-511-6-13-3