AIR ACTIVITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 30, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
THE WHITE ~ HOUSE
~s~~~~~~r~~~~u~
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KIS5INGER.
FROM; Laurence E. Lynn,
SUBJECT: Air Activity in Southeast Asia
1].28 7
1p976
ACTION
June 3 p, 19 70
OSD, DIA, USAF,
JCS, NSS, reviews
completed.
Dave Packard has written the President (Tab B) arguing that the
effectiveness of air operations in Southeast Asia is limited and
substantial reductions should be carried aut during FY 71 as now
planned. Similar va.ews were sent to you recently by Secretary
Laird (Tab C).
Enclosed at Tab A is a summary of Packard's views on air activity
fox the President.
Air Activity in Southeast ,Asia
The principal OSD contention is that air activity is quite ineffective
in many Tales and can be reduced in scope without significant effect.
Zn particular, Laird disti_zguished between "high priority" and "low
priority" air missions in the following manner:
-- In Northern Laos: 25% of U. S. air strikes are against enemy
troops and fortifications; 75% are strikes against enemy LOCs and
supply systems supporting those troops.
-- Iri Southern Laos; 25?Jo of our sorties attack trucks and
infiltrators; the rest are used against enemy LOCs and storage
areas.
-- Tn South Vietnam.; 35% of the Allied air effort supports, ground
forces in contact with the enemy or hits targets on which we have
fresh intelligence; the renaixxdex are largely-preplanned strikes
against suspected enemy locatioxzs ox LOCs.
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SECRET /SENSITIVE
Defining close suppaxt of .Allied farces .and attacks against enemy
trucks as "high. priority," Laird {and presumably l~ackard) concludes
that aver 60% of our total aix effort is devoted to "low priority"
missions. In assessing the effect of reductions in these "low priority"
missions, Laird points to the fallowing consideratianst
-- We have never been able to xeduce logistics flows to the paint.
that enemy activity levels in South Vietnam, were curtailed to any
significant extent.
-- We are able to provide adequate support for Allied forces in
combat using only a paxtian of the tactical air sorties we axe now
flying in South Vietnam.
Therefore, the Laird/Packard view is that reductions in our air
activity related to interdiction in. South Laas or nan~suppart xxlissions
in South Vietnam and North Laos will "not seriously affect our combat
operations or increase the risks to our troops or thane of our allies, r-
I definitely agree with the general view that air activity rates can be
reduced without risk to our objectives in Indochina. We engage in a
large amount of ineffective and highly inefficient air activities in
Southeast Asia. (See my earlier m.errxo to you at Tab D.) However,
I find many. problems in accepting the logic that leads Laird and
Packard to their conclusions. My principal prablenzs are:
-- We da nvt have a conceptual basis fox assigning priorities to
various tactical air missions. Laird/Packard da not offer evidence
as to why interdiction bombing has a law priority. Are they arguing
that such missions should be reduced to zero? If we accept their
general arguments, what sortie levels are we "approving? "
-- We do not really have an analytical handle on the importance
of air support for ground force activity and how many sorties. of what
kinds are needed for this znissian in the future.
-- We are not given a clear account of the apposing viewpoints in
U. S. government on air operations. While noting that the 3CS actually
want a sortie level higher than at pxesent, Packard makes no attempt
to pxesent and explain their views and indicate why he disagrees., 'The
/~,~'~ .President is entitled to such an explanation.
1 ~. ~
~ ~
-
_
SE GRET /SENSITNE
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SECRET /SENSITIVE
For these xeasans, I believe we should caution the President that
we da nat yet have all the amswexs on air operations effectiveness
and, until, we da,~ we should avoid acting precipitously as a xesult
of budgetary pressuxes. t have prepared a summary of Packard'.s
views for the President along these .lines.
TtECOMMENDATION
That you faxward to the President Dave Paclc.axd's views ('l'ab Aj
an air activity levels in Southeast Asia.
Enclosure s
SECRET /5ENSITIV E
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 e `- ` V ' ?yVi~ilwy
r 4 ~ ~.
THE SECRE7A~RY OF ?EFENSE
WASHINGTON, d. G. 20301
5 JUN 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
5UBJECT: Tactical. Air Operations in Southeast Asia
As we discussed at breakfast Thursday morning, we need to evaluate
carefully our tactical air Operations in Southeast Asia.
'The highest priority for these operations is close air support for
allied troops to South Vietnam. As you knew, we have much more air cap-
abili'ty in South Vietnam than is required for this mission. Most of the
tactical air forces based in Thailand and on Navy carriers are involved
in the interdiction of enemy supply movements from North Vietnam into
Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam, Despite the intensity of this inter-
diction bombing, we have apparently not been able to reduce logistics
flows to the point that enemy activity levels in 5auth Vietnam are signi-
ficantly curtailed. It may be presumed we have increased the casts in-
volved to the North Vietnamese. The extent to which the incidence of
this burden has been transferred to the North Vietnamese suppliers is
unknown. Again, a logical assumption is that the burden has been mainly
transferred to those suppliers. 1=or these reasons, I believe the re-
ductions in tactical air operations in Southeast Asia approved by the
President will not seriously affect our combat operations or increase
the risks to our troops ar those of our allies.
These beliefs are supported by the enclosed study of tactical aircraft
operations in Southeast Asia developed by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis). The study examines deployments,
missions, levels of operations, and relative casts and assesses the effect
of planned sortie reductions on essential missions. As you would suppose,
it is virtually impossible to derive a consensus on the impact of tactical
air operations, I am providing this study, not because it represents the
last ward, but because it provides a viewpoint not commonly provided.
The most significant finding of the study is that, of the total sorties
now being flown, a relatively small percentage perform ape rations considered
to be of a priority nature. The analysis assumes that?the key missions
executed by tactical aircraft are close air support. in South Vietnam and
Northern Laos and attacks on moving vehicles to the Laotian Panhandle..
About 60r of the total effort is devoted to lower priority missions. Other
relevant findings are:
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-- Only #~ of the fatal air effort in Southeast Asia
is directed to the support of allied troops in con-
tact with the enemy in South Vietnam.
-- The Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) now delivers aver S0~
of air support for South Vietnamese troaps, compared to
less than 25~ in early 19b9. -
-~ By the end of FY 72, the planned expansion of the
VNAF will increase its total capability about 70~
over the present level. Therefore, the assumption
of greater responsibility by the South Vietnamese
for tactical air operations should continue, contribut-
ing significantly to the Vietnamization of the war.
-- Only 25~ of U.S. air strikes in Northern Lays are against
enemy troaps and fortifications; 75% are strikes against
roads and supply targets, and the results are limited.
-- Of the total supplies necessary to meet the enemy's
requirements In the South, about 70~ come from within
5auth Vietnam itself.. Of the other 30?6, only about
half are moved from North Vietnam through Laos. Despite
intensive interdiction bombing, the enemy still has enough
supplies to meet current or even increased needs.
-- in Southern Laas, by devoting greater emphasis to truck
strikes and cutting back on low pay-off sorties, ap-
proximately the same destruction rate in Laos could be
continued with fewer total sorties.
-- The steady depletion of North Vietnam's manpower re-
serves in battle appears to .be the primary constraint
on enemy activity levels in South Vietnam, rather than
air attacks along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos.
-- During the last twelve months, allied tactical aircraft
operations in Southeast Asia cost $3.5 billion, which
represents 20-25~ of the estimated FY 70 .incremental
cast of the war. The reductions in air operations for
FY 71, approved by the President last December, would
reduce the cost by about $0.9 billion.
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While it is clear that tactical air operations must continue at a
level which would assure the can.tinuance of essential missions, the 25$
reduction in sortie rates, approved by the President for ,FY 71, will still
leave farces fully adequate to meet priority air support needs.. This
planned decrease would eliminate or substantially reduce sorties of lower
priority which do nat contribute significantly to the basic obJectives of
our air operations.
believe that the study gives a reaiistic perspective on what we can
and cannot accomplish with tactical air operations in Southeast Asia. 1
would appreciate any comments you might have on this subject.
Enciasure
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SOUTHEAST ASIA TACTICAL AIRCRAFT OPERATTOTdS
.Introduction
.A. Purpose
1. To show total allied tactical aircraft deployments, levels
of operation, and their annual costs in Southeast Asia (SEA).
2. To show .the employment of aLli.ed tactical aircraft in differ-
ent theaters .and far different missions -w particularly support of
allied troops in South Vietnam -- and to examine the effects of air
interdiction on the enemy supply system in Southeast Asia.
- 3. To identify planned F`Y 7l reductions in the level af_U.S.
tactical air ,operations and-their effect on essential missions.
B. Summary Findir_gs:
1. Close Suptiort in South Vietr_am (SVN - Only a very small per-
centage (about Z+~o of ,the total air effort in Southeast As~.a is xn support
of allied troops in contact with enemy?units in South Vietnam. Mast of
the remainir.~ sorties attack known or suspected enemy locations, roads,
and supply storage axeas. ~ _
2. South Vietnamese A.i-r Supuort - Of the total allied air effort
-
are reported as.
in South Vie nom, about one-zouxth of the attack sorties
beir~ flown for the Republic of. Vietnam A.r.?~.ed Forces (RVi~4F) ua?zi.ts. Tn
Line with our Vietnamization objectives, the Vietnamese Air Force (ViL~F)
has increased the percentage of these missions it flies from ~j of total
in early lg6g to over 5~jo currently. A planned 70 o increase s.n VDIAF sortie
capability in FY 72 will continue RVIVA.F's trend toward complete indepen-
dence from US air support.
? 3. Interdiction in Southern Laos -Air operations aver the
Laotian Panhandle strike at a flow of enemy supplies from Plaxth Vietnam
equal to only 2.bout 15 f of the total energy supply requirements in Scuth
Vietnam. Even with the intensive bombing, the enemy still. moves supplies
adequate to continue, or substantially increase, his current operational
levels .
? i
4. Northern Laos -About 75?f of U.S. air support far the Royal.
Lao forces in Porthern Laos. strikes logistic targets ~ yet the flow of
supplies into Northern Laos has consistently exceeded by a significant
margin the requirements of Communist force's there. Plorth Vietnamese
manpower requirements and casualties in this area are not ~. significant
drain on the total manpower pool.
5 ? Communist Bloc Su~nort to Ptorth Va.etnam (P1VtI) -Air opera-.
lions impose na meaningful materiel eacts an idorth Vietnam since its
allies pay for most of the re:o~.~rces. north Vietns,m's forein aid
during the past three years has been two to three times as large as
the casts of keeping her forces in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos
supplied and replacing the damage caused by the bombing of PIorth Vietnam.
w w ~. R~r ~"',T'
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OASD~ A
June ~, 1970
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6. Reductions in Sorties - Current FY 71 plans provide enough
tact3.ca1 aircraft sorties (L1S, VT:P.F, and RCAF) to carry out those missions
we consider to be must essential -- direct support of gxound operations
xn South Vietnam and Northern Laos and attacks an moving trucks through
the Laotian Panhandle. Substantial additional sorties (707fo excess) wiJ.1.
be`available to meet identified lesser prioxity requirements.
LI. Allied Air Resources ,
A. Deployed Tactical: Aix Farces: See Table 1 for US, Vietnamese Air
Force (VITAE ' and Royal Laotian Aix Force (RCAF) tactical aircraft by
base locations.
- Force dxawdawns already executed, or now planned through June 1970,
will reduce US forces based in SVN and naval carriers offshore by one-
third fxom peak 196$-1909 levels. ?
. - VNAF and RCAF capability has increased about one third since?1967.
- Overall the numbex of allied tactical aircraft tieplayed in SEA.?has
declined about 13 o from 1968-1969 Peak -levels . ' -
-Offsetting these reduced force levels, allied tactical air forces
3n Southeast Asia have been steadily improved by the addition of
slow-moving fightex/attack aircraft (A-ls, A-37s, B-57s) and aircraft ?
gunships, both of t~rhich are much more effective providing close ground
support and attacking moving vehicles than high-performance jets.
Improved ordnance, delivery techniques, and intelligence collection
and targeting have fuxther improved air capability.
B. Tactical Air Sortie ~I,evels~: See Table ? 2 for iJS, VNAF, RCAF
attack sorties by theater. - `~? - .
- SEA tactical air attack sortie levels are cuxrently about 20%
below peak FY 68-69 levels. Planned FY 71 reduced levels will be 25~
below current ones.
-Many of the past sortie reductions have been in South Vietnam sortie
levels; this has largely been due to reduced levels of combat in SVN.
- Fallowing the November 196$ bombing halt over NVN, the US air effort
--shifted first to Southern Laos and then in raid-1869 to Northern Laos.'
' O. B-52 Sorties: See Table 3 far B-52 sorties flown in Southeast
?As~,a since FY 7. ~
? ~ ~.
- Overall B-52 sortie levels tripled from FY 67 to FY 69 (fxom 600
saxties monthly to 1200 to 1800) in xesponse first to"the Beige of Khe
Sarah and then the February 1968 Tet offensive.
1 See Table ?4, which shows the. relative effectiveness'of'gunships
' and other aircraft against moving trucks and Table 22, which shows
the change in the m>.x of allied aircraft.
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.. Commensurate with overall reductions in combat a etivity in South,
.V3:etnam, FY 70 .sortie levels axe about 1,t+00 sorties monthly, 2c~~ lower
than in FY 69. FY 71 planning calls for an additional 300 decrease to
1,000 sixties per month.
In k'Y 71 deployed B-52 aircraft ~rlll retain the capability to surge
far 30 days..to at least 1,100 sorties per month.
- The B-52 strike emphasis shifted to Southern Laos from South
Vietnam in FY 69 and FY 70 to support interdiction efforts against the
Ha Chi Minh Trail.
D. Air Suprport in Cambodia: See Table 4 showing xecent US and Vi`IAF
sir strikes in Cambodia and the required diversions of sorties .from SVN.
and Laos .
.- Allied air operations in Cambodia now constitute about one-fourth
of total SEA. tactical air and B-52 .sorties. This has necessitated sub-
stantial. reallocations of air effort fxom SVN and Laos.
- The tactical air sorties (6,600 per month) were reallocated almost
equally from SVid and Laas, thereby lowering both the SVN and Laos sortie
levels by , 20-25?f .
- B-~52 saxties were re~.llocated in large part from Laos.
- It is doubtful that the diversions from Laos have had much impact
s3,nce the monsoon xains have begun which hamper air operations. .
allied air operations in SEA, bxoken dawn by theater.
E. Cost Xinpact: See Table 5 which shows FY 70 estimated costs -of
. - The estimated incremental costs of allied air operations in South-
east Asia currently are about $3.5 biLl.ion per year.
- The casts of air operations in South Vietnam represent $1.9 billion
(550) of the total. '
U.S. air apexations account for $3.2 billion (91?fo) of the total.
B-52 operations account for $700 million (200) of the total.
' A. 'Introduction: This section discusses relevant objectives for
air operations, identifies sorties devoted to d~fferent:tatxgets ana
missions, and finally, where data permits, assesses the effectiveness of
the fulfillment of the mission objectives.
B. Close Air Subport in SViW
1. Objective: To supplement the fire support xequirements of
the ~,raund conuuandcr vrith adequate capability made available to the ground
commander on a timely basis. ,
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2. Ana sis:
a. Uses of Sorties in SVC~: See Table 6 for a breakout of
SVN air strikes sho~rinG su~pox?t i'or troops in contact, immediate sorties
delivered, and prepTanned strikes. ?
- Less than 100 of all air strikes in SVN (~F?jo of total
in SEA} axe flown to support allied forces in contact with enemy forces.
- Another 25?fo of SVN sorties fulfill a request from a
gxaund commander ar forraard air controller for an "immediate" strike on
a target that is time sensitive (e.g., enemy troops an occupied base
camp, an anti-aircraft site, etc.) ,
-? Mast of the re.~na.ining sorties are? preplanned 24 hours
or mare in advance to strike known,ar suspected enemy locations.
b. RVI~sAF Air Support: See Table 7 which ider_tifies air
strikes far RVP:AF, shaoring ma..;nitude of sorties flo~m, numbex of sorties
supporting RVPIAF troops in contact with enemy forces, and the percent of
s apport flown by V11AF . .
- RVNAF receives about ~+-.5,000 tac air sorties per month,
about 2Uof of total allied SEA capability. ?
- Consistent with our Vietnamizatian efforts, an increasing
percentage of RVTIAF aix support -- r_ow 52?jo, as compared to 2~F?jo in early
196g -- is flown by the VTdA.F. As vIdAF attack sortie capability increases
in FY72 by almost 70;'o above current levels, VMAF should continue to provide
an increasing proportion of total RVI~:AF support. {See Table $ which de-
tails bath the approved e~cpansion ?in VNAF tactical capability through FY72
and an illustrative plan for further expansion in FX73.)
- Overall RVNAF air support levels have declined since
early 1969, consistent Frith the reduced total SVN sortie effort; however,
the essential air support?sorties for RVrdAF troops in contact have in~
? 4
c. Comparison of R~,~PTAF and US Air Support: See Table 9, which
relates SVN air strikes for RVL~AF?and US forces to numbers of battalions
and numbers of friendl}r casualties.
. .
creased.
? - RVNAF units in South Vietnam apparently receive less
air support than U.S. units -- only about 60?f as many sorties per :,attalion
and 25`~o as many per man killed in action. '~
? - For both RVNAF and US units, support for troops in
contact requires only about l~o of total sorties received. .
- RVNAF's share of SVPt'air support (US ar_d RVNAF) has
? risen from 33?J in early 1869 to ~+3?fo in early 1970.
,p ~....
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 ' C. Interdicting; Supply Movements: Results. of these missions, which
? .occur ~.n all theatexs,sre illustrated by US aperatians in Southern Laos.
1. (?b~jectives
w To impose a ceiling on .enemy combat activity in South.
? Vietnam by reduciz~ the flow of supplies below amounts requixed to sup-
p ort high activity levels, the p~?imary concern being the enemy`s ability
to launch an offensive. of sufficient intensity to upset Vietnamization.
To impose a meaningful cost on the North Vietnamese in
terms of theix matexiel and human resources (to be meaningful, the costs
mint be at or neax maximum levels which the North Vietnamese are willing ?
to sustain). ._ ..? .
2. Analysts:
a. North Vietnamese ~,ogistics: See Table 10 for a flow
diagram of supply movements sho;aing all supply floz?rs into SVN and con-
sumption by VC~~NA forces these, consumption and destruction in transit
through Laos, etcr
.
The enemy receives about '~'0?fc, of his supplies for SV1~T
operations fxom souxces inside SV~i7; 10% ?from, Cambodia, and about 3;~o from
?across the DidZ. He xeceives ab~aut 15'~v from 1;Vid over his su~,ply routes
through Laos, the supply route aga~,nst which our primary air interdiction
effort is directed.
About one-third of all supplies shipped into Southern Taaos
transit the system into SVN. The rest axe destroyed by air strikes,
consumed an-transit, or stockpiled in Zeros. '`~-._.
-Seaborne imparts into P1VN axe aver 20 times greater than
estimated supply shipments from NVN into Northern and Southern Laos.
All variables on supply flows ase uncertain, and of these
the most uncertain axe probably amounts destroyed by air strikes.
b. Laotian Supply P~Iovements : See. Table ?.~. for a comparison
of supplies waved Pram IT~T3 via Laos a.nto SVil during last dry season to ~.
estimated VC~NVA supply requirements in SVN. {
? ~ - even 3.n fierce of the intensive aix interdiction effort, the
Cozarnunists successfully move large amoutits~ of supplies through Laas into
? SVN. ' . "..'..La
't ~.
During the last dry season
Eebruary 1 Q supply flo;?rs, for instance, We25X1
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- Assum3.ng the Communists suffer permanent ].ass of seaborne
.- shipments of arms and ammunition (up ~a 15 tons per day) into and through.
the Port of Sihanoukville (Cambodia), and assuming they can continue last
season's dry season shipment rate through Laas next dry season, they sri13.
meet their average daily supply requirements in SVid if they .can ship
25 tans of supplies through Southern Laos during the wet season. All
3.ntelligence indicates the enemy intends to do this. They will, however,
remain dependent on Cambodian rice sources.
c. Enemy Materiel Costs: See Table 12 far a car~parison of
the costs of replacing trucks, sup,~l~.es shipped into Laos,and selected
other war costs to NViV foreign aid. .
-T Foreign aid~to 1Torth Vietnam?has substantially exceeded the
costs of supplying Communist forces in Laos, South .Vietnam, and Cambodia
in the years 1907-1969.
- The costs of supplying Communist farces in Southeast Asia
declined by about one-half between '1967 and .1969 primarily because of
the bombing halt over North Vietnam.
- Military aid ?to Ptaxth Vietnam. declined even more sharply
than costs between 1967 and 1969
- A 25% increase in economic aid partially offset the sharp
decrease in military aid between ].967 and 1969, but total aid was lotrer
by nearly one-third.
- The estimated incrQmental cast to the U.S. of interdicting
Communist supplies in Northern and Southern Laos of about $1.~ billion
3.n 1969 was nearly ten times greater than the cast of all enemy supplies
shipped into Laos and the replacement value of trucks destroyed by air
strikes. ,
d. Targeting and Aircraft Effectiveness: See Table Z3 which
shows the relative emphasis of Southern La.as stra.kes against trucks, roads
and supply storage areas and the resulting effectiveness in destroying
supplies.
-During 1909-197Q dry season interdiction program, 7th Air
Force significantly shifted the target e:~phasis to movin vehicles,
3~ncreasing these stri~ses from 15;~af total in the 1908-199 dry season ~ ,
to 27?j'of total this dry season, while at the same time reducing strikes
against roads and supply storage areas:
- This shift: increased estimated total des?~ructian of enemy
supplies by about 20`/ over dry season 1968-].909; the shift increased
destruction per sortie about 60~o since 1g69-~.97o sortie 'levels were
reduced about 2~j?fo.
SECCt&T
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~~ ~w~s.~:~ ~ 7
- The increased supply destruction xesulted largely from
greater reported txuck destruction, which iri turn resulted from the
large increase in truck-ki1.l sorties and the addition of highly effec-?
five ~unsl?~ip aircraft (.~C-ll~s and AC-130s) to our interdiction force .
(See Table ~.~? which shows relative aircraft effectiveness against trucks
.and supply targets.), -
By continuing to emphasize truck targets with the most suit-
able truck-killing aircraft and reducing the numbers of sorties floiti-n ?
during the wet season (Jan-Sep) irhen visibility degrades effectiveness
(and enemy truck traffic normally is substantially reduced, we can
achieve about the current levels of destruction *+ri.th substantially
fewer sorties. (i?~:ule 19 illustxates an example pf such a prooxarx.
This one requires only about 4o` as many sorties as currently bei.rg used.)
d. Enemy Casualty Considerations : See Table 15 4~nich shows
the relationship bet5?reen combat levels in SViu, resultant enemy casualties,,.
and North Vietnamese manpo;?rer reserves.
~. -? Continuance of the high first half l~o$ combat levels
would result in about 3~O,OOO losses per year ($00,000 of tahich would
come Pram NVP7). These replacement rates in three years would reduce
available NViV manpa~~er reserves by almost one-haif'.
- Manpoc~er and casualty considerations rather than supply
availabilit3.es appear to impose the effective ceiling on North Vietna-
mese activity levels in SVTT. ~ - .
? D. Air Su~poxt for Royal Lao Operations. _ ~ ~`'
' 1. . Objectives i ?
? ~ Ta help limit the capability of the enemy to advance during
the dry season.
-. To xznpose meaningful costs on enemy efforts . -
2. Ana]tiysis: ;
i
a. Close Support Versus Interdiction: See Table l6 for
a breakout of US anc~ RLA~% sorties in Atorthern Laos showing strikes in
~? prov3.ding close support versus interdiction missions.
? ?
~~~~
- During the las'c year US aircraft' flew ari ?a~erage of about
two-thirds of the fatal 5,700 monthly attack sorties over Northern Laos;
RLAF T-2$s flew the rems,inder.
- About 7qf; of the US and 1Cr~n of the RIA~' sorties performed
interdiction missions slang the enemy suppJ.y routes from Pdorth Vietnam;
the others were directed mainly at enemy troops, fortifications, and
weapons positions.
~~~~9~4~
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r"~3e:~~ti+Ce~ N
b. N:easures of Effectiveness: See Table 17 which shawl a
caznparisan of Plarttx Vietnamese supply losses and KTA in Northern Laos,
comparative lasses in other theaters, and ~.vailable NVN resources.
- A]lied apexations in Northern Laos have little impact on
evailable Plarth'Vietnamese manpawer or .supply flows. Lasses axe small
relative to other theaters and to available replacement manpower and
supplies.
IV. Reduced Sartie Levels
A. Essential Strikes: Tn each theater only a small percentage of
the tactical air strikea hit targets considexed essential or. of proven
value .
-South Vietnam: less than l~~ o,.' all s tr~.kes support troops in
contact with the enemy (over 6ora of all strikes are pre-planned 2~ hours
in advance or longer to hit suspected or known enemy locations).
-Southern Laos: a small percentage of total strikes.(1,5-25~f .
depending on season hit moving vehicles which are the most lucrative
t&xgets (See Table 13). Of these strikes, a small number of gunships
accomplish most of the reported destruction (See Table 14).
? -Noxthern Laos; nearly 75~j of a71 US strikes hit supply-related
interdiction targets, i~ritrz limited effectiveness in denying the enemy his
supply requirements.
? .. .. _ ..
higher ones.
S. Conclusions Pertinent to Sortie Reductions; Substantial xeduc-
tSons in tactical aircraft sorties can be achieved with little adverse
impact on essential missions. ~~??.
- Preplanrzed strikes in~SVN?Can be xeduced with little degradation'
in quality of close air support. ~ ~ - '
- Ii~.Southern Laos, by shifting mare sorties to trucks, and
relying on aircraft that are effective in truck-killing, current rates
of destruction can be continued with fewer total sorties. Mast of the
reduction would be in high-speed ,jet aircraft sorties that are relatively
ineffective for this particular mission in Southern Laas. ~~~
Even with the intensive air interdiction effort in Sauthexn
Laos, traffic flow estimates shotir the enemy infa.ltrates, supplies adequate
for his cuxrent levels of operations in South Vietnam ar substantially
~. This xaises the question of what additional actions,,if any, the
enemy might initiate in South Vietnam ~,rere the US to cease bombing
in Laos. This~questian is more fully addxessed in an interagency
study currently being prepared by OSI7.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04_/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
- In Northern Laos, by reducing interdi.ctian strikes but con-
tinuing direct support missions, it would be possible. to continue to
maintain significant pressure on the PL~N'VA wa.th 50 u fewer sorties.
C. Priorit Sorties'; The following sorties are considered high
pr3.or~.ty: See Tables 18, 19, and 20 for detailed sortie levels.)
1. South Vietnam: Air strikes for allied troops in contact
with enemy forces and other strikes called for by the ground commander
ar forward air controllex on a~. inunediate basis (i.e., time-sensitive
targets).
`. 2. Southern Laos: Attacks against moving trucks emphasizing
slow-maving,.truck-.tilling aircraft and strikes against enemy air
defenses to protect the slow-mavz.ng aircraft (could also include
limited ntiunbers of strikes against identified lucrative supply storage
targets).
3. Northern Laos; Close air support for Royal Lao forces,
probably emphasizing strikes against ener.~y troops, but not excluding
other close support battlefield targets.
4. FY 71 Sortie Plans: Comparison of planned sortie levels for
FY 71 with priority sorties needs above shows that reduced FY 71 levels,.
althou;h lowex than current levels, are substantially in excess of "high
priority" requirements (See Table 21).
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
 ' No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
TABLE ].
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT ITS S4UTI-~kST ASIA
Possessed Aircraft
Dec 67 Dec 6$ Dec 69 Jun 7G
Projected
s------
svN
-
~ 363 ~
414""
36q~
332
Thailand
255
29~.
297
306
Tota].
~1S
705
~ '"
USMC (svrr)
139
lg2
i~8
log.
USN(Offshore)
16~
202
17.9
122
U.S . Total.
g24
1099
933
~~-
v1~AF(svrr}
~go
~+4 J
12o
ii~+
RLAF (Laos)
53
61
70
7d
Total Tactical
Aircraft ~
].067
120
1123
~'
1045~~`?
a Reduced VNAF force caused by A..1 aixcraft attrition which depleted
aircraft inventories. _ ~ ~ '
~SD~SA .. ,,
J'ut~te 4, 1870
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
. ~ .,~CLI~i~l,'
TABT~ 2
US~VNAF1RLAF ATTACK SORTIES 'BY TARGET_AREA
Monthly Average Rates
FY 67
FY 68
FY 69
FY 70 FY ?l J
(Jul-Mar) (Projected)
South Vietnam
1+,648
17,$77
17,385
12,x+64
9,788
North Vietnam.
9,065 '
7,955
4,196
10
Maas:
South
2,9$1
.3,698
8,489..:
7,890
x,0$7
North
1,099
1,372
2,475
5,732
4,305
Total
27,793
30,902
32,545
26,096
19,180
a Projected using FY 71 budget plans; allocated to target areas based on
FY 70 experience.
c
c~s0/sA
June 4, 1970 t
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
TABLE 3
8-52 0~'ERATTOPIS IPT SOUZ'HFIEAST ASIA.
Average Sorties Per hlonth)
F~7
.FY 68
FY Gg
FY 70
.
~
u1. 9-Mar 70)
FY 71
Projected
South Vietnam
483
$64 ~
~., 328
981
678
South Baas
143 ,
~ 187
424
465 ~.
322 ,
North Vietnam
(and Dh1Z)
~
~
47 .
Total
0
636
i, 2i4
~. ~ 799
~., 446
1 000
OASD~SA
June ~+, 1970
SECf~'f
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
 ]MF'A.CT OF C.A.t99BODIAN OPERATIONS
{US, .1T~IAF
Tactical Aircraft.Sorties
Percent
$?52 Sorties
Percentage of Total
Air Ordnance (OOO Tons)
Percent
Tactical Aircraft Sorties
Percent.
9, 7'33
847
63~
325
24~,
219
. 160.
1., 335
'1
. 47.5 25.2 27.8. x.00.5:
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
South Vietnam:
TABLE S
FY 70 INCRFa'~'~1~ITAL COSTS ~F ALLIED
wrnw..~rw ~.~wr~ -nwr r. ~rnnrrrrw hrn .r.~w
functions appropra:atians for support of the RLAF and VNA,c"".
SEC:2~T
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
U. S.
~J
.. Total
$~~~~~
"'~ ~a
~,~ ~ ss
Northern Laos:
u.S.
390
u
RLAF ~ ~
~ 40
a.
Total
0
12
Southern Laos -
1150
33
Total Cost s~
3, X480;
100
ojected from sortie rates during,: July 196g~March 1970.`
Includes tact3.cal fighter sorties (attack and non-attack),.
sorties flo~m by ..supporting a:ircraft,, ana. $-52 sorties. '
Excludes peacetime operating costs of aircraft a.aa the post-
Vietnam. force structure.
A~.r Force estimate of amounts included. in the FY 7? military
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 208q12/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
~~1.11i~
Table 6
-SOUTH TIIETPIAM~ - TYPES OF AIR STRIKE Mf.'SSTOr7S
Attack Percentage
Monthly Sorties of Total a~
Jul g ~ Niar 70 )
Support of Allied Traops z.n Cantact (TTC)
From Strip Alert Aircraf t
722
6
Frorn Preplanned Strikes
~ 328
3 .
From Armed Reconnaissance PQissions
21
-.
,Total
~~
}
Immediate Strikes (Other than TIC) ~
~.
KnaVm Enemy Locations ~
1,851
15
Suspected Remy Locations ~
778
6
Preparation of Allied Positions
203
2
Anti Aircraft Sites
222 '
2
Total
3 05
~5
Preplanned Strikes (?plot-Diverted)
KnoVm Ene~,y Locations
3,470
2$
Suspected Enemy Locations
3,886
32
Preparation of Allied Positions
708
5 '.
Anti Aircraft Sites
164
1
Total
~8 ~ 33$?
~'
Total Sorties
12,46+
1Q0
Calculated from an analysis of U.S. tactical aircraft sorties flosm
3n August 1868 SOURCE: USAF DASCLOG Computer File.
QA.SD~SA
June 4, 19j0
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
TAGTZCAL AxR SUPPORT F4R RVi`IAF
,? Attack Soxties Per Month
1g6g
z97o
Jan-Jun
Jul'-Dec
Jan-Apr
Air Strikes for RVNAF.
Txoaps in Contact
=6~5
~?~5~
~9p
Total RVrdAF Strikes
.5173
~+5a5
363a
of Total Strikes
2~~0
~?~
5~
Flown by VNAE'
?.
.
SFC~IeT
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
OASD~SA
June ~+, ? 1q'r0
 i14.~171l1~ ~:
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
PLANS ~'QR INCREASES IN V1KAF TACTIC:AI,
Aixcraft;
A~ i
37
~5
Total
Attack Sortie Capability
Dec 66 Dec 67
lo$ 70
~ r
20
~, go
(per month} 2;657 2,059. l;
a Phase II, VNAF T&r4 Plans; U.S. aircraft w~.11
beginning July 1971.
JCS Proposal inclu~ec7 as a recor.~mendation fay
c/ Sortie rates: A-1 3q/month, A-37 36~month,
TABLE $
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
 'J?AB~ 9
COMPAR1SOr1 OF RVPTAF AD1D U5 AlR SUPPORT LEVELS
Jan 9 -Feb 70
.
Support Far Troops
3n Contact with
Enemy
Total Air
support
Rec
e3ved
Total Attack Sorties Received Per Month
RVNAF ~ ~
us
. RVNAF as ~ of US
Total Attack Sorties Per Person Killed
_ 514 ..
?939..
55~
~
4,639
. $, x3o
57"~
~.n Aetion
_ _ ~_
~
RVNAF ~ _
Q ? ~. - -~ ~
3.0
tJS ~
~ `~ 1.3
11..3
RVNAF as ~ of US
~~~
25~
Total. Attack Sorties Per Battalion
R~vAF ~
5 ~
46
us
~ g
81
RVNAF as ?~o of Us
56~
57`~
For calculations assume .one ARVN battalion equates to 0.6 U~S battalions.
~~
~C~SD~SA
June ~, 19"j0
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
 SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
TABLE ZO
THE NORTH V~ETHA~ESE LOG~ST~CS SYSTE~>~
iEstima#es of Supply Housman#s in Sl7or# Tans Per Uay -Average Over a 12 Hors#h Cycley
? NORTH V~ETNAH
SOUTHERN LAOS
Seabamo 8,240
Imports
Land Imports N/A
From China
Cocbe
Captures
CAH80DEA
N~A =Not A~ailab].e
Internal Sources ~
~ 1r~
Destroyed by Air Strikes
SOUTH VIETNAM
Internal Sources Available far Stacfcpiles
\~,
Availoble For Stockpiles
NjA
NiA
Infernal Cambodian Sources
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
(ZASD~SA
June ~+, 1970
280 Consumed
by VCJNVA Forces
N/A Seaborne ~s
to Cambodia
SECRET
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04_/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
Table 11
INTERDICT20N - LAOT7Al`d SrJPPLY FLOS~JS COMPARED
TO SVN SUPPLY F~C~UTP,Er?~P1TS
Short Tons
Per Day
YC/NVA Supply Reauirements in SVN
Total Supply Requirements
External Supply Reauirements
Total From Laos and Cambodia
Total from Laos Assuming Carioadian Rice, but not
320
9Q
Cambodian Arms and Ammunition, Available cj (5
Total from Laos Assuming Cambodian Rice, Arms and
Amraunit5! on Available d,'
S0
Supply Flans From Southern Laas into South Vietnam
' Dr r~Seasan
November 1969
12
? December lg6g
~2
January 1970
130
February 1970
215 '~-?
March. 1970
1.~+g
April 1.970 ~
79
May xg7o (est.)
~ 4g
Wet Season Projection (Jun-Oct)
Full-Year Average
2S-5o
. 68--78
a 7th Air Farce estimates based on sensors placed along roads
leading into SVN from?Sduthern Laos.
Excludes 10 tons of rice per day which NVN ships across the DMZ.
' ~ Cambodian sources supply about 25 tons Hof rice per day ~o IT ..u.,1
ITT Corps . ~ ' ?,
In the past up to l~ tons per day of arms, ammunition, and other
'equipment were moved to TII and TV Corps. The closure of Sihanouk-
ville will mast likely curtaa.l these shipments.
. C~1.SD~SA
June ~+, 1970
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
. !- S~~ S~~' ~' .
Table 12
a~ .
Costs of Supplies Shi~abed To:
Northern Taos
Southern Laos
Total. '
Calendar Year
~- " 7 19 19 9
53 61 5$
45 63 60
9$ 12~+ 11$
Costs of Trucks Destroyed: .'
Northern Taos
1
~ 1
3
Southern Laos
~ 6
~+~+
38
Total
7
~5
~7.
Casts of Supplies, Eau-? p;,.ent, and
c
'
Industry Destroyed in i~iorth.vietnam -
139
$5
d
Cysts of Air De~'ense in Piortn. Vietnam
23S
~~
$3
_.
Tatal. casts - ~
479
376
242,
,a'
Total Fareion Aid To North Vietnam: =~
Economic
??
380
4$0
~--,.,
470
Military ~
650
395?
220
Tatal
1.,030
$75
Total Casts as ?fo of Foreign Aid
4~
430
35?0
Tatal Costs as ~ of Military Aid
74%
95?0
110%
a Computed frpm CIA estimates of supply shipments and estimated costs
.per ton of supplies of $1,300 far Northern Laos and $1,100 fir ,
Southern Laos.
Computed from D7A estimates of truck attrition and estimates cost
'of $6,000 per vehicle.
QASD~SA estimates, based on several earlier studies.
J CIA~DxA estimates.
INTERDICTION -SELECTED EPIEP~TY' COSTS
Millions
~+~~;; `~' (SASD~SA
. r~a.~d ~ 1 June ~+~ 1970
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
TABLE ~''~3
~~
U,S. INTERDICTIOi~I EFFORTS IN SOUTHERPI LAOS
Dry Season
Nov 6 -A ri1
Tar ets Struck (average
aaonthly sorties)
Moving Vehicles x.,$26
Storage Areas and Truck
Parks 4,261..
Roads ~ 4,747
Anti-Aircraft 730
Other 609
Total Sorties 12,173
Estimated Supply Destruc-
Tons Destroyed (000's) 26.$
,Tons per Sortie 0.37
a LOC's, Traffic Control Points.
USAF estimate
Wet Season
.Dry Season
9
May 9-Oct ~9
?iVov 69-Arr 70
751
2,471
3,377
2,562
2,101.
2,10
300
1,oa6
976 ~
~., oog
7,505
9,153
8.4
_. 31.9
0.1~
-~_. 0.58
OASD~SA
June 4, 1870
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
TABLE ~-~
INTERDICTION - RELATIVE AIRCRAFT EFFECTIVENESS
Reported Bomb Estimated Supplies
. Damage Per Sortie Destroyed Fer Sortie
Results From Truck Trucks Destroyed/
Damaged
High-Peri'armance
Jets ~ ~ 0.27
Tons
0.67.
Slow-Moving Attack
Aircraft a~ ~ 0.37 0.92
Aircraft Gunships ~? ~ 2 ;40 - , 5 ~ 9~
Total From Truck
Attacks ~ 0.35 ~ ~ 0.86
Results Fxam Storage Area/ Secondary Fires/
-Truck Park Attacks Explosions Tons
? All Aircraft ~ 1.64 0.67.
a Results during randomly selected. time periods of 1969-70 dry season.
F-4, F-140, F-105, A-~+, A-6, A--7.
A-1. ~- _.
~~ AC-119, AC-123, AC-130.
e~ Calculated first by assuming ~5?fo of trucks are loaded and carry 3.$ tons
of supplies and second '~y adding 0.187 tons per truck-related secondary
Fire or explosion. (under the assumption that 5'0?,0 of truck-related second-
aries result from roadside caches not cargo in trucks).
Results achieved by all tactical aircraft from November 1969 to April
1970. Calculated by assuming each secondary fire or explosion associated
with an air strike against a storage area target means 0.375 tons of
supply destruction. '
'November 1969-April 1870. -~ .-
SFC:i~T
QA.SD~SA .
? ?June ~+, 1970
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 _ ~ A:Q No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
INTERDICTION - NV1V MAPTPOTSIER~ RESERVES VERSUS SVN COMSAT LEVELS
~.
?
NVN
Annual
Replacement
Annual
Additions
SVN
Manpawer~
Required
to NVN ~
Projected
Cot~bat ~
Reserves.
for SVN' ?/ Manpower
.NVN Manpower Reserves
Rate
Dec 69)
Lasses) =~
Pool
_~
-Dec 170
Dec 1971
Dec .i97=
Peak Rate
(Jan-May 68)
Average Rate
1,500,000
300,000
~ ~
74,000
1,274,000
'
1,048,000
822,0
(Jul 68-
~
~
.
sun 69)
Lull Rate
1,5ao,ooo
172,000 ~
74,aov
1,402,000
1,304,000
1,2o6,oc
(Jul-oGt 69j
l,sao,ooo
x.40,000
74,000 .
1,434,000
1,368,000
1,3o2,cr
a Activity indicators for these periods are not perfectly symmetric. The
' average rate is closer to the lull rate than the peak rate.
U.S. Census Bureau Study. Includes 560,000 in the Armed Forces.
Assumes first, that VC continue present recruiting rates in SVN and that
all VC~NVA. lasses above 5,000 per month are replaced by NVN and second,
that losses from all causes (KTA, died of wounds, captured, deserted,
etc.) continue constant through the forecast period at rates actually
experienced during each given sample time period.
137,000 physically Fit males wi11 reach the age of 15 years; but 63,000
males, not in the North Vietnam military, leave the manpower pvpl by
xeaching the age of 35 years or through natural death as civilians. Males
in the military of all ages are assumed to remain in the manpower pool
indefinitely.
of An additiona1.10,000-15,000 North Vietnamese casualties per year occur in
Laos . .. . , ~
. OASD~SA
June ~, ].9'70
S~~~~T
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
Table ~-~
AIR SUPPORT FOR ROYAL' LAO FORCES
?
Monthly
.Average
Attack
Sorties
Fercent
US Tactical Aircraft
Strikes Against Enemy Troops, Fortifications,
and Weapons Positions
97~?
17
Interdiction
2,770 .
~+~
Anti-Aircraft?Suppression ~
156
3
Total
3,902
~
+ RIAF
Strikes Against Enemy Troops, Fortifications,
and Weapons Positions
].,647
2g
Interdiction
183
3
Total ~
x.;$30
32
Total
5,732
100
a Average for the Ju],y Zg6g~Maxch 1g70 period. Breakdown by
mission estimated from data in the USAF L3cN card file for
May~December lg6g.
QASD f SA
June 4, lq'j0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
 .?
. ' .~
3'
' No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
IMPACT 0~' ALLIED OPE'RATIOT:S xRT NORTHERN LAOS
Enemy Personnel Lasses
.Total NVA casualties in Plorth Laos
As percentage of P3VA casualties in SVit'
Number Years of Available manpower Reserves
3n NVN at Above Loss Rate.
Monthly Avera..~*e Rates
10-12,000
$~10 fo
14 years
Enemy Su~~ly Losses
Total supply lasses in North Laos (tons)
~4'~0-~QQ
? As percentage of supply lasses in South Laos
~ 20-~F0'~o
As percentage of supply inputs to Ptorth Laos
12-250
Time period - an average of recent supply and. loss experience during
~.ast 12 ?months .
?
SECfcffT
QP,SD~SA
Jt~ae ~, lq"(0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
?Q? srw~aaa^ss ^
a See Table for further detail.
~~
~ QASD f SA .
,~ ' June ~+, 197'(7
~~~~~~
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
TABU ~9
? fi~'Gi. Yt~xC:;T'TY ~:IF STR2i~S ?11 SOUl+'~?~iJ La OS
i='?St FX17Gri.G z.'Cr:
I?T',y ~?.E'c'3.50n ~'~[t F.w.SOT'i t ~ ~rvr ~;G?,
' PdOV O-t'' r o I~Sa r q )Ct t-?.: ! '"
. ~
!~ ?
' '.Att ckirr 'T'rucks
Gt;nships
63
Other Truck Stx ikes -
x.
.763
Total
1,
~
~..~31i ~ t.?~. 1C~.e S
~~7. C~!
Gu:~ship escort (Strryka.n~ .Fl-s_Fl). 63 of
Total A.P. Stril?_es 730
Totc.:i ::i~h-t~_"iority 2, 55~
Lo;..er~ ~r.~.ca?ity S-~xikes
Suri~.ir.'~ `q2d Sy*S~e~ ~,7~?7
S%i'i'r:i.~E, StG~,:x~e ~rEaS r'~
ather ~ 6cg
~l'otal Lozaer-rr5.cx'ity 9` ;~17
12,173
~/ r I
~~f
&91 a/'
~~;,
~
7fi1
,
~,~:
i
/ ~.l / '
~ J
3Q0..
1, GOx
1, a5~-
3, ~?7
~, 701 M
2,10;
.,~..~. .
97~
~ .ao
`~~ ~
5, 7~
7,505
9,15
a/ ~."c ser. t ? fiL'-1~s0, ~:C-11,''r~, a:',d .~zC- l~3 ~;ur. ship ca wbil~.tj-: ...
./ T;ece::~er "wi6~ e~,~eriur,ce, ~ri?~.ch can rcascr.~wbly b~ co: s~d~r?n Rbout a
~2a'..rccTu=rei4er,~t; only about 1, X00 truck sorties ;l:on4hly,w~y:. ,?;~::d
durir.~; 79~:~-1;~~ c?ry season. ~ . ? .
c~ OaT.cui.a tc;c by usin t1?ro tactical air. sorties der ~;Unsnip~ but w'it:i
only cne of the t~c;o sorties actua?.1y striking -.n A~~A sita. The
ci?;es ;20 oi,t'r:ly sca?t:.es, be'_?~~ ncn-attack, a:fc e:c?'a~~c3 f~c~ thi..
table.
ra. vi:::a c`.G?t3 . .... ..
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : LOC-HAK-511-5-6-2
'rj~ f c~acrl;; ~r~ct: S?~;,n;-; '~'Or~' Y~?n.t?
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TABLE 2p
___--~
J
~CGH PRIORITY U.S. STRIKES IN PtORT:~RN LAOS
Jul. 9-Nav 70
Monthly
Attack Sorties o Total
High Priority Strikes
Lower Priority Strikes
U.S. .
Trucks
208
~?
Logistic Storage Areas -
Truck Parks~LOCS
2,456
~+3
Enemy Fortifications
Weapons Positions
3~+5
~ -'
6
~/'
? Other ~
lp6
2
dotal Lower Priority Strikes
3,~-~-5
54
Total
5,73
c
2
].p0 i
.Airfields, dams ,'free, strike zones, heavy construction equipment,
construction areas, tactical vehicles, watercraft other (unspecified).
Saxtie rate May 69-Aec). ~
u~~a
?~
QASD~SA
June ~+, 1970
~~~~~~
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ALTERNATIVE `TACT:ICAL AIRCF~AFT SOT~T~'E LEVELS
Current Operations (Jul~r 1.969~I~.rc'h 1970)
JCS 'klan/Current. Bud~,ets (End ~ 71) b/~
,... -
An Illustrative Priority Sortie Plan
JCS Plans subma.tted to the Secxe~ary of Defense on Apr~.l 30a 1970 ?
Sortie Rate
Total
2,6Q0
~.
9~9a4':
a January lg October 1968.
c~ .F].anned 3.ncreases which 3.nclude gunship a3,rcraft.
US, VNAF, RLAF
South Vietnam - Support of Troops in Contact
Other T.mmediate Strikes -
Southern Laos. - Truck Ati;acks and AAA Suppx~essian
Naxthern Iaas - RLf1F Sorties and Arb3.trary U.S.
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Attack Sorties
Per Month
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~~~~~~
x~z~ 22
ASR ;RESOURCES - 'X'HE I~IxX` OF DEPLQYED AIRC'RA~"I'
'US a? VNAF' RLA~'
High Performance :Jets
8~ .
1046.. '
877.
731,
a
Slow-moving .Attack , ~ircxaft"I
146
13'x'
~=:
176
244
~~-28s (Rr~) ? -
~ 53
""
6i ~
7Q
70
` Total :.. -?
10
7
124 ? ~
1123 ~
10
Tactical A~.xcraft
A:~:xcraft C~ur~sh~vs
- -
Total 1147 1254 3179
Wthout'sensar ~quipmer~~ ~ ~. ~6
W~i;h sensor equa.pment=~
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TOP SECRET
? MEMORANDUM h'OR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: Laurence E. Lynxx, Jr.
ACTION
June 6, 19'70
SUBJECT: Air Activity in Southeast Asia
Several months ago, the President asked for an evaluation of the
effectiveness of our interdiction campaign in Laos. More xecently,
you approved seeking permission for a VSSG review of our air
activity throughout Sautheast Asia.
This memo discusses the issues involved in our Laas campaign,
also summarized ixx a men~xa for the President, and presents a
study plan for the President's approval (Tab A).
i
Air Activity in Sautheast Asia
With the cessation of the. bombing of North Vietnam, U. S. air
activity has been focused on three principal areas:
-- In South Laos, continued interdictian of the enenzy~s
infiltration involved about 7, 500 sorties per rxa.axath.
-- In South Vietnam, attacks on enemy base areas and support
of Allied ground farces require about 13, 500 sorties per month.
Each of these operational areas has its own distinct operational
character. While I will discuss below the character of our
interdictian campaign in Southern Laos, a similar, if not mare
expert, evaluation of our efforts in South Vietnam and North Laos
is also needed. With the granting of authority far a small intex-
dictian program in Northeast Cambodia, we also need to look
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TOP SECRET
into the problems there, .particularly those associated with the
starting of a new enemy logistical systeizn. along the Se Kong
and Mekong. rivers.
Our Bombing Campaign in South Laos_
Since its inception in 1964, the principal focus of our borxxbing
campaign in South Laos has been an destroying supplies available for
shipment to South Vietnam. To do this we attack moving trucks,
truclc parks, and storage sites with half or more of our average of
7, 500osarties monthly. The remainder of our effort is aimed at
reducing the capacity of the Laotian road-net by attacking the roads
themselves and the crews that attempt to repair them.
The air resources that we use to carry on this campaign include;
-- Gunships, These converted cargo planes (C--130 and
C-123s) are equipped with side-firing guns guided by night
observation devices and covert illuminators. They are used to
attack moving trucks in largely undefended areas.
-- Slaw-Moving Aircraft. These ~ta;ctical aircraft (mainly A-ls
and T - 38 s) are equipped with guns for straffing and canventianal
bombs but not special night observation devices. Like the gunships,
they are used mainly to attack m.aving trucks in lightly defended
areas.
-- Fast-Moving Aircraft. These tactical ai.rcraf+ (largely F-4s)
are largely equipped in the same rxaa.nner as the slower tactical air-
craft. They are used to suppress enemy AAA fire and to attack
targets in defended areas, particularly during day-time.
The strengths and weaknesses of the U. S. interdiction effort in
Laos, particularly against moving trucks, largely result from the
operational characteristics of our aircraft:
-- Target Acquisition.. Our tactical aircraft, except for the
gunships, are unable to locate their awn targets. Instead, targets
are located by FACs (aicled by the sensor system) which then
illuminate or mark the area with flares and lead the fighter pilot
to the target. 'phe noise, delay, and illumination involved in locating
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? TOP' SECRET
a target give the enemy warnix~.g of attack and time to take counter -
xneasures.
-- Bombing Accuracy. Our tactical aircraft generally bomb
from at least 2, 000 feet during the night and higher during daytime.
With unguided ordnance, the expected error during daytime when
most bombing is done is about 300 feet far aslaw-moving plane
(A-1) and 500 feet fax afast-moving aircraft (F-4). During night-
time when there is bad weather the expected errors fax both air-
craft. types are 1000 feet or more. These bombing erraxs are very
large given the target size presented by a moving truck or the sxxxall
storage dumps typical of Laos. With laser-guided bombs, these
error. s could be substantially reduced but only few bombs of this
type are available and few planes ark equipped to use them.
-- Boxx~.b Lethality. Our standard 500-pound baxnb has a lethal
area of about ?5 square feet agau~st a truck. With this lethal area
and the ave'ra.ge nighttime bombing accuracy, it usually takes 10
500-pouz~.d bombs -- two full. loads of a slaw-xnaving A-1 -- to ensure
the destruction of a single truck. Fax the fast-moving F-4, four
sorties and up to twenty 500-pound boxrabs are required to accomplish
this same result. While other types of bombs have a greater lethal.
area -- firebombs and bomblets -- conventional ~'iran" bombs are
the most frequently used ordnance. ~ .
The enemy knows these characteristics of the U. S, aircraft and the
tactics used in our bombing effort. He has put. great effort and
ingenuity into countermeasures that reduce the effecti??ren.ess of our
bombing:
-- Weather. The enemy operates alxnast entirely at night or in
bad weather when U. S. aircraft are unable to acquire targets visually
without warning the enemy and when bombing accuracies are greatly
reduced. Because the enemy roadnets axe pperated far below their
capacity, the enemy can move required supplies without exposing
them to interdiction during periods of daylight and goad weather.
-- ]dispersal. The enemy has dispersed his truck convoys arzd
' storage areas so a s to reduce target size. ~ Convoyed trucks are often
. spaced about 200 yards apaxt so that no a~x,.are than one can be
destroyed by a single aircraft. Small storage areas containing five
to i:enQtons of supplies are sprinkled throughout the countryside.
e
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- - Camoufl I ge_._, The enemy has expertly carxiouflaged his truck
and storage are~.s greatly increasing the difficulties of locating them
in thickly-fares~ed and mountainous Laos. While our Iglaa White
sensor system end roadwatch teams help to offset this enemy tactic,
they are not co~pletely successful. ..' _
-- Bomb C aui1termeasures. The enemy has learned to locate and
disarm the mines and delayed-fuse bombs we use. Against the MK.-36
anti-vehicular mine, for example, the enemy knows the location of the
mine because its tail assembly sticlrs out of the ground after impact.
Because the mine uses a magnetic fuse, the enemy, knowing its
location, can trigger it easily from a safe distance using a magnetic
tail. While some delay and inconvenience is caused, the enemy does
not suffer substantial losses.
~-- Road Repair. The enemy has scattered road repair cxews and
materials along all the principal routes through Laos. While the U. 5.
attempts to forestall repair by the use of anti-personnel mines and
delayed-fuse bombs, the enemy has been able to repair any damage
to its roads in less than two days with only a few hours usually
required.
Because of these effective enemy countermeasuxes and our technical
limitations, the air interdiction effort has always been relatively.
inefficient though not without effect. To evaluate these effects, we
tuxn next to a more detailed discussion of truck and supply destruction
and road interdiction.
Truck Destruction ti
Because of these difficulties, U. S. pilots in Laas report that only
one out of evexy five enemy trucks sighted in Laos is destroyed and
only a fraction of the actual movement is probably sighted. However,
in spite of this acknowledged inefficiency, our pilots also report that
they destroyed maze than 5; QQQ trucks per yeax in 1968 and 1969 and
more than 5, QQQ in the current dry season.
While these pilot reports represent the best information available
_ and, with minox adjustments, are accepted by the Air Force and DIA,
they may seriously overstate our actual destruction of trucks for the..
following reasons:
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 -_..
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-- Pilot Error. Rewarded on the basis of reported destruction,
U. ~. pilots have an obvious incentive to inflate the damage reported.
VYhile the pilots reports Can be checked against the reports of PACs,
there is little aubt that both ,probably seriously overstate the damage
suffered by the eneixxy. Following the Korean War, detailed analysis
showed that individual pilots reported as nnuch as ten times as much
destruction as ~ad actually occurred because they tended to restrike
aver and over targets already destroyed. Because of pcrar visibility
caused by the leight, the weather,and effects of exploding bombs,
pilots and FACs are often unable to accurately assess the daxxxage
they have caused. '
-- Other Evidence. Past-strike photography has never revealed
the large numbers of disabled trucks in Laos expected Pram pilot
reports. Our best intelligence is that the enemy's fatal inventory
of trucks in Laos (1000 fa 1400 vehicles). is substantially less than
the trucks reported destxoyed even in some periods as short as a
month.
Far these reasons, Y believe it is likely that oux estimates of enemy
truck lasses, based an pilot reports, are probably substantially
overstated. This judgrrxent is informally shared by many individuals
in the services.
Secondary Fires and Explosions
Besides attacking moving trucks, our bombing effort also hits enemy
storage areas and truck parks. The assessment of damage done to
these facilities is based largely an the nurxxber of secondary fires and
explosions reported by U. S. pilafs. During the current dry season,
oux pilots have reported about 20, 000 secondary fires and explosions
caxnpared to 13, 004 in the same period last year. In general,. These
secondary fixes account for about two-thirds of the fatal supplies L-he
13IA and the Air Force report that The enemy has lost Through our
air campaign.
However, there is no reliable zx~eans of checking these reported
results ar determining their significance in terms of enemy personnel
and supply lasses. For purposes of analysis, the Air Farce and D IA
assifn an estimate of the supply tonnage last in ,each secondary
explosions but these. estimates represent little mare than arbitrary
.__--assumptions that cannot be independently corroborated and are -
undoubtedly subject to serious errors.
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TOP SECRET ~ ~ ~ 6
Enemy Supply Flows
-~-
Based an the u certainties of the reported destructiozx, the intelligence.
caminunity has Ueen at odds over the extent to whiclx enemy supplies.
in Laos are ac wally destroyed by our bombing effort and .whether,
given the l~xow~ supply flaws into Laas and consumption there, the
enemy has more ar less supplies available than he needs to meet
his requireme Jts in South Vietnam. The two principal views are:
-~ The Air Force and DTA officially accept the pilot's reports
of trucks destroyed and secondary explosions at face value.
Extrapolating these effects into supplies last to the enemy, they
find that the enemy is losing or consuming in Laos mare supplies
than he has been bringing into Laos. They conclude, therefore,
that the enemy has only maintained the flavor of supplies into South
Vietnam by depleting stockpiles previously built up in Laos.
-- The C7A believes that the actual supplies lost to the enemy
are substantially less than reported by our pilots. On the basis of
all available intelligence, they believe that the enemy loses about
25% of his supply flow in Laos and that consequently the enemy has
more supplies available in Laas than needed to both supply South
Vietnam and build substantial stockpiles in Laos.
Thus; there is' a basic disagreement about the enemy's supply
situation in Laas. Aside from the factors, such an overstatement
of enemy losses already mentioned, the principal reason for
supporting the GIA. view is that our information on actual enemy
supply flows iota South Vietnam shows that the enemy is able to
vary his supply flows greatly, increasing them to levels far beyond
his ixiini.mal requirements even during periods of intense bombing.
During January and February, 1970, the enemy's actual supply flows
were almost four times the estimated requirements of VC/NVA forces
in 5VN during the same period. If these flows occurred, I believe
that they prove beyond a reasonable doubt that aux interdiction effort
has not lix~nited substantial increases in enemy supply flows. This
direct evidence is corroborated by what we know of the capability of
the enemy supply systerxx: its excess road and truck capacity, and
relatively low manpower requirements. .
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 i ~ ,.
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~
y
TOP SECRET ~
i
On the other halnd, if the pilau xeports and the Air Force /DIA view
of their implic~ bons are correct, they form a strong axgument
that the interdi Lion campaign in South Laas has effectively faxced.
the enemy to deplete his stockpiles of war material ,there and may
have reduced e~.exny supply flows into South Vietnam below its ..
Other Bombing' Effects
Although our bombing may not effectively xeduce enemy activity
in Soutlx Vietnam, it does increase the resources required Pram
North Vietnam and its allies to support its forces and continuously
disrupts enemy logistical activity creating substantial managerial
difficulties for North Vietnam.
The cast to North Vietnam consists a? the supplies destxayed and
xnen killed by our bombing. Since 1964, about l5, 000 trucks and
70, 000 tons of supplies with an estimated value of ~I67 million have
been reported destroyed. While almost all of this material is
provided by Hanoi's allies -not North Vietnam itself - it undoubtedly
xepresents some loss to North Vietnam.
Because our bombing is directed mainly~against logistical targets it
has not cast the enemy dearly in manpower. Although the incidence of
disease among infiltrating personnel is liigh, most of theix personnel
recover and few permanent lasses (about 10% of the infiltrators)
result from it. Likewise, while the Naxih Vietnamese have to maintain
some ma,npawer in Laos to offset the effects of bombing that could
otherwise be redeployed, the numbers involved (10, OO~a to 20, 000 men)
axe not substantial.
Yn addition to increasing the cast to North Vietnam, the bombing in
Laos also disrupts the flow of supplies to base camps in South Vietnam..
While little is known on this point, Y think that these disruptions
probably have a vexy limited impact an enemy operations within South
Vietnam itself, because the enemy has been able to maintain his
ovexall supply flaws at ar above required levels. .Though enemy supply
shortages are reported in South Vietnam they are usually caused by
__. forward distribution prablexns -inadequate numbers of laborers, allied .
distraction of VC storage areas, and poor transportation -not an overall
_ sh~xtage of supplies coming from. Laos, ,_: _.. __..
TOP 5EC1tET
xequirements here for some periods.
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TOP SECRET
Even though the disruptive anal cast-increasing effects of our bombing
are relatively slight, 1 nevertheless think that they axe important enough
so that same interdiction campaign can be justified.
There are, however, numexous ixnprovexnents in our present campaign
that. would achieve these results at a decreased cast ox incxease our
effectiveness at current e~.penditure levels.
Sax7xe possible iznpxovements are;
-- Wet Season Bombing. The Air Force has usually. continued its
a interdiction effort. in South Laas during the wet season at only ?
sligh~ly-reduced levels (5, 000 to 7, 000 sorties monthly). Because
the enemy has sharply reduced his supply activity during these
periods, these sorties have been much less effective than sorties
made during the dry season when targets are plentiful.
.o
--Aircraft. The fast-moving jet aircraft (F-4s) used by the Air
Force are much less effective than either slaw-moving (A-1 or A-20)
ar gunships (AC-130) aircraft at destroying enexYay supplies. Never-
theless, because of its desire to keep fast-moving aircraft in its
post war inventory, the Aix Farce has consistently redeployed slow-
xnoving aircxaft rather than fast-moving aircraft and has never
deployed gunships in appropriate .numbers. As a result, our
interdiction effort is probably less effective and mare costly than it
needs to be. .
-- Ordnance. The development of new ordnance suitable fox Laos
and the reduction of ordnance already developed suffers from many
shortcomings. We still largely use conventional "iron" ordnance in
La.ns even though we have every reason to believe that C.BUs, napalm:
.and laser-guided bombs are more effective.
With DOD plans to reduce our overall air effort in Southeast Asia, it
is critical that we develop as efficient an air effort in Laos as possible.
However, even if our aix activities in Laos were as efficient as
possible, we would still face the difficult strategic pxoblerns created
. by a budgetary squeeze an oux aix. activity_ including:
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_ `s
TOP SECRET
-- Determining the overall sortie level i.rz SoutheasL? Asia
required to support our nnilitary and diplomatic strategy.
-- Allocating these saxties a~~ong the various operational. areas
axed missions withix-. those areas. .. .. .
Funding the level of air activity that appears desirable on
strategic grounds.
T have prepared a directive Exam you to the VSSG designed to start
a study e?fart answering these questions. T suggest that you seek.
the Preside~~t's support .for the si.-udy and farn.iliarize hirx7. to a e
RECOMMENDATION
That- you forward the enclosed memo (Tab A) to the President
asking his al5proval of a VSSG evaluation of air activity in 5outhea.st
Asia.
Approve Disapprove
Tf you feel the mernorandunz far the President is unnecessary, Z
recomrx~end you sign the study directive. (Tab S)
Attachments
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