VIET CONG MILITARY PROSELYTING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-511-3-14-5
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: May 11, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-511-3-14-5
MEMORANDUMS W
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
TOP EC ET May 11, 1970
fi
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSING4,R
FROM: Laurence E. Lynn, Jr
SUBJECT: Viet Cong Military Proselyting
10019a
At your request I have prepared a memorandum for the President
on Viet Cong military proselyting and penetrations within the GVN
and RVNAF.
I believe that the enemy's subversive effort represents a serious
allied vulnerability in South Vietnam:
plans for the recent operations into
Cambodia were known to the enemy at least two days in advance of
the ARVN Parrot's Beak o eration and at least a day before the U. S.
operation in the Fishhook.
It is an accepted fact that ARVN rarely mounts a major
operation without the enemy knowing the full details beforehand. Not
so widely recognized but of great importance is the role. played by VC
military proselyting cadre in degrading ARVN performance. These
TOP EECr'ET
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TOP SECRET 2
cadre encourage defections and promote indifferent performance
by ARVN soldiers by promising. favorable treatment for those who
sympathize with the VC cause.
These enemy proselyting activities represent a serious drag on
Vietnamization. Unless the GVN develops the capabilities to cope
with this effort, GVN and ARVN performance will probably not reach
the level required to prosecute the war without a large U. S. involvement.
In the President's memorandum I have briefly described the nature of
these VC subversive activities. The memorandum informs the President
that you have asked CIA Director Helms for a full report on the enemy's
proselyting effort and GVN activities to counter it.
RECOMMENDATION:
1
I recommend that you:
-- sign the memorandum for the President at Tab A,
-- sign the memorandum for Director Helms at Tab B.
TOP SECRET
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Ids 0~i,
_ MEMORANDU w
V5 s, naT
Mp(2 A9 E WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Henry A.
Kissing e
l
SUBJECT: Viet Cong Military Proselyting
MAY 19 1970
The Significance of Enemy Proselyting
A key but rarely discussed aspect of the enemy's activities in
Vietnam is his military proselyting effort. Enemy proselyting
activities are designed to:
- - obtain intelligence,
-- degrade GVN and ARVN performance,
prepare for political competition with the GVN in the event
of a ceasefire or through GVN elections.
VC military proselyting organizations have an estimated 20, 000
members, including about 10, 000 regular party members. They
account for about 25 percent of the strength of the Viet Cong
infra structure.
In addition to this formal bureaucracy, the Viet Cong proselyters
have recruited a large network of about 5, 000 subversives within
the GVN. Another 15, 000 VC agents are in the Vietnamese armed
forces, a third of whom are officers or NCO's.
a major increase in VC- proselytini25X11
penetration activities. This shift could be read as the prelude to political
struggle, i. e. creasefire, or merely as another tactic to counter
TOP SECRET
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In either case it is of the utmost importance that the GVN take
measures to cope with this threat.
- It is an accepted fact that ARVN rarely mounts a major
operation without the enemy knowing the full details beforehand. Not
so widely recognized is the role played by VC proselyters in degrading
ARVN performance by encouraging desertions and sympathetic
performance by GVN/ARVN personnel. Thus these enemy activities
are a real threat to Vietnamization.
The GVN Response
GVN awareness of the problem of proselyting and penetrations within
RVNAF has grown and its effectiveness at dealing with the problem
has also increased:
However, much remains to be done and the GVN is still faced with
several intractable problems that hamper its efforts:
TOP SECRET
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In sum, while the GVN is making some progress in improving the
effectiveness of its security forces, there is no reason to believe
that they have made significant inroads into the existing networks
of VC agents, except in Saigon, or that these networks cannot be
increased in size and quality.
Conclusion
Enemy proselyting activities and the absence of a determined GVN
effort to counter them represents a serious if not crippling drag on
Vietnamization.
I have sent a memorandum to CIA Director Helms asking him to
investigate the seriousness of this problem and the sufficiency of
present GVN actions to counter it. I have also sought his views on
any actions we might take to help improve the GVN's countermeasures.
His response is expected by June 1, 1970 at which time I will forward
recommendations to you on possible LT. S. course of action to improve
the situation.
TOP SECRET
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR
MAY 19 1970
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Viet Cong Military Proselyting and Penetration Activities
Through the work of the Central Intelligence Agency, I have become
aware of the Viet Cong Military Proselyting and Penetration effort
in South Vietnam. I understand the Viet Gong have recently increased
their proselyting effort and that this could have an important effect
on Vietnamization or bn any political settlement.
I have informed the President of the scope and nature of these enemy
activities. I would like to inform him further on such matters as:
-- your assessment of the extent and significance, particularly
for the Vietnamization program, of these activities,
-- the nature and effectiveness of current GVN measures to
cope with this threat,
-- alternative courses of action we might take to improve the
GVN's capability to counter enemy proselyting and penetration
activities.
Your analysis of the foregoing considerations is necessary for a
complete assessment of the situation. Please forward your. results
to me by June 1, 1970.
(Signed) 11MW A. KISSING
Henry A. Kissinger
TOP SECRET
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