THE RISKS OF VIETNAMIZATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-511-1-4-8
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 19, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM W I
MAR 19 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger gal
SUBJECT: The Risks of Vieehamization
Secretary Laird's Memorandum
Army, OSD,
JCS, NSS,
reviews
completed
Secretary Laird has written you a memorandum (at Tab A)
which strongly suggests that budget stringencies may require
adjustments in Vietnam programs that may affect the progress
of Vietnamization.
The Secretary begins by noting that we have already had to cut
back on some operational support, such as B-52 sorties, for
Vietnam in FY 70. He further indicates that "we shall have to be
increasingly mindful of costs" through FY 1970 and FY 1971.
Southeast Asia war costs in the DOD budget will fall from $14. 7
billion in FY 70 to $10.5 billion in FY 71.
Secretary Laird concludes: "Current budget plans should be
adequate to support our objectives, but the choices involved in
allocating the increasingly scarce resources will become harder and
harder."
Secretary Laird provides two examples'of what this situation may
mean:
-- The budget demands of war can be uncertain: the, 35% surge
in bombing in Laos between October 1969 and January 1970 ran up
DOD costs by an unprogrammed $100 million. Finding the funds from
elsewhere in DOD budget "will not be an easy chore. "
-- Since DOD's budget plans assumed "significant reductions in
both our deployment and activity rates would be feasible, U. S.
combat and combat support efforts will continue to be reduced. "
TO
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I understand that a major aspect of the problem is that the Navy
and Army budgets are consistent with 260, 000 U. S. ' troops in
Vietnam at the end of FY 71, whereas the Air Force budget - -
for B-52 sorties and tactical air support -- is consistent with only
190, 000 U. S. troops in Vietnam at the end of FY 71. Thus, if
260, 000 turns out to be, correct (the JCS recommend 270, 000), we
will be short about $1 billion in B-52 and tactical air support for
the war. To provide this support, other programs would have to
be cut, unless we can conclude that the sorties we must give up
are not crucial to the war effort.
To stay within the budget ceilings he established and to accommodate
unplanned expenditures, Secretary Laird has told the JCS to "identify
trade-offs" within our present Southeast Asia programs. As for
looking elsewhere in DOD budget for relief of Southeast Asian
shortfalls, Secretary Laird says: "Any such reductions. would have
to be at the expense of readiness levels necessary to support NATO
and other non-Southeast Asian commitments. "
Laird concludes his memorandum as follows:
"In thinking about Southeast Asia operations, especially
any contemplated new operations, we should be aware of
the generally tight budget situation. This situation will
continue to constrain our operational options, and with
increasing restrictiveness. When new operations are
postulated, our first consideration must be the source of
the resources."
This approach will be successful if everything goes according to
plan, i. e., if ARVN performance, GVN territorial force performance,
and GVN."government.effectiveness improve as planned. Most important,
this approach assumes that the enemy threat to the GVN and ARVN will
continue to decline. This is far from certain.
Problem
The uncertainties associated with continued Vietnamization progress
were made clear to me by the report submitted by my staff
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE/NODIS
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members who recently visited South Vietnam. Based on their
analysis I concluded that we cannot automatically assume that
Vietnarnization will succeed. Their report suggests that some
reverses are highly probable. (I am sending you a summary of
their report. )
The war in Vietnam is not over:
-- the enemy has not been defeated nor has he given up;
an intensive enemy logistics effort is underway in Laos;
-- we have detected tentative signs that the GVN's pacification
momentum may be faltering.
These signs dictate caution and suggest that the enemy still deserves
respect.
General Abrams' view, as reported by Secretary Laird in his trip
report, that the next redeployment increment may be the "crunch"
increment, may be a reflection of his reading these same signs.
Despite improvements that have been made on the South Vietnamese
side:
-- ARVN forces and GVN territorial forces are by no means
fully effective;
-- many GVN reforms (anti-corruption, land, official attitudes)
have yet to be accomplished, and economic stability is by no means
guaranteed.
It would be surprising if these GVN shortcomings are overcome on
schedule and if the enemy adheres to our plan.
In programing for the future, it is particularly important to recall
that the gains that have been achieved in pacification and in the large
unit war in the past clearly demonstrate that such progress can. only
result from steady pressure and full support on our part.
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Considering these uncertainties, you may want to consider whether
you have adequate control of Vietnam.ization:
-- You have no way to systematically follow the course of
Vietnamization except in the grossest sense. For example, in
large degree our Vietnamization plans assume that ARVN main forces
will be able to carry a steadily increasing share of the main force war.
But, no periodic assessment is being provided that would show whether
or not this is happening.
-- When Secretary Laird talks of "trade-offs" we have no. way of
knowing what is being traded off for what, nor do we know how these
trade-offs affect General Abrams' plans or his expectations con-
cerning continued pacification progress and continued success in
the large unit war.
For example, cut-backs in U. S. combat support may affect the
fighting capabilities of South Vietnamese forces, despite a steadily
increasing combat support capability of their own. U. S. forces still
provide the bulk of the combat support available to GVN territorial
and regular forces. There is substantial evidence that the performance
of these GVN forces varies directly with the amount of helicopter lift,
gunship and medical evacuation support, tactical air support, and other
combat support.
While our long-term goal must be self-sufficient Vietnamese forces,
in the near term it is probably unrealistic to expect Vietnamese forces
that have received relatively little U. S. assistance in the past, to
perform effectively without substantial U. S. combat support.
Budget Ceilings and Vietnarnization
Currently budget ceilings are being used to determine the pace of
Vietnamization. They also have an important effect on the composition
of Vietnarnization programs.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE INODIS
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The Ris f Vietnamization
TOP SECRET/ NSITIVE/NODIS
5
The result is that Vietnal-nization programs are competing with all
other priorities NATO programs, new weapons systems, etc.
Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services are being asked
to, adjudicate among the priorities _., to make the "trade-offs" with
the following implications:
1. If Vietnamization goes slower than expected, if there are the
usual uncertainties such as the requirement for additional B-52
sorties, or if the threat increases inst-e-a.d of declining as our present
plans assume, the JCS and the Services are placed in a very difficult.
situation. They are being asked to forego programs to which they
have long-standing operational or political commitments.
2. The Vietnamization process is almost by do?inition a process
whereby the Vietnamese will require more support. Yet this Vietnamese
interests are a "new" claimant on DOD's declining budget. It would be
natural to expect that Vietnamization programs would get squeezed out
fir st.
3. There is also the risk that the established budget ceilings alone and
the current manner in which they are enforced. will restrain our forces.
They may operate too cautiously and not inflict the damage they are
capable of inflicting, or they may fail to provide valuable support for
the Vietnamese forces in order to avoid heavy budget outlays.
4. Most importantly Secretary Laird has seen to it that budgetary
restrictions will make it impossible for your to deliver on your
threat. This will soon become apparent through increasing resistance
to any fundcorsuming operations which might be required to sustain
this threat.
A Quarterly Vietnamization Report
If you want to follow the progress of Vietnamization more closely,
the first requirement is to have more information. While you don't
want to get into the position of deciding on clay-to-day policy and
program issues, you do want to know in broad terms if Vietnamization
is succeeding as planned:
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-- Are ARVN units taking over from U. S. units?
-- Is pacification being challenged and with what result?
- - What is the enemy doing militarily? What can he do?
-- What are the basic thrusts of our program effort: Are we
asking ARVN to replace U. S. units but giving them inadequate
helicopter and artillery support? Are we giving ARVN too much
equipment? What are we doing in support of the GVN's territorial
forces?
Only in the case of the pacification situation is this type of knowledge
available. The Vietnam Special Studies Group has developed a sound
conceptual and analytical framework for monitoring pacification
progress.. No such framework exists for evaluating ARVN effective-
ness, the enemy's capabilities and strategy alternatives, or the current
program effort.
RECOMMENDATION: '
I recommend that you direct the preparation of a Quarterly Report
on the State of the War and Vietnamization similar to the CIA's
Strategic Report.
This report would give you the basis for making a broad evaluation
of the war situation and for monitoring Vietnamization progress.
If we had such a report now we would be able to respond to your
request for a study of the make-up of South Vietnamese forces
forthwith. It would enable you to monitor DOD's plan and judge DOD
proposals in the context of the overall war situation.
The Quarterly Report on the State of the War and Vietnamization
would include an analysis of:
-- State of the Main Force War. (The state of U. S. and ARVN
regular forces, U. S. support for GVN forces, U. S. troop withdrawals,
and an analysis of the friendly main force situation by Corps areas),
-- State of the Control War. (The pacification situation and
prospects),
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE /NODIS
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE /NODIS 7
State of the Enemy's Capabilities and EneMy Strategy
Alternatives .
The report would be covered by a 10 to 15 page summary. It would
be prepared by interagency task forces working under the supervision
of the Vietnam Special Studies Group. A detailed proposed outline is
at Tab B.
Approve Disapprove
- - -
J4
Enclosures
~d
TOP SEC RE T /SENSITIVE /NODIS
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE #1e.
WASHINGTON. D. G. 20301 r.- b / 7
27 February 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: FY 1970-71 Budget Situation for Vietnam
Our budgets for supporting military operations in Southeast
Asia for FY 1970 and FY 1971 are tight by any reasonable standard.
As I indicated to you in an October 6, 1969 memorandum on B-52
sorties and again on February 3, 1970, in a memorandum on oper-
ational contingencies for Southeast Asia, (a) we have had to cut
back on some operational support (such as B-52 sorties) in FY
1970, .and (b) we shall have to be increasingly mindful of costs
throughout the remainder of this fiscal year and throughout the
next. I should like to highlight the nature of the problem for
you.
The dollar amounts and activity rates being postulated
would, perhaps, be illuminating. The following table outlines,
in brief, selected activity and funding indicators:
FY 1970
FY 1971
Southeast Asia Incremental
(Costs by Budget Title
$millions-TOA)
Military Personnel
$ 5,367
$ 4,074
Operations and Maintenance
5,322
3,470
Procurement
3,861
2,509
Research & Development
133
104
Military Construction
34
77
Combat Readiness, SVN Forces
--
300
Sub-Total
$1+,717
$10,534
. Bud eted Amounts Selected Items
$millions-TOA)
Supplies and Material
$ 2,263
$ 1,501
(OSM financed)
Ground Munitions
1,868
1,106
Air Munitions
1,304
903
Aircraft Procurement
1,284
807
Tactical Air Operating Rates
Attack Sorties per month
26,800
18,800
B-52 Sorties per month
1,400
1,200
Copy-.._. ,.w-_0f---6-_..-Cep3.?s
---- p&dLeS{ =~ tl `y... c..,, n...a n,...,.t? u" Rte- - }
..
--
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- } i5 ' ,'-rya '? ~.b
The most obvious point in the data shown is that Defense
funds and activity levels for Southeast Asia are large in abso-
lute terms, but are diminishing. The resources available to our
forces will-become fewer rather than more. Current budget plans
should be adequate to support our objectives, but the choices
involved in allocating the increasingly scarce resources will
become harder and harder.
Another point -- and one which is not so obvious -- is
that resource problems can develop as our forces in Southeast
Asia respond to changing combat situations. During January 1970,
for example, our tactical air forces increased their sortie
levels and ordnance expenditures to, or above, programmed levels.
Total attack sorties increased to 27,600, after having declined
to 23,700 in October 1969. The consistent increase since November
reflected the tempo of activity in Laos. Attack sorties in that
country increased from 10,500 to 14,200 during the period from
October 1969 through January 1970, respectively. Furthermore,
air ordnance consumption during January totaled 117,000 tons,
well above the anticipated 100,000 tons expenditure. This may be
construed as a one-time surge in operations; but it may require
the reprogramming of $100 million in FY 1971 funds to insure
maintenance of adequate air munitions stocks. As is evident from
the FY 1971 budget data, such reprogramming will not be an easy
chore.
As we proceed with the Vietnamization program, US combat
and combat support efforts will continue to be reduced. As you
know, we anticipated, during the development of the FY 1971
budget, that further significant reductions in both our deployment
and activity rates would be feasible. This anticipation permitted
further sizeable cuts in the Defense budget now before Congress.
But these reductions also impose financial constraints that
restrict to a considerable degree our ability to impose added
operations, especially any high unit-cost or sustained operations,
on the programmed operations rates.
To preserve adequate levels of flexibility, I have asked the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the field commanders to be mindful of
the budget and resource situation. I have asked them, too, to
be thinking of potential `trade-offs. In a January 28, 1970
memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, I noted:
"it is clear ... that if we are to consider
seriously increases in one type of support, we
must be willing to identify the trade-offs in-
volved and specify what we shall give up in other
areas to fund the increased activity."
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During my recent visit to South Vietnam, I emphasized the
desirability of considering trade-offs within our Southeast Asia
budget, if and when added operations are considered. We have
already drawn down the baseline (peacetime) force to support
activities in Southeast Asia.
The total FY 1971 budget, when expressed in terms of FY
1964 dollars, is only $3.8 billion higher in outlays than FY
1964. Southeast Asia incremental support costs during FY 1971,
expressed in FY 1964 dollars, total $9.4 billion. Accordingly,
funds in the amount of $5.6 billion, in terms of 1964 dollars,
will have to be diverted from support of the FY 1964 baseline
(peacetime) force level to support of Southeast Asia. Further
reductions in baseline force support would be necessary to finance
any increases in Southeast Asia activity levels or forces during
FY 1971 and would have a significant adverse impact. Any such
reductions would have to be at the expense of readiness levels
necessary to support NATO and other-non-Southeast Asia commitments.
In thinking about Southeast Asia operations, especially
any contemplated new operations, we should be aware of the
generally tight budget situation. This situation will continue
to constrain our operational options, and with increasing re-
strictiveness. When new operations are postulated, our first
consideration must be the source of the resources.
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SECRET
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QUARTERLY OUTLINE REPORT ON STATE
OF THE WAR AND VIETNAMIZATION
I. State of the Main Force
A. Enemy Main Forces
An assessment of the current strengths, capabilities,
structure, and disposition of enemy main force units. An analysis
of the foregoing factors against past trends and an assessment of
the significance of the current situation with regard to future enemy
activity.
B. U. S. Main Forces
Current state of U. S. main force units, their strengths,
composition, and deployments. An assessment of U.S. performance
and effectiveness and the implications of the current U.S. role for
planned tDoop withdrawals.
-- Current strengths, dispositions,, force composition, and
vulnerabilities.
707
-- A trend analysis of RVNAF main force unit performance
and effectiveness to include: force structure, (combat, combat support,
combat service support) force readiness (manpower, training, logistics,
intelligence, polwar/psyop), and operational performance (activity
levels, operational effects,. operational effectiveness).
-- A trend analysis to include the past and current status of
programs to:
-- improve RVNAF leadership
-- equip RVNAF main forces
SECRET
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SECRET
-- provide combat support and combat service
support to RVNAF main force units.
provide RVNAF with a logistics capability
-- provide RVNAF main forces with U. S. advisory
support
-- improve RVNAF morale and performance.
II. State of the Control War
A. An analysis of the current and past control and security
situations.
B. Evidence on the strength and durability of control as
measured by:
-- RF, PF, and PSDF strengths, kills, kill ratios,
desertiona., operations per contact, and weapons captured/weapons
lost. Available support for territorial forces including air and
artillery, medical evacuations, equipment (e.g., weapons, radios)
and logistics support,
-- significant economic development conditions including
prices, production, and land reform,
-- the political situation to include evidence on province,
district, and village hamlet leadership, corruption, arid political
attitudes.
III. State of Enemy Capability_ and Enemy Strategy and Tactics
A. An analysis of enemy logistics and manpower infiltration,
recruitment, enemy losses, and projected aggregate enemy
capabilities.
B. An analysis of enemy documents and sources relating to
and activities of the main force, local force, guerrilla, and VCI
elements of the enemy's force structure.
SECRET
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SECRET 3
C. An analysis of trends in the activities of the enemy to
include types of incidents, attacks, and proseltying.
D. A summary analysis of the enemy's strategy drawing from
the above and considering how the evidence on enemy capabilities,
enemy activities, relates to specified enemy strategy options to
include stepped up main force attacks, protracted war, and a
political strategy of ceasefire, coalition or negotiations.
SECRET
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE /NODIS
EXCHANGES ON ARVN PAY AND PERFORMANCE
The following exchanges have taken place on the subject of ARVN
pay and military performance:
At the June, 1969, Midway Conference the Vietnamese
sought support for better living conditions for ARVN and argued
that this would improve ARVN performance;
-- On November 24, 1969, after a conversation with Secretary
Laird, you asked me to look into the relationship between ARVN
desertions and pay;
-- On December 11, 1969, I sent you a memorandum that
suggested that some particular financial reforms might cut
desertions and you approved my sending Secretary Laird a
memorandum suggesting that he look into the problem;
--y Secretary Laird replied in a memorandum dated January 28,
1970, that there might be something in the suggestion. He said he
had instructed his staff to examine the idea in more detail and he
planned to look into it on his trip;
In his trip report on February 17, 1970, Secretary Laird
again mentioned the desertion-pay problem, saying "The South
Vietnamese believe the continued success of Vietnamization depends
in large measure on (a) better living standards for the military and
their families and (b) more weapons." In the margin of Laird's
report you noted his statement and questioned me on it.
Thus, nearly nine months after this problem was raised by the South
Vietnamese, it has still not been resolved, and it could have important
implications for Vietnamization success.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE /NODIS
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 7807
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MEMORANDUM W
/ --
THE WHITE HOUSE -,D
WASHINGTON
ACTION
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE /NODIS March 18, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: Laurence E. Lynn, Jr.
SUBJECT: The Risks of Vietnamization
I have revised the "Risks of Vietnamization Memorandum," covering
Secretary Laird's Vietnam budget memorandum, along the lines you
suggested.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab A.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
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