VIETNAM AD HOC WORKING GROUP MEETING, JULY 13, 1971

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-489-1-18-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: July 26, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-489-1 1 9 + +L-Ab o"S
^^` T/SENSITIVE _ July 26, 1971
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
State Dept. review completed
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE FILES
Vietnaim.Ad Hoc Working Group Meeting,
Jul 13, 1971
- - ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
Ambassador Sullivan opened the meeting by discussing current press
reports on U. S. Ambassadorial changes at the Paris Talks and in South
Korea, South Vietnam, and Thailand. He confirmed that Ambassador
Bruce would be replaced by Ambassador Porter, probably in August,
while Ambassador Habib would be going to Seoul to replace Porter.
Sullivan also noted that press speculation about Ambassador Colby' s
replacement centered on Messrs. Jacobson and Mendenhall. Sullivan
said that he was not sure that any firm decision had been made, but that
these two men seemed to be the likely candidates. Mr. Whitehouse noted
that the field seemed to be favoring Jacobson. When asked about press
reports that he would be soon replacing Ambassador Unger in Bangkok,
Sullivan only smiled.
Sullivan announced that Secretary Rogers would be conferring with the
President in San Clemente later in the day on Madame Binh's seven point
proposal. In any event, Sullivan said, the U. S. delegation in Paris would
simply tread water at the ne-.t meeting on July 15, In passing, Sullivan
noted that both the Soviets and the French were characterizing the seven
point proposal as a "very serious offer" in conversations with U. S. officials.
Ambassador Sullivan then turned to the oil exploration issue. He confirmed
the speculation voiced by Mr. Bennett at the previous meeting that U. S. oil
companies were indeed pressing'us to have the GVN postpone the project.
He underlined the obvious problems that would develop if the U. S. Govern-
ment became embroiled in the issue at this point. He also stated that he had
persuaded Secretary Rogers first to ask for Ambassador Bunker's views on
a GVN postponement, rather than requesting Bunker to take the issue
directly to the GVN.
Ambassador Sullivan then asked Mr. Constant if MACV's final views on a
reduction in the CORDS organization had been received. Mr. Constant replied
that there had been a delay in sending out the cable, but that an answer was
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-489-1-18-9
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expected soon. Ambassador Colby's replacement was again discussed
briefly. Sullivan said that no decision had yet been made, although
Ambassador Bunker had been asked for his views. Sullivan voiced the
opinion that should Jacobson (Colby's former deputy) be selected, an
"outsider", rather than someone now in CORDS, should then be named as
Jacobson's deputy in order to minimize any clannish tendency within
CORDS. Sullivan also noted that Frank Shakespeare is attempting to dissolve
JUSPAO and to withdraw USIA officers at the province level from CORDS.
Sullivan announced that Ambassador Bunker is strongly opposed to both of
s
these proposals.
Mr. Whitehouse then reported further on his Indochina trip, He said that he
had discussed the narcotics problem with Souvanna. Souvanna had pledged to
do what he could to help, but had responded with an air of aggrieved help-
lessness when reminded of official Lao complicity in the heroin traffic.
Mr. Whitehouse found the current atmosphere in Phnom Penh "incredible. "
Life continued at a very leisurely pace, government offices closed at noon
and most major decisions related to_planning dinner menus. Mr. Whitehouse
observed that most Khmer still retained a child-like belief that their sense
of nationalism would somehow ward off the .Communist threat. He emphasized
that few Khmer yet recognized that hard work and organization as well as
faith were needed. In Tam had expressed a few vague ideas about a paci-
fication apparatus and the need to strengthen links between the government
and the countryside, but he was virtually alone. Mr. Whitehouse concluded
that very few Khmer even yet admitted the presence of indigenous Khmer
Communists in the countryside.
General Karhohs announced that DOD was preparing a memorandum proposing
that the ARVN be given its own herbicide capability. He said that it would
be sent to Secretary Rogers for his views as soon as Secretary Laird returned
from his Asian tour.
Ambassador Sullivan asked Mr. Carver about the status of the North Viet-
namese road being constructed south through the DMZ. Carver replied
photography showed the road to be motorable through the DMZ to the Khe
Sanh area. Carver added, however, that there were no signs of movement
on the road as yet. A general discussion then ensued about the North
Vietnamese ability to move armor rapidly along this route. General Karhohs
felt that a tank column could probably reach Khe Sanh from North Vietnam
within thirty-six hours if it had to transport its own POL, but that the move
could easily be made over night if POL were prepositioned. Carver wondered
whether this NVA road building activity should be raised as a violation at
the Paris talks. Sullivan agreed that it deserved consideration.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-489-1-18-9
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Discuuion then turned to the de-classification of the Pentagon Papers
being supervised by D_ eputy Assistant Se(re.tary of Defense Rankin, The
working level review was-just about complete and Henkin was now correlating
the deletions suggested by State, CIA, and DOD. Sullivan announced that
although State had participated as requested, it was opposed to releasing a
de-classified version. Sullivan said a memorandum to that effect would be
sent to Mr. Henkin, Mr. Carver agreed with State, and that CIA would send
a similar memorandum to Mr, Henkin. Sullivan emphasized that an official
release of the Pentagon study by DOD would bear the unmistakable
imprimatur of the Executive Branch:-no matter what caveats were devised.
He also wondered how such a release would effect the work of the Justice
Department in prosecuting Ellsberg, and possibly the Times, Post, and
Globe as well.
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-489-1-18-9