VIETNAM AD HOC WORKING GROUP MEETING, SEPTEMBER 25, 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-488-19-13-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: September 30, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

r- arc - `y~ - V,
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-488-19-13-6
MEMORANDUM V W
INFORMATION
September 30, 1970
SUBJECT: Vietnam Ad Hoc Working Group Meeting, September 25, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES
Ambassador Sullivan brought up the Ky visit, and remarked that
Foreign Minister Lam and Ambassador Bui Diem had gotten a real
working over from many people in State on the need to discourage Ky
from coming. Bui Diem was now in Paris, and the first accounts of
his efforts sounded quite good. Ambassador Bruce had an appointment
with Ky, as did Dr. Kissinger. However, there was nothing definitive
as yet even though it looked possible for the trip to be turned off. If
Ky actually came, 125 SY personnel would be needed to protect him.
In addition, it was likely that a confrontation would take place between
the McIntire supporters and the hippies, yippies, etc. The FBI had
informed Sullivan that these types were planning to make a big thing out
of Ky's presence. This would be too bad, since it would raise the Vietnam
issue earlier than we wanted -- it would be better if we dealt with Vietnam
on our own terms.
Thieu was worried about the possibility of Ky's making some initiative in
Paris. Sullivan felt that Ky indeed might be inclined to do this especially
if he called off his U. S. trip.' He would need to explain why he was staying
on in Paris. Sullivan anticipated that Ky might touch on the subjects of a
cease-fire and free elections in SV. If he were to do this in a press
interview, it wouldn't be so bad, but if he made a more formal pitch, there
would be considerable confusion.
proposal more credibility.
Sullivan said that he did not yet have a feeling for how the American people
had reacted to Madame Binh's proposal on POWs. Her pitch was transparent
and fraudulent, but it seemed that more and more among the next of kin were
being influenced by Hanoi's tactics. This was a sensitive issue, and we
needed to be careful as to how we handled it so as not to give Madame Binh's
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-488-19-13-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-488-19-13-6
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE 2
Sullivan noted that Senator Pell had received an offer from Xuan Thuy to
go to Hanoi. Sullivan believed that we should encourage the Senator to go,
and added that in his opinion Senator Pell could be trusted to keep from
being used by Hanoi. General Karhohs observed that Secretary Laird
favored Senator Pell making the trip, and hoped that something could be
accomplished by it. It emerged that the Senator was not planning on going
until January or February if he went at all.
Sullivan stated that the conference committee on the Defense Appropriations
Bill had accepted the Fulbright amendment on allowances for foreign troops,
but that according to Senator Stennis it would apply to new agreements only
so that we would have no problems on this score. Sullivan suggested that
the legal people in Defense should look into the other aspects of the Fulbright
amendment, and provide interpretations on support for local forces in
Thailand and Laos and what could and could not be done on behalf of the
Cambodian governm 25X1
Nooter announced that AID was undertaking a review of the FY 72 budget for
Vietnam along the lines which he had brought up in the last meeting of the
Ad Hoc Committee, i. e. a total of $750 million with an increase in the CIP,
a decrease in DOD requirements, and a $250 million short-fall. The question
was whether this short-fall would be funded by AID by DOD or by both. If
AID was to take care of it, we needed to address the question of how it would
be handled. There might be objections to increasing the AID appropriation
by $300 million; nevertheless, DOD's input would go down anyway and it would
be better to face up now to the desirability of placing this responsibility on
AID. It might be possible to call the increase a "Vietnamization fund" which
would take the place of DOD funds. Nooter added that the possibility of
approaching the Japanese for help was being considered.
Sullivan remarked that he understood Secretary Laird's conversation with
the President on a supplemental had been inconclusive, and that the
Secretary had been asked to come back with figures backing up his belief
that a supplemental could be obtained now. Sullivan had heard that Senator
McGee wouldn't address the AID bill until after the elections, ostensibly
because of hostile "pecking. " Under these circumstances, it would be
awkward to go in for a supplemental before an actual appropriation bill
had been passed. Sullivan surmised that the President's request to
Secretary Laird for further data was a deft Presidential way of saying no.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-488-19-13-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-488-19-13-6
w ?
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
Nooter questioned the figure of $100 million for Vietnam in Secretary
Laird's proposed supplemental. Neither AID nor State believed that
this sum was necessary, and it would be difficult to justify it before
the Congress. Nooter believed that it would be inadvisable to ask for
funds which could not be justified.
Sullivan raised the question of the disposition of surplus U. S. Government
property in Vietnam. He wanted to know if Defense had a good idea of what
surplus property was on hand so that its disposal could be handled in the
most effective manner. General Karhohs and General Smith both asserted
that Defense had a very good idea of the surplus property available, since
this was on computers and the information was kept up to date. The group
agreed that if MAP funds shrunk, excess stocks might begin to figure much
more importantly in the U. S. military assistance programs and we would
need to keep a handle on the surplus property situation.
Sullivan said that during Foreign Minister Lam's conversation with
Ambassador Johnson, the question of GVN's release of more NVA
prisoners had come up. Lam had remonstrated against the release of
anymore, but had eventually said that it would be possible for the GVN
to arrange the release of more "packages. "
Turning to the visit to Washington of Senator Tran Van Don, Sullivan
remarked that Don had said he was "putting together a team" to see if
it was possible to work with Thieu. About a dozen people would be involved,
representing a broad spectrum of non-governmental opinion. The objective
would be to work in the government, rather than with Thieu personally.
Sullivan indicated that he did not know what Don really had in mind by all
this, and would try to find out more.
General Karhohs referred to messages cleared in the White House on further
U. S. troop withdrawals, and said that Secretary Laird had instructed
Admiral Moorer to make this information available to General Abrams and
have him discuss the withdrawals with Vien. The GVN would need to know
what our plans were so that it could make plans of its own to mesh with our
redeployments. Although the rate of redeployment was quite rapid, the
posture of the Army world-wide was such that a slow-down would not be
feasible.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-488-19-13-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-488-19-13-6
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
General Karhohs announced that General Ewell would meet with Secretary
Laird and Admiral Moorer on October 3. General Karhohs also announced
that Brigadier General Watkins had been named MACV Deputy Chief of
Staff for Economic Affairs.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/03 : LOC-HAK-488-19-13-6