INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SALT TALKS IN GENEVA, JULY 2, 1975

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-488-11-6-2
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 18, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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July 18, 1975
NSC REVIEW COMPLETED,
7/2/03.
National Security Decision Memorandum 301
TO: - The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secr. ctary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, U. S. SALT Delegation
SUBJECT: Instructions for the SALT Talks. in Geneva, July 2, 1975
The President has approved the following instructions for the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks beginning on July 2, 1975 in Geneva. These
instructions supplement those contained in NSDM 285.
1. At an appropriate time, and in a 'Manner of its choosing, the
Delegation should indicate willingness to consider the Soviet proposal
to ban the development, testing, and deployment of systems for placing
nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction into
e; rth orbit if the provision is broadened to-include present and future
fractional orbit bombardment systems (FOBS). Prior to discussing
treaty language for dealing with this system, alternatives to the Soviet
language should be submitted to Washington for approval.
2. With respect to the effective date;of the 2,400 aggregate limitation,
while it is the US view that both sides should be at this level by
October 3, 1977, the US is prepared to consider a reasonable proposal
(a few months) from the Soviet side as to what mutually agreed period
of time after that date might be required in order to attain that level..
The agreed period of time should reflect an expedited pro ;ram of
dismantling and destruction of those strategic delivery vehicles in
excess of 2,400.
So In connection with discussion of the effective date of the 2,400
aggrcgatc limitation, the Delegation should note that the US believes
the Other obligations in the agreement, which are not inconsistent with
the Interim Agreement, should become effective upon entry into force
O.e., exchange of instruments of ratification) of the new agreement.
TOP ST`CRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS (3)
- No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/19: LOC-HAK-488-11-6-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/19: LOC-HAK-488-11-6-2
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4. On the question of impeding verification by national technical
means Contained in Al tide
XVlI of tiie Joint Draft Text, paragrapil 3
should be reworded as follows:
Each Party undertakes not to use any measure or
practice, including measures and practices associated
with testing and dcvelolpnicuyt, which deliberately impedes
verification by national technical means of compliance
with the provisions of this agreement. This obligation
shall not require changes in current construction, assembly,
conversion, or overhaul practices. The parties undertake
to avoid measures or Practices which result in unintended
interference with national technical means of verification
of the other party.
5. The following language should be substituted for the current US
version of Article XVI of the joint Draft Text:
"77ie Parties undertake to continue active negotiations
for limitations on strategic arms, beginning no later than
one year following entry into force of this agreement, with
the objective of achieving further limitations and reductions
of strategic arms at the earliest possible date. The Parties
shall also have the objective of concluding negotiations, well
in advance of the expiration of this Agrecinent, on an agreement
? limiting strategic offensive arms to become effective upon
such expiration.
"
6, The Delegation should indicate to the Soviets that the unb
portions of the JDT are acceptable to the US Government with theeted
exception of Article VII and paragraph 3 of Article XVII which should
be modified as described above. Concerning some issues contained
within the bracketed poi tions of the JDT;
a, Preamble: Either bracketed formulation would be acceptable
and resolution of this issue is left to the Delegation.
3. Article II: The phrase "capable of ranges"
tuted for "with should be subs t' --
h a range' in the US definition of IC3Ms, ASI3Ms, and
any subscquciat definitions based on range.
Top SECRET/SENSITjV>/ = jXCDS
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/19 : LOC-HAK-488-11-6-2
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/19: LOC-HAK-488-11-6-2
ACIDS
3.
c. Article IV: The tcri "depth" niny lac used in place of "length"
provided the negotiating record reflccts the understanding of both
sides thgt "depth" is defined as the total internal distance from the
tole to the bottom of an ICI3it1 silo launcher. In connection with
discussion of this Article, if the Soviet side continues to reject the
US formula set forth in the JDT the Delegation should explore alterna-
tive formulae.
Henry A. ), issinger
cc The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/19: LOC-HAK-488-11-6-2
 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL .-4- Aa r -,
73
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS August z0, 1975
National, Security Decision Memorandum. 303
The Secretary of Defense/
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, US SALT Delegation
Subject: Instructions for the SALT Talks in Geneva
The President has'approved the following instructions for the Strategic
Arms Limitations Talks. These instructions supplement those contained
in NSDM 285 and NSDM 301.
1. The Delegation should indicate to the Soviets that the US is willing
to ban the development, testing, and deployment of the following
systems:
To:
Land-ba fled r
- -?_ i+zv vA J.llV~l ( vn Linental range;
Ballistic missiles capable of ranges greater th
600 k
an
m
carried on waterborne vehicles other than submarines;
Installations for launching ba1c missiles which could
be emplaced on the seabed or ocean floor, including territorial
seas or inland waters.
a. The limitation provided for in Article III of this agreement
.shall not apply to ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers.
"OP SECRET/SENSITIVE _ XGDS (b)(3)
IQFVlassified by Henry A. Kissinger
2. The Delegation should propose the following definition of a cruise
missile:
A cruise missile is any armed, unmanned, self-propelled,
guided missile which sustains flight through use of aero-
dynamic lift over most of its range.
3. The following language should be substituted for the current US version
of Article VII of the Joint Draft Text:
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b. The parties agree that:
(1) There shall be no significant increase in the number
of IC]3M or SLBM test and training launchers or in the
number of such launchers for heavy ICBMs.
(2) Construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test
ranges shall be undertaken only for purposes of testing and
training.
(3) Operational 1C]3M and SLBM launchers used for testing
or training shall be considered operational launchers.
In discussing the proposed language for Article VII, the Delegation should
indicate that it is the US interpretation of Article VII that all operational
launchers, wherever located, should be counted in the 2400 aggregate.
The Delegation should also state.that in the US view an increase of 15%
would constitute a "significant increase" within the meaning of paragraph 2a
of Article VII and solicit a Soviet response to this statement.
cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
.T..oP SECRET ISENSITIVE - XGDS
Wi. ,
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/19: LOC-HAK-488-11-6-2