SECRETARY'S VISIT TO PEKING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-469-3-1-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/19: LOC-HAK-469-3-1-7
NSA review completed
?
1
-T-012-19Belleill110171S
VOLUME I
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
SECRETARY'S VISIT TO PEKING
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DOS and JCS reviews
completed
SCOPE PAPER
Recent Cables
BILATERAL RELATIONS
Taiwan
Liaison Offices
Tab A - Housing
Tab B - Travel Procedures
Tab C Consular Affairs
Marine Guards
MIA's
Exchange Program
Tab A - Detailed Position Paper
Tab B - Completed, Scheduled and Agreed
Exchanges 1971-73
? Tab C - Schedule of Major Proposed Exchanges
Tab D - Treatment of Announcement Q.
ExQbangg$
XAVOlvizig the Priixkiiikctoinizittees
Tab E' - Requested Additions to the Paris/London
Exhibition of Chinese Antiquities
Tab F - National Committee on US-China Relations
Proposals for Exchanges?
Tab G - Committee on Scholarly .Communication with
the PRC Proposals for Exchanges
? Tab H - Cooperation in Earth Resource Survey and
Conservation
Trade and Economic Relations
Tab A - Claims/Assets
Tab B - Trade Imbalance
Tab C - MPN
Tab D Scheduled Air Service
Tab E - US Textile Imports
Tab F US Participation in Development of PRC Oil
Tab G - Export Control Problems
Tab H - ExIm Bank Financing
? Tab I - Cooperation on Agricultural Issues
U.S. Press Representation in Peking
Diplomatic Relations
Summit Visits
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY, PAGE 25
- TOP SECRETINODIS
XGAS - 3
DPMO, DIA, review
completed.
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VOLUME II
THIRD COUNTRY MATTERS
Soviet Union
Europe
Korea
Japan
Vietnam
Cambodia
Laos
Thailand
Burma
Middle East
South Asia
Persian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula
US Aid to the Near East and South Asia
Mongolia
AmmsCaltrol Issues
PUBLIC STATEMENTS
Arrival Statement
Toast - PRC Dinner
Toast - US Dinner.
Departure Statement
COMMUNIQUE
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SOVIET UNION
I. FEBRUARY 1973 TALKS
Chinese Position in February
--So long as the objectives are the same, we can work together to
commonly deal with a bastard. (Mao)
--The goal of the Soviet Union is to occupy both Europe and Asia.
(Mao)
--If Russia attacks, China will let them go where they want and will
fight a guerrilla war and protracted war. (Mao)
--The West has the idea of making peace with Russia and pushing
Russia eastward -- against China, Japan, and in the Pacific and
Indian Ocean. (Mao)
--Europe and the US would think it a fine thing if Russia got bogged
down in China. After 6 months or 1-2-3-4 years, the US can then
poke its finger in the Soviet back, in the name of peace, as .a way
to bring the Soviet Union down. The US would help them in doing
business and offer help against China. (Mao)
--China must think of the worst eventuality -7 that they would attack
China and be defeated. (Mao)
--The Europeans do not appreciate the menace of Soviet military
preparations.
--The Soviet Union has its weak points. It is strong militarily but
weak economically. If they use their military power, there will
be no end. This will be a mess for them.
?The new Czars are extremely sly. The Brezhnev doctrine has its
timid aspects, e.g. on nuclear weapons, but in other aspects they
are extremely aggressive. As soon as you slack your steps, they
will step in.
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(Chinese position, cont'd)
--The Soviets are afraid of fighting a nuclear war, and they are even
worried that conventional fighting might lead to nuclear war. That
is why they have silly ideas like a nuclear treaty.
--To expose the deceptive nature of Soviet policy is a very compli-
cated struggle. E. g., it is difficult to oppose Soviet non-use-of-
force proposals. (In the UN, only Albania, China, Portugal and
South Africa did. Many abstained. But 70 voted for it.)
--The US wants to reach out to the Soviets by standing on Chinese
shoulders. The US thinks China is easy to talk to. E. g., sending
Thieu 30 aircraft from Taiwan.
--Both world wars show historical examples of the West having the
idea of pushing the aggressor eastward.
--US agreements with the USSR (e.g. Berlin) can be said to be
consistent with the Soviet policy to lull or demoralize Western
Europe.
--The Soviets want the nuclear agreement to deceive the people of
the world; they want secret deals with the U.S. as a means to
continue their competition with the U.S. and threaten areas they
wish to threaten.
--The Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty hasn't expired but it is non-
existent. The Soviets seek anon-aggression treaty. This is
absurd for allies, and neither sincere nor necessary. If they
wanted to end the border conflicts, the first step would be to
clarify the preliminary agreement on the border situation. This
they won't do. Their motive is propaganda.
--The Soviet Union may have initiated the idea of having Waldheim
attend the International Conference on Vietnam.
? The inevitable result of improving the Soviet economic position
is to add to their military power. That is all they have thought about.
How they realize it is another matter.
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1.7.C.A.a.L1-12.. J. 0.C.INOI-Li V
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(Chinese position, cont'd)
--It is not easy for the Soviet Union to achieve its goal [to surpass
the US.] If they reach out their hands to the whole world, then
they will be in the same position as the US before -- in a passive
position. They want to gain the upper hand everywhere, but
actually that is impossible for them.
--It is true that if the US thought China could be easily defeated
[HAIV s first easel there would have been no reason for the US
to seek better relations with China. The second and third cases
are two sides of one thing, because I-IAK too attached importance
to the danger and to the need to prevent it.
--As Mao mentioned, China must be prepared for the worst. There-
fore, China must "dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and
never seek hegemony."
--China must be prepared to withstand an attack for 1-2-3-4 -5 years,
until the world understands and reproaches the USSR. China
must be prepared so that the attacker will be able to enter but
not come out.
--But it is best to prevent the event before it happens.
U. S. Position
--It is not our policy to push Russia to fight China, because the
danger to us of a war in China is as great as that of a war in
Europe. (to Mao)
--If Russia attacks China, we would certainly oppose them, for our
own reasons. If Russia overruns China, this would leave all coun-
tries less secur e and the US isolated. (to Mao)
--The US wants to discourage and prevent a Soviet attack, not defeat
it. (to Mao)
--We both face the same danger. We may have to use different
methods sometimes, but for the same objectives. Even if we
sometimes criticize each other, the US will coordinate its actions
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U. S. position, cont'd)
with China and will never participate in a policy to isolate China.
(to Mao)
-We will never knowingly cooperate in an attack on China. (to Mao)
--If a real danger exists or hegemonial intentions become active,
we will resist them wherever they appear -- in our own interest,
not as a kindness to anyone else. (to Mao)
--There is a strong community of interest that is operating imme-
diately between us. (to Mao)
?There are certain factors pointing toward an era of peace (e.g.,
possible tranquility in Southeast Asia), but in the long term there
are countervailing factors: First, the intensive Soviet military
buildup in all directions and in strategic and tactical weapons
simultaneously; second, the intellectual confusion in Western
Europe and Europe's weakness as a counterweight; a third
problem area is Japan.
--Resisting a Soviet thrust eastward is politically and psychologically
more difficult for us than resisting a thrust westward. But the
consequences of not preventing a thrust eastward are equally
dangerous for us.
?The intensive Soviet effort of military preparations ? not just in
Siberia but in strategic forces pointed towards us -- can't be
accounted for unless one assumes the option of their use is being
prepared.
--It is .too dangerous for the Soviets to attack Western Europe. They
will try to create an atmosphere of peace to free themselves to
move East or South.
--The Soviets do not like to take excessive risks.
--The Soviet Union has its weak points economically -- but this may
give them an incentive to use their military machine while it is ?
still so strong.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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(U. S. position, cont'd)
--The US is not standing on Chinese shoulders to reach out to the
Soviets. Our shipments of arms to Thieu from Taiwan had nothing
to do with the USSR.
--The Soviets have again proposed a Nuclear Agreement and want to
sign it when Brezhnev comes to the US. But there is no possibility
the US will agree to a treaty obligation not to use nuclear weapons.
The only question is tactical?whether to reject it completely or
evasively. We have considered a draft on creating conditions in
which nuclear weapons would not be used, which would amount to a
renunciation of force. This depends on our basic strategy.
?HAK's trip to Peking in July 1971 gave the Soviets an incentive to
improve their relations with us. We had expected the opposite.
The most probable Soviet motive is to demoralize Western Europe,
exploit US technology to build up their power, isolate weaker oppo-
nents and ultimately isolate the US,
?The US strategy, because of our difficult domestic situation resulting
from Vietnam, is to maneuver rather than have a frontal confronta-
tion. When necessary (Cienfuegos, Jordan), we have reacted with
extreme violence to direct Soviet challenges.
--We have had to rally our people by some conspicuous successes
in foreign policy. We had to end the war in an honorable way. We
want to modernize our strategic power. We want to maneuver the
USSR into the position of provocateur. We have to get our people
used to some new propositions about US interests. This is deter-
mined by our own necessities.
--The only agreements we reach with the USSR are ones that either
cost us nothing (Berlin), are in a general interest (SALT), or are
nonpolitical (exchanges).
--In this context, the nuclear treaty is to play for time without giving
away anything of substance.
--Since SALT, we have greatly accelerated the qualitative improve-
ment of our strategic forces. Our preparations for SALT led us
to study our defense posture in particular detail. _
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Wr.greirrnIOMPERI.FROMPIWWWYMIRRIMIEMIIMI.11.9,1,..
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(U. S. position, cont'd)
--The collapse of the Paris Agreement on Vietnam would affect
our ability to conduct any effective foreign policy. This is one
reason the Soviets are moving into a position of undermining
the Agreement. They are also trying to establish their position
in Hanoi.
--Under no circumstances will, we make any secret arrangements
with the USSR. The PRC will be kept informed, and everything
will be published.
--We will never accept that in case of a Soviet attack on Europe
Soviet territory will be immune; that in case of war in the Middle
East nuclear weapons cannot be used; or third, that it is possible
to threaten the international balance without the risk of nuclear
war.
?The Soviets want US technology to improve their economic position,
not their military position. Though they also want to improve
their military position,
?The lesson of two World Wars is that once a big war starts, its
consequences are unpredictable. A country which encourages
a big war in the hope that it can calculate its consequences is
likely to produce a disaster for itself. In both wars the Germans
moved westward first.
--As for the US pushing the Soviets toward the East, there are three
possible causes: (1) that we want the Soviets to defeat China,
(2) that we want a stalemate that exhausts both, or (3) that we
produce such a result by incompetence, by permitting such
demoralization in the West that the Soviets feel free to attack.
--The first case would be a disaster for the US because a victorious
USSR would attract Japan, Finlandize Europe, and isolate the US.
--As for the second case, the President believes a Sino-Soviet war
would have cataclysmic effects regardless of the outcome, and
very, unpredictable consequences. The Soviets could break out in
some other direction to escape their dilemma. Japanese and
Indian actions could not be predicted. It would demonstrate US'
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(U. S. position, corxttd)
impotence and irrelevance, or force the US into extremely
complex decisions.
--So if a Sino-Soviet war occurs as a result of our action, it will be
the result of misjudgment, not deliberate policy. A morally dis-
armed West could tempt them to act. This is a real danger.
--If they attack China, it is very probable that we would poke them
in the back, as Mao suggested. Our aim is to develop our policy
so that we can take such measures.
--The greatest danger is that the Soviet Union will become so frus-
trated that it will do something rash. Their nervousness about
HAK's visit to China indicated they do not feel they are gaining
ground.
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t
Chinese Po. in February
- The U.S. should cooperate with Jap
matters.
es through Japan he should perhaps talk a bit more
ay isn't very good ,for their face. (Mao)
Japanese fe1ing toward the USSR are not very good. The Soviets
grabbed VionAtolia half of Sinkiang, Manchukuo, Sakhalin, and the
Kuriles. It doesn't seem likely that Japan and the USSR will form
closer pt.litical relations. (Mao)
-- China would rather see Japan have better relations with the U.S.
than closer relations with the Soviet Union. (Mao)
- We (the U.S. and PRC) can also so some work there. (Mao)
-- The Japanese may want to grab something (economically) in Russia.
(Mao) '
lvlaybe the' 13. S. pians to raise tariffs and non-tariff barriers in
order to mtjmidate Japan and Europe. (Mao)
Ohira see
Japanese..
-- China has nc
of the people.
tion. (Mao).
-- It will be mor
the U.S. (14ab
learer idea of the Soviet Union than other
?Jap.n for indemnity. It would add to the burden
this way can we move from hostility to relaxa-
icult to settle the hostility with Japan than with
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(Chinese Position - Continued)
-- The Sino-U.S. trade situation is the opposite of the Sino-
Japanese situation, because U.S. imports from China are
much less than Chinese imports from the U.S. and U.S. im-
ports from Japan.
-- China' S policy with Japan is to do things step by step. China
does not exclude their contacts with others.
? Since liberation, China has never ceased exchanges with Japan,
and has been able to increase understanding in areas of contact.
In other areas, there is still quite a large amount of prejudice.
- In the case of a Sino-Soviet war, there may be countries
from the east that would like to fish in troubled waters.
? Japan is at a crossroads. China is not in favor of Dulles' US-
Japan Security Treaty. But proceeding from the present situation,
China did not touch on that when it established relations with Japan.
Japan's economic development will inevitably bring with it an
ideology of military expansion. That is objective. The U.S.
fattened up Japan at the beginning, in order to prevent what it
saw as Communist expansion. The U.S. should not have let
Japan expand economically so unrestrictedly. But that is an
?
objective development that does not heed the Will of man. The
U.S. also gave aid, paid its own occupation expenses, and
encouraged investment and technical knowhow -- to make a
better impression on the Japanese people after the atom bomb.
-- What Japan has now is only an attempting, an ambition, but
they want to gain more independence out of this development.
Like when a young man grows up, he wants more freedom.
-- A spirit of restraint would be better, but Japan's economic base
doesn't allow it to restrain itself; it will compel it to develop.
-- The other Asian countries have learned their lesson about Japan,
and fear it. The Japanese have enough self-criticism to know
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(Chinese Position - Continued)
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that If they do not obey a spirit of restraint they will become
"ecofl?flLtc animals."
- -There is a way out for them but they refuse to take it. That
Is why they are trying to expand their investments abroad,
and why Siberia is so attractive to them.
Japan was afraid China would oppose the Siberian projects, but
China said it was for them to decide. A good thing that would
come from U.S. -Japanese cooperation. in Siberia is mutual
restraint on each other. Opposing it might have had bad results.
The U. S. ellzto-1.141 give consideration to trying to win over Japan.
We shOyid try to harness the trend and administer them into the
best chinnels.
China supports Japan's recovery of its northern islands. But the
Soviets pit a..P a ferocious front.
-- It is difficult to blame Japan because they have to rely on foreign
raw materials and foreign markets. And their present self-
defense capacity is limited, and they would meet both domestic
and International opposition if they tried to develop it.
- JaPan should not be allowed to enter Korea. China has told its
Korean friends that.
China agrees that the U.S. and China should both influence Japan
to develop good relations.
U.S, Position in February
The U.S. will cooperate with Japan and .Europe on all essential
matters. (to Mao)
-- It would be very dangerous if Japan and the Soviet Union formed
closer political relations. The U.S. is prepared to exchange
information with China on this. (to Mao)
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.0'viet relations aieamb1valent. But the Japanese
by the econornic possibilities in Russia. (to Mao)
welcome the Japanese-Chinese relationship. (to Mao) We
encouraged it.
to trade -- that it is for political, not commercial
is unlike the Japanese attitude.
- It is important that Japan be anchored with as many countries
as possible that have peaceful intentions.
The danger is that the very aggressive economic nationalism
that now: exists could in time become political nationalism and
even military nationalism. If they pursue their economic policy
so aggressively they could get sucked into arrangements in Siberia,
the Mideast, and Southeast Asia that could affect their interests.
-- In 1973, we will try to develop a common economic and military
policy with our European allies, and have a Summit to develop
a new Chaxter of our relations. We will ask Japan to participate
in the economic aspects of this.
- We wee with Ghouls analysis of the dangers. Why the U.S.
foresee the Consequence of Japan's industrial growth is
an interesting historical question; But the biggest danger is that
if XaP041, is, torn between too many conflicting pressures from too
many lti4its, they will, become more and more nationalistic. There-
fore on:Our side we Will not encoitrage them in an anti-Chinese
direction. We should jointly encourage them to develop [good]
relations.
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THEJOINTCHIEFSOFSTAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECREJA Y OF STATE
Subj: Visit to the PRC
THM:dfb
5 October 1973
Henry,
In view of your forthcoming trip to the PRC I wanted
to point out this intelligence item as a matter of possible
interest:
The senior Hungarian on the ICCS, MAGEN SZUCS, stated
on Saturday, 29 September, that the Soviets will not equip
North Vietnam with necessary supplies to mount a new
offensive providing the US does not build up GVN offensive
capabilities. The Soviets are satisifed with the "status
quo" in the Republic of Vietnam and do not want to
jeopardize existing US/USSR relations. Local fighting
4941/ will, most likely, continue.
He emphasized that continued stability in the Republic
of Vietnam also depended on our ability to get similar as-
surances from the PRC. The Hungarians do not know what
the PRC is now providing to North Vietnam.
imam
T. H. MOORER
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY
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BRIEFING PAPER
TOP SECRET/NODTS
LAOS
fie_ 194/04e z
I. Background and Developments Since February 1973
With the conclusion of the agreement between the
Royal Lao Government (RLG) and the Lao Patriotic
Forces (LPF), Laos is not an issue between the U.S.
and the PRC. Following the signing of the peace agree-
ment on February 21, a cease-fire took hold rather
quickly and the RLG and LPF have continued by and
large to observe it. During the post-agreement period,
negotiations on a Protocol continued at a slow pace until
the end of July, when it appeared that agreement had
been reached. At that time right-wing pressure on
Souvanna forced the re-opening of several issues.
Efforts by the American Embassy and the after-effects
of an abortive coup on August 20 moved things back on
track and on September 14 the Protocol to the agreement
was signed by both sides. The Protocols are beginning
to be implemented: both sides have named their repre-
sentatives to the Joint Commission to Implement the
Agreement (JCIA) and the first LPF troops and cadre
have arrived in Vientiane to prepare for the neutrali-
zation of that city and Luang Prabang. The next most
important steps will be the formation of the coalition
government and the simultaneous? start of the 60-day
period for the withdrawal of "foreign troops."
Recently implementation of the Agreement has been
obstructed -- at least temporarily -- by the LPF's
refusal to convene the JCIA to establish procedures
for monitoring LPF troop deployments to the capital.
On October 18 the RLG suspended arrivals in Vientiane;
however, on October 25 a compromise was reached,
"informal" meetings of the JCIA have been held, and
LPF arrivals have baen scheduled beginning November 3.
T.SECRET/I;CDIS
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TOP SECRET/NODIS
A. Military Situation
Since February 21, the RLG forces (FAR) and the
LPF forces (LPA) have observed the ceasefire to a large
degree. Reported incidents have averaged less than ten
a week for the past several months, with virtually no
casualties. The FAR,
number approximately 80,000, compared
to 30,000 in the LPA. The FAR could probably cope with
the LPA if the LPA did not have NVA support.
North Vietnam has removed few, if any, of its
forces so far (as of November 1) and we have no indi-
cations of intentions to do so in the near term.
Intelligence estimates that a major road system of
300 miles through the Panhandle is under varying stages
of construction and at the present rate could be completed
by next spring. Infiltration continues from North Vietnam
through Laos to South Vietnam; more than 65,000 NVA troops
have moved through the pipeline in the last nine months.
Although we have no clear indications of NVA inten-
tions in Laos, the following may be considered a
reasonable estimate. There are three types of NVA
forces in Laos: combat units, transportation units,
and advisors and technicians associated with the LPA.
There are approximately 24,300 personnel in combat
units, 32,300 in transportation and administrative units
and an unknown number (but probably about 5,000) serving
as advisors and technicians. The NVA may well remove
most of the combat troops, since in most cases they
would be capable of returning in 24-48 hours from North
Vietnam to their present positions. Up to 50% of the
transportation units could be moved from the Panhandle
across the Annamite Chain to northern South Vietnam,
where another road net is in use. We judge few if any
of the technicians or advisors would leave their LPA
units.
B. The Protocol
Summary of Provisions: The Protocol signed
September 14, provides details for implementing pri-
marily the military provisions of the February Agree-
ment. The major provisions of the Agreement, such as
TOP SECRET/NODIS
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TOP SECRET/NODIS 3
the release of POWs and the withdrawal of all foreign
troops within 60 days of the investiture of the new
coalition government (PGNU), the cessation of military
activity and the prohibition against aerial recon-
naissance, are essentially only restated in the Protocol.
The Protocol identifies 27,demarcation points between the
two sides and establishes the means of neutralizing the
two capitals, to be enforced by a Joint Police Force
(JPF) of 1,000 from each side in Vientiane and 500 from
each side in Luang Prabang. All RLG military are to be
withdrawn from the two cities except for one battalion
in Vientiane and two companies in Luang Prabang--the
LPF will station troops in equal numbers in the two
cities. With regard to POWs, the Protocol calls on
both sides to report the number of those captured,
indicating nationality, and a list of those who died
in captivity (DIC) within 15-30 days of the signing of
the Protocol. As of November 1, two weeks past the
deadline, neither side has complied with this require-
ment to our knowledge. The details of implementation
are to be directed by the Joint Commission to Implement
the Agreement (JCIA).
The political provisions of the Protocol apportions
the portfolios of the new PGNU between the two sides,
giving Education, Defense, Interior, Finance and
Public Health to the RLG, and Foreign Affairs, Public
Works, National Economy, Information and Religious
Affairs to the LPF. Posts and Telecommunications and
Justice will be headed by "qualified persons" acceptable
to both sides. The new PGNU, when formed, will work
with the Joint National Political Council (JNPC) which
is to be composed of 16 persons from each side and 10
"qualified persons."
Status of Implementation: The first groups of
LPF to man the JCIA and the Joint Police Force have
arrived in Vientiane, and Luang Prabang. The PRC has
shown interest in these implementation activities, and
provided airlift for the groups going to Luang Prabang.
The LPF personnel have been working with their RIG
counterparts, primarily in clearing up logistical and
administrative problems created by the impending
arrival of the LPF implementation teams.
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A controversy over monitoring of LPF arrivals by
the JCIA has obstructed implementation of the Agree-
ment since October 18. The Pathet Lao have sought to
delay the workings of the JCIA until all their security
and administrative personnel are safely ensconced in
the capital cities. The JCIA has therefore been unable
to monitor LPF arrivals and the RLG military have become
gravely alarmed. On October 18 they persuaded Souvanna
to halt further LPF arrivals until the JCIA meets to work
out the requisite procedures. On October 25 the LPF
reportedly agreed to a compromise, "informal" meetings
of the JCIA have been held, and LPF arrivals are
scheduled to recommence November 3.
Meanwhile, Pathet Lao sources in Vientiane have
let it be known that establishment of the new coalition
must await full neutralization of the capital cities.
The PGNU therefore is not expected to be formed before
late November at the earliest, and one Communist source
has speculated that investiture could be delayed until
year's end. In order to work out the method whereby
Souvanna can obtain some sort of tacit approval of the
Agreement and Protocol by the National Assembly (which
the LPF does not recognize), he has obtained the consent
of the King to extend the Assembly's current session
until early November. If there is further delay beyond
that time, Souvanna would have to reconvene the Assembly
to get its approval. The JNPC has also not yet been
formed.
As the ceasefire has taken hold, the US presence
in Laos has been reduced. The remaining military ele-
ments of the Attache office, with the exception of
those recognized by the RLG in the newly-established
MO, and the Thai SGUs fall in the category of "foreign
troops" that must be withdrawn under the provisions of
Agreement and Protocol. Recommendations on the phased
withdrawal of these personnel have been submitted by
the WSAG--from 17 to 10 battalions in the first 40-day
period after investiture and the rest in the context of
future NVA withdrawals mentioned below. Aerial recon-
naissance by the US is continuing, in technical vio-
lation of the Agreement and Protocol. We have been in
frequent contact with the UP on the subject of MIAs
and POWs, and have been assured repeatedly that the LPF
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will cooperate fully once the new PGNU has been formed.
The LPF acknowledge they hold only one prisoner
(civilian pilot Emmet Kay) and have cautioned that they
may not be able to provide very much information on MIAs.
We know of cases of Americans who were seen in captivity
in Laos who have not been,released, and we have told the
LPF that we expect information on their fate.
With the formation of the JCIA and as the implemela-
tation of the capitals' neutralization and other pro-
visions is proceeding, the role to be played by the
ICC/Laos has become the subject of renewed interest.
The Commission has been relatively inactive in
recent years, and the terms of the Lao Agreement and
Protocol restrict it more than did the 1962 Geneva
Accords. The ICC/Laos is now subordinate to the Lao
JCIA, which can only act unanimously. While it is true
that the JCIA could well hamstring the ICC/Laos, both
Lao parties have assured Commission members that it has
an independent role to play, and that they hope it can
bP hPlpful in implemPnting thp spi71-117-ment. LPF rwpre-
sentatives on the JCIA are also lower-ranking than
originally expected, and this may indicate a downplaying
of the JCIA role.
India and Poland have indicated interest in the
reactivation of the ICC/Laos, while Canada has taken a
more cautious approach. Still smarting from their
unhappy experience in Vietnam with the ICCS, the Cana-
dians are concerned with the ambiguity of the Commission's
role under the Agreement and Protocol. They are awaiting
an official request from the Lao parties and a clearly-
defined role for the Commission before making their
final decision to participate. The ICC/Laos also needs
financial.as well as moral support from all the Geneva
powers. The PRC has not contributed to the Commission
for some years, but the Indian ICC Comptroller in
Vientiane has told us that last June in Hanoi the PRC
gave him assurances that they would contribute if the
ICC is reactivated and its role expanded. Their
assistance in providing airlift for the LPF contingent
to Luang Prabang may be an indication that they would
be willing to offer similar support to the ICC. Both
Geneva Co-chairmen, UK and USSR, are making efforts to
provide support for the ICC, and the USG provided an
additional contribution of $110,000 for the remainder
of this calendar year.
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? Both the Agreement and the Protocol stress that
decisions in implementation and conducting the business
of the new government must be made on the basis of
unanimity. Although it has yet to be demonstrated
how this will work, both the RLG and the LPF have
demonstrated at least some willingness to compromise
throughout the negotiations that have led to the present
political settlement. If the same spirit of cooperation
continues, prospects for the settlement holding are good.
Souvanna was the key element in bringing the opposing Lao
factions together and his continued presence and in-
fluence will strongly effect the outcome of the settle-
ment. The most likely disruptive factors are the inten-
tions of the DRV (discussed below) and renewed rightist
opposition. On the latter, the USG has firmly stated to
all interested parties its support for the Prime Minister
and the negotiated settlement. While we cannot guarantee
that no incidents will mar the peace in the future, this
strong stand by the USG should go a long way in discoura-
ging further rightist attempts to sabotage the Agreement.
C. DRV Policy
Given the DRV's historical strong interest in Laos,
particularly mountainous eastern Laos which borders North
Vietnam, and the dependence of the leading personalities
of the LPF on the Lao Dong Party the North Vietnamese
will almost certainly continue their strong efforts to
achieve ascendancy in Laos. For these historical,
political, and security reasons, Hanoi will continue to
seek hegemony over Laos as a longer term goal and seek
in the shorter term to diminish what it considers to be
hostile foreign predominance in Lao affairs. These
goals, however, do not preclude the possibility of
removing of significant military forces from Laos for
tactical purposes. Hanoi sees the Panhandle in southern
Laos as a vital link in its chain of support to its
apparatus in South Vietnam and Whatever its tactical
plan is for the rest of Laos, it will almost certainly
maintain control of this area.
TOP SECRET/NODIS
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D. PRC Views
Peking has publicly welcomed the Agreement, and,
through its airlift assistance to the LPF implementation
personnel and its stated intention' to support a reacti-
vated ICC/Laos, seems to have indicated that it will
play a more active role in post-ceasefire Laos. In
Vientiane there have been indications (such as the recent
Chinese-hosted farewell party for the American ARMA) of
increased PRC diplomatic activity. We do not know
whether the PRC urged Hanoi and the LPF to conclude the
Agreement with the RLG, but public statements made after
the signing and during the visits of LPF delegations 'to
Peking indicate Chinese support for the political settle-
ment.
There are presently an estimated 29,000 Chinese
working on and defending the road complex in northern
Laos. While there are no firm indications of plans to
bridge the Mekong, work is taking place on the airfield
at Munng gal_ and i-l-nop q111tel-s arc3 heing h113.1i- ner,11-
Pak Beng. Portions of the road were evidently damaged
during the rainy season, and it appears that some
engineering troops may be withdrawn once the repair
work is completed. Peking has remained silent regarding
the ultimate disposition of the complex or the withdrawal
of their personnel. However, now that the Protocol is
signed, the PRC may realize that the continued presence
of its construction personnel and anti-aircraft troops
will appear increasingly anomalous, particularly if the
DRV withdraws its forces. Peking's holding or extending
the road will also hamper its efforts to improve its
relations with Thailand--particularly since the roads
substantially increase access from China to the Thai
border. The Thai expressed their concern about the
Chinese road to you when you visited Bangkok last
February.
E. USSR Policy
The Soviet Union in Laos seeks to block the exten-
sion of PRC influence in Southeast Asia by enhancing
the Soviet position with the RLG and the LPF, as well
TOP SECRET/NODIS
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as the North Vietnamese. Within this context the
Soviets probably see a return to stability in Laos
in accordance with the Geneva Agreements as assisting
in this purpose and are prepared to act to this end.
The Soviets, for example, were of significant assis-
tance in early September in getting the military com-
ponents of the two Lao sides together to work out
certain military problems in the draft Protocol.
Current Issues
While Laos is an important factor in the Indochina
situation, it is not a significant point of contention
between the US and the PRC. While you will be able to
discuss Laos in the context of the similarity of our
objectives, the discussion will also provide an
opportunity to
-- Impress on the PRC that we fully support the
Laos Agreement and view its implementation as an important
component of stability in Indochina.
-- Gain an understanding of Chinese views regarding
DRV intentions in Laos, with the objective of enlisting
Chinese support on NVA troop withdrawals.
-- Determine Chinese intentions concerning their
road network in northern Laos.
-- Encourage Chinese support for a revitalized
ICC/Laos.
III. Talking Points
-- Like you, we are gratified that the agreement
was reached. I want to impress on how how important
this agreement is in the broader effort to achieve
stability in Indochina. You know how hard we worked
behind the scenes to support Souvanna Phouma in his
efforts to conclude the agreement.
TOP SECRET/NODIS
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-- We know that Souvanna Phouma wants to make the
agreement work and he has our full support in this
endeavor. Towards that same end, the US will do every-
thing it should and can do.
-- We expect the LPF and Hanoi will also live up
to the agreement. In this regard, we encourage you
to use your influence with Hanoi to get it to remove
its forces from Laos, as called for in both the agree-
ment and the Protocol.
-- I would be very interested in your under-
standing of North Vietnamese intentions in Laos.
-- We will welcome your thoughts regarding any-
thing either of us can do to improve the prospects for
the agreement to lead to a permanent solution of the
Laos problem.
I would like to suggest a specific contribution
that I feel our two countries can make to stability in
Laos. As a participant in the 1962 Geneva Conference,
the PRC has an interest in seeing the ICC/Laos play a
useful role in Laos. I understand that one of your
representatives expressed your interest in a reactivated
and expanded ICC/Laos to Indian representatives on the
Commission. We welcome your support both in resources
and in your influence on the parties concerned, and we
welcome your thoughts on how the ICC/Laos can be made
more useful in stabilizing the peace in Laos. I can
assure you that the USG will support any efforts to
make the ICC/Laos more effective-
-- Now that the Laos agreement has been raised
what are your intentions with regard to your presence
in Laos? As you know, once the new government is formed,
all foreign forces are to be withdrawn within sixty days.
-- As you know, the Thai and many of the Lao, are
concerned about your road construction in northern Laos.
What are your intentions in this matter?
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Laos
Drafted: EA/LC:SBThomsen:BDPorter
10/13/73 X 21449
Clearances:
EA - Mr. Hummel
EA/PRCM - Mr. Armstrong
NSC - Mr. Stearman
NSC - Mr. Adams
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?
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I,' r r?I ???? ? ir
t.
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE INFORMATION
November 1, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: RICHARD H. SOLOMON
SUBJECT:
Director Ikle's Memorandum Suggesting Arms
Control Issues for Possible Discussion in Peking
At Tab A is a memorandum to you from Fred &le', Director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, in which he suggests a number of
issues you might wiSh to discuss with Chinese leaders during your
Peking trip:
-- He suggests the Chinese may be concerned about the "provocative
attack" argument detailed in John Newhouse's study of Salt I (Cold Dawn),
and that they might welcome your views on this issue.
He details a number of issues related to Salt II -- the way we appear
to have used our new relationship with Peking to gain arms control
agreements with the Soviets, and the way that the "FBS" issue will
influence Soviet deployments against them -- where you might clarify
our position to them.
-- He proposes that a "hot-line" arrangement with the PRC might be
useful as a way of exchanging time-sensitive information about
Soviet military actions directed against China, thus in effect enhancing
their inadequate early warning system. He also suggests that we can
make Skylab high resolution "earth resource survey satellite"
photographs available to them through normal commercial channels
(they are already purchasing low-resolution ERTS photographs) in
order to heighten the accuracy of their targeting on Soviet sites --
thus increasing the effectiveness of their deterrent against the
Russians.
-- He suggests .a number of non-proliferation activities where we might
elicit tacit or even active PRC support.
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS 5(b) BYAUTH Sec Kissinger
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IUr 00011C1 4t
This document consists of ..... ..........
Nutber i of ... __copies, Series .....
A.
:UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
wAs.timpToN
CIFFICEOF
THE1:44Frusitt
ACDA-, 6383
40,04-1,1
4 -
Ht
October 22, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. HENRY KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: Your Trip to Peking: Arms Control Aspects
For the sake of brevity, I am omitting the more
obvious ideas, such as:
? explaining to the Chinese our approach to
SALT and MBFR, and perhaps offering to keep
them informed;
? suggesting technical discussions on nuclear
weapons safety (in which Vice Foreign Minister
Chiao Kuan-hua expressed some interest to
visiting U.S. scholars);
? raising the possibility of conventional arms
limitations for Korea.
Instead, let me briefly list some items that may be
less obvious.
Chinese Concerns About SALT After Newhouse's Book
The publication of John Newhouse's book last spring
might have influenced Chinese assessments of SALT, pro-
vided they regard John's account as fairly authentic.
For example:
-- Peking's intelligence specialists will have
combed through the "provocative attack" part
and compared it with related points that we
CLASSIFIED BY pc I
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY #3
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON ......... .....
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-2-
--and perhaps the Russians--might have made
to tifem separately. On this, for them, most
sensitive aspect of SALT, they will presumably
try to integrate all available sources.
Newhouse's point that progress toward the
Berlin agreement was influenced by your trip
to Peking, plus his more general points
regarding the effect of triangular politics
on SALT, might strengthen a Chinese belief
that we now need detente arrangements with
them in order to cope with the seemingly
stronger Soviet position in SALT II.
The Newhouse book, in combination with the
Congressional hearings on SALT I, will tend
to portray our conceptual approach to SALT
as centering on the Soviet disarming strike
against the US, with no apparent concern for
the Sino-Soviet strategic relationship. With
this in mind, the Chinese might be worried as
to how the "FBS" issue will be dealt with in
SALT II: Will SALT II free Soviet military
resources against China? Will Soviet IR/MRBMs
and medium bombers be shifted from Europe to
the Far East because of an "FBS" deal? Etc.
Given the continuing, serious impasse on FBS
in SALT II, I would advise against committing
ourselves further to our resent FBS position
in conversations with the Chinese.
Our Greater Knowled?e About Soviet Forces 25X1
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Thus, we might pick-up warning of a Soviet surprise
attack on China hours before the Chinese could (depend-
ing, of course, on how the Soviets prepared such an
attack). And given that a large portion of the Chinese
strategic forces will continue to consist of bombers,
hours of advance warning could be used by them to reduce
the vulnerability of their forces significantly. Yet,
if it were a matter of hours only, ordinary communica-
tions channels would not permit us to convey such
warning to them.
This possibility puts the old idea of a Peking-
Washington hotline into a new light. As to whether
or not you wish to stimulate Chinese interest in a
hotline depends, of course, on broader. considerations
(such as its impact on Moscow). But if you should wish
to raise the idea in Peking, the fact that the hotline
might enable us to transmit warning of a possible Soviet
attack could be a powerful argument. It seems to me,
this trilateral argument would carry more weight in
Peking than the traditional bilateral reason for a
hotline: a device to manage crises or accidents between
the two capitals it connects. Of course, the value of
all this, for us and for them, would be to increase
deterrence of an attack.
You are aware that the Chinese have bought up
(through a cover) NASA "earth resource" photographs
(ERTS) of Soviet regions adjacent to them. If they
followed up by acquiring also the commercially available
computer tapes, they could improve their current target
information of the USSR. We have so far avoided taking
Skylab pictures over these regions, but if we did, this
would offer the Chinese pictures of at least 10 times
the resolution available from ERTS on an open "commer-
cial" basis.
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The question as to whether we want to strengthen
China's deterrent against Russia, of course, depends
on our overall concern regarding the Sino-Soviet rela-
tionship. But if we should some day wish to do so, we
would surely want to avoid enhancing, at the same time,
China's capability against us. The above measures
(especially the hotline) would meet this requirement,
whereas general technical assistance, such as facili-
tating Chinese acquisition of computer technology,
would not.
China's Interest in Non-proliferation
It seems doubtful that the Chinese are sufficiently
concerned about the Indian and a possible Japanese deve-
lopment of nuclear weapons to overcome their opposition
to the nuclear test ban, or to make them openly support
the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But more tacit Chinese
support for non-proliferation seems less unlikely. For
example:
Continued toleration IAEA safeguards of
Taiwan's facilities even though Taiwan was
expelled from the IAEA. (Taiwan representa-
tives have recently sought to obtain a reactor
fuel re-processing facility from the US; we
continue to rebuff these efforts.)
Discreet support for the 1975 review conference
for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the prepara-
tions of which are now beginning in the UN and
IAEA.
A reconsideration, in the more distant future,
of Peking's attitude towards the atmospheric
test ban (which would, of course, be dependent
on the possibility of US-Soviet agreement on
a threshold ban or comprehensive ban).
FrecV. Ikle
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