SRG MEETING ON CHILE, NOVEMBER 18

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-460-5-7-8
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: November 17, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DOS, OSD, JCS,
NSS reviews
completed.
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Richard T. Kennedy V'
Arnold Nachmanoffikl?,
November 17, 1970
SUBJECT: SRG Meeting on Chile, November 18
This will be the first meeting to get our new policy moving. The
NSDM which is the basis for the policy is at Tab. A 40-Committee
on this subject is scheduled to follow the Senior Review Group meet-
ing.
State has prepared a paper (Tab-State Paper) which outlines where
we stand and some proposed actions. It also rasies for decision (a)
public statement, (b) congressional briefings, (c) a proposed mes-
sage dealing with continued US military presence and assistance,
and (d) a proposed position on continuation of Peace Corps.
We recommend that you ask Mr. Meyer (Chairman of the Ad Hoc
Group) to bi_istly summarize where we areL what has been done
and what he proposes.
We recommend that you then proceed through the agenda of the
meeting covering the following major topics;
1. Diplomatic Steps
2. Economic Measures
3. Military Steps
4. Peace Corps
5. Public and Congressional Posture
Your talking points which follow proceed in this order. You will
want to drive home the following points.
a. We need a fully fleshed-out action program with all of the policy
ramifications considered, and
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
b. All steps must be cleared through the interagency mechanism
(cables should be cleared by the White House).
. Diplomatic Steps
?f- 0/4 (5 ?
a. Approaches to the OAS - The US in a November 13 statement
reaffirmed adherence to the OAS Resolution on Cuba sanctions.
Chile has reestablished relations with Cuba and is exchanging
representation. State proposes to "take careful soundings on
prospects for constructive statements within the OAS forum"
and is urging Latin American governments to make unilateral
V' public statements along the lines of our own.
-- Have any specific steps been taken or are they planned?
With which governments? What has been the reaction of the
Latin American governments?
- Who are we approaching with what kind of statements (State
has sent a cable to all Latin American Posts - Tab A)?
What do we expect them to say or do in the OAS? What are
the prospects for any kind of resolution? Do we want one?
Specifically what do we propose to say in the OAS? Should
we take the lead?
(We need to get specific on these points. We need also to have
a clear definition of precisely what we are trying to achieve.
Generalized approaches are not likely to produce the kinds of
specific results we want.)
b. Spreading the word about Chile - State is proposing to provide
"selected" Latin American Governments information on Chile's
links with subversion in other countries and to encourage them
to adopt a posture similar to ours.
? To whom is the information being provided, and what do we
expect them to do with it?
c. Consultations with Key Governments, particularly Argentina
and Brazil to coordinate efforts on Chile - State is preparing
and instruction for such consultations and the Ad Hoc Working
Group plans to meet promptly to consider how to increas
efforts to maintain relations with friendly military leaders.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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-- What specifically do we plan to tell the Brazilians and
Argentines, and what do we expect them to do? When will
the instruction be ready?
What specific steps will the Ad Hoc Group consider to in-
crease ties with the military? Could we have a detailed report in
two weeks? (Ask Adm. Moorer for his views.)
-- Is the military in Brazil and Argentina, for example,
likely to want to--or be able to?influence the Chilean
military in any significant way? (You may wish t o ask
for a detailed report on these diplomatic efforts within
two weeks.)
2. Economic Step!,
a. IDE lending to Chile -2Loans for Chile are awaiting action by the
IDE Board of Directors--a total of $11.6 million for two uni-
versities; another $8. 6 million loan for agriculture research an
extension may be ready during December. State is exploring
proceduralpossibilities for delay or veto of the loans, and will
prepare a recommendation for action. In the interim, the
Executive Director will take the position that he is uninstructed
and, therefore, effectively block action on the loans. (State Paper Tab B)
-- What steps are we taking to coordinate our taefics with other
friendly Latin countries in order to reduce our unilateral
visibility?
-- You want to emphasize that no new loans are to be approved;
if there is any question about a specific case, it should be
brought back to the SRG.
? What steps are being taken to limit Chile's access to credits
from other international financial institutions?
b. Economic Assistance to Chile - State has issued instructions
to withhold new commitments of AID loans, investment guaran-
tees, and Ex-Im Bank loans and guarantees. State is preparing
recommendations on how to handle investment guarantee prob-
lems when the GOC begins to nationalize US property.
-- What is being done to determine how we can defer or cut off
existing commitments if that becomes necessary?
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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-- What provisions of law are applicable if Chile resumes
trade with Cuba, or establishes trade with North Korea
(as they recently announced they would)? At what point
do these provisions become applicable?
-- When can we have State's recommendations on how the
U. S. Government should react to the first incidents
of Chilean nationalization of U.S. property?
State has briefed the AFL-CIO and the staff of the Council
of the Americas and several companies interested in Chile
on an off-the-record basis.
-- What specifically has been said in the briefings to labor ...
and business leaders? What have we suggested that they
do about Chile, if anything?
\\
? What are State's plans for systematically briefing Amen- \ \_:,
can business on the situation in Chile and our approach?
Is the Commerce Department involved?
TOP SECRE T/SENSITIVE
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3. Military Steps
a. Military Presence
Our small military mission (approximately 17 men) is still
in Chile. It offers a means of continued close contact with
the Chilean military and we will want to keep it there for
this purpose as long as we can. But it is there under the
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1952 and a Military
Mission Agreement of 1964. The Chilean Defense Minister
has stated that the Government of Chile will study all military
agreements and the decision as to whether the US mission
remains is a decision for the two governments. The question
is whether we should force the issue of a reaffirmation of
those agreements by the Allende Government. We may have
much to gain by the continued contact with the Chilean military.
If we force their hand now, we might cause a break. On the
other hand if we push the Chilean military to press for continuance,
the chance of success might increase and, if Allende refuses,
the discontent of the military might increase. State has a
proposed cable at Tab D - State Paper. It would have the
military go in and raise the question now. (We recommend you
not clear the cable at the meeting.)
? Do we gain more by pushing this issue ourtLelves or by
waiting for the Allende Government to raise it with us?
-- The Service Chiefs seem to want us to stay. Will we make
it more difficult for them to maneuver if we give them what
seems to be a demand for an early final decision?
-- Should this be handled by our military with the Chilean
military or by Korry with the Minister of Defense or Allende
(whatever is done we believe should be done initially at
least by the military).
b. Military Assistance (Tab E - State Paper)
-- There are twenty M-41 light tanks funded under a Credit Sale
in FY 69 which have been overhauled and are ready for shipment
to Chile. The Chileans also have expressed interest in purchasing
three C-47 aircraft, three C-130s and eleven F-5s on a commercial
basis. The C-130s and F-5s would not involve any USG financing
but would require decisions on export licenses. If we are
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responsive we would strengthen our hand with the Chilean
military, increase Chile's dependence on US spares and
replacements, and preempt Communist suppliers with this
type of equipment; but we would also strengthen Allende's
forces and perhaps confuse some of our Latin American
friends and generate pressures for more military assistance
from others. If we are unresponsive we would disassociate
ourselves from strengthening Allende's forces and avoid the
disadvantages of confusing our friends or generating demands
for assistance from them; but we would alienate Chile military,
reduce our influence with them, and perhaps turn them to
Communist sources of supply.
-- What should we do about the tanks? How long can we hold
up this delivery?
-- Will the aircraft sales be possible without credit assistance
(allegedly the Chileans will not require new USG financing
but they may require some sort of financing assistance
from the suppliers -- would we be willing to encourage or
permit this?)
-- Can we sell the aircraft and not deliver the tanks?
-- What will the real effect be on our Latin American friends?
Can we explain this to them?
-- Can we deal with the question of continued deliveries of
these proposed sales without having first resolved where
we stand with respect to the military assistance agreements?
4. Peace Corps (Tab F - State Paper)
We have 17 Peace Corps volunteers who will complete training in
the U.S. on December 12 and then are scheduled to go to Chile.
There are 92 volunteers now in Chile who will complete their tours
between now and the end of 1971. The question is whether we should
send the new volunteers either when they are ready in December or
at some later time or not send them at all. If we hold off until we
get Allende's confirmation of the request for them, which his
predecessor gave us, we leave the initiative to Chile. This would
put the onus for whatever decision is finally reached on Allende
but could result in a growing press campaign with a highly
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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emotional content. If we decide now not to send them we would
probably face early termination of the entire program and lose
the opportunity for continuing contact in Chile; we would be open
to the charge that we were taking punitive action and seeking to
worsen relations.
-- Is there any real hope that the program will continue?
-- Do we want to keep the Peace Corps in Chile?
? Will our actions on the 17 new volunteers have any important
bearing on the 92 now in Chile?
Can we afford to hold off and if so for how long?
. Public Position
State asked for approval of a statement (which is at Tab C of the
State paper) which could be drawn upon to answer questions on
Chile. DOD has proposed some alternative language.
-- What is it we want to get across.--or avoid--in a public statement?
-- While something undoubtedly will have to be said before long,
it is probably desirable to say the least amount necessary.
-- I suggest that we say something along the following lines:
"The new President has taken office in accordance with Chilean
iconstitutional procedures. We have no wish to prejudge the
future of our relations with Chile but naturally they will de-
pend on the actions which the Chilean Government may take
toward the United States and the inter-American system. We
will be watching the situation carefully and by in close consul-
tation with other members of the OAS."
6. Consultations with Con_gress - State recommends high level
briefings of key Congressional leaders on our Chile policy.
? What do we want to accomplish by Congressional consultations?
Who should we talk to? How much can we tell them? Who
should do the briefings?
We need a well-thought out assessment of the pros and cons
of Congressional consultations, and a detailed strategy pro-
posal.
I r v. 1-1 ?-? tr. I "1"...."
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SECRET! SENSITIVE
Chile - Status Report on implementation of NSDM 93
A. Multilateral
1. OAS and Cuba. The Department of State isurging Latin
American governments to make unilateral public statements
along the lines of the U.S. statement of November 13, re-
affirming adherence to the OAS resolution on Cuba sanctions,
and is taking careful soundings on prospects for constructive
statements within the OAS forum. Circular telegramisent
November 15 is at Tab A.
2. Concern over Chile. The Department of State is pre-
paring to provide to selected Latin American governments overt,
and to the extent feasible,covert information on Chile's links
with subversion in other countries, to document the reasons for
our concern over Chile and to encourage other governments to
understand the U.S. posture and to adopt a similar one.
3. Consultation with key governments articularly Brazil
and Ar entina, to coordinate efforts on Chile. The Department
of State is preparing an instruction to selected posts for such
consultation and the AA Hoc Interagency Working Group on Chile
will meet promptly to consider haw' to increase efforts to
establish and maintain close relations with friendly military
leaders in the hemisphere.
4. IDB Lending, to Chile. The Department of State is
exploring with the U.S. Director of IDB and the Department of
the Treasury the procedural possibilities for delay or veto
of FSO loans to Chile, and will prepare a recommendation for
action. See Tab B for discussion.
B. Bilateral
1. Public Position. RECOMMENDATION: that approval be
given to the statement at Tab C, to be drawn upon on a con-
tingency basis by senior USG officials in responding to questions
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Group 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.
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2 -
on Chile. The Department of State has meanwhile given (on
November 12) an off-the-record briefing on Chile to
Mr. George Meany and other leaders of the AFL-CIO, and will
give on November 17 in New York similar off-the-record
briefings to the staff of the Council for the Americas and
to senior officers of Anaconda and other companies interested
in Chile. -
2. Consultations with the Congress. RECOMMENDATION:
that consideration be given to having high level briefings
of key Congressional leaders on our Chile policy, to insure
understanding of our posture, and with a view to easing
present legislative restrictions in economic and military
matters of special interest to Latin American governments,
with which we will be consulting closely on Chile; e.g.,
soluble coffee for Brazil, meat for Argentina, and reductions
in MAP and FMS availabilities in general. The Department of
State will prepare proposals for carrying out the consultations
with the Congress.
3. Military Assistance to Chile. RECOMMENDATION: that
approval be given to the proposed telegram to Embassy Santiago
at Tab D, instructing the Ambassador to begin moves which
will have the effect of forcing a decision from the GOC on
continued U.S. military presence. Discussion of existing and
potential requests by the Chilean military services for the
purchase of arms and equipment in the United States is at
Tab E. Note that the Chilean desire to buy three C-130's
and e16ven F-5's would not involve USG decisions on financing.
Decision would be required on export licensing and on
accommodating any FMS part of the sale (i.e. government
furnished equipment such as weapons) within the $75 million
area limitation on FMS and grant materiel articles for Latin
America.
4 Economic Assistance to Chile. The Department of
State has issued classified instructions to withhold until
further notice any new commitments of U.S. bilateral-
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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SECRET! SENSITIVE
-3-
assistance to Chile, including AID loans, AID Investment
Guarantees, and Eximbank loans and export guarantees. The
Department of State has in preparation recommendations on
courses of action on handling Investment Guarantee problems
which may arise when the GOC begins to nationalize U.S.
property.
5. Peace Corps. RECOMMENDATION: that the 17 PCV's
scheduled to go to Chile following completion of training
on December 12 be held back until the Allende government has
given some authoritative confirmation of the request for them
made by the previous government. We would make clear at the
working level that we would not be prepared to go ahead with-
out such reaffirmation. See Tab F for discussion.
C. Organizational
1. The Ad Hoc Interagcncy Working Group on Chile has
been organized and has begun its work under the chairmanship
of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs,
Charles A. Meyer.
2. The Department of State Country Director for Andean
and Pacific Affairs has been permanently assigned full time
to Chilean affairs, and has been provided an additional
Associate Director exclusively for Chile, and has been
designated as the central working-level point of coordination
for Chilean matters.
Attachments:
Tab A - Circular Telegram on OAS and Cuba
Tab B IDB Lending to Chile
Tab C - Proposed Public Statement on Chile
Tab D - Proposed Telegram to Embassy Santiago on
Military Relations
Tab E - Chilean Interest in U.S. Military Equipment
Tab F Peace Corps
SECRET! SENSITIVE
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CONFID7NT14L 403
PAGE 01 STATE 187197
85
ORIGIN ARA-20
INFO OCT-01 I0-13 EUR-20 CIAE-.00 DODE00 pm.OB. INR.08
L-04 NSAE-.02 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-Zi SS.20 uS1A612
NIC701 /121 R
66641
DRAFTED BY; ARA/ USOAS/ RAPOOLE
APPROVED BY:ARA/CHARLES A. MEYER
ARA/ USOAS-,. AMB. CATTO
ARA/,USOAS. MR FORD
ARA/ AP- MR FISHER
ARA/ CCA- MR ARENALES
01 266-1
P 152040Z NOV 70
FM SECSTATE WAsHDC
TO ALL AMERICAN REPUBLIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NY
/USCINCSO
CONFIDENTIALSTATE 1871.97
SUBJECT: RE- EbTABLISHMENT OF CHILE. CUBA RELATIONS
10 WE ARE .SURPRISED THAT CHILE'S ACTON IN RESTORING. RELATIONS:
WITH CUBA IN CONTRAVENTION OAS. DECISION HAS TO OUR KNOWLEDGE,
ELICITED PUBLIC REACTIONS FROM ONLY THREE OAS MEN,AER!
GOVERNMENTS TO DATE: COSTA RICA, COLOMBIA AND U.s.
2. ALL ACTION POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO DELIVER TO FOREIGN
MINISTRIES COPIES OF DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENT
OF NOVEMBER 13, QUOTED PARA 3, STATE 186923, AS FOLLOWS1
QUOTE
QUESTION; HAVE YOU ANY COMMENT ON THE ACTION OF CHILEAN!
GOVERNMENT IN DECIDING TO REESTABLISH RELATIONS wITW CLTAT
ANSWER; THIS IS A MATTER THAT CHILE ASA SOvEREIGN NATION
CAN, OF COURSE, DECIDE FOR ITSELF. 4E DEPLDRF. THE FACT,
HOWEVER, THAT CHILE HAS ACTED OUTSIDE 0/7i THr CONSULTATIVE
CONFIDENTIAL
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Department of State r..-1,-19 ?
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CONE IDEN1 AL
PAGE 0? STATE 187197
FRAMEWORK DECIDED IN 1964 BY THE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
FOR COLLECTIVE CONSIDERATION OF T--IE gUESTION OF CUBA BY
OASMEmBER STATES. TEAT mEETIN3 DETERMINED, B.7CAusE OF
CUBAN INTERVENTION AND-AG3RESSION, THAT DIPLOMATIC AND
TRADE RELATIONS. WITH CUBA WOULD BE SUSPENDED UNTIL THE
OAS COUNCIL DETERMINED By Tw07 THIRDS VOTE THAT CUBA NO,
LONGER POSED A THREAT TO THE PEAc7: AND SECURITY OF THE
HEMISPHERE. THE OAS COUNCIL HAS NOT AS YET mADE THIS'
DETERMINATION. WE, FOR 91..),i PART, PLA_-. To CONTINUE TO+ SUPPORT
EXISTING OAS DECISIONS AND RECOmm!---NDATIONS DN CUBA'
AND WE HOPE OTHER CAS mEmBERS.wILL CONTINUE To Do LIKE01SE.
UNQUOTE
3. IN INTERESTS PREVENTING FURTHER EROSION OAS'. CUBA
SANCTIONS, POSTA ARE REQUESTED TO DISCREETLY ENCOURAGE ?
..RESPECTIVE.GCVERN.METS TO MAKE simIEAR: UNILATgt-RAL. STATEMENTS:
REAFFIRmING. ADHERENCE NINTH MFM DECISIONS, INCLJDIG ?!
POSITION ?THAT SANCTIONS CAN PROPERLY BE MODIFIED ONLY THROUGH
OAS MECHANISM ESTABLISHED BY NINTH!. mFm-- 1417. BY flA01-THIRDS
DECISION OF (PERMANENT) cOUNCIL. STATEMENT CONFINED TO A
GOVERNMENT'S OWN POSITION WOULD BE: ADEyutTE IN CASES,7
WHERE THERE IS RELUCTANCE mAKE.DIRECT CRITICISM OF CHILE'S
ACTION AS U.S. DID.' (FOREGOING ACTION WOULD NOT APPLV OF COURSE
WHERE SATISFACTORY STATEMENTS ALREADY ? MADE, NOR ToHIEXIC0,.
PERU, BOLIVIA, TRINIDAD- ? TOBAGO, JAMAICA, BARBADOS OR GUYANA,
WHICH WE ASSUME WOULD NOT BE INTERESTED IN MA(ING STATEMENTS:).
4. FOR ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND, OBLIGATORY NATURE OF OAS
SANCTIONS (MEXICO'S NON- CO1PLIANcE AND CHILE'S REvERSAL
NOTWITHSTANDING) STEMS FROM FACTS THAT (A) MEASURES ADOPTED
BY RESOLUTION I OF NINTH mFM wERE TAKEN IN ACCORDACE
ARTICLES 6 AND 8.0F RIO TREATY AND (6) ARTICLE 2?' DF 1 TREATY
STATES THAT DECISIONS REQUIRING. APPLICATION OF MEASURES:
UNDER ARTICLE 8 ARE BINDING ON PARTIES TO TREATY EXCEPT
NO STATE ? REQUIRED' TO USE ARIED FORCE. wITHOUT'ITS CONSENT.
CHILE ITSELF RECOGNIZED OBLIGATORY NATURE WHEN IN 1964 IT
APPLIED sANCTIoN9. IT HAD VOTED AGAINST. (BARBADOs. AND
JAMAICA, WHILE OAS. MEMBERS, ARE .NOT SIGNATORIES RIO TREATY).?
S. AS FURTHER ARGUMENT FOR mAINTAININGOAS CUBA cANCTIONiS,.
YOU SHOULD REVIEW U.S. POSITION SET FORTH STATE .23858. IN ?
SUPPORT YOU SHOULD CITE (A) STATEMENT BY CUBAN MINISTER; OF
CONFIDENTIAL,
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PAGE 03 STATE
187197
CON.FIOFNTIAL
STATE CARLOS RAFAEL RooRispEz IN .SANTIAGO WHO ACCORDING!
TO NOV. 12 PRESS REPoRTS SAID THAT ROAD OF: ARMFo STRUGGLE"
OR " VIOLENT ANAY" CONTINUES TO SE ONLY ONE AVAILAP.LEi IN, LA
DESPITE EXCEPTIONAL CHILEAN CASE, WHICH COULD NOT E REPEATED
IN ANY OTHER LA COUNTRY; ANL) (B) CASTRO'S RrAFFIRmATIOM OF
HIS COMMITMENT TO SuPPORT REVOLUT/ON IN HIS SPEECH OF
APRIL 22: 1970.
6. SO FAR WE HAVE REPORTS
OF F0LLowiN3 Punic STATEmENTSI
(A) COSTA RICAN FONmIN GoNZALO FAcIO, W,10 CRITICIZED CHILEAN
ACTION AS VIOLATING OAS DECISION 4HICH STILL! IN EFFECT AND
AS WEAKENING INTER- AMERICAN SYSTEM SAID PROPER COURSE,
FOR CHILE WOULD HAVE SEEN TO CONVOKE DAS MEET IN TO REQUEST
RECONSIDERATIJN 1964 RESOLUTION; AND STATED GOCR WOULD
MAINTAIN AT ALL TIMES POsITIDN OF REPUDIATION CASTRO REGIME;
(S) COLOMBIAN FONMIN VAZQUEZ CARRIZOSA wHO SAID COLOMBIA, WHICH
HAD PLAYE0 IMPORTANT ROLE IN OAS DECISIONS .EXCLUDING
CUBA AND IMPOSING SANCTIONS,. DOES NOT WANT TO RESOLVE SITUATION
BY SETTING ASIDE MULTILATERAL PROCEDURES OF RIOT.Ri,-..ATY OR
WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT DECIS/ONS A NEW MFM MIGHT ADOPT:
(C) PERUVIAN FONMIN mERCADO AHO ADDRESSED PROBLEM OF CUBA'S
EXCLUSION FROM OAS RATHER THA'I SANCTIONS, STATING OAS
SHOULD REVIEW FORMER TO DETERMINE WHETHER REASONS -2,TILLEX1sT.
WE WOULD HOPE STATEMENTS ALONG LINES PARA 3 ABOUVE WOULD
AVOID SPECULATING ON PossieLE REcoNsipERATIoN BY OAS AS: INi
CASE VAZCUEZ AND MERCADO STATEMENTS.
7, YOUR CONVERSATIONS MAY ENGENDER RESPONSE OR OULT'RY RE
POSSIBILITY OF ADDRESSING MATTER IN OAS ITS;'1_17. IF ASKED,
YOU MAY SAY WE TOO HAVE BEEN WEIGHING PROS AND CoNS OF
POSSIBLE STATEMENTS IN OAS PERMANENT COUNCIL, BUT SOI FAR
HAVE NOT REACHED ANY POSITIVE CONCLUSION. WHATEVER THE
CONCLUSION, HOWEVER, THIS WOULD IN NO wAY VITIATE DESIRABILITY'
OF UNILATERAL STATEMENTS. OUR INTEREST OF COURSE IS TO
DISCOURAGE FURTHER EROSION, AS wE RECOGNIZE NOTHING
PRACTICABLE CAN BE DONE BY OAS TO REVERSE CHILEAN DECISION,
ESPECIALLY SINCE NOTHING wAS DONE IN MEXICAN CAS!,
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF STATEMENTS IN COUNCIL ARE; (A) FOR CHILEAN
REVERSAL TO PASS IGNORED IN OAS MIGHT GIVE IMPRESSION OAS
HAD LITTLE CONCERN AND MIGHT THUS ENCOURAGE OTHER DEFECTIONS;
CONFIDENTIAL
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OONFIDErTIAL
PAGE 04 STATE 187[97
(B) FOREGOING COULD (1E EFFECTIVELY COUNTERED BY FrRt.0
STATEm.ENTs BY AAJORITY OF mEMBERS, PARTICULARLY moRF!
IMPORTANT ONES,- ARGUMENTS ASAINST ARE: (A) THERE IS RISK
THAT ONLY A .FE, MIGHT SPEAK UP. WHICH WOULD CREATE EvEA
WORSE IMPRESSIDNi (B). TO t beCYfor
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CON VIZ FATIA
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SECRET
Statement on Chile
Tab C
Senior USG officials may on a contingency basis draw upon the
following statement in responding to questions on Chile:
President Allende and his government have the honor and the
responsibility of having taken office in accordance with
Chilean constitutional procedures.
There has been, we know, a great deal of speculation as to
what the new government will do, and we are aware of various
statements made over the past few years by President Allende
and his supporters regarding the United States and the
hemisphere. We believe, nevertheless, that future actions
are more important than past statements, and we have no wish
to prejudge the future of our relations with Chile.
The emergence anywhere in the world of a state h6st-41e to
the United States, or which violated the honored principles
upon which international amity and cooperation are based,
would clearly be a matter of concern to us.*
Chile has long had justification for pride in its traditional
political and intellectual freedoms, and of the very important
contributions it has made in the past to the furtherance of
an inter-American system based on mutual respect and coopera-
tion among independent nations. We would therefore expect
*DOD takes position that this paragraph should be replaced
by the following: "We would, however, view with grave concern
the adoption of policies, alliances or courses of action by
the Allende government that transformed a friendly country
into a state hostile to the United States or violated or
denigrated the honored principles upon which cooperation and
peace in the hemisphere are based.
. SECRET
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SECRET
that the policies which the new government pursues will
permit the continuation of the constructive relationships
which Chile and the nations of the hemisphere have so long
enjoyed.
SECRET
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SECRET
Proposed Telegram to
Action: Santiago
Limdis
Subject: Military Relations between US and Chile
Ref: Santiago 4864
JOINT STATE DEFENSE MESSAGE
1. Reftel reported that Mindef in Nov 10 press conference
stated that GOC will study all military agreements, and that
whether US military mission will remain is determination for
both governments to make.
2. This public statement seems to us to offer suitable oppor-
tunity for you to send the senior military members of your
mission to Chilean military service chiefs to convey following
message: (a) we have noted Mindef's statement; (b) we await
GOC's decision on reaffirmation of Mutual Defense Assistance
Agreement of 1952 and Military Mission Agreement of 1964;
(c) we desire to have effective cooperation with Chilean mil-
itary but our ability to do so depends upon the actions of the
GOC particularly with respect to the two agreements mentioned
above; (d) if the agreements are reaffirmed, we will continue
Milgrp training and other standard activities, continue de-
liveries of programmed MAP materiel, and consider applications
by Chile for arms purchases in the US on the same basis as such
SECRET
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-2-
applications would have been considered under the previous GOC
and in other American Republics.
3. After learning how Chilean military service chiefs react
to foregoing message we will decide whether and in what
context you should follow up with Fonmin or President
Allende. Unless you were to be called in by GOC specifically
to discuss military relations, or are specifically instructed
by us to raise subject with .GOC YOU: should avoid discussing
it with GOC officials. If it is decided to instruct you to
raise it with GOC, we would expect that it would be included
among a number of other subjects to avoid giving any erroneous
impression of anxiety on our part.
4. Whether conversation contemplated in preceding paragraph
initiated by us or by GOC we would expect it would provide a
good opportunity for you to be sure that new government is
fully and accurately aware of provisions of US legislation
regarding third-country trade with Communist countries, ex-
propriation of US property, ett., outline of which has already
been provided to you.
END
SECRET
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SECRET
CHILEAN INTEREST IN U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT
DISCUSSION:
Twenty M-41 light tanks, funded under FMS credit in FY
1969, have been overhauled and are ready for shipment. We
presently have a hold on the delivery of these tanks and they
are therefore incurring storage charges.
The local Chilean Military Mission on September 15
informed the USAF of its interest in the purchase of three
new or reconditioned C-47 aircraft.
The Chilean Air Force has informed a U.S. aircraft repre-
sentative in Santiago of its desire to purchase three C-130
aircraft and eleven F-5 aircraft on a commercial basis, and
the representative claims that the Chilean Air Force desires
our cooperation in effecting the purchase. With regard to
the possible purchase of F-5 combat jet aircraft, the USG
last May publicly announced that it was prepared to provide
this aircraft to several South American countries, including
Chile, if so requested. The Chilean Air Force jet combat
strength presently consists of seven pre-Korean War F-80C's
and 17 British Hawker Hunters of 1959 vintage, along with
five armed 1953 vintage British Vampire trainers. Peru and
Argentina, which could be expected to react to Chilean
acquisition of the supersonic F-5, already have larger and
superior combat jet inventories. Argentina reportedly is
prepared to purchase 14 supersonic French Mirages of which
Peru already has 16 in its inventory.
OPTIONS:
Tab E
(a) To be responsive to_present Chilean military requests
and any which may materialize in the near future.
Advantages: (1) this option would strengthen U.S. in-
fluence with individual members of the Chilean military
services and thus serve to harden resistance to Communist
domination of Chile; (2) it would increase Chilean dependence
SECRET
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2
on U.S. sources of supply for spares and replacements for
vitally important equipment; (3) it would preempt Communist
or other suppliers of this kind of equipment from such an
association with the Chilean military services; and (4) it
would arouse concerns in Peru which would hinder extension
by Allende of his influence in that country.
Disadvantages: (1) it would strengthen the military
force of the Allende government; (2) it could confuse and
dishearten some of our friends in other Latin, American
countries; (3) it could stimulate an arms race between Chile
and its neighbors; and (4) it would result in pressures on
the U.S. to assist the neighbors to obtain new military
equipment.
(b) To be unresponsive to present Chilean military
requests and any which may materialize in the near future.
Advdntages: (1) it would disassociate the U.S. from
any strengthening of the military force of the Allende govern-
ment; (2) it would reduce the likelihood of an arms race in
South America; (3) it would reduce the likelihood of pressures
coming on the U.S. from neighboring countries for assistance
in arms acquisition; (4) it would avoid confusing some
quarters of opinion in Latin America and elsewhere on our
attitude toward the Allende government.
Disadvantages: (1) it could alienate members of the
Chilean military and reduce our influence among them, and
might discourage their continued independence from Communist
Party attempts to dominate the government; (2) it could leave
an opportunity for a Communist or other supplier to sell the
equipment to Chile, gaining corresponding advantages therefrom;
and (3) it could stimulate the Chilean military to seek to
end their dependence on U.S. military equipment sources.
SECRET,
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SECRET
SITUATION:
Peace Corps
Tab F
There are currently 17 Peace Corps Volunteers in the United
States who, upon completion of their training on December 12,
are scheduled to go to Chile. They were recruited for spe-
cific locations in Chile (10 in forestry and 7 in fisheries)
by a Chilean who came to the U.S. for the purpose. The 92
volunteers presently in Chile are scheduled to complete
their tours at various times, none later than the end of
1971.
DISCUSSION:
There are three options:
1. Send the volunteers to Chile without further con-
sideration.
Hold off sending them until we receive some
authoritative confirmation of the request for
them made by the previous Chilean Government.
????
3. Determine unilaterally not to send them at all.
Option 1 is obviously unacceptable.
Option 2 leaves the initiative to the Chilean Government, and
allows us to avoid appearing over-interested in the matter.
It contain 's the danger, however, that we might have to wait
a long time before receiving an authoritative expression of
opinion, and that such an expression might only be made
after the matter had become a public issue surrounded by
emotional and inaccurate press comment. This alternative has
the advantage, however, of making Allende responsible for
whatever happens regarding the Peace Corps in the future.
For him to welcome additional volunteers would undercut the
potential for anti-Peace Corps attacks in the future, while
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-2-
his refusal to let the new ones in would place on him the
onus for the further down-turn in relations.
Option 3, on the other hand, would place the onus on us, and
could give some aid and comfort to those in Chile seeking to
benefit from charging us with responsibility for worsening
relations. It could unnecessarily reduce opportunities for
us to maintain people-to-people contacts and to preserve
some points of laeting influence at the grass roots.
RECOMMENDATION:
That we adopt option 2.
SECRET
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(iiJ' et,
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 7.0506
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
National Security Decision Memorandum 93
TO:
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
Director of Central Intelligence
November 9, 1970
SUBJECT: Policy Towards Chile
Following the discussion at the meeting of the National Security Council
on November 6, 1970, the President has decided that the basis for our
policy toward Chile will be the concept underlying Option C of the Inter-
agency paper submitted November 3, 1970 by the Department of State for
the consideration of the National Security Council as outlined in the guide-
lines set forth below.
The President has decided that (1) the public posture of the United States
will be correct but cool, to avoid giving the Allende government a basis
on which to rally domestic and international support for consolidation of
the regime; but that (2) the United States will seek to maximize pressures
on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability
to implement policies contrary to U.S. and hemisphere. interests.
Specifically, the President has directed that within the context of a publicly
cool and correct posture toward Chile:
-- vigorous efforts be undertaken to assure that other governments
in Latin America understand fully that the U.S. oFposes consolida-
tion of a communist state in Chile hostile to the interests of the
? United States and other hemisphere nations, and to the extent
possible encourage them to adopt a similar posture.
close consultation be established with key governments in Latin
America, particularly Brazil and Argentina, to coordinate efforts
to oppose Chilean moves which may be contrary to our mutual
interests; in pursuit of this objective, efforts should be increased
to establish and maintain close relations with friendly military
leaders in the hemisphere.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
? necessary actions be taken to:
a. exclude, to the extent possible, further financing assistance
or guarantees for U.S. private investment in Chile, including
those related to the Investment Guarantee Program or the
operations of the Export-Import Bank;
b. determine the extent to which existing guarantees and financing
arrangements can be terminated or reduced;
c. bring maximum feasible influence to bear in international
financial institutions to limit credit or other financing assistance
to Chile (in this connection, efforts should be made to coordinate
with and gain maximum support for this policy from other
friendly nations, particularly those in Latin America, with the
objective of lessening unilateral U.S. exposure); and
d. assure that -U.S. private business interests having investments
or operations in Chile are made aware of the concern with
which the U.S, Government views the Government of Chile and
the restrictive nature of the policies which the U.S. Government
intends to follow.
no new bilateral economic aid commitments be undertaken with the
Government of Chile (programs of a humanitarian ci,r private social
agency character will be considered on a cash by case basis);
existing commitments will be fulfilled but ways in which, if the U.S.
desires to do so, they could be reduced, delayed or terminated
should be examined.
The President has directed that the Director of the Office of Emergency
Preparedness prepare a study which sets forth the implications of possible
developments in world copper markets, stockpile disposal actions and
other factors as they may affect the marketing of Chilean copper and our
relationships with Chile.
The President also has directed that the Senior Review Group meet monthly
or more frequently as necessary to consider specific policy issues within
the framework of this general posture, to report actions which have been
taken, and to present to him further specific policy questions which may
require his decision. To facilitate this process the President has directed
the establishment of an Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group, comprising
representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of
Central Intelligence, and the President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs, and chaired by the representative ofthe Secretary of State, to
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
prepare options for specific courses of action and related .action plans for
the consideration of the Senior Review Group and to coordinate implementa-
tion of approved courses of action.
Henr A. Kissinger
cc: Secretary of the Treasury
Administrator, A. I. D.
Director, Office of Management and Budget
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Top cror-I, vir /q7N.qierrVF: /EYES ONLY
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NDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
November 19, 1970
MEMORANDUM TO THE WHITE HOUSE POLICE,
The following officials will be attending a meeting in the White
House Situation Room at 4:00 p.m. today:
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, State
Mr. Charles A. Meyer, State
Mr. William I. Cargo, State
Mr. David Packard, Defense
4Mr. G. Warren Nutter, Defense
Mr. Armistead I. Selden, Defense
, Defense
13 eta -Qgt C. OVV:11, St etZ.
Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, CIA
Mr. William Broe, CIA
IYht Ti?car?a4 Y-aa. irtecsF? , QIII
Adm.. Thomas H. Moorer, JCS
B/Gen. Joseph Belser, JCS
Maj. Michael D. Salmon, JCS (aide; will not be attending
meeting)
Chris Stickell
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