CIA ACTION PROPOSALS FOR CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-38-4-21-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: August 31, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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? OUTS. THE''SYSTEM
MEMORANDUM
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MORI C05079708
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
SUBJECT:
?)
AvIgust,t31, 1973 -
//'
MR. KISSING
RICHARD T. KE DY
WILLIAM L. STEARMANIJ
CIA Action Proposals for Cambodia;
ft .4 44,
I
/
Bill Colby sends you suggested measures to be taken in Cambodia if the GKR
weathers the next few weeks of military action. (Tab A). After this period
prospects for the survival of the GKR will be good enough to consider additional
temedial action. The paper, surrn-narized below, suggests such action.
The Problem.
-- The Khmer Communists may now be undertaking the military offensive
to destroy the GKR as a functioning entity. Our mission in Phnom Penh --
and Sir Robert Thompson -- believe ' the Communists will not succeed.
CIA gives the Communists a fifty-fifty chance.
The GKRIs problems are not rooted in lack of resources, but in ineptitude
resulting from poor leadership and the lack of coherent programs.
-- Should the GKR check or stalemate the Khmer Insurgents in. the months
'ahead, Vietnamese Communists might still tip :thelscales militarily. This
could rekindle Khmer nationalism and hatred for Vietnamese invaders,
which would make a political settlement more attractive to Hanoi.
.t2paposed Measure-- to be taken over the next two or three months - to improve
the.effectiveness of the GKR in prosecuting the war:
,--*DeClaration of Martial Law by the GKR with real penalities for crimes
?(hoarding, taking bribes, deserting, etc.) impeding the war effort. Steps
should also be taken to render military officers, even at the highest level,
subject to military discipline.
fr
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? An "Arm the People" program to be started in the Phnom. Penh area --
and later extended -- so the people will feel they are participating in
collective defense. The ILS.would have to provide weapons.
? A "Pay the Troops program. Late or no pay to Cambodian troops has
greatly hurt YANK morale.
? A top-level advisor to the GKR. Lon Nol asked President Nixon, on
August 6, for such an advisor. He would help surface effective leadersilip
in the GKR and coordinate the type of internal GKR political, militar2,5X1
and propaganda programs the situation now requires.
25X1 ? Expand present efforts to exploit the enemy's weaknesses. All fire fights
. and frictions between the KI and Vietnamese Communists must be systemati-
cally publicized by all available media.
wing
Our comments on Colby's proposals follow:
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25X1 ? This paper is dated and needs to beMade current.
-- Ongoing psywar activity to exploit friction between the KI and Vietnamese
Communists should be intensified. .
--?The GKR penalizing for crimes and enforcing military discipline in the
officer corps is sound, but we question that the GKR. can effectively enforce
Lull martial law. Our emphasis should be pressing the GKR to effect reforms
and tighten controls -- with perhaps limited martial law.
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-- The "Arm. the People" program would probably accomplish little and run
the risk of losing weapons to the enemy. The GKR should concentrate on
inducting more soldiers into FANK. As an alternative means to engage
the populace in the war effort, we should explore social mobilization
programs that would involve Cambodian civilians in medical, school
rebuilding, and other, such endeavors.
?
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum at Tab B.
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? CENTRAL INtELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
28 August 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
? Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
SPBJECT : Action Proposals for Cambodia
1. Attached for your information is a memorandum con-
tabling a series of measures suggested for implementation in
Cambodia, if the GER proves able to weather the next two or
three weeks of military action. (If the GKR survives until
roughly 10 September, the rains are likely to give it a respite
until October or November.) '
2. This mernoranduat has been prepared wholly within
the Central Intelligence Agency, and has not been coordinated
elsewhere within the government.
Attachment
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28 August 1973
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Action Proposals for Cambodia
I. ?The Problem
1. The Khmer Communists may now be starting the military
offensive which they hope will destroy the Cambodian government
(the GKR) as a functioning entity. If they succeed, further discussion
of measures to improve the viability of the GKR as it is presently
constituted will be academic. The considered judgment of all com-
ponents of the U.S. Mission in Phnom Penh, however -- and also the
judgment of Sir Robert Thompson ? is that they will not succeed,
at least in the next several weeks . The judgment of the Central.
Intelligence Agency's analysts in Washington is less sanguine than
that of the U.S. Mission and of Sir Robert, but we do give the GKR a
fifty-fifty chance of surviving the military campaign of the next few
weeks.
2. If the GKR can weather the next two to three weeks its
prospects will be enhanced enough to make consideration of additional
remedial actions worthwhile. The GICR's problems are;rooted not in a
lack of resources but in its own ineptitude. This ineptitude in turn is
a result of poor leadership, poor morale, administrative inefficiency,
and the lack of any kind of coherent or realistic political program.
While a continuation of military and economic aid to Cambodia is
clearly necessary, it will not solve any of these problems. Given the
existing constraints on U.S. policy, it may be impossible to reverse
the downward slide of the GKR. If the GKR gets through the next
several weeks, however, the rainy season may provide a respite
during which we can try to reverse the present downward.trend.
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At that point it should be clearly understood that additional aid for
Phnom Penh will be less important than efforts to create a situation
in which the GKR can and will employ its present resources effective-
ly enough to preclude a military victory by its indigenous opponents.
3. It may be argued that even if the GKR should prove able
to check or stalemate the Khmer insurgents, Vietnamese Communist
regulars could re-enter the fray and provide the necessary force to
tip the military balance. Politically and psychologically, however,
this would create difficulties which the Communists do not now face.
Hatred of the Vietnamese is an emotion both strong and widespread
in Cambodia. In its halcyon early days of spring and summer 1970,
the GKR was sustained and supported by a genuinely spontaneous
welling of nationalist sentiment -- a sentiment it subsequently
squandered. The factor Of "Vietnamese imperialist aggression" is
now largely dormant because the Communists' battles are being fought
by Cambodians. It could be quickly rekindled, however, if Vietnamese
troops were re-introduced into combat. Thus if the GKR could hold
its Cambodian adversaries at bay, a negotiated settlement could well
become more attractive to Hanoi -- as well as to the Khmer Communists
and Sihanouk -- than an image-spoiling employment of Vietnamese
troops.
U. Proposed Measures
4. Suggested below are five measures which could be imple-
mented quickly and which might ? over the next two or three months --
markedly improve the effectiveness of the GKR's military forces, strengthen
the popular support of the GKR, and encourage the already existing
divisive tendencies within the Khmer insurgents and between the insur-
gents and the Vietnamese Communists.*
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) Martial Law
The government should declare martial law,
with real penalties for crimes which impede
the war effort. Hoarders, bribe takers (at
all levels), deserters, etc. should be subject
to'immediate trial by military tribunal. It
should be publicly announced that military
Commanders must remain with their units in.
the field unless summoned or specifically
authorized to come to Phnom Perth. Severe
penalties should be imposed in the event of
infractions. In this and every other sense,
officers -- no matter how senior -- should be
subject to military discipline as fully as any
common soldier.
(b) An "Arm the People" Program
The GKR should enlist and engage its people in
their own defense by adopting a Cambodian
variant of the South Vietnamese government's
People's Self Defense Forces (PSDF) . This
would involve arming those elements of the
population not in the regular armed forces with
small arms ? giving them the means to help
defend themselves against the Communists. Such
a program could be started immediately in the
Phnom Penh area and then extended to other areas
under government control. The U.S. would have
to provide the weapons. The people should be
given a sense of participation in a collective
national effort and grounds for believing that
their efforts can make a difference.
(c) Pay the Troops
Too many Cambodian Army troops do not receive
their pay on time, or never receive the full pay to
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5.r:C.22173'ENSITNE
which they are entitled. Many reports have
indicated that failure to receive full pay --- or
any pay at all -- is probably the single most
important factor in the poor morale of FANK
troops A special inspection corps, perhaps
with U.S. military officers as observers, should
physically carry the pay to the major FANK
units in the Phnom Penh area, and remain with
each unit until the pay is distributed.
(d) Exploit the Enemy's Weaknesses
The GKR (and also the U.S.) should expand
their psywar efforts to compound the problems
and exploit the vulnerabilities of the Khmer
en-mm.11T1i gfq
(e) A Top-Level Advisor for the GKR
To survive, the GKR will have to provide its own
leadership -- all we can perform is the midwife
.
function of helping that leadership surface. But ??
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4.4.ol?fl..4114111 Mal
if the GKR is to improve and integrate its
military, political and progaganda performance
in a many faceted struggle with the Communists,
it will probably need a top level advisor to help
explain and orchestrate the kind of interrelated
programs the situation requires. Lon Nol has
asked for such an advisor in his 6 August letter ?.
to President Nixon. An individual of the caliber
of the late John Vann is what is
Penh.
. We would recommend that an
immediate search be made for an American offi-
cial with the requisite abilities. Brig. Gen.
Thomas Bowen or Colonel Ladd might be possible
candidates. Whoever was chosen would have
to be given wide-ranging personal authority
to deal with all of the top Cambodian leaders,
under the overall guidance of the Ambassador.
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Mir
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS
MEMORANDUM FOR
Mr. William E. Colby
SUBJECT: Action Proposals for Cambodia
Your paper concerning actions we might take in Cambodia has been read25X1
.with interest. It has stimulated some further ideas which are included
below.
Present efforts and programs to exploit frictions between the KI and
Vietnamese Communists should be continued and intensified.
As you suggest, the GKR should do all it can to: (a) impose penalities for
? crimes impeding the war effort; and (b) render officers, even at the highest
? level, subject to military discipline. However, it is doubtful whether the
CKR could actually enforce martial law. Means for achieving these goals
short of full martial law should be explored further.
It is important that the GKR engage the populace in the war effort, but we
feel the "arm the people" approach suggested woula not accomplish enough
in a positive way to offset the risk of losing weapons to the enemy. Highest
priority should go to conscription which now only affects the 31-35 age
group. We should explore the possibility of the GKR engaging the populace
in the war effort by social mobilization programs such as refugee relief,
school rebuilding, and.bandage rolling. Organizations of Bhuddists, students,
merchants, etch. could be involved in these useful and peaceful efforts.
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Troop pay now appears to be less of a problem than it has been, but
proposals you may develop on specific initiatives we might take in this
direction will be welcome.
In order to consider further the proposals in your paper, it would be
appreciated if you would submit them in a WSAG paper -- consulting
other departments as appropriate ? and circulate it to the WSAG
principals, hopefully by September 12.
Henry A. Kissinger
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