MINUTES OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING JANUARY 25, 1969

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-312-2-3-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 25, 1969
• Content Type: MISC

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yIINUT ES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
January 1969
NSC, DOS,
JCS
REVIEWS
COMPLETED
(pgs 1-39)
OSD, DIA, NSS
Review
Completed.
The National Security Council convened at 0930 hours,
January 25, 1969, in the Cabinet Room of the White House.
Attendees are at Tab A.
Substance of Meeting
The first formal briefing was given by Mr. Helms, Director
of CIA, the text of which is at Tab B. The briefing included a
summary of Hanoi's objectives in South Vietnam which included
(1) unified country under Communist control, (2) elimination of
dividing lines, (3) acceptance of the concept that North Vietnamese
forces are not foreign troops and (4) the recent determination that
they cannot win by military means and a decision that they can negotiate
a settlement which will permit attainment of objectives.
The internal situation in South Vietnam was discussed. The
Director concluded that under the present ground rules, assuming
the withdrawal of our troops, South Vietnam would be able to go it
alonin approximately one year. Director reviewed the probable
negotiating position of the North Vietnamese government stating
that while he believes they are serious about negotiations, they will
insist on (1) total U. S. withdrawal and (2) a role in the South
Vietnamese government which they believe will optimize their
opportunities for ultimate'takeover. Director turned next to Laos
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and made the following points:
War started when the French withdrew.
Majority of the fighting is done by North Vietnamese
troops with the view towards protecting their logistic
Up until now, there has been a reluctance on both sides
to expand the war in Laos. At present, government
represents a three-way coalition of neutralist, rightists
and the Pathet Lao.
- Souvanna has recently shifted from a neutralist align-
ment to a rightist stance and generally supports the
U. S. view, especially a compromise political settle-
ment in South Vietnam.
Director turned next to Cambodia making the following points:
-- Sihanouk has long expected a Communist win.
Has recognized NLF.
-- Protests U. S. incursions.
Has recently developed second thoughts as the Communist
foothold in his country has increased and has initiated
tentative feelers to renew relations with the U. S.
- Cambodia realizes significant revenue through logistic
support to NVA.
The Communist organization in Cambodia controls the
logistics framework for the war effort in South Vietnam
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25X1
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which includes both land and water routing but CIA
lacks hard intelligence with respect to the latter.
Director turned next to Thailand, making the following points:
-- Has made little progress in controlling insurgency in
Northeast Thailand.
-- Thailand extremely concerned about possible U. S.
withdrawal from. South Vietnam.
The President interrupted and told the Director that he wished
to have an in-depth analysis of Indonesia.
Director stated that in general the U. S. image in Southeast
Asia was quite favorable and the primary concern in the area is that
the U. S. might withdraw precipitously.
The President then inquired about Malaysia, Singapore and
Burma.
discussions with Mr. Bundy at that time. He added that in 1967 Ne Win
again reaffirmed his support for the U. S. in discussions with Premier
privately to support of the U. S. war effort and reaffirmed this in
Bundy interrupted and stated that as early as 1966 Ne Win had shifted
out against the war in South Vietnam. At this point, Mr. William
Director stated that Ne Win, leader of Malaysia has spoken
Sato of Japan, much to the surprise of the latter.
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Concerning Burma, the Directed stated that Li Quon Hu
generally supported the U. S. position but was pessimistic about the
Thieu government in South Vietnam.
The President then asked how the other leaders feel about
replied that they strongly support the U. S. since the fall of the
Sukarno regime, recognizing that the U. S. presence in South Vietnam
the Thieu government. Mr. Helms stated that the picture was
generally mixed, adding that President Marcos of the Philippines
supports the U. S. but has been preoccupied with internal problems.
Japan appears to be the main center of the Communist echo in the
area. Most of the leaders of the Southeast Asia countries believe
the U. S. is willing to settle the war in good faith but are fearful of South
Vietnamese delaying tactics. Mr. Helms listed Thailand, South Viet-
nam and South Korea as countries who were most fearful of the
results of a U. S. withdrawal from the area.
The President then asked how the Indonesians felt. Mr. Helms
actually assisted in his downfall. President Suharto has become
increasingly willing to encourage a return of U. S. business to
Indonesia. At this point, William Bundy emphasized that initial
fears in Indonesia concerning U. S. persistence in South Vietnam
seemed to be settling.
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The President then asked the Director, CIA, to provide him
with a review of the outlook of all the countries in Southeast Asia
A
with respect to the options which have been laid out in the paper
for consideration by the National Security Council.
Mr. Helms' briefing was concluded.
The briefing by Lt. Colonel Thrush, member of the Joint
Staff is at Tab C. Colonel Thrush's briefing consisted of a series
of charts which covered (1) infiltration statistics, (2) force projections
(Note: The V. P. joined the Security Council meeting at 0934 hours),
(3) enemy casualty statistics, (4) enemy logistics framework,
(5) main enemy logistics routes, (6) enemy bases, (7) enemy bases
in Cambodia, (8) location of supply centers in South Vietnam.
At this point, the President interrupted and asked why we are
finding more and better enemy caches recently. General Wheeler
replied that this was due to better intelligence, a greater number of
defectors who are willing to talk. General Goodpaster added that
this also resulted from increased operations in enemy gut areas,
withdrawal of main force units from some of these areas.
Mr. Alexis Johnson then added: "I was informed while in
Saigon that enemy PWs are now quite disillusioned, even angry and
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are willing to talk". The President retorted, "I think there is a tendency
to get skeptical of these optimistic reports". Both Mr. Johnson
and the Chairman reiterated that there is a positive and honest
shift in the enemy's attitude in South Vietnam and in his willingness
to surrender. General Goodpaster added that there has been a
Chieu
of activity is quite different. In the I Corps area to the north, the
In
enemy's logistics are weak and he is suffering. _/the III Corps area
which includes Saigon, the picture is quite different due to the
extensive availability of food and supplies moving through Cambodia.
The briefer then turned to what the Joint Staff considered
to be four main enemy options in their future operations which could
be undertaken individually or in combination:
1. Attack across the DMZ.
striking but not as yet significant increase in ! Hoi rates.
Secretary of Defense Laird stated, "I have heard these briefings
each year and each year they get more optimistic and, therefore, I
hope that we will be very careful in digesting the material which is
put forth. "
Briefer continued showing chart no.. 9 on food shortages.
General Goodpaster pointed out that the logistic situation in each area
Attack in North and South Vietnam, flanking the DMZ
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Attacking east and southeast across the Cambodian
border towards Saigon.
4. Continue current operation of'maintaining sporadic
effort in all areas of'South Vietnam, utilizing main force to attack
U. S. forces and guerilla operations to disrupt pacification operations
and to strengthen Communist political infrastructure.
The Chairman, General Wheeler, suggested that the last
option appeared to be the one that the Communist would continue with for the
time being. Briefer then displayed Chart on air operations and at this
point, President interrupted and asked the Chairman whether or not
the military were being restricted in their operations in South
Vietnam. General Wheeler replied, "only by the decision of the
President". The President asked if General Wheeler agreed with
these restrictions. General Wheeler replied that if we need authority
to do more, it will be requested. The President commented that he
hoped these restrictions were reviewed and reexamined regularly.
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General Wheeler noted that the North
Vietnamese react very quickly to aircraft north of the 19th
Parallel.
Briefer then reviewed type military operations conducted in
the various Corps zones in South Vietnam. Under Secretary
Richardson inquired, "do our forces involved in interdiction action
just set astride enemy supply routes or infiltration routes? "
The briefer replied, "yes, but with aggressive patrolling outward".
Mr. Richardson then inquired, "does this involve much movement?
General Wheeler and General Goodpaster then described the style
of U. S. operations with focus on the III Corps area, commenting
that the three ARVN divisions in the III Corps area were their poorest
units but that this situation has been resolved through the utilization
of the ARVN strategic reserve which. includes their airborne division
plus their ranger and marine lirwHe also added that the recent
redeployrni nt of the 1st Air Mobile Division from the 11 Corps zone
to the III Corps zone had added immeasurably to our capabilities in
this area. General Goodpaster then explained the technique of
"pile-on tactics" through which U. S. forces rapidly converge on
enemy contacts with superior mobile force and firepower whenever
the contact develops.
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The President then asked, "is this what you described to
me as "wielding the force? " General Goodpaster replied affirmatively.
10
General Wheeler stated that the 2, 000 casualties per week figure
is probably modest since it is based on body count and does not
reflect the untold casualties inflicted by air nor include the numerous
enemy wounded in action. Under Secretary Richardson again asked
The President then asked about the caliber of the ARVN Generals in
the Saigon area and what we are doing about their inferior quality.
General Wheeler, replied that General Abrams has been pressuring
the South Vietnamese on both this issue and on the alarmingly high
rate of South Vietnamese defections. Dr. Kissinger then asked for
some statistics which would enable us to compare friendly and
enemy casualties when (a) actions were friendly initiated or
(b) enemy initiated. General Goodpaster said he would judge that
about 80 to 90% were the result of friendly initiated actions. He
also added that U. S. and ARVN casualties inflicted on the enemy were
running about equal. General Lincoln then asked why the enemy
was willing to sacrifice approximately 2, 000 casualties per week
in what appeared to be a meat grinder. General Wheeler stated
that the enemy must continue its military activities to maintain the
most favorable negotiating stance, adding that furthermore if they
were to slow down, pacification operations would pick up.
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if this figure could be firm. General Wheeler reemphasized its
modest content.
The President then asked what the reason was for the drop-
off in enemy captured during the last quarter of 1968. General
Goodpaster stated he was not sure but it might be due to statistical
lag.
The President then inquired whether or not we felt the enemy
had deescalated since the bombing halt and if they had whether or
not it was forced by friendly effectiveness or was the result of a willful
decision to do so. General Goodpaster stated they are continuing
to attempt to achieve a success, especially in the III Corps areas and
have not been holding back.
The President asked whether enemy initiatives had been in-
creasing or dropping. General Goodpaster replied in the III Corps
area they have definitely increased, especially in the IIIKray Ninh
and Michelin areas.
The President inquired if they were trying to keep up the
pressure during the talks. General Goodpaster replied definitely
but they have been restricted by our operations to jungle sanctuaries.
The President then asked if we were. ready for enemy activity
during TET, emphasizing that he wished to be updated on the
military situation so that he could approve contingency actions which
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might be necessary. General Wheeler stated that General Abrams
is ready to,,move quickly, adding that intelligence indicates that the
enemy hopes to move in the Saigon area but has been frustrated
by General Abrams' employment of B-52s, tactical air and artillery,
together with the logistical attrition that the enemy has suffered.
The President then asked what would hpen if the enemy
moved massively across the DMZ. General Wheeler replied that he
would immediately request authority to initiate bombing in and
north of the zone. The President again asked if the military was
able to do what they wanted in the conduct of the war. General
Wheeler replied, "yes, with the exception of the bombing of the north
and mentioned that if Saigon were attacked, that ,big-contingency
plan is in existence which included strikes in North Vietnam to
reflect our serious concern for a breach of understandings arrived
at in Paris.
The President asked to see the plan.
Secretary of State Rogers then inquired, "how long General
Wheeler thought the enemy could continue in the face of the
present losses? "The Chairman replied that in his judgment about
two years, pointing out that the conflict was not like World War II
where at this point in time exploitation could be initiated and
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a decisive victory achieved. The Director of DIA interrupted and
stated, "bu,,t at this point there are still 500, 000 regulars that have
not been used in North Vietnam." Secretary of Defense stated,
"but attacks are dropping off". General Lincoln then asked whether
or not the continuing losses of the enemy were a result of a failure
of local units to get the word to fall off. General Wheeler said, "no,
they are attacking on orders from Hanoi".
Dr. Kissinger then asked about casualty rates in the event
we were to deescalate our operations. General Wheeler replied we
would then suffer greater losses as a result of turning the initiative
over to the enemy. General Goodpaster added, Uwe must keep
pressure,on the enemy or he will achieve local initiative, over-
run exposed static U. S. units and, in general, add to U. S. losses".
Secretary Rogers then inquired about the possibility of mutual
deescalation by agreement. General Wheeler replied, "I can see
no viable agreement of that type in the wind". General Lincoln.
added, "such an agreement need not be explicit but could be tacit".
It
Secretary Rogers said,frankly I just cannot accept such a concept".
At this point, the JCS briefer continued covering air operations,
B-52 operations and carrier operations, naval operations, to include
,4arketo ame arden and naval gunfire. Briefer then reviewed
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ground reconnaissance operations in Laos (Prairie Fire), Cambodia
(Daniel Boone) and current restrictions and ground rules involved.
Briefer turned next to modernization and improvement of Vietnamese
forces under Phases I and II, stating that we were now in Phase II,
programmed for completion in FY 72. A discussion on desertion
rates followed and General Wheeler stated that he is convinced that
the ARVN leadership is improving and should continue upward,
adding that some of the deserters were statistical only in that they
deserted one unit to go to another unit which had higher pay or better
living conditions.
The President then asked whether or not our modernization
program for the Vietnamese Armed Forces was adequate.
Secretary Laird stated, "I think we are moving but started very
late". General Wheeler stated, "I think we are going about as fast
as both we can provide and the South Vietnamese can accept".
General Goodpaster added, '"we are paced about right with about two or three
qualifications. These include engineer artillery, transportation and
medical equipment which we are planning to provide through
selective reduction in U. S. units. The worst problem area is the
development of the Vietnamese helicopter capability. We would
like to deactivate some U. S. units but don't dare at this time.
The President then asked about the situation with respect to
local ARVN forces, stating that in his view the AID people are totally
unsuited to supervise the development of local security forces,
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stating it is like the blind leading the blind, adding AID is incompetent
to handle this mission. General Goodpaster suggested that we receive
a report from the field.
The President stated, "I know this operation is inadequate and
recognize that a police force must be developed. The President
whi,-Ii raf1E?rfard fhnf 7101 of gniifh ~Tiofnnm tvac wv~na4 1\ f"~,,~,. l
then told General Wheeler to get a complete report on the whole
program to include who is doing it, whether he is qualified, what
system he is employing.
The briefer then continued showing some pacification statistics.
At this point, Dr. Kissinger asked what are your criteria for the
various categories of pacification (referring specifically to statistics
Wheeler replied, "that figure is probably vulnerable' a,rid the
for the month of December 1968 which were the second highest to date.
The briefer then showed a chart reflecting the roundup of Viet Cong
infrastructure. The Director of DIA commented that President Thieu
has finally moved out in this area. Dr. Kissinger asked, "why is
there such a problem in getting the South Vietnamese to move against
o,r
pacification chart is significant primarily because it reflects trendsa,..
noting that subsequent to TET there was an initial drop but with a
steady increase shortly thereafter.
Briefer showed a chart on Chieu Hoi which reflected statistics
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people who are bent on doing them inr o which Mr. Bundy replied
it is primarily a problem of organization and leadership". The
President asked who was our representative charged with this job
to which Mr. Bundy replied, "this comes under the COORDS
organization under Mr. Colby".
The President then asked "is he a specialist, does he have
any idea of what he is doing? " Mr. Bundy replied he was the
11
Chief of Station in Saigon when you were Vice President.
JCS briefer then concluded.
Secretary of State Rogers introduced Mr. William Bundy
at 1100 hours. The President stated we will listen to Mr. Bundy
for 30 minutes, take a five minute break and then return for our
discussion.
Mr. Bundy introduced his briefing, stating that he would
comment on (1) pacification, (2) the economic situation in South
Vietnam, (3) the political situation in South Vietnam and (4) the
situation in Southeast Asia in general.
Mr. Bundy made the following points:
Agree that pacification trends are upwards but
emphasized that this is extremely vulnerable.
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Pi4Ci
Pacification is mostly a GVN effort a cl`support the-
COORDS organization under Colby which includes
some 5, 000 military and 1200 civilians, the latter
being primarily AID with some foreign service officers.
-- The economic situation indicates that inflation con-
tinues to be a serious problem.
-- There has been progress in the countryside on rice
production.
Main problems center on'requirement to control
budget (U. S. must carefully gauge its input),
post-TET progress has been good, on along-
term basis, South Vietnam has good economic recovery potential.
Discussing the political situation, the following points were made:
Until June 1967, Ky appeared to have the helm in South
Vietnam. Then Thieu took over an uneasy primary role,
with Ky controlling cabinet appointments and providing
a basically technician cabinet.
- Thieu began last May to reform cabinet and installed
Huong and the power struggle resolved in favor of-
During Fall, Thieu's stock raised and then fell back
Thieu.
o its current low point.
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Huong is on Ky"d$ bad list although he looks like a
good man and a an of honor. The cabinet is
of Thieu's and Huong's formulation and although it
has weaknesses is better than previous models. The
General Assembly has performed well as a sounding
board, albiet hard line,-r
Until recently, Corps Commanders wielded autonomous
and considerable power which has been reduced since
June.
I Corps Commander still very strong. At the district
and province level, Chiefs are now appointed from
Saigon.
- Civil Service is of mixed quality.
Mr. Bundy then turned to political forces in South Vietnam,
pointing out that it is a conglomarate of geographic, religious and
ethnic divergency.
The major problem is the confidence effectiveness
index of the central government.
TET was their Pearl Harbor which crystallized their
confidence. Confidence grew as a result of TET,
our presence and the retirement of President Johnson.
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It appears they can do the job assuming a third factor
is properly added to the index, i. e. , a -sense. o
reality.
.Despite this, there is a great distance to go.
Main problem is corruption.
At this point, Secretary of State interrupted and stated that
he has spoken to Senator Kennedy about the recent Kennedy report
on corruption and has been assured by Kennedy that he will not
release this report.
The second major problem is how the South Vietnamese
can politically organize to permit participation by the
NLF either through legitimization or a front solution.
There has been little progress in this area. The Lin
Minh party supported by Thieu has been floundering due
to lack of positive leadership by Thieu who hangs back
until he is convinced that success is assured.
An effective coalition must be organized.
Mr. Bundy then turned to his view of Southeast Asian reactions
to types of settlements referring to the November NIE on this subject.
The President interrupted and stated that he wished to look
at this NIE. Mr. Bundy made the following points:
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In general, the nations would be appalled by U. S.
defeat and defeat in their view has military over-
tones but in the final analysis will be measured by the
ultimate results, i. e. ,cif the Communists prevail in
South Vietnam we are defeated
Nations are sure we have the power but are less certain
In Laos, Souvanna would not survive. In Cambodia,
Sihanouk would become a satellite. In Thailand, the
situation would be knife-edge, especially with the obvious
fall of Laos. In Malaysia, the situation would deteriorate.
In Singapore, there is some pessimism about the future
and hope that the U. S. will hang in. The Indonesians
would like a peaceful solution and might be willing
to play a role in Hanoi. They would definitely be shaken
if the U. S. were to fail but would probably not collapse
as a result. In the Philippines, failure would be a setback
and might combine with the Huk problem to escalate
difficulties.
The President then emphasized that he wished to read the NIE
on this subject and asked how it was prepared. Mr. Bundy replied that
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it was an intelligence community document under the Chairmanship
of CIA, ' approved by the U. S. Intelligence Board. Mr: Bundy
concluded his presentation and was succeeded by Mr. Philip Habib,
Member of U. S. Paris negotiating team.
Mr. Habib brought the group up to date on the Paris
negotiations, making the following points:
-- U. S. kicked off with a limited bombing pause.
-- Hanoi insisted on total halt and was noncommital
on what would follow.
-- U. S. insisted that while we were willing to stop
bombing we wanted assurance that serious negotiations
would follow.
-- Negotiations started slowly with typical propaganda
theme. Hanoi would not engage in discussion of gut
issues.
-- Hanoi continued to demur until during private talks
with Vance and Habib indicated they might be willing
to do something.
n two months, U. S. got a basic understanding which
included (1) cessation of U. S. bombing and all acts
involving the use of force against the Territory of
North Vietnam. At this point, Mr. Habib implied that
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the North Vietnamese understood that We would continue
reconnaissance operations over North Vietnam. In
response the above, North Vietnam assured us
that (1) they would respect the DMZ by not moving
through it or massing north of it, (2) discontinue
indiscriminate attacks on major cities, such as
Saigon, Da Nang and Hue. Attacks included not only'
ground attacks but shelling and mortaring.
While the North Vietnamese never subscribed to the
above agreement, they "understood that if it were
broken, talks could not be conducted". While there
was no written agreement to this understanding, the
North Vietnamese understood what we expected.
U. S. side believe the Soviets moved in and applied
some modest pressure at this point and also felt that
the approaching U. S. election also exerted pressure
on the North Vietnamese.
Initially, Hanoi did not want the GVN in the picture.
This was the genesis of our side-your side formula
which was to permit four-sided solution. As talks became
more specific GVN became increasingly fearful and it was
obvious that Thieu was under pressure.
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Our side-your side formula confirmed NLF participation
and raised GVN fears.
The President then asked what was the U. S. relationship
with the GVN at this point. Habib replied, the only South
Vietnamese 'who really knew what was going on was Thieu and a handful
of his advisers. As we approached agreement, he realized he did not have the
political support needed to accept the package.
The President then asked what was his main concern then?
Habib replied, "two areas:`. First the provisions of the non-agreement
itself and second, the fact that he might not have the political support
to accept such a package but mostly he did not know what the specific
role of the NLF would be under the formula. General Goodpaster added
that another problem was the tinging of the non-agreement. Thieu
needed more time to get the eneralsuppor and we were pushing
very hard.
The President then asked, "am I right that the main problem
was the role of the NLF"? Habib replied, "correct, they could see
a three on one situation developing and our agreement was finally
arrived at th4"7our side-your side formula..
Next the procedural wrangle started, the time barrier
being the President's inauguration and i~ feeling on the
other side that a settlement should be reached before
the new President was installed. It was at this point
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that the Russians played a key role, suggesting that
conversations be conducted on a two-sided basis. Habib
conjectured that the Soviets may have applied a little
arm twisting. Mr. Habib then reviewed where we are
pointing out that he expected-
A renewed period of intense propaganda sessions followed
shortly by secret talks with DRV. Habib emphasized
that the D!?,`.- has already agreed to meet at any time at
any level.
The outlook is for a circus arena, followed by private
sessions which will get down to brass tacks.
Negotiating team views the future in Paris as a subtle
balance between political and military negotiating
tracks.
The U. S. perhaps to pursue the military track, such
as withdrawals, ceasefire and DMZ.
The North Vietnamese to seek a political solution providing
for participation by the NLF in the south, combined with
U. S. withdrawal.
subjects
Habib states all xxmaK can be raised at the meeting.
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U. S. probably should initiate pressing for restitution
of DMZ and mutual withdrawal. The North Vietnamese
-24 _
will probably insist on U. S. withdrawal, plus political
entre initially through the so-called "peace cabinet"
which could negotiate with the NLF 1 } ultimately
seeking a coalition government.
NLF will carry main thrust of Communist political
objective.
Mr. Habib then stated to the President, "what we need from you
Mr. President are answers to the following questions:
1. What are the issues on which we should negotiate in order
to secure the objectives you have defined?
2. What is the objective of the negotiations? Should it be: (a) withdra -
al, *b) neutrality, (c) use DMZ as separate and distinct early negotiating
objective, (d) what will be the treatment of the internal political
solution in Vietnam, (e) what should be the level of hostilities as related
to negotiations, i. e, the relationship of deescalation to negotiation,
(f) how should we treat inspection, verification, supervision and guarantees,
(g) how should we treat the question of Laos and Cambodia?
The above is the balancemixture of political and military issues
which-will concern us in the negotiations, not only in their substantive
content but also as these issues relate to one another in the sense of
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time." Habib stated that the North Vietnamese are worried about keeping
strength on tJ.e ground to provide leverage. This will influence their
timing.
The President then asked what the South Vietnamese think.
Habib replied, "they consider themselves the victims of aggression
from the north. If that aggression would cease, they believe they
could work bilaterally with the NLF or any other opposition groups"
The south wants to talk primarily to the DRV but have
reluctantly agreed to talk to the NLF if need be.
The heart of their problem is withdrawal by all Vietnamese
who came down across the DMZplus all those in South
Vietnam who will not lay down their arms.
-- The South Vietnamese are not yet in tandem with us on
this withdrawal issue.
In June, we had talks between Vance and Lo and in these
initial talks the North Vietnamese seemed easy on the
DMZ issue and most difficult on the withdrawal issue,
claiming as Vietnamese they had the right to fight anywhere
in Vietnam. Initially, they insisted that the present
government and constitution must go but their line con-
tinued to change.
First insisted on patriotic coalition.
Second, insisted on coalition less Thieu and Ky.
Third, insisted on "peace cabinet" alternative.
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26
Fourth, they dropped their requirement for a reunification.
Fifth, as talks continued, they expressed great concern
about U. S. escalation.
The North Vietnamese felt that we abrogated initial
understanding when we moved military assets involved
in northern operations to participate in southern operations.
North Vietnamese indicated that Cambodia and Laos are
not acceptable for early discussion.
-- On the issue of supervision and guarantees while appealing
to the Geneva Accords, the north does not want to discuss
or provide for them. Hanoi insists on recognition of
''political realities".
At this point, Dr. Kissinger asked if the North Vietnamese had
not asked what we actually meant by the Manila formula. Habib
replied, "under authority from Washington, we said withdrawal
under Manila indicated mutual withdrawal but that we would not be
completely out until six months after they were completely out".
The U. S. also indicated that the level of violence did not mean a total
cessation of violation but assuming complete North Vietnamese
withdrawal, "residual violence" would not be included under Manila.
The President then stated that he anticipated that the thrust of
future negotiations would be done in private and that there would be
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without formal agreement?* Then if this happens the GVN might
be able to do the job and, of course, the north knows this and will
out that the north had, really never agreed on the reconnaissance issue
and emphasizing that they have abided by the provisions of the no-
attack on major cities. General Wheeler retorted "yesterday they
fired five times on our reconnaissance aircraft".
The President asked what was the GVN attitude. Habib replied
the GVN want international guarantees and supervised withdrawal
similar to that in 1954. They will insist on guarantees but might
accept the pragmatic withdrawal, provided some border guarantees
are offered.
The President then surmized "then from Thieu's viewpoint
withdrawal without political settlement may be good, is that right? "
Habib replied affirmatively. The President asked "can we do this
that initially the North Vietnamese would prefer to negotiate down
both tracks -- mutual withdrawal and political settlement. At
this point, General Wheeler stated that the north had not abided by
the under standings on the DMZ. Habib replied that their violations
had been,minor, such as patrolling and reconnaissance, pointing
no public agreement. Habib stated that this was probably true and
insist on the dual track.4
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At this point, the President interrupted the proceedings to
tell General Lincoln to get moving on the tornado problem in
Mississippi. He also asked where Ky's wife came from. Bundy
stated she was a southerner and the President replied, "she is a
dandy".
The President thanked Mr. Bundy and Mr. Habib and they departed
at 12:4U p. m.
~pKxz~x~ex~xh~xb The President
paimd=
Obviously the questions that have been circulated will
provide us a factual basis for proceeding with our
investigation and we need the answers soon. We want
to approach this problem without inhibitions as to
where we have been. I want you to think of the problem
as a new one. Seek ways in which we can change the
game. We must know what we want. The gain could
take many turns. I visualize that it could take two
years to settle this thing. Give me your ideas.
At this point, he turned the meeting over to Dr. Kissinger
who made the following points:
-- A paper for consideration was drafted in New York without
access to government machinery. It can be refined when
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_2q_
when we get the answers to the questions.
;,There are ;rr:any topics not included in the paper such as
what are the world-wide implications, the domestic
implications.
options
Three i are the easiest to choose but depth
and problems associated with these options must be
s ed out and judged.
There are four outcomes 't objectives, with three
military postures ranging from escalation to reduction.
The time relationship is important in this regard. For
example, some reduction might suggest to the other side greater
staying power. An escalation of force might suggest to
the other side that our staying power has been compressed.
It is obvious that assured GVN control is the desirable
objective but what are the costs and will it take longer
to achieve than we are willing?
If we can't accept this, we then turn to the other
formulas- which include risks. We could press for
mutual withdrawal, achieve a military settlement and
leave the political side to the Vietnamese.
This could be a good initial approach to give us time to
work out the others, i. e. political, plus the military
or the political alone.
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-30-
the maximum or lessening pressure would be preferable.
It'is very difficult to translate negotiating language to
reality. This might be a good start.
Should we go the political withdrawal route and, if so,
I believe we would have to press the GVN to broaden
its base. This is a two-edge sword.
In sum, we should study and determine what kind of a
settlement we would accept short of assured GVN
control and to go down the political withdrawal route
without knowing this could be disastrous.
The next question is should we go the laundry list route
or concentrate on one or more objectives.
Should we establish priorities?
Will deescalation help or hinder the process?
I believe we need an early decision on whether or not
that I believe it would require basic changes. Other questions
involved should the scale of military operations be an
The team in Paris must know this. Similar judgments
must be made on ceasefire. Doesn't this issue imply
some form of political settlement? These are some of our
questions that must be answered. While we have listed
in the paper territorial settlement, this is so fundamental
a
object of the early negotiations in Paris are=
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Would unilateral US reductions help or hurt?
Should the team in Paris go for a large menu or focus
on a few or give priorities to some?
Do we wish to continue priority development of South
Vietnamese army and police?
Many of the above questions can be decided without prejudice
to subsequent negotiations. Group convened for luncheon and re-
convened at 1400 hours.
The President asked whether or not it would be appropriate to
seek the reestablishment of relationships with Cambodia. Ambassador
Murphy commented that he thinks this would be a wise move.
The President stated, "I remember him and think we can do
business. Perhaps I should write a note to him,
The President then discussed his views on the ceasefire, pointing
out that in his view a guerilla war does not lend itself to a ceasefire.
Secretary Rogers added, "no one wants to advance this as a
negotiating position but what are we going to do if the other side
raises it? How will we proceed from there? The public will give
us problems in the event we did not have an acceptable reply. 'p It
was agreed that his reply should follow the lines that a ceasefire without
a withdrawal of forces would not be feasible in a guerilla conflict.
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The President stated that the ceasefire issue should be
stricken from the U. S. negotiating menu. General Goodpaster added
that some work was done on this subject in Saigon. A staff paper
was prepared which concluded that a ceasefire should be related to or
linked with force withdrawal and should start with the DMZ where
withdrawals might be effected early. Since the DMZ is already in
piece
the U."S. negotiating position, linking ceasefire with that zka o?
territory might prove the feasible course of action.
The President summed up the issue by saying that this might
be a good initial position. General Goodpaster added that, in
essence, a ceasefire in South Vietnam constitutes a political settle-
ment unless the GVN have the freedom to move anywhere in South
Vietnam.
The President directed that the US think through its reaction
to a ceasefire proposal from the other side, especially if Hanoi
decides to drag the negotiations on they may raise this issue.
Secretary Rogers agreed that this could happen, adding if they
propose it without proclaiming it, then what is our reaction?
The President then asked for a recap of what the North Vietnamese
negotiating position will be. It was agreed that they will press for
U. S. withdrawal, seek a political settlement in the south, initially
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through a peace cabinet and ultimately a coalition government. They
will probably follow two tracks to insure complete flexibility but with
accent on the political settlement issue. Their basic objective would
be to use negotiations to break the back of the current regime in
South Vietnam. Recent efforts to establish front groups in South
Vietnam by the Viet Cong have failed. Secretary Rogers said our
maximum objective in our negotiations would, of course, be option
(a) but our minimum objective should be to give South Vietnam an
opportunity for time to insure their ultimate control of the government.
General Goodpaster added Hanoi will initially also target on the U. S.
domestic problem, i. e. , U. S. public opinion, stating he is sure that
a short range target of the north is to erode U. S. patience and willingness
to continue. Secretary of Defense stated it appears we should get
a grip on our world-wide objectives. We should know why the Russians
are pressing Hanoi.
The President stated that is exactly why I want so much to know
exactly where the Soviets stand on this issue. We may be closer
to a limited goal than we realize, primarily because of what the
Soviets have done. For that reason, I believe our best course of
action would be to hang on. On the other hand, we do have the
internal problem in the U. S. and it will be very difficult to continue
without some some change. We do have this problem. We thus
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need much from Paris as it affects our public attitudes at home. It
also means we may have to take more risks in a settlement than we
would prefer. While I am optimistic that it can be done, I am worried
about our ability to sell it to the American people. In summary,
maybe our best course would be to focus on mutual withdrawal.
Secretary of State Rogers added, "I think we can expect more from
the American people, especially if we could at some point reduce
our commitment by perhaps 50, 000.
The President stated if you can do this perhaps maybe we can
buy time and perhaps some support. Secretary Rogers mentioned
the Bunker telegram outlining his proposed style for American
negotiations with emphasis on the patient approach (Saigon 1474).
The President stated that he wished that there be absolutely
no public or private criticism of the GVN, that he is tired of seeing
them kicked around.
Dr. Kissinger suggested that we should consider ways of
insuring that the Soviets know that we are determined to settle
this issue one way or the other.
The President asked why the Soviets pressured Hanoi. General
Wheeler replied, "economics, strengthening U. S. -Soviet ties, perhaps
an effort to move in the Middle East". Ambassador Murphy asked
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-35-
in a tactical sense might it not be better to let the Soviets take the
initiative. Dr. Kissinger stated, "I think the Soviets are nervous
about you, Mr. President".
The President stated I think we will need about six months
of strong military action, combined with a good public stance which
reflects our efforts to seek peace. I feel we must not lose our
nerve on this one, We should buy time with negotiations and continue
to punish the enemy.
trnder Secretary of State Richardson stated, "could we not also
seek a small reduction of U. S. forces along the route, perhaps three
or four months from now''?
The President asked why Thi.eu agreed to some U. S. force
reduction. The Chairman replied,to insure U. S. support and maybe
also to help his own domestic image in the sensethat the government
is progressing and their forces are growing. What we visualize is
the replacement of certain U. S. units with certain GVN units.
Reductions must be balanced at any rate. We are now talking at
the staff level in Saigon on this issue. It would also involve the
turnover of U. S. equipment) o the Vietnarneseiof certain types "
The President stated, "this might be the thing, to do in four
months or so, after the initial negotiations are underway, Maybe we
had better cut out the bilateral staff talks and conduct this as a
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unilateral move in four months or so. It certainly should not be
done in the context of the negotiating framework". General Goodpaster
stated, "I would be most reluctant to commit ow.el s on this at
this time. The Viet Cong are concerned with progress in the pacifica-
tion area. General Abrams may be able to push up some reductions
earlier than May or June. If we can confirm this, we maybe ready
in a cbujle of months.
The President stated if we do this it must be held very closely
until the time ii. execuCThe President said our press line on the
troop withdrawal issue is important. Dr. Kissinger stated ",;ou
might say that this issue is under full factual review by the NSC but
that we will never keep more troops in Vietnam than are necessary.
14, The Presidentiask'~vhat is the most effective way to bring
the war to a conclusion? Our interest now is to get peace and I
shouldn't comment now on the troop withdrawal issue since our
position has been stated clearly in Paris". The President then
turned to the issue of the political settlement, stating that he saw
little hope for such a settlement. We might end up with a settlement
of some type without a formal agreement, a sort of mutual accommodation
in which either side is not deprived of the hope of ultimate success.
The south must know that we are with them. The north thinks they
are going to win anyway. We must leave some hope on both sides.
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When you lose your nerve, you can losChe basket. The mix of
actions should be something like this, We talk hard in private but
with an obvious peaceful public stance, seeking to gain time, initially
giving the South Vietnamese a chance to strengthen the regime ande,
the pacification effort while punishing the Viet Cong. Within three
or four months bring home a few troops unilaterally as a separate
and distinct action from the Paris negotiatiomand as a ploy for
more time domestically, while we continue to press at the negotiating
table for a military settlement.
Under Secretary of State Richardson asked, "yes, but can we
hang on with heavy draft calls, a"? General Wheeler added that
our draft calls in the next few months will be high.
The President then said, "yes and there is a question of our
European troop levels, the 6a Division issue. General Wheeler commented
"the Army is at the end of its .two--year cycle. Consequently, draft
calls will increase.
The President asked when the new pay bill would go into effect
and General Wheeler replied about July 1st.
The President then said,. "what about an all volunteer Army'.?
I would like something on this".
The President then asked about the issue of prisoner exchange.
Dr. Kissinger stated this is in the opening statement. The President
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then turned to Secretary Laird and stated, "I would like your views
on the draft issue" Ambassador Murphy raised the issue of U.S.
covert efforts to discredit the Hanoi leadership group.
The President directed that the 303 Committee look at this
very carefully stating he was tired of permitting this kind of thing
to go on and registering concern about groups in the U. S. who sup-
ported Hanoi.
The President asked again about the feasibility of sending a letter
to Sihanouk with the view towards reopening diplomatic relations.
The President then asked where our contact with the Soviets
is at present. Secretary Rogers said the Soviet Ambassador here
in Washington but also the Soviet Ambassador in Paris.
The President stated, "I would like to get some recommendations
on getting to the Soviets. In a tactical sense, we need a solution
to bridge the gap but we also need strategic help in making Hanoi
change its policy, a sort of carrot and stick approach. These efforts
should be' centered here in Washington. Talking on the strategic
arms issue is certainly the carrot. We should get planning started
on this immediately".
Dr. Kissinger added actions can be undertaken which look
threatening which worry the Soviets but actually may not occur.
These also m*Fy help. General Goodpaster stated if we are to contact
Sihanouk, we should discuss our concern about Sihanouk' ille and
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-39-
the movement of North Vietnamese arms through that port.
Dr. Kissinger stated, "Sihanouk's main value is the fact that he
mirrors the attitudes of the Asians. He is a sort ofbarometer. You
can be sure he will never stick his neck out.
The President said, "another carrot with respect to the Soviets
the
would be/hbnproliferation Treaty. As you know, we will go forward
after discussing this here - first with the Soviets and then with our
legislative leaders a week later. This will be a great symbol.'
The President then stated that he had a press conference on
Monday and emphasized that he did not like to use the term "no
comment".
The meeting concluded at 2:20 p. m.
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January Z9, 1969
Wednesday. 9:35 a. m.
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Actions Resulting from National Security
Council Meeting of January 25, 1969
Attached is a list of the actions indicated during the
National Security Council meeting on Saturday, January 25,
1969 dealing with Vietnam. The list has been coordinated
on an eyes only basis with the principals and has been agreed
to by them.
With your approval, I will prepare appropriate im-
plementing instructions where required.
G - ,"'
Approve
Disapprove
Other
Attachment (Top Secret-Sensitive)
SECRET
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