SENIOR REVIEW GROUP MEETING ON MAAG REQUIREMENTS: MONDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1976, 3:00 P.M.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 26, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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441 MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ELCRET XGDS INFORMATION
November 26, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT S COW CROFT
FROM: ROBERT B. PLOWDEN, JR
SUBJECT:
Purpose of This Meeting
Senior Review Group Meeting on MAAG
Requirements: Monday, November 29, 1976,
3: 00 p.m.
To determine what structure should be proposed to perform security
assistance functions in Fiscal Year 1978.
The following issues are in contention and should be addressed:
1. What MAAG-type organizations should be proposed for retention
in Latin America?
2. In countries such as Ethiopia, Spain, and Turkey, where there
is disagreement only as to the number of personnel to be assigned
to the MAAG-type organization (Defense Field Office) , what number
of personnel should be proposed?
3. In what form should an amendment be proposed which would permit
continued Defense Attache Office participation in security assistance
functions? Should a general repeal of the current restriction be
requested, or should authorization be requested for specified
countries?
4. Should the security assistance organization in Jordan be an
augmentation to the Defense Attache Office, or a separate Defense
Field Office?
NSS, DOS, DIA, OSD
reviews completed.
XGDS
XGDS of E .0. 11652 by authority
of Brent Scowcroft; Exemption
Category Section 5(B) (2) and (3)
ON FILE OMB RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
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5. Should legislation be requested which would permit, without
specific congressional approval, assignment to each U.S.diplo-
matic mission of up to six (instead of the current three) military
personnel to perform security assistance functions?
Background
The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act
of 1976 required a reduction to 34 MAAGs by September 30, 1976; in
addition, the Act requires specific congressional authorization for MAAGs
existing after September 30, 1977. The reduction has been completed,
and the study on MAAG requirements prepared by the Interdepartmental
Group for Political-Military Affairs in response to NSSM 243 has resulted
in four options for MAAG presence after September 30, 1977.
The agencies involved in this review were Defense, State, OMB, CIA,
and ACDA, and their study comments are at Tabs B through F, respectively.
Defense and State recommended specific options in their study comments,
while CIA and ACDA comments were generally supportive of these options.
In addition, the NSC Staff and. OMB have recommended third and fourth
options based on their evaluation of the study comment options. Before
addressing the differences in the four options, some elements of commonality
should be mentioned.
Common Positions
Each of the four options recommends that security assistance functions be
performed by Foreign Service Officers in countries with the very smallest
programs; by Defense- Attache Offices (DA0s) in some countries; by the
newly-established, three-person Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODCs)
in most countries (ODCs do not require specific congressional approval);
and by congressionally-approved, MAAG-type organizations -- Defense
Field Offices (DEF0s) -- with reduced staffing and functions in countries
where U.S . foreign policy interests necessitate a group of more than three
members of the U.S. Armed Forces.
There is also general agreement on three particular aspects of the MAAG
issue:
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? Three former MAAGs -- Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia -- will be
designated ODCs, with personnel in excess of those three funded
under FMS contracts. These contracts have not yet been signed, so
Defense has included those country figures in its alternative, while
State and OMB, assuming the contracts will be signed, have not
included the excess personnel or costs in their alternatives.
? It will be necessary to rely on temporary duty teams of experts to
perform security assistance on one-time bases as manpower levels
in MAAG-type organizations are reduced.
? The law (which now prohibits use of DAOs for security usistance
functions) should be amended to allow DAOs to continue performing
security assistance functions in countries where political sensitivities
are paramount or manpower savings are effected by not establishing
separate ODCs . (As discussed below, the NSC Staff option recom-
mends that DAO augmentation be requested only in those countries
where manpower savings are effected.) The provision of the law
which prohibits DAO involvement resulted in part from the efforts
of a House International Relations Committee staff member who had
served in a DAO while on active duty, and who thought that security
assistance functions he had to perform detracted from performance
of his intelligence functions. While such an allegation may have
been true in his case and isolated others, the proposed change to
the law is supported by all agencies involved, including strong
support from the CIA and JCS.
Aside from these broad areas of agreement, distinct positions have emerged
on the number of MAAG-type organizations/DEFOs to be retained, the manning
levels needed in various countries,? and the costs involved to support the
recommended positions. A summary of the key features of the four options
is at Tab G.
Defense Option
The Defense option recommends that 31 M.AAG-type organizations be
retained in FY 1978. While the Defense proposal substantially reduces
manpower in many cases and represents some cost reduction from the
FY 1977 program cost, the proposal represents a reduction of only three
MAAG-type organizations from the 34 authorized for FY 1977.
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Fourteen of the 31 organizations proposed are the traditional Latin
American military groups, which, quoting Defense, are recommended
for continuation to "perform the traditional role of representation and
essential security assistance functions on an as-required basis."
Because the clear intent of the law is to authorize only those personnel
performing "essential security assistance functions," the traditional
representation argument will carry little weight absent more compelling
evidence of need. To request approval of 31 MAAG-type organizations,
therefore, even with some reductions in manpower, quite probably would
be regarded as unresponsive by Congress and might lead to enactment of
more restrictive legislation,
State Option
The State option proposes the retention of 20 DEFOs in FY 1978, although
for reasons discussed below, the proposed cost and total number of
personnel are virtually identical to the Defense proposal's figures.
State proposes retaining four of the 14 Latin American military groups
as DEFOs, but offers somewhat more convincing reasons for the four
than Defense did for the 14: Panama, because of the on-going negotiations
leading to a new defense relationship; Brazil, because of its geo-political
importance; Argentina, because of the need to not appear as unduly
favoring Brazil; and Bolivia, through FY 1978 only, because of our
undertaking for a military modernization there.
In some countries where State and Defense agree on the need for a DEFO,
State has proposed a higher number of personnel, primarily military, to
staff the DEFOs than has Defense: e.g., Ethiopia (59 as compared to 34);
Spain (42 as compared to 30); and Turkey (127 as compared to 97). In
each of these instances, Defense has requested the number of people it
deems necessary to perform the essential security assistance functions,
while State appears to be requesting additional personnel for "traditional
representation" purposes. For this reason, the Defense position appears
more acceptable because it better comports with legislative intent.
The State alternative also recommends that legislation be proposed which
seeks the authority to assign up to six, rather than three, military person-
nel to ODCs without congressional approval. Because an amendment already
will be required to allow DAOs to perform security assistance functions,
there is small chance that Congress will accept two simultaneous revisions
to its recently enacted law.
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NSC Staff Oytion
The NSC Staff option recommends combining the best features of the
Defense and State options. It proposes retention of the 20 DEFOs recom-
mended by State, plus one DEFO in Jordan (where State has requested
a DAO augmentation of 10 military members, a request which I believe
would seriously harm chances for legislative relief from the current DAO
restriction, because it was Congress' intent to identify and specifically
authorize large security assistance operations such as this) To disguise
a DEFO by integrating it into a large DAO clearly would subvert the
legislative intent. In addition, it proposes acceptance of the lower Defense
figures for those DEFOs where Defense and State disagree only as to numbers.
Essentially, this proposal accepts the State option insofar as Latin America
is concerned, and the lower Defense personnel figures in countries such
as Ethiopia, Spain, and Turkey. The result of this combination is a
proposal which provides for that number of missions and personnel needed
to perform essential security assistance functions, a result totally consonant
with legislative intent.
In addition, the NSC Staff option recommends that continued DAO parti-
cipation in security assistance operations be requested only in those
countries where personnel or cost savings are effected by not establishing
separate ODCs. Defense, State, and OMB recommend continued DAO
security assistance participation in some countries where personnel or
cost savings are not effected, but where "political sensitivities are
paramount." The legislative history of the Act, however, is quite clear
in its intent that security assistance organizations be used only for
performance of essential security assistance functions, and not for
representative" or "politically sensitive" purposes. A proposed amend-
znent requesting continued DAO security assistance participation in as
few countries as possible, and then only where personnel and cost savings
are effected, would appear to have the greatest chance of success in
Congress..
OMB Option
The OMB option recommends retention of 14 DEFOs in FY 1978. From
the list of 20 on which Defense, State, and the NSC Staff agree, it further
recommends terminating MAAGs in Panama, Liberia, Tunisia, Pakistan,
the Philippines, and Japan. No reason for this recommendation is given,
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other than OMB's unsupported conclusion that "programs and functions
in those countries do not warrant more than three military personnel."
Considering the political sensitivies involved in our relationships with
these countries and the fact that the NSC Staff option results in significant
reductions from FY 1977 MAAG totals, I believe that the NSC Staff option
will satisfy the congressional desire for phasing down the MAAG presence,
while avoiding the repercussions which OMB's precipitous cuts would
occasion. In addition, keeping in mind that a proposal similar to this
now must be made to Congress each year, the NSC Staff option leaves
the most flexibility for future years.
Approach at the Meeting
Your talking points for the meeting are at Tab A. I suggest that you
open the meeting by underscoring the fact that the International Security
Assistance and Arms Export Control Act marks a new day insofar as MAAGs
are concerned, and attempts to maintain the status quo almost certainly
will meet with congressional disapproval. Also, while there has been a
considerable degree of agency agreement on this topic, a number of
contentious issues require resolution prior to formulation and submission
of the.FY 1978 budget request for MAAG-type organizations.
Specifically, in view of the considerations and agency positions detailed
above, you will want to:
Determine which countries in Latin America should retain MAAG-
type organizations.
Determine what number of personnel should be proposed for
assignment to Defense Field Offices in those countries (such as
Ethiopia, Spain, and Turkey) where there is general agreement
on the need for a DEFO, but differing views on the number of
personnel needed to perform security assistance functions.
Discuss the form in which an amendment should be proposed
which would permit continued Defense Attache Office participation
in security assistance functions in FY 1978.
Decide whether the security assistance organization in Jordan
should be a DEFO or a DAO augmented by 10 members of the
military .
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Discuss the desirability of requesting an increase from three
to six in the number of military personnel which can be assigned,
without prior congressional approval, to the Chief of each U .S .
diplomatic mission to perform security assistance functions.
Indicate that you will discuss with the President these and other
points raised at the meeting and that a Presidential decision
memorandum will be forthcoming.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Talking Points Tab A
Defense Position Tab B
State Position Tab C
OMB Position Tab D
CIA Co nun en ts Tab E
ACDA Comments Tab F
Statistical Summary Tab G
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TALKING POINTS
General
As you are aware, the International Security Assistance and
Arms Export Control Act of 1976 required a reduction to 34 MAAGs
by September 30, 1976; in addition, the Act requires specific
congressional authorization for MAAGs existing after September 30,
1977.
The mandated reduction has been accomplished, and our purpose
today is to decide a number of contentious issues concerning our
MAAG posture for FY 1978. The President decided to postpone a
decision on this subject pending the outcome of this meeting, but
since this is a budget as well as a policy issue, the decision must
be made shortly.
At the outset, two new terms developed by the interdepartmental
study should be understood by all . Defense Field Offices --
acronym DEFO -- will be the title for those current MAAGs proposed
for retention in FY 1978. Office of Defense Cooperation -- ODC --
will be the title for the three-member security assistance organi-
zations which may be assigned to each diplomatic mission without
prior congressional approval.
It also should be noted that the agency positions to which I will
refer are those which were advanced in formal agency comments
to the interdepartmental study and not those advanced in the study
Itself.
Latin America
I note that Defense has recommended retention of all MAAGs
currently operating in Latin America, while State recommends
retention of organizations only in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
and Panama. Is this still the Defense position?
The Defense rationale for this continued presence in Latin America
cites the need to have these organizations perform "the traditional
role of representation and essential security assistance functions
on an as-required basis." Because the new Act's clear intent is
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to authorize only those organizations performing essential security
assistance functions. It appears that the traditional representation
argument will carry little weight absent more compelling evidence
of need.
Jim (Lynn), I notice your proposal also recommends termination
of the MAAG in Panama? Would you not agree that we should retain
such a presence there because of our on-going negotiations leading
to a new defense relationship?
Other Countries
There are a number of countries such as Ethiopia, Spain, and
Turkey where there is agreement on the need for a DEFO, but
disagreement on the number of personnel to be assigned to the
DEFO.
I would think that the lower figures recommended by Defense
would be the figures we should propose, since Defense is charged
with administration of the security assistance program in each of
the countries in issue.
Defense Attache Offices
There is general agreement on the desirability of continuing DAO
participation in security assistance operations, but I think we need
to address the form in which an amendment to the currently restrictive
law should be presented.
Realizing that Congress is reluctant to repeal outright provisions of
recently-enacted laws, I am inclined to believe we instead should
identify those countries in which continued DAO participation
actually is necessary, and specifically request a waiver for those
countries.
Also, I believe that the argument which will be most persuasive on
the Hill is that continued DAO participation will result in personnel
and cost savings in the countries specified. For this reason, I am
skeptical about citing "paramount political sensitivities" in some
countries as a reason for seeking an amendment to the current law,
a law which clearly is designed to authorize personnel only to
perform security assistance functions.
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Jordan
-3-
I believe the proposal to continue the significant augmentation
of the DAO in Jordan to perform security assistance functions
would seriously jeopardize our chances for obtaining relief
from the current DAO restriction.
In essence, we are disguising a DEFO in a greatly augmented
DAO. Congress' intent in passing the current Act was to identify
and specifically authorize large security assistance operations
such as this. Augmenting the DAO would appear to subvert this
legislative intent, even though "paramount political sensitivities"
in Jordan point toward retention of the current practice.
Six-person Offices of Defense Cooperation
While this appears to be an attractive alternative in a number of
countries, particularly Latin America, I would think that this
request may harm chances for obtaining relief on the DAO
restriction.
Decisions
I will discuss with the President the points raised here today, and
a Presidential decision memorandum should be forthcoming soon.
The personnel and cost figures will be those contained in the
President's FY 1978 budget request.
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SECRET
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: NSSM 243, MAAG Requirements Study (C)
This memorandum answers your staff memorandum of 19 October 1976 which
requested formal agency views on the MAAG Requirements Study prepared by
the Interdepartmental Group for Political Military Affairs in response
to NSSM 243 (Atch 3).
sgo r
We have reviewed the Study and discern varying degrees of attractiveness
in the alternatives presented. Alternative 1, for example, would maintain
the current MAAG structure as a projection of U.S. influence and power
overseas, reinforcing U.S. interest and capabilities in countries with
little or no other U.S. presence. However, this alternative does not
reflect the realities associated with the legislative history of the Inter-
national Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976. On the other hand,
Alternative 5, which would be within legislative restraints, does not provide
sufficient personnel to manage effectively the security assistance program in
many countries.
Alternatives 2, 3 and 4, which are more flexible in their approaches, have
a high degree of commonality and have been used by DOD as the basis for
. developing a concept which incorporates the best features of these three
alternatives. The new alternative, which we propose, can be justified to
the Congress as it reduces manpower and costs. At the same time, this
alternative would preserve military relationships provided by the MAAG-type
organizations and would not restrict the President's options to meet
current, realistic security and foreign policy requirements.
Recommend that the concept at Attachment i be forwarded through the Senior
Review Group to the President for his consideration/approval and eventual
submission to the Congress in the form of proposed legislation (Atch 2).
In the meantime, we will continue to coordinate with the Department of State
to determine the direction of MAAG-type organizations, their titles and to
refine personnel requirements, functions, terms of reference, funding and
other procedures required to implent and 'ustify u proposed alternative.
)1-
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Attachments
a/5
classmea ty Director, Policy Plans and NSC Affairs
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION S.,CTLLE OF Upon removal of attachments
MECUTIU ORDER 11052. AUTOrATICALLYPOI:=3:W-71.) this document becoMaa
... DE6 -84..
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? 77-7:77.-.
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_Attachment
- DOD Proposal
Description: Eliminate all Military Assistance Advisory Groups and establish -
Defense Field Offices (DEFO) in countries where major security assistance
delivery programs are on-going. Representation to Latin America countries
is a special situation and will require the continued operation of Military
Groups which will perform the traditional role of representation and
essential security assistance Functions on an as required basis. In
countries where the security assistance function can be performed by three
military personnel or less, a separate Office of Defense Cooperation will
be established. in other countries where there is only a limited security
assistance program or circumstances indicate, we will ask Congress for
authorization to allow the DAO to handle security assistance responsibilities.
Foreign Service Officers will handle security assistance in countries
with the very smallest programs if legislative relief cannot be obtained.
Concept of Operation:
a. In developed countries where the major security assistance function
is focused on acquisition of equipment and services, the MAAG will be
replaced with a DEFO that is specifically structured to meet individual
country needs. In these.Countires, (currently Japan and Taiwan) the new
activity would not have advisory or training functions and would be staffed
with only the requisite numbers of contract, fiscal and logistics personnel.
111/ The primary function of the activity would be to serve as a conduit for
information on FMS actions to include technical matters, payment and follow-on
actions.
b. In developing countries, the DEFO will, in addition, manage
and monitor delivery programs and assist in the integration of equipment
as required. Advisory ortraining functions would be met primarily by
periodic survey/planning teams, Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), Technical
Assistance Field Teams (IAFTs) or Technical Assistance Teams (TATs)
when requested by the country concerned and the Department of State.
However, the concept is flexible enough to permit DEFOs to perform training
and advisory functions as may be required. DEFOs or ODCs, as appropriate,
would coordinate and supervise the advisory and training functions provided
by transitory teams. The teams would be supported by funds made available
through the MAP appropriation or by FMS procedures. Military Groups for
Latin American countries are categorized separately due to their special
relationship with host countries.
In countries where there is a type of Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA),
either in effect on under consideration by the Congress, the security
assistance management organization has specific functions associated with
the agreement or US forces in the host country. Approval should, therefore,
be sought in legislation to have the DEFOs in these countries approved for
the duration of the agreement.
Projected Organizational Manning and Funding Requirements
Developed countries with Defense Field Offices 2
Developing countries with Defense Field Offices
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tot.,cocci
.?
2
DCA Countries with Defense Field Offices
4
'?
Countries with Military Groups
14
Countries with Offices of Defense Cooperation
12
Countries where DAOs perform security assistance
functions
23
Personnel requirements (estimated FY 78) (us Mil-
itary-780; US civilian-120; and local civilian-
1184
284)
- USG funding FY 78 $50.4M
Requirements for Implementation ?
Congressional authorization to establish and sustain operation of Defense
Field Offices; to continue the operation of Latin American Groups;
and to permit designated DAOs to perform security assistance functions.
Advantages
? Provides a lower profile for security assistance personnel.
Changes the name of MAAGs to a title more in line with functions
performed.
Demonstrates a willingness to change.MAAG organization and functions
with no open-ended commitments.
Provides both in-country and TOY flexibility by establishing a min-
imal essential base of personnel that can be augmented by MTTs and
TAFTs as required.
Reduces the number of uniformed service personnel required to perform
security assistance functions and enhances reimbursement possibilities.
Provides for continuing Latin American military mission agreements.
- Retains organization, functions and procedures for assignment and
control of DOD personnel in security assistance positions in foreign
nations.
Permits use of DAOs in performance of security assistance functions in
selected countries with resultant savings in manpower and operating
costs.
Disadvantages
Could have a short-term impact on host country perceptions of US
interests.
Requires completely new legislation authorizing DETOsitii1Gps.
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Fewer US military personnel with detailed knowledge of recipient countries'
problems and military personnel.
Requires relief from legislative constraints on use of DAOs in accomplish-
ment of security assistance functions.
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FY 78 Manning and Funding Estimate
Personnel
---------- US
Military Civilian
1. Defense Field Offices (DEF0s)
A. Highly Developed Countries
Taiwan
Japan
B. Developing Countries
15
7
Local
Civilian Total
Korea
Indonesia
Thailand
Iran 1/2/
Kuwait 2/
117
33
40
5
. 9
30
3
7
2
o
43
16
15
1
o
Morocco
14
2
2
Pakistan
7
o
3
Saudi Arabia 2/
80
2
10
Tunisia
6
1
2
Portugal
12
4
9
Ethiopia
21
3
to
Liberia
6
0
2
Zaire
10
o
3
Jordan
10
2
5
C. Defense Cooperation Agreement Countries
Greece
29
7 ?
16
Philippines
37
9
6
Spain
18
4
8
Turkey
55
12 '
30
2.
Military Groups
Argentina
20
0
9
Bolivia
22
2
8
Brazil
38
6
26
Chile
12
0
6
Colombia
18
1
6
Dom Rep
8
0
2
Ecuador
8
1
2
El Salvador
8
o
3
Guatemala
9
0
3
Honduras
8
o
3
Nicaragua
10
0
2
Panama
13
1
1
.
Peru
7
0
4
Venezuela
19
0 ?
.4
Cost
US
Cost
22
932.5
17
630.2
190
4,990.0
52
1,950.0
62
1,959.1
8
341.0
9
430.6
18
822.2
to
470.0
92
3,884.1
9
342.7
25
597.9
34
1,408.8
8
910.4
13
772.1
17
675.0
52
1,771.7
52
1,955.7
30
1,028.8
97
3,054.5
29
956.3
32
1,184.5
70
2,512.6
18
756.1
25
863.2
10
418.9
11
299.5
ti
463.3
12
519.4
11
334.9
12
401.4
15
461.8
11
362.3
.23
1,412.9
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?In 1,6
Personnel
Cost
Military
US
Civilian
Local
Civilian
Total
US
Cost
Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODCs)
Belgium
3
1
1
5
191.5
Denmark
3
1
1
5
191.5
France
3
1
1
5
216.5
Netherlands
3
1
1
5
191.5
Norway
3
1
1
5
191.5
India
2
1
2
5
206.5
Costa Rica
2
0
1
3
106.7
Yemen
3
o
1
LI
191.0
Paraguay
3
o
1
It
186.5
Uruguay
3
0
1
4
186.5
Germany
3
2
5
to
306.5
Italy
3
2
1
6
201.5
Defense Attache Offices
6(0)
o(o)
o(o)
o (0)
-"Afghanistan 4/
o(o)
Australia 3/
3(3)
0(1)
o(o)
3(4)
124.9(166.5)
Austria 3/
2(3)
0(1)
o(o)
2(4)
88.2(176.5)
Burma 4/?
o(o)
o(o)
o(o)
0(0)
o (o)
v Egypt 3/
3(3)
t(i)
0(0)
4(4)
196.0(196.0)
Finland 4/
0(0)
0(0)
o(o)
0(0)
0 (o)
',Ghana 4/?
o(o)
0(0)
o(o)
o(o)
0 (o)
'Haiti 3/
1(2)
o(o)
o(t)
1(3)
58.3(140.0
Israel4/
o(o)
o(o)
o(o)
0(o)
o (0)
'Lebanon ,/
0(3)
o(o)
0(1)
0(4)
o (191.0
%Malaysia 3/
1(3)
o(1).
o(i)
1(5)
33.3(166.5)
. Mali 4/
o(o)
?o(o)
o(o)
o(o)
o (o)
Mexico 3/
1(2)
o(o)
0(1)
1(3)
39.4(118.3)
Nepal 4/
o(o)
o(o)
o(o)
o(o)
o (a)
New Zealand 4/
o(o)
o(o)
0(0)
o(o)
o (0)
'Nigeria 3/
1(2)
o(t)
0(1)
1(4)
38.4(153.5)
Senegal V/
o(o)
o(o)
0(0)
o(o)
o (0)
',Singapore 3/
1(3)
o(i)
o(o)
1(4)
41.7(166.7)
Sri Lanka 4/
o(o)
o(o)
o(o)
o(o)
o (o)
Sweden 4/ ?
o(o)
o(o)
o(o)
0(0)
o (0)
Switzerland 4/
o(o)
o(o)
o(o)
o(o)
o (0)
vUnited Kingdom 3/
2(3)
0(1)
0(1)
2(5)
76.6(191.5)
'Yugoslavia 4/
o(o)
o(o)
o(o)
0(0)
0 (o)
Hq Admin Cost
7,500.0
Total
780
120
284
1184
50,438.9
p
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: .LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
1/ The majority of the spaces are paid out of reimbursable FMS expenses.
Total 150 military, 19 US civilian and 39 local civilian.
2/ DEFOs may be replaced with 00Cs if adequate level of reimbursement can
be obtained from host country.
3/ The numbers of personnel and costs shown outside parentheses reflect
the augmentation to DAO and associated operating costs and would be
applicable if legislative relief on the use of DAOs in the performance
of security assistance functions is obtained. Personnel levels and
costs shown in parentheses would apply if legislative relief cannot
be obtained and ODCs must be established.
4/ In the event legislative relief on the use of DAOs in the performance
of security assistance functions is not obtained, the security assistance
function will be transferred from the DAO to Foreign Service Officers on
Embassy staffs.
?-? 1
?
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
A JOINT RESOLUTION
TO AUTHORIZE MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS, MILITARY
MISSIONS, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS OF UNITED STATES
MILITARY PERSONNEL PERFORMING SIMILAR MILITARY
ADVISORY FUNCTIONS UNDER THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Whereas section 515(b)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, as amended (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"),
provides that, after September 30, 1977/ "no military
assistance advisory group, military mission, or other,orga-
nization of United States military personnel performing
similar military advisory functions under this Act may
operate in a foreign country unless specifically authorized
by the Congress"; and ?
Whereas section 515(b)(1) of the Act applies only to
military assistance advisory groups, military missions, and
similar organizations whose services are not directly and
fully reimbursed under the Arms Export Control Act by foreign
countries pursuant to foreign military sales cases expressly
providing for such reimbursable services: Now, therefore,
be it
Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that
organizations of United States military personnel performing
security assistance, liaison, and ,equipment delivery functions,
whose services are not directly and fully reimbursed under the
Arms Export Control Act, are hereby authorized to operate in
the following countries during the period beginning October 1,
1977 and ending September 30/ 1980:
Latin American Military Groups in Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,Ecuador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Venezuela; and
Defense Field Offices in Ethiopia, Greece', Indonesia,
Iran, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Kuwait, Liberia, Morocco,
Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain,
Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and Zaire: Provided,
That such Offices in Greece, Spain, Turkey and the
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15 : LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
?
Philippines are authorized to operate during the period
October 1, 1977 and ending on the respective dates of
expiration of the treaties, or executive agreements approved
by the Congress, with those respective countries pursuant
to which security assistance is provided.
Sec. 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the performance of security assistance, liaison and equip-
ment delivery functions by Defense Attaches during the
period beginning October 1, 1977 and ending September 30,
1980 in countries not designated in section 1 of this Joint
Resolution is hereby authorized at each diplomatic mission
where the President shall determine it to be appropriate.
Sec. 3. Section 43(b) of the Arms Export Control
Act is amended, effective October 1, 1977, by striking
out the period at the end of the subsection and inserting
the following in lieu thereof: ", except for the adminis-
trative expenses of any mission or group which are directly
and fully charged to, and reimbursed from amounts received
for, sales of services .under section 21."
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-30772-3-5,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
November 2, 1976
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: NSSM 243: MAAG Requirement Study
We have been asked by Miss Davis' memorandum'of
October 19, to give our views on the study prepared
in response to NSSM 243, which presents five options
for restructuring and staffing of MAAG-type organi-
zation for security assistance functions.
The Department endorses Option 4, as modified in
the attachment. This option is a product of the views
of our ambassadors, regional assistant secretaries,
and other senior Department officials. We feel that
Options 1 and 3 envision greater personnel resources
for security assistance functions than are necessary.
Moreover, these options are too close to the status
auo and would be unacceptable to Congress. Option 5
is an extreme reduction in staffing that would damage
political relationships and necessary operations.
Option 2 does not address the desirability of having
DAOs or Embassy Foreign Service Officers perform secu-
rity assistance functions. It also overstates the
need to continue military programs in Latin America.
Option 4 seems preferable as it sets forth a
simplified concept of security assistance operations
which, we believe, will have the greatest appeal to
Congress. It reduces the number of MAAG-type units
from 34 to 20, the number of security assistance mili-
tary personnel from 1263 to 682, and total costs from
about $54 million to $46.7 million. The concept is a
comprehensible one, calling for the submission to
Congress for approval of proposals to maintain 20
CONFIDENTIAL
GDS
?
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Sgo
?
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CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
MAAG-type units (Defense Field Offices - DEF0s) on
the grounds that they are essential in terms of our
political relationships or our military position in
the countries concerned.
In 26 other countries we would establish three-
man (or smaller), military Offices of Defense Cooper-
ation (ODCs) which, under the new authority of
Section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended,
do not require further Congressional authorizatioh.
Included in this group would be all but four countries
in Latin America where we feel the military groups
have outlived their utility and where we can expect
Congressional criticism. We would retain military
groups (DEF0s) in Panama because of the on-going nego-
tiations leading to a new defense relationship, in
Brazil. because of it political importance, in
Argentina because of the need to maintain a balance
with Brazil, and in Bolivia, through FY 1978 only,
because of our undertaking for a-military moderniza-
tion program there.
Also included in the three-man ODC group are the
OPEC countries where the governments will finance
virtually all security assistance personnel under FMS
sales cases. Three-man units in those countries would
not require Congressional approval, but the military
presence, including host-government funded Technical
Assistance Field Teams (TAFTs) there, would be reported
to Congress periodically and notification of the FMS
cases over $25 million in value would be furnished to
Congress as required by law.
Finally, we propose to ask Congress to approve
DAO participation in security assistance in the case
of 13 countries where, because of important political
sensitivities or for reasons of manpower savings, the
DAOs now handle security assistance and are preferable
to ODCs. Elsewhere (12 countries) Embassy FSOs would
handle the responsibility.
CONFIDENTIAL
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
suggest that the NSC Staff approve the new
concept for ex-MAAG structures along the lines of
Option 4, direct DOD to send survey teams to the
large DEFOs to assure austere staffing and request
the Senior Review Group to resolve remaining
differences between agencies so that a proposal,
possibly with options, may be presented to the
President for his approval. In the interim, the
NSSM Working Group can continue to work on such
matters as Terms of Reference, functions, and
financing.
In recommending the foregoing position, the
Department also recommends that..we seek legislation
to authorize the assignment of up to six, rather
than three, military personnel to the ODCs where
there is a clear need to do so. The Department
believes that the present ceiling of three personnel
is too restrictive and inflexible. The possibility
of enlarging those Units to six members would enable.
us better to conduct our operational requirements
and meet our political responsibilities. If the
measure were adopted by Congress, the size of at
least some ODCs would increase. Some of the smaller
DEFOs would also become ODCs, thereby reducing the
number of MAAG-type groups for which Congressional
authorization is needed.
, \I Cr6
Q.--c
aClx . Arthur Borg
utive Secretary
Attachment:
Modified Version of Option 4.
CONFIDENTIAL
?
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
'CONFIDENTIAL
OPTION 4. FY 1978 MANNING AND FUNDING ESTIMATE
(Revised October 22, 1976)
(FY 1977 Military Staffing Authorizationr
where different, in parenthesis.)
. Defense Field
(DEF0s)
Personnel
Cost
Military
US
Civilian
Local
Civilian
Total
US
Cost
Offices
Taiwan
15 (30)
5
2
22
932.5
Japan
7
5
5
17
630.2
Korea
117 (155)
.30
43
190
4,990.0
Indonesia
33 (54)
3
16
52
1,950.0
Thailand
40 (117)
7
15
62
1,959,0
Morocco
17 (19)
2
2
21
928.0
Pakistan
8 (9)
0
3
11
550.0
Tunisia
6 (9)
1
2
9
342.7
Portugal
12 (14)
4
9
25
597.9
Ethiopia
46
3
10
59
2,868.0
Liberia
9
0
2
11
974.0
?Zaire
10
0
3
13
772.1
Greece
29
7
16
52
1,771.7
Philippines
37
9
6
52
1,955.0
Spain
30
4
8
42
1,650.0
Turkey
85
12
30
127
4,450.0
Argentina
20 (22)
0
9
29
956.3
Bolivia
22 (29)
2
8
32
1,184.5
Brazil
33 (31)
6
26
65
2,420.0
Panama
13
1
1
15
461.8
2. Offices of Defense Cooperation
(ODCs)
Austria
2
0
0
2
63.3
Belgium
3
1
1
5
191.5
Denmark
3
1
1
5
191.5
France
3
1
1
5
216.5
CONFIDENTIAL
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
India
Iran 1/
Kuwait 1/
Saudi Arabia 1/
Australia
Chile
Colombia
Dominican Rep.
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
4111 Nicaragua
%Costa Rica
\Paraguay
Peru
'Uruguay
Ecuador
Venezuela
CONFIDENTIAL
Cost
- 2
-
Personnel
Military
US
Civilian
Local
Civilian
Total
US
Cost
3
2
5
10
306.5
3
2
1
6
201.5
3
1
1
5
191.5
3
1
1
5
191.5
2
1
2
5
206.5
3
2
1
6
160.0
3
0
0
3
296.2
3
2
10
.15
186.0
3
1
0
4
166.5
3
(15)
0
6
9
223.0
3
(21)
1
6
10
232.3
3
(8)
0
2
5
181.0
3
(10)
0
3
6
179.0
3
(12)
0
3
6
173.0
3
(11)
0
3
6
185.0
3
(11)
0
2
5
176.0
2
0
1
3
106.7
3
0
1..
4
186.5
3
(7)
0
4
7
212.3
3
0
1 .
4
186.5
3
(8)
1
2
6
191.5
3
(19)
0
4
7
282.3
2/
3. Defense Attache Offices ?
(DA0s)
(Figures represent personnel required to augment existing DAO
staff for security assistance functions.)
Afghanistan
0
0
0
0
0
Nigeria
1
1
'
1
3
'
120.0
Yemen
2
.0
1
3
191.0
Israel
0
0
0
0
0
1/ In Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia all security assistance
personnel, except 3 military in each country, are to be funded
by the host country.
2/ Should Congress refuse to permit DAOs to exercise security as-
sistance functions, ODCs will be established or the functions
may be shifted to Foreign Service Officers. An exception must
be made for Jordan: If Congress will not permit the DAC) to per-
form security assistance taks, provision must be made for the
establisment.of a ten-man DEM. Congress should be forewarned
of this fall-back positiqn.
?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
CONFIDENTIAL
3
-
Personnel
Cost
Military
US
Civilian
Local
Civilian
? US
Total Cost
Singapore
1
1
0
2
75.0
Egypt
0
0
0
0
0
Ghana
0
0
0
0
0
Haiti
1
0
0
1
58.3
Lebanon
0
0
0
0
0
Malaysia
1
0
0
1
49.2
Yugoslavia
0
0
0
Q
0
United Kingdom
2
1
0
3
120.6
Jordan
10
2
5
17
618.3
Hqs. Admin. Cost
8,000.0
TOTAL
682*
123
280
1,176
46,714.2
4110 Subject to Ambassadors concurrence, Foreign Service Officers
on Embassy staffs will perform security assistance functions,
assisted on occasion by TDY DOD personnel: Gabon, Cameroon,
Burma, New Zealand, Nepal, Senegal, Mexico, Sweden, Switzerland,
Finland, Kenya (The GOK pays for an F-5 Technical Assistance
Field Team), and Sri Lanka.
CONFIDENTIAL
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
?
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20503
November 4, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Robertflowden
Acting Director, Planning Staff
National Security Council
FROM: "rdWiMirnana'rs
Deputy Associate Director
International Affairs Division
SUBJECT: NSSM 243: MAAG Requirement Study
12. ?fop,.
/C" 2
We were requested to provide formal agency views on the draft response
to NSSM 243 including comments and recommendations on the issues and
options involved.
Official comments from the OMB representative to the IGPMA Chairman
on October 14, 1976 indicated that Alternatives 1 and 5 should have
been dropped. These alternatives incorporate staffing and funding
levels which are not realistic in terms of the Congressional mandate
(Alternative 1) or our foreign policy and program management interests
(Alternative 5). It was also suggested that a bare bones alternative
be developed by the Working Group. As such an alternative has not been
included in the draft response, OMB is developing such an option with
Manning and costing estimates for 1978 and 1979. As soon as we have
cost estimates for this lower option, we would like to discuss it with
you prior to the OMB Director's review.
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No Objection to Declassification in Part2013/08/15 : LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
WilLarit\L
Issue Paper
International Security Assistance
1978 Budget
Issue #12: Military Assistance Advisory Groups
Background
Military assistance advisory groups, missions, and other similar security assistance units (commonly
referred to as MAAGs) were originally established to assist foreign governments in their military
planning, training, and the assimilation of U.S. military equipment into their forces. MAAG organizations
have also served as a direct, military-to-military link between U.S. forces stationed in a foreign country
and the host government. In foreign countries with military governments, the U.S. MAAG has often provided
an important avenue of communication. The primary role of most MAAGs, however, is still related to U.S.
military equipment and training.
Much of the military equipment which was originally given to foreign countries under the grant military
assistance program (MAP) is now being sold through the foreign military sales (FMS) program either on a
.cash or a credit basis. This change in our military assistance program from grant to sales has been
accompanied by a shift in the role of MAAGs. No longer are MAAGs involved in field-level training and
advisory functions or military planning at the unit level. Training for foreign students in U.S. military
schools is programmed by the MAAG's training officer. More and more of the FMS business is conducted
. directly between Washington and the foreign government, and the military advice from MAAGs to host govern-
ments often takes the form of high level communications concerning force planning concepts or policy issues.
With the gradual phasing out of the grant MAP program Congress has taken a closer look at MAAGs in terms
of both the costs to the United States and the continued U.S. military presence abroad. As a consequence,
the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 required elimination of 10 of the then existing 44 MAAGs by September 30,
1976, while allowing assignment of up to three military personnel (Office of Defense Cooperation) to the
chief of.the diplomatic mission to carry out security assistance functions. All remaining MAAGs are to be
eliminated by September 30, 1977, except as specifically authorized by Congress. The new law also requires
that administrative expenses of the FMS program incurred by U.S. Government agencies (including MAAGs)
primarily for the benefit of a foreign government be reimbursed from the 2% administrative fee charged on:
every FMS case.
CONFIDERIAL
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
52
_111/0 No Objection to Declassification in Part2013/08/15 : LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
C 0 firrEFITI AL 01111
The new law provides an opportunity to reVise the organization, functions, and staffing of our military
missions abroad in keeping with the changing nature of our security assistance programs. The NSSM 243 .
MAAG Requirement Study was initiated by the NSC staff to determine which MAAGs should be retained after
FY 1977 and to develop legislative options for FY 1978 and beyond. The study recognizes that security
assistance functions could be handled by foreign service officers in countries with the very smallest
programs, by the Defense Attache's Office (DAO) in some countries, by the newly established Offices of
Defense Cooperation (ODC) in most countries, or by a MAAG-type organization (Defense Field Offices)
with reduced staffing and functions in countries where U.S. foreign policy interests necessitate a group
of more than three members of the U.S. armed forces.
The Departments of State and Defense and OMB have generally agreed on three aspects of the MAAG
issue: .
An increased reliance on temporary teams of experts will be necessary as manpower levels in
MAAG-type organizations are reduced.
The law should be changed to allow DAO's to continue performing security assistance functions
in countries where political sensitivities are paramount or manpower savings are being effected.
Three military missions which were previously MAAGs--Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait--could be
designated ODC's with three or fewer U.S. military personnel funded out of the MAP account and
the remainder of the U.S. Government personnel funded under FMS cases and separately reported
to Congress.
Distinct agency positions have emerged from both the Departments of State and Defense on the number of
MAAG-type organizations (Defense Field Offices-DEF0s) ?to be retained, the manning levels, and the costs.
Both Departments have qualified their positions with suggestions that further interagency discussion is .
necessary. These positions and the OMB and NSC recommendations are outlined in the following chart. Attached
are a table showing the MAAGs eliminated under each alternative and a detailed country-by-country table
showing costs and manning levels.
Statement of Issue
How many military assistance advisory groups, missions, and milgroups and at what military manpower and
total funding levels should be authorized for fiscal year 1978 and 1979?
CONFIPENTIAL
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d 53
rirt Ai
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
Alternatives
1/1. Seek authorization for a total of 31 MAAG-type organizations with security assistance staffing levels
of 695 U.S. military personnel at an estimated total cost of $39.0 million in FY 1978 and $39.0
million in FY 1979. '(Defense request)
1/2. Seek authorization for a total of 20 MAAG-type organizations in 1978, 19 in 1979 with security
assistance staffing levels of 682 U.S. military personnel in 1978, 663 in 1979, at an estimated total
-cost of $38.6 million in FY 1978 and $37.6 million in FY 1979. (State request)
#3. Seek authorization for a total of 21 MAAG-type organizations in 1978, 20 in 1979 with security
assistance staffing levels of 608 U.S. military personnel In 1978, 586 in 1979, at an estimated total
cost of $34.8 million in FY 1978 and $33.8 million in 1979. (NSC recommendation)
#4. ?Seek authorization for a total of 14 MAAG-type organizations in 1978 and 11 in 1979, with security .
assistance staffing levels of 461 U.S. military personnel in 1978, 350 in 1979, at an estimated
total cost of $27.9 million in 1978 and $23.2 million in 1979. (OMB recommendation)
Ana:lysis
1976/TO
Actual
1977
Budget
Number of MAAG-type
organizations proposed
for retention
44
. 33
Total Security Assistance
manpower required
2,056
1,902
(Military Personnel)
(1,455)
(1,296)
Cost of Military Assistance
Organizations (MAAGS, ODC's
DAO Augmentation, etc.)
72,4
56.3
? Reimbursed from 2% FMS
Administrative Fee
--
36.0
Net Cost to MAP
20.3
1978 .
Alt. #1
Alt. W2
Alt. #3
Alt. 1/4
Alt. 1/1
31
20
21
14
31
1,090
1,087
1,005
783
1,098
(695)
(682)
(608)
(461)
(695)
1979
Alt. #2 Alt. #3 Alt.
19
20
1,063
986
(663)
(586)
1
64E1
(35C
($ in millions)
39.0
38.6
34-.8
29.0
29.0
26.6
10.0
9.6
8.2
nrw 7-1 rim r7-1 1!
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
27.9
39.0
21.0
29.0
6.9
10.0
37.6
33.8
23.2
28.0
25..6
17.0
9.6
8.2
6.2
4111 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
UU LIWL
Alternative #I. The Department of Defense believes that 31 MAAG-type organizations should be proposed for
FY 1978. Since the three MAAGs dropped (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait) would not actually be eliminated
or reduced in strength but only shifted to host country funding, the Defense proposal is a reduction in
number of MAAGs in appearance only. Military manpower is substantially reduced in many cases (46% overall).
Fourteen of the 31 MAAG organizations to be retained are the traditional Latin American Military Groups,
which are proposed for continuation largely on the basis of historical relationships. To propose that
CongreSs specifically authorize 31 MAAGs would clearly be regarded as unresponsive by Congress, and might
provoke them to act arbitrarily.
Agency Request: Alternative #2. The Department of State proposes the retention of 20 MAAG-type organiza-
tions in FY 1978, a reduction of over one-third in the present number of MAAGs, 47% in military manpower, and
31 in costs. Based on the importance of our foreign policy interests and the size of existing milgroups -
and security assistance programs, State proposes retaining only four of the fourteen Latin American
Milgroups--Brazil, Argentina, Panama,. and Bolivia (where we have an equipment commitment only through FY 1978).
All other currently operating MAAGs are proposed for retention, except Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait which are
to be retained in fact but converted to host country funding. Although the State proposal would deal with
Latin America in a realistic manner, the absence of any real MAAG elimination elsewhere is not in consonance
with Congressional intent.
NSC Staff Recommendation. Alternative #3. NSC staff recommends combfninq the low options in Alternatives #1 and n
i'--611-ing in the retention of 21 MAAG-type organizations in FY 1978, with a 53% reduction in military manpower
and 38% in costs. In effect, NSC endorses the State position except in Jordan and in those countries where
? the Defense Department has recommended lower numbers of military personnel to perform security assistance functions.!
.flAAGs outside of Latin America have not been eliminated.
OMB Recommendation: Alternative #4. OMB recommends the continuation of MAAGs in only those countries where
major security assistance programs exist, where U.S. forces are present and a representational function is
required for the MAAG, and where major U.S. foreign policy interestswould be severely damaged by elimination.
Application of these criteria, tempered by a two-year phase-out in some cases, results in a FY 1978 proposal
of 14 MAAG organizations, with 11 remaining in FY 1979. This represents a reduction of over 50% in the
number of MAAGs and in total costs from the status quo and a military manpower reduction of 647 in FY 1978.
We believe this is more appropriate to the changing role of U.S. security assistance as a foreign policy tool
and more likely to elicit a favorable response by the Congress.
President's Decision:
No Objection to Declassification 'in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
Year
1978
No Objection to Declassification in Part2013/08/15 : LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
CONFIDENTIALIIIF
Alternative #1
(Defense)
*Iran
*Kuwait
*Saudi Arabia
Military .
Manpower remaining 695
1979
None
Military
Manpower remaining 695
MAAGs ELIMINATED.
Alternative #2
(State)
*Iran
*Kuwait
*Saudi Arabia
Chile
Colombia
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
.Nicaragua
Peru
Venezuela
Ecuador
682
Bolivia
663
Alternative #3
(NSC)
*Iran
*Kuwait
*Saudi Arabia
Chile
Colombia
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Peru
Venezuela,
Ecuador
608'
Bolivia
586
*Converted to ODC with balance of personnel funded by host country.
------ No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
Alternative #4 ?
(OMB)
*Iran
*Kuwait
*Saudi Arabia
Chile
Colombia
Dominican Republict
El Salvador
Guatema1a
Honduras
Nicaragua
Peru
Venezuela
Ecuador
Japan
Pakistan
Tunisia
Liberia
Philippines
Panama
461
Bolivia
Ethiopia
Taiwan
350
Fr)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
CONFIDENTIAL
Military Assistance Advisory Groups - FY 1970
Military
Alt. tl Alt. t2
Taiwan 15 15 '
Japan 7 7
Korea 117 117
Indonesia 33 33
Thailand 40 40
Iran 5 3
Kuwait 9 3
Morocco 14 17
Pakistan 7 8
Saudi Arabia 80 3
Tunisia 6 6
Portugal 12 12
Ethiopia 21 46
Liberia 6 9
Zaire 10 10
Jordan 10 10
Greece 29 29
Philippines 37 37
Spain 18 30
Turkey 55 85
Argentina 20 20
Bolivia 22 22
Brazil 38 33
Chile 12 3
Colombia 18 3
Dominican Republic 8 3
El Salvador 8 3
GuatelmaIa 9 3
Honduras 8 3
Nicaragua 10 3
Panama 13 13
Peru 7 3
Venezuela 19 3
Belgium 3 3
Denmark. - 3 3
France 3 3
Netherlands 3 3
Norway 3 3
India 2 2
Costa Rica 2 2
Paraguay 3 3
Uruguay 3 3
Germany 3 3
Italy 3 3 '
Yemen 3 2
Afghanistan 0Y 0
Australia 3 3
Austria 2 2
Burma 0 -1/
Ecuador 8 3
Egypt 3 0
Finland 0
Ghana 0 0
Haiti 1 1
Israel o 0
Lebanon 0 0 ,
Malaysia
1 1 I
Mali 0
Mexico 1 - 1
Nepal 0 . .
New Zealand 0 . i
Nigeria 1 1 i
Senegal 0
Singapore 1 1 i
Sri Lanka 0 1
Sweden 0 -
Switzerland 0
United Kingdom 2 2
Yugoslavia 0 0
Frommrmm...TP
Total 780 682
Total Security
Assistance Personnel
(includes military,
U.S. civilian, and
local civilian
personnel)
1,090 1,087
? Total Costs
Alt. t3
Alt. 04
Alt. fl
Alt. #2
Alt. #3
Alt. #4
15
15
932.5
932.5
932.5
932.5
7
3
630.2
630.2
630.2
265.0
117
80
4,990.0
4,990.0
4,990.0
3,695.0
33
25
1.950.0
1,950.0
1,950.0
1,598.0
40
30
1,959.1
1,959.0
1,959,0
1,489.0
3
3
140.0
140.0
140.0
140.0
3
3
296.2
296.2
296.2
296.2
14
14
822.2
918.0
822.2
822.2
7
3
470.0
550.0
470.0
230.0
3
3
186.0
186.0
186.0
186.0
6
3
342.7
342.7
324.7
210.0
12
12
597;9
597.6
597.6
597.6
21
21
- 1,408.8
2,868.0
1,408.8
1,408.8
6
3
910.4
974.0
910.4
390.0
10
10
772.1
772.1
772.1
772.1
10
10
618.3
618:3
618.3
618.3
29
20
1,771.7
1,771.7
1,771.7
1,305.0
37
3
1,955.7
1,955.0
1,955.0
282.0'
18
18
1,028.8
1,650.0
1628.8
1,028.8
55
40
3,054.5
4,450.0
3,054.5
2,408.0
20
15
956.3
956.3
956.3
720.0
22
22
1.184.5
1,184.5
1,184.5
1,184.5
33
28
2,512.6
2,420.0
2,420.0
2.178.0
3
3
756.1
223.0
223.0
223.0
3
3.
063.2
232.3
232.3
217.0
3
3
418.9
181.0
181.0
181.0
3
3
463.3
179.0
179.0
179.0
3
3
519.4
173.0
173.0
173.0
3
3
334.9
185.0
185.0
185.0
3
3
401.4
176.0
176.0
176.0
13
3
461.8
461.8
461.8
195.0
3
3'
362.3
212.3
212.3
205.0
3
. .3
1,412.9
282.3
282.3
268.0
3
3
191,5
191.5
191.5
191.5
3
3
191.5
191.5
191.5
191.5
3
3
216.5
216.5
216.5
216.5
3
3
191.5
191.5
191.5
191.5
3
3
191.5
191.5
.191.5
191.5
2
7
206.5
206.5
206.5
206.5
2
2
106.7
106.7
106.7
106.7
3
3
186.5
186.5
186.5
186.5
3
3
186.5
186.5
186.5
186.5
3
3
306.5
306.5
306.5
306.5
3
3
201.5
201.5
201.5
201.5
2
.1
191.0
130.0
130.0
75.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
3
134.9
166.5
166.5
166.5
2
2
98.2
98.2
98.2
98.2
-
0
-
-
-
3
3
299.5
191.5
191.5
191.5
0
00
-
196.:
-
0
-
0
.
0
0
0
0-
1
o
1
o
58.3
o
58.3
0
58.3
o
58.3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
l'
59.2
59 .2
59.2
59.2
8
-
0
1
-
0
59.4
0
.
-
-
-
59.4
-
-
-
0
-
1
-
1
-
58.4
0
110.0
58.4
-
58.4
-
1
1
59.7
75.0
59.7
59.7
0
o
0
-
-
0
0
0
-
0
0
0
-
2
2
76.6
120.6
76.6
120.6
o
o
0
0
. -
-------
608
461
38,952.0
33,603.8
34,759.6
27,882.5
1.005
783
No_Objection to Declassification in Part 2913/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5 3 0
a ?
A..,lx? ?
?
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
National Security Council
FROM : B. C. Evans
Executive Secretary
SUBJECT CIA and Intelligence Community Staff
Comments on MAAG Requirements Study:
NSSM 243
1. 'The CIA stands by the original 'comments it made on NSSM 243
to ISA on 14 October 1976 and by the DCI's letter of:8 June 1976 to
mr Iohn 0 Marsh. Jr., Counsellor to the President, spelling out
-copies of
whicn are attacneu.
2. The Intelligence Community Staff has reviewed subject
report and concurs that any of the Alternatives 2, 3, or 4 appears
generally feasible for adoption. From the national intelligence
perspective, Alternative 3 appears most desirable.
3. We also concur in the view that those issues identified
in Section IX, paragraph 7, are worthy of further study and resolu-
tion, especially "roles of MAAGs, beyond arms transfers." The
Intelligence Community, in its program of reviewing and evaluating
reporting from overseas missions, has surfaced on several occasions
inadequacies in the interaction of MAAGs with other components of
diplomatic missions, especially Defense Attache Offices, in providing
information on host country armed forces.
4. In the selection of alternatives in the reference study and
in the final definition of the mission of the successor security
assistance organization, it is recommended that there be:
?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
a. retention of some security assistance role for
Defense Attache Offices in missions abroad; and
b. appropriate guidance in the terms of reference for
future MAAG-type organizations, so that they participate
effectively in providing overtly acquired military informa-
tion to the U.S. Mission and to the Intelligence Community.
Attachments:
As stated
B. C. Evans
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
25X1
2bAl
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
. SECRET
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WAS
October '21, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR MRS JEANNE DAVIS
STAFF SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Subject: NSSM 243
In accord with your request we have reviewed the study on
MAAG Requirements prepared in re-sponse to NSSM 243.
As stated in paragraph V.c. of the study, the MAAGs have
an arms control function. However, that same function could
be served by any of the alternatives postulated in the study.
Therefore, ACDA does not recommend any particular option over
the others, but urges that the present guidance to MAAGs
concerning a responsible approach to arms sales be reiterated
throughout any new organization that may be established.
A. M, Christophev
Executive Secretary
SECIUT
GDS
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
PROPOSED MAAG PRESENCE -- FY 1978
Number of MAAG-type
Organizations Proposed
1976/TQ
1977.
Defense
1978
Actual
Budget
State
for Retention
44
34
31
20
Total Security Assistance
Manpower Required
2056
1902
1090
1087
Military Personnel
(1455)
(1296)
(695)
(682)
? Cost of Military .
`. Assistance Organizations
(millions of $)
72.4
56.3
39.0
38.6
,
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
NSC
OMB
21
14
1005
783
(608)
(461)
34.8
27.9
?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2,-,3-5
MAAG-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS PROPOSEIW ?(t, znii1/4//1 YEAR 1973
FY 1977
Defense
State
NSC
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Bolivia .
Bolivia
Bolivia
Bolivia
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Chile
Chile
Ethiopia
Ethiopia
Colombia
Colombia
Greece
Greece
Doninican. Republic
Dominican Republic
Indonesia
Indonesia
Ecuador
Ecuador
Japan
Japan
El Salvador
El Salvador
Korea
Jordan
Ethiopia
Ethiopia
Liberia
Korea
Greece
Greece
Morocco
Liberia
Guatemala
Guatemala
Pakistan
Morocco
Honduras
Honduras
Panama
Pakistan
Indonesia
Indonesia
Philippines
Panama
Iran
Japan
Portugal
Philippines
Japan
Jordan
Republic of China
Portugal
Korea
Korea
Spain
Republic of China
Kuwait
Liberia
Thailand
Spain
Liberia
Morocco
Tunisia
Thailand
Morocco
Nicaragua
Turkey
Tunisia
Nicaragua
Pakistan
Zaire.
Turkey
Pakistan
Panama
Zaire
Panama
Peru
Peru
Philippines
Philippines
Portugal
Portugal
Republic of China
Republic of China
? Spain
Saudi Arabia
Thailand
Spain
Tunisia
Thailand
Turkey
Tunisia
Venezuela
Turkey
Zaire
Venezuela
Zaire
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15: LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5
OMB
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Ethiopia
Greece
Indonesia,
Korea
Morocco ?
Portugal
Republic of China
Spain
Thailand
Turkey
Zaire