WHAT WE WANT FROM THE REVIEW GROUP ON SOUTHERN AFRICA TODAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-302-7-3-5
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 16, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE ,WH.I',l'h -HOUSE
WASIIINOTON Thursday -.October 16, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER
FROM: Roger Morris and Richard T,`-Kennedy
SUBJECT: What we want from the Review Group on Southern Africa today.
Background
The concept of the paper:
The five option s are choices of general posture toward the area
as a whole. The posture is our relationship (distance from,
acceptance of) to the white minorities in power.-
The posture can be general because, despite real differences
between the situations in the white states, black irredentism
and minority control form a common problem.
The posture should be general because our actions toward any
one regime are seen by both whites and blacks as affecting our
relations, with everybody in the . area., Thus, because others (in
the UN, etc.) react to our policies as a coherent whole, we need,
a coordinated posture to take account of that reaction.
However, this does not rule out dealing with specific issues re-
garding each of the states individually. The general posture,
therefore, is simply the sum of specific operational decisions on
outstanding issues in our policy toward each of the parties in the
area.
This approach takes into account the differences between the whites.
The range of choices on posture -- and thus on policy in specific
issue, --. with the Portuguese Territories does proceed from the -
special aspects 4 the Portuguese situation. That is, the fact
that the Ter,~itoes are a colonial problem, and that we have a
NATO relationship with Lisbon. Likewise, the policy choices
reflect the fact that our current adherence to the UN sanctions
program is a particular restraint on our Rhodesian policy.
Thus, the decision-making problem is how to present the choices on
general posture, and the specific issues which make it up, to the Pres-
ident. You want some agreement from the RG on the NSC agenda.
a
DHS, USAID, USAF,
JCS, NASA, NSS,
DOS, OSD, reviews
completed
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But here is where we run into the old bureaucratic quarrels we des-
cribed to you.
If you ask the RG how to proceed:
State will probably suggest raising only general posture, for
reasons you know well.
- Defense, CIA, Commerce, Treasury and OEP have long wanted
specific decisions on ship visits to South Africa, chrome imports,
etc., with general posture a secondary concern.
If you ask for a discussion of the options, you'll risk a repeat
of the sterile bureaucratic debates that absorbed the last six months
on this paper.
You need to nail down (as in the Latin American study) both a general
'posture decision and some specific operational decisions to define the
posture as well as guide the bureaucracy in further policy actions.
The attached Talking Points take this tack.
Attachments
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WASHINGTON
SECRET October 15, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER
FROM: Richard T. Kennedy
Charles H. Hermann(. f
Roger Morris j,-~,~, ? 1]
Y a
SUBJECT: Southern Africa - NSC Review Group - Thursday,
October 16.
Attached are your talking points and a self-contained summary
of the basic paper for your NSC Review Group meeting on Thurs-
day. (The IG summary- was- inadequate as to essential background
and description of the issues and options.)
We have included also:
(a) a table relating the five options to the basic objectives
for Southern Africa and a table illustrating specific actions
associated with each option;
(b) a brief summary of specific issues which may be raised;
(c) the IG paper ; and
(d) a copy of NSSM -39.
A map of the region precedes your talking points.
Your talking points highlight differences on basic judgment on policy
on policy questions raised by the NSSM. For your background, our
views on these judgments and questions are:
Judgments
Prospects for change in White attitudes.
Prospects for major change which would satisfy.the blacks
are slim. Any change will be slow and modest. But viol-
ence won't bring change -- the whites have control and blacks
can't overcome that reality, however they continue to try.
There are forces for moderation in white states --- some
Church leaders, a few politicians, youth and the social
effects of a modern economy.
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The black states have problems of their own -- tribalism,
insurgency, poverty -- which demand attention and resources.
They will find it hard to divert much energy (as contrasted,
with ritual rhetoric) to the liberation struggle.
Their own problems could spawn, however, radicals whose
rhetoric on Southern Africa (and abuse of us) could grow
in proportion to frustration vis-a-vis the whites. This is
much less likely than pragmatic resignation, but it's possible.
US Influence
Isolating the whites has failed. '(Rhodesian, sanctions, arms
embargoes, verbal attacks). Outside pressure has tended
to reinforce their. "seige mentality" and their autarchy --
generating reaction rather than moderation.
But pressures have generated black demands for still more
action. The radical blacks want really unrealistic sanctions
and use of force.
US influence is marginal with both sides. We might get some
leverage from the whites' desire for better relations and the
blacks' need for political and economic support -- but not
much.
Penalty for relations with whites
We might suffer from black reaction. Harsh words are more
likely than expropriations, base denials, etc.
The blacks know our support will be crucial. to their ultimate
;:.u:cce s s and they want our aid money.
0
Policy Questions
Nature and Extent of Involvement
We are involved because of (a) our official presence in the
Space Station, etc., as well as trade and investment and
(b) because others (with Communist help) have made the
-racial issue in Southern Africa a chronic international issue
in the,, UN and elsewhere.
- - Opting out (Option 5 may limit' involvement. But we could
hardly ignore a race war. And complete disengagement
would forfeit, whatever leverage we may possess against
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StC;l l T
some distant calamity.
But the sheer uncertainties argue against active involvement
to the extent proposed in O t~ion 2. We need to keep our
options open to defuse the blacks and promote white moder-
ation.
Continued equivocation (Option 3) will only postpone deci-
sion and generate pressures from the blacks for greater
support. Moreover, the operational effect (which State
intends) is gradually to dissociate from the white (moving
toward Option 4) with a growing commitment to the blacks.
A posture between-Option 2 and O tion 3 would keep our op-
tions open while attempting as we can to cope on both sides
within a potentially dangerous situation. We should never
ignore racism or excuse the whites. But both white strength
and growing black realism about it argue that we stay in the
game with both sides.
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 Present Policy
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Policy toward the white states in Southern Africa has sought
progress toward majority rule through political arrangements
which guarantee increasing participation by the whole population.
Tangible evidence of such progress has been considered a
pre-condition for improved US relations with the white states.
We maintain cordial relations with the black states and provide
limited aid principally through regional and multi-donor projects.
We maintain discreet contact with the liberation movements.
Specific policy decisions on Southern Africa, however, have
been largely ad ^hoc, based on judgments of benefits and political
costs at a given moment. The strength of this approach -- its
flexibility in a situation where US interests are conflicting -- is
also its weakness. Decisions have not reflected a coherent
and conscious effort in policy to achieve agreed objectives.
Moreover, be cause differences of view in some instances have
been irreconcilable, some decisions have been held in suspense
"pending review of policy" (e.g., naval calls in South Africa;
imports of Rhodesian chrome ore; status, of Consulate in Rhodesia).
The Options
Each of the five options outlines a general direction of policy
based on a specific premise about Southern Africa's future and
the nature of US involvement. Specific operational actions. are
included with each option for illustration. Selection of a basic
policy, however, need not dictate an inflexible set of specific
actions.
The central element of each option is our policy toward the
white states.
Options 1 and 2 move closer to the white states;
O t:ions 3 and 4 increase our distance from them p-
P
__._
Option 5 disassociates from both black and white states
to limit involvement in the area.
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Option One (pp 23-26)
Closer association with the white regimes to protect
and enhance our economic, strategic and scientific interests.
Premise: Our disagreement with the domestic policies
of either side should not inhibit our relations with them.
We can have no significant effect on the situation in the
region. Therefore, we should pursue our economic, stra-
tegic and scientific interests because the political costs
will not be excessive.
Pro: This policy would preserve and expand our
scientific, strategic and economic interests in the white
states; would remove an irritant in our relations with
Portugal; and would establish friendly relations with the
strongest powers in the region.
Con: This policy does nothing to deal with the prob-
lems of racial repression and potential violent confrontation.
It would damage our standing in Africa and elsewhere on the
racial issue, lose African support on East-West issues i n
the UN, and enhance the standing of the USSR and Communist
China with the black states and liberation movements.
Option Two (pp 27-31)
Broader association with both black and white states
in an effort to encourage moderation in the white states, to
enlist cooperation of the black states in reducing tensions
and the likelihood of increasing cross-border violence, and
to encourage imps ved relations among states in the area.
Premise: The blacks cannot gain political rights
through violence. Constructive change can come only by
acquiescence of the whites. We can by selective relaxation
of our stance toward the white states and increased economic
assistance to the black states in the region help to draw
the two groups together. Our tangible interests are-'a basis
for contacts with the whites and can be maintained at accept-
able political cost.
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Pro: This policy would encourage existing tendencies
toward broadened relations between black states -and white
thereby reducing tensions; would lift. seige mentality of
the whites and encourage forces for moderatio -within the
white states; would preserve economic, scientific and
strategic interests in the white states; and would reduce 'a
major irritant in relations 'with Portugal.
Con: There is no assurance that we could persuade
black states to cooperate with us in pursuing this policy
if they do not, our standing in Africa and elsewhere on the
racial issue will be damaged as in option,l. There is
virtually no evidence that the whites would change their
policy in response to our actions. The policy requires
extensive diplomatic and economic involvement probably for
several years in a situation in which the outcome --is doubtful
at best.
Option Three (pp 32-34)
Codifie-s and extends present policy. Limited associa-
tion with the white states and continuing association with the
blacks in an effort to retain some economic, scientific,..- and..
strategic interests in the white states while maintaining a
posture on the racial issue which the blacks will accept,
despite our opposition to violence.
Premise: We cannot significantly influence-the
domestic policies of the white states; nor is there any internal
indication of change. Maintenance of a posture 'on--the racial
question acceptable to the blacks need not entail giving up -
all material interests in the white states.
Pro: This policy would preserve most major econ-
omic, scientific and strategic interests in the short run
while giving us some access to the black states in the region
and some standing with the Afro- Asians. It retains some
flexibility for the future and could bring some"improvement
in relations with Portugal.
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-7-
'Con: This policy would be seen as expedient and
hypocritical by both sides and satisfy neither. It does
nothing to deal with the problems of violence or increasing
Communist influence in the area. Some potential US. econ-
omic and' defense assets in the area would be given up.
Option Four (pp 35-37)
Disassociation from the white states with closer rela-
tions with the black states in an effort to enhance our, stand-
ing on the racial issue in Africa and internationally.
Premise: We cannot influence the white states for
constructive change and therefore increasing violence is
likely. Only by cutting our ties with the white regimes
can we protect our standing on the race issue in black Africa
and" internationally. Since our tangible interests are not vital,
this is a reasonable price to pay.
Pro: This policy would increase our credibility in
black Africa and the UN on the racial issue and give max-
imum leverage to limit Soviet and Chinese influence with
the black states and liberation groups.
Con: This policy would increase our involvement
with liberation movements and stimulate demands for more
far-reaching action. We would sacrifice economic, scien-
tific, and strategic interests in the white states. France and
the UK are not likely to support us and our relations with
Portugal will be more difficult.
O tion Five (pp 38-40)
Disassociation from both black and white states in an
effort to limit our involvement in the problems of the area.
Premise: The racial confrontation in southern Africa
is unmanageable and potentially dangerous and will grow worse
despite any efforts we might make. Thus we should lower our
profile in the area and avoid identification with either side.
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Pro: This policy would relies pressures in the UN
and elsewhere which flowed from our diplomatic "leadership"
on Southern Africa issues and give us greater flexibility to
cope in the future with pressure for greater involvement.
The danger of miscalculation by either blacks or whites as
to our support in a future confrontation would be lessened.
Con: This policy sacrifices our economic, scientific
and strategic interests in the area, foregoes influence. an both
sides and does nothing to ease racial confrontation. We
would open the door to communist influence in the region and
lose support on East-West issues in the UN.
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SECRET HAK TALKING POINTS
Review. Group -Meeting, on Southe'rxf Africa,.` October- 16, ? 1969'. .
1. The five options are choices of general posture toward the area.
They differ as to (a) degree of association with white states and
(b) degree of involvement in the area.
Present policy (option 3) is equivocation -- attempt to balance
posture on the racial issue acceptable to blacks with retention of
some material interests in white states. It is flexible but satis-
fies neither blacks nor whites.
Greater isolation from whites and closer relations with blacks
(option 4) -? acceptable to blacks, at least for a time, but sacri-
fices interests in white states.
Greater contact with whites:
To pursue material interests (option 1) which might damage
relationship with blacks, or
To try to deal actively with area tensions (option 2) with un-
certain prospects for cooperation by either blacks or whites.
Disengagement from both sides (o ttion 5):
Limits involvement but tends to sacrifice material interests.
2. Do the options cover the full range of policy choices?
3. Basic posture (as in the Latin America review) is the sum of op-
erational decisions on specific issues.
Many operational decisions have been held in abeyance pending
policy review.
We want a.decision on general posture but we also need deci-
sions on some specific issues, to illustrate the application of
that posture to particular countries.
Can we agree that the NSC agenda should seek:
-- Decision on general posture.
Decisions on the following specific issues illustrating policy
toward individual states. (These. issues are sketched in the
tab "Specific Issues. )
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SECRET.
Rhodesia - chrome ore imports (effect of UN sanctions);
Consulate in Salisbury.
-- South Africa - ship visits.
-- Portuguese Territories - arms embargo.
Black States - bilateral economic aid.
-- Liberation movements - US contact and assistance.
5. Anticipated Review Grou Positions
'Z-EP has an annex on Rhodesian chrome (attached).
-- Commerce may submit an annex on domestic effects of sanctions.
-- State may propose a new option for general posture. to substitute.-..
for option 3 of the basic paper. We just learned of this but have
not seen it.
Defense and the JCS may propose some clarifying language changes
to the basic paper and will emphasize strategic importance of the
area.
6. You may wish to suggest that the NSC meeting scheduled for October 22
be delayed to allow time for: --
-- Preparation of specific issues papers.
-- Consideration of the anticipated new option to be proposed by State.
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 n Ctrr:.t f,~n t wary Ke.+.i
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it.., They may decide at some time, however, not to
`-their operation of the mine but have, thus far, continued
--Rhodesian authorities took over operation of the mine
.to maintain it, and Foote ceased to transfer funds. A
subsequent UN resolution of May 29, 1968, and US Executive
Order of July 29, 1968, prohibited all transfers of funds.
The Rhodesian authorities have periodically reconsidered
to maintain operations. At the beginning of 1968, the,
permanent loss of its mine, or of having to commit funds
.will be made in the regulations to deal with cases of
undue hardship arising from transactions commenced before
the date of the Order." Union Carbide transferred its
funds after the date of the UN Security Council resolu-
tion but before the date of the Executive Order. Foote
Mineral transferred its funds after the date of the first
Executive Order, to maintain its mine. The Order per
..mitted such transfers, provided that the materials pro--
duced were kept in Rhodesia. Foote Mineral faced the
alternatives of risking deterioration and possible
1966, the White House press release stated that "provision
When the US Executive Order was issued on January 5;
1967, supporting the economic sanctions against Rhodesia
in the UN Security Council resolution of'December 16,
source of chrome, which is used in stainless steel.and
other steel alloys, including high-temperature alloys.
The other principal source is the USSR.
TO IMPORT THEIR CHROME ORE FROM RHODESIA
REQUESTS OF UNION CARBIDE AND FOOTE MINERAL
The issue is whether-or not to approve the requests of
Union Carbide and Foote Mineral to import into the
United States 150,000 and 57,000 tons respectively of
chrome ore already mined in their mines in Rhodesia
and paid for. Rhodesia is the only major Free World
cont. iue it further.
1.' Union Carbide, having paid for the ore before
the date of the first-Executive Order, is entitled to a
hardship exception.
the first Executive Order, it nevertheless paid for the.
2. Although Foote Mineral paid after the date of
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 rl 1) "1qi i
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ore prior to the date of the second Executive Order.
Foote's transfer of funds had the effect of maintaining
.the operability of a major Free World source of chrome
ore. After having been permitted to transfer these
funds, Foote was'subsequently deprived by the 1968 UN
Resolution and US Executive Order of the right to resume
such transfers if the Rhodesian authorities were to cease
their operation of the mine. Under these circumstances,
Foote should be allowed to recoup its expenditures by
importation of the ore.
3. Both cases involve a basic general principle
of embargoes -- that the country subject to embargo
should not be allowed to keep both the foreign exchange
benefits and the commodity purchased.
I. The UN Resolution made no provisions for hard-
ship exceptions. The legal justification for such ex-
ceptions, if any, must be. that of transitional measures
necessary in connection with making the prohibitions
generally applicable and effective. Such an exception
cannot be justified at this time as a transitional
a clear understanding that the ore must remain in
Rhodesia.- To adopt'the principle of granting hardship
exceptions for such reasons as the discontinuance of
expenditures imposed by the second Executive Order might.
prejudice enforcement of the China and Cuba embargoes.
2. Foote Mineral transferred its funds after the
date of the first Executive Order and on the basis of
on US relations with the United Kingdom, and on the US
3. Approval of either request would have serious
adverse effects on US relations with most African countries,
position in the United Nations.
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 O A'zl I
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cc-A. 0
$L+"CRET TALKING POINTS
Review Group Meeting on NSSM 39 -- Southern Africa
1. I appreciate that this was a difficult paper to tackle. The policy
choices cover several issues -- some with broad implications.
The paper identifies five broad objectives:
-- Improve US standing on the racial issue.
-- Minimize violence and risk of US involvement.
-- Minimize Soviet and Chinese opportunities to exploit.
-- Encourage moderation of white policies.
-- Protect economic, scientific and strategic interests.
You might ask:
Should "economic development" be one of our objectives?
Several of the options propose economic aid. I don't think
we need to return the paper to the IG to make this addition.
Is there consensus that these are our objectives?
3. There has been no agreement on priorities to be given any of
these objectives. They are often in conflict.
The problem of establishing priority among objectives and choosing
a policy arises from difference in judgment as to:
Prospects for change in white attitudes
Does only prospect lie in violence because whites are
intractable, and blacks determined to force change at any.
cost, or
Are there forces within white states which make change
inevitable and is black resolve questionable?
Degree and kind of influence US can have. Can the whites
be moved by:
Isolation which would be acceptable to the blacks but
tends to stiffen white reaction, or
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Contact which infuriates the blacks without clear assur-
ance of white cooperation?
Extent to which blacks penalize US for relations with whites
- - Do State, Defense, CIA wish to ex ress views?
5. The policy questions then seem to be:
-- How much and in what ways should we be involved, and
-- What is price to us for involvement or non-involvement?
The five options give a broad choice of posture differing as to
(.) degree of association with white states and (b) degree of in-
volvement in the area. (Relation between the options and the
objectives appears in table at Tab A)
-- Present policy (option 3) is equivocation -- attempt to balance
posture on the racial issue acceptable to blacks with retention
of some material interests in white states. It is flexible but
satisfies neither blacks nor whites.
Greater isolation from whites and closer relations with blacks
(option 4) -- acceptable to blacks, at least for a time, but
sacrifices interests in white states.
Will we suffer appreciable damage to our interests be-
cause of closer relations with whites, or
Will black reaction be restrained by self-interest?
To pursue material interests (option 1) which will sac-
rifice any relationship with blacks, or
To try to deal actively with area tension (option 2) with
uncertain prospects for cooperation by either blacks or whites.
Disengagement from both sides o tion 5):
Limits involvement but sacrifices material interests.
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Do options cover full ramie of policy choices? Are arguments clear?
8. Basic posture is the sum of decisions on specific issues:
The paper gives illustrative actions for each policy choice.
(Table summarizing specific actions for each option is at Tab B)
Many operational decisions have been held in abeyance pend-
ing policy review.
?e"Are there important specific issues, in addition to broad
policy, which -require President's decision? (Summary of
specific issues which you may wish to discuss or others
may raise is at Tab C).
Commerce may submit an annex on domestic effects of sanctions.
OEP has annex on Rhodesian chrome.
-- We will include these annexes with the paper if desired.
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Situation in the Region
The problem centers on (a) the racial repression of black
majorities (30 million) by entrenched white minorities (4 million)
in South Africa and Rhodesia and (b) Portugal's continued colon-
ial hold on Mozambique and Angola.
The whites are sensitive of outside criticism and want
friendly relations with the West -- but not at the price of, their
political control. The South Africans, Rhodesians, and (less so)
the Portuguese are tough and increasingly self-confident. They
command efficient security organizations and relatively powerful
military forces. African nationalist movements, supported by
the Organization of African Unity (OAU which includes all
African states except the white states), and by communist coun-
tries and organizations, are trying to overthrow the white minority
governments. So far, armed guerrilla activity has been significant
only in parts of the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique
(tying down 100, 000 troops of which over two-thirds are regular
Portuguese forces).
The black-ruled states of the region -- Zambia, Malawi,
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland -- are in varying degrees
economically dependent on the white-ruled states. All of them
need outside aid to develop or just stay even.
US Interests
Our interests in the region are important but not vital.
US investments, primarily in South Africa, total about $1 billion,
and our trade with South Africa yields a highly favorable balance
of payments advantage. South Africa and. the Portuguese Territories
have major ship repair and logistics facilities which can be useful
now to our naval forces moving to and from Southeast Asia and
could be valuable in future contingencies in the Indian Ocean area.
NASA has an important space tracking station in South Africa.
Before imposition of UN sanctions, the US imported a major por-
tion of its chrome-ore needs from Rhodesia.
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Outside of the region our investments in Africa total about
$1. 5 billion ($1.0 billion in black Africa South of the Sahara)
and profitable trade relations are expanding. These economic
assets and other interests, such as overflight rights and com-
munications stations in black Africa, could be jeopardized if our
policies toward the white governments in southern Africa generate
intense adverse reaction.
Policies toward the whites also affect our political interests
in black Africa and the UN. In the UN, the US has joined nearly
universal opposition to the racial and colonial policies of the
white regimes. Since 1960, however, the Afro-Asian states
have steadily steadily increased demands for stronger UN measures,
including sanctions against South Africa and the use of force.
The 'US, Britain and France have resisted these demands as
unrealistic,. with the result that we are now seen by the non-
white states to be "defending" the white states. While the Soviet
Union and China do not accord southern Africa a high priority,
they have taken firm positions supporting liberation goals of the
blacks and given some arms and money to liberation movements.
In so doing, they have made some gains in Africa and in the UN.
Objectives
Our broad objectives in the region are:
- To improve the US standing in black Africa and inter-
nationally on the racial issue.
To minimize the likelihood of escalation of violence
in the area and the risk of US involvement.
To minimize the opportunities for the USSR and Com-
munist China to exploit' the racial issue in the region
for propaganda advantage and to gain political influence
with black governments and liberation movements.
To encourage moderation of the current rigid racial
and colonial policies of the white regimes.
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SECRET 3.;
To protect economic, scientific and strategic interests
and opportunities in the region, including the orderly
marketing of South Africa's gold production.
But these_ objectives are often in conflict. Efforts to re-
strain violence by black liberation movements or steps to protect
our tangible interests in the white states tend to be seen as
favoring the white governments. So perceived, these actions
run counter to efforts to improve our standing in black Africa
and internationally on the racial issue. There has been no
consensus within the bureaucracy about the region's future or as
to the effect of our policies.
There is disagreement over:
Prospects for non-violent change in the region. All
agree that some violence is inevitable. The disagree-
ment turns on whether (1) any meaningful change in
white attitudes will occur except in response to viol-
ence and (2) the blacks have either the capability or
resolve to sustain a level of violence which would force
change.
External influence or internal development as factors
to induce moderation by either blacks or whites. The
disagreement turns on whether (1) any influence other
than isolation and stronger pressures against them would
lead the whites to modify their policies and (2) the pros-
pects for success in efforts to exert moderating influence
warrant the level of involvement required.
-- The damage to our present and long-term political
interests which would result from pursuit of our tan-
gible interests in the white states. The disagreement
turns on the reaction to our policies, whether we will
suffer serious political damage, or whether reaction
will be restrained by the forces of self-interest in the
black states.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24: LOC-HAK-302-7-3-5
SECRET SPECIFIC ISSUES
Consulate in Rhodesia . The United States maintains a reduced staff
at our Consulate in Salisbury. With the Rhodesian determination to
declare itself a republic, the British have withdrawn their represent-
ation B
th
h
o
t
.e UK and Black Africa are disturbed by the support
for Rhodesia imnlier3 by our presence. The Consulate provides
ican residents in that country. State has urged that the Consulate
be closed.
25X1
Rhodesian Chrome Ore. Union Carbide and Foote Mineral want to
import a total 207, 000 tons of chrome ore produced in their Rhodesian
mines. The companies clairn that the ore has already been purchased
and, therefore, no further economic benefit would accrue to Rhodesia
if the chrome ore were exported. The controversy centers on the
Executive Order directing US participation in UN sanctions. The
Order recognizes the possibility of "hardship cases" but leaves the
term undefined. State opposes both claims. Commerce and OEP
support both claims, and Treasur supports only Union Carbide. (O&P , xn
a acne
Bilateral Aid to Black States. Under current AID policies, assistance
to the black states of Southern Africa is limited to regional and multi-
donor projects and small self-help programs. Bilateral assistance
has been limited to 10 concentration countries in Africa, none of which
are in the southern region. State contends that regional programs are
impractical for these states and wants bilateral assistance as an indica-
tion of our support. AID opposes new bilateral programs.
Arms Aid to Black States. The US gives no military aid to any of
the states in Southern Africa -- black or white. The black states -
particularly Zambia -- are fearful of attacks by the white regimes in
retaliation for the passage of liberation groups through their territory.
Zambia is purchasing air defense missiles and possibly jet aircraft
from the UK. The Conte Amendment requires reduction of US aid
in an amount equivalent to expenditures by a recipient state for sophis-
ticated weapons. The Administration has introduced legislation to
change the Amendment to provide greater flexibility, but Congress has
not acted. State would like this flexibility and wants to be able to
respond to arms purchase requests from the black states (particularly
Zambia. )
Naval Calls - South Africa. No US navy ships have called at South
African ports (except in emergency) since the issue of segregated
facilities ashore arose in 1967 when the Carrier FDR planned to visit
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Capetown. Thirty-eight Congressmen protested at that time to ex-
posure of US personnel to South African racial policies. South
African ports have the best support facilities in the region.
Defense would like to resume operational calls to ease refueling
problems. State. opposes arguing that the other Africans would see
this as signalling closer association with the white states.
Arms Embargo - Portuguese Territories . We have enforced a uni-
lateral embargo on the use of US-supplied arms by Portugal in the
African Territories. This has been an irritant in our relations
with Portugal and may come up during the Azores base negotiations.
State opposes any relaxation of the embargo and export controls.
Defense may propose some relaxation to improve relations with a
NATO partner.
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EXECUTIVE'OFFICI- OF THE PRESIDENT.-
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Haakon Lindjord V
MORI/CDF
Assistant Director
C03235152
page 23 P
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
(State)
e
rsen
Mr. Richard F. Ped
Mr. G. Warren Nutter (Defense)
Mr. R. Jack Smith (CIA)
Lt. Gen. F. T..Unger (JCS)
SUBJECT: Annex 4 of the NSSM 39 Study on Southern Africa
of the NSSM 39 study.
In the October
mend that the attached draft be substituted for Annex 4
1A Review Group meeting, OEP will xecom-
not completed its consideration o t e p
findings are to be announced.soon.) The comm
f h roblAM
232 of the Trade Expansion Act o 7 ittee has
t,arniue allu ruu- 1'tJ..avi...... ....1 -- -- - - -
lated to an OEP ferroalloys investigation under Section
f 1962 on which the .
under Tae C,I1ct 4A 1It0.11J,.ik. . + _ t - _-
Staff, to consider-these requests. Participating in its
_r r?y 'T`-noltrNr Commerce.
the present Annex 4o f the NSSM 39 sl.udy.
r?mmi ttPA was convened in mid-August
issue involved-more concisely and accurately t an oes
and Foote Minera p
in Rhodesia. We believe the attached paper statesdthe
Attached is a paper on the requests of Union Carbide
l to em ort ore they have already mined
Attachment
:CC:
Mr.-Frank Shakespeare, USIA
Mr. Anthony J. Jurich, Treasury-
Mr.'K. N. -Davis,, Commerce
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 d z% Je. 11 L2/ry N-_. au.,n -1 1 - -
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i 11
,REQUESTS OF UNION CARBIDE AND FOOTE MINERAL
it. They may decide at some time, however, not to
their operation of the mine but have,, thus far, continued
The Rhodesian authorities have periodically reconsidered
to maintain it, and Foote ceased to transfer funds. A
.subsequent UN resolution of May 29, 1968, and US Executive
Order of July 29, 1968, prohibited all transfers of funds.
undue hardship arising from transactions commenced before
the date of the Order." Union Carbide transferred its
funds after the date of the UN Security Council.resolu-
tion but before the date of the Executive Order. Foote
Mineral transferred its funds after the date of the first
Executive Order, to maintain its mine. The Order per-
mitted such transfers, provided that the materials pro-
were kept in Rhodesia. Foote Mineral faced the
alternatives of risking deterioration and possible
permanent loss of its mine, or of having to commit funds
to maintain operations. At the beginning of 1968, the,
Rhodesian authorities took over operation of the mine
TO IMPORT THEIR CHROME ORE FROM RI-IODESIA
The issue is whether or not to approve the requests of
Union Carbide and Foote Mineral to import into the
United States 15.0,000 and 57,000 tons respectively of
chrome ore already mined in their mines in Rhodesia
and paid for. Rhodesia is the only major Free World
source of chrome, which is used in stainless steel and
other steel alloys, including high-temperature alloys.
The other principal source is the USSR.
When the US Executive Order was issued on January 5,
1967, supporting the economic sanctions against Rhodesia
in the UN Security Council resolution of'December 16,
1966, the White House press release stated that "provision
will be made in the regulations to. deal with cases of
'continue it further.
hardship exception.
1. Union Carbide, having paid for the ore before
the date of the first.Executive Order, is entitled to a
the first Executive Order, it nevertheless paid for. the
2. Although Foote Mineral paid after the date of
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W1 WiJ W J W 6' ra u U a u.l u._RA
importation of the ore.
Foote should be allowed to recoup its expenditures by
such transfers if the Rhodesian authorities were to cease
their operation of the mine. Under these circumstances,
ore prior to the date of the second Executive Order.
Foote's transfer of funds had the effect of maintaining
the operability of a major Free World source of chrome
ore. After having been permitted to-transfer these
funds, Foote was subsequently deprived by the 1968 UN
Resolution and US Executive Order of the right to resume
3. Both cases involve a basic general principle
of embargoes -- that the country subject :to embargo
should not be allowed to keep both the foreign exchange
benefits and the commodity purchased.
.1. The UN Resolution made no provisions for hard-
ceptions, if any, must be. that of transitional measures
necessary in connection with making the prohibitions
generally applicable and effective. Such an exception
ship exceptions. The legal justification for such ex-
-.measure.
cannot be justified at this time as a ,.transitional
Rhodesia., To adopt the principle of granting hardship
exceptions for such reasons as the discontinuance of
expenditures imposed by the second Executive Order might.
prejudice enforcement of the China and Cuba embargoes.
date of the first Executive Order and on the basis of
..a clear understanding that the ore must remain in
2. Foote Mineral transferred its funds after the
3. Approval of either request would have serious
on US relations with the United xingaom, ana on zne ua .
adverse effects on US relations with most African countries,
position in the United Nations.
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
April 10, 1969
National Security Study Memorandum 39
SECRET
policy toward Southern Africa (south of Congo (K) and Tanzania).
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: Southern Africa
The President has directed a comprehensive review of U.S.
of basic strategies and policy options open to the United States.
of the U. S. interest in Southern Africa; and (3) the full range
The study should consider (1) the background and future
prospects of major problems in the area; (2) alternative views
,the Portuguese territories, and adjacent African states.
The review of interests and policy options should encompass
the area as a whole -- including Southern Rhodesia, South Africa,
The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental
The study should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by
Group for Africa perform this study.
April 25th.
cc: Secretary of the Treasury
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Administrator, AID
Acting Director, NASA
MORI/CDF
C03234975 Page 26
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Secretary of Commerce
rHenA. Kissinger
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SECRET
NSC REVIEW GROUP MEETING
Thursday, October 16, 1969
Time and Place: 2:04 P. M. -- 3:20 P. M., White House Situation Room
Subject: Southern Africa (NSSM 39)
Participation:
Chairman - Henry A. Kissinger JCS - LTG F. T. Unger
State - Richard F. Pedersen OEP - Haakon Lindjord
William I. Cargo
David Newsom USIA - Henry Loomis
Donald McHenry
Commerce - Kenneth N. Davis
NSC Staff - Roger P. Morris
- Richard T. Kennedy
- Jeanne W. Davis
SUMMARY OF DECISIONS
The I. G. paper is to be reworked to refine the options along the
following lines and to indicate their most significant operational con-
sequences:
a. restate Option 1 as a more faithful rendition of the "Acheson
view" of U. S. interests and policies in Southern Africa,
b. add the revised Option 3 as a different option between the
present Options 2 and 3,
c. retain Option 4,
d. restate Option 5 to call for hands off on the political aspects
and business as usual as U. S. interests indicate;
e. add an option which would be an attempt to change the white
states by exerting more economic pressure.
SECRET
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SECRET
Mr. Kissinger opened the meeting referring to the "substantial" paper
and its five options and associated measures. He stated that as a general
rule the President does not wish to receive general options since he finds
that, once a general option has been approved, those actions which were
listed under the rejected options are suddenly found to be consistent with
the option which he had accepted. The President wants to see the precise
steps which will flow from each. posture. He pointed out that these corn-
ments did not necessarily apply to the South Africa paper. He assumed
that when the options are discussed the associated measures are implied
as a part of the general approval, although these measures are of course
not an exhaustive list.
He asked if the options as stated are a reasonable list of those available.
Are there any options not listed? He noted that the NSC Staff had under-
taken a survey of the outside literature on the question and had satisfied
itself that it contained no new ideas not considered in the paper.
Mr. Pedersen said the State Department is submitting a substantial
revision of Option 3 and a minor revision of Option 4.
Mr. Kissinger commented that. since he and others had not seen these
revisions he thought we should discuss the options as they existed in the
paper, possibly adding the State Department revisions as options 6 and 7.
Mr. Ware noted that the Defense Department had prepared an expanded
summary of the paper which would be distributed at the table.
Mr. Davis asked if the agencies had yet taken a position on the options.
Mr. Pedersen said the agencies had not yet been asked to take a position.
He assumed this would be done at the NSC meeting.
Mr. Kissinger asked if this was not an IG paper and did Mr. Davis mean
positions taken by agencies not represented on the IG.
Mr. Cargo said if Mr. Davis was asking whether the State Department
had indicated which option they preferred, the answer was no.
Mr. Pedersen noted that while this was strictly true, there was certainly
an indication of. the direction in which State would go.
Mr. Davis commented that the IG had not attempted to define agency
positions but had attempted to project the broad spectrum of choices.
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SECRET - 3
Mr. Kissinger said that he had received a statement of Mr. Acheson's
position. He asked if, with the proposed State Department modifications,
the paper put forward a reasonable statement of the choices.
Mr. Pedersen described the general nature of the revised Option 3 as a
phased strategy with steps taken in sequence, first to improve our position
in the black states and, somewhat later, to consider steps in pursuit of
our interests in the white states. The revision of Option 4, he said, was
to soften the coercive elements of the original. draft which were not
intended as such.
Mr. Kissinger asked if it was reasonable to try to form general proposals
covering Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia and South Africa.
Mr. Newsom replied that these four areas cannot be satisfactorily grouped
in discussing the premises. He thought the two Portuguese territories
(Angola and Mozambique) could be considered together but that South Africa,
Southwest Africa and Rhodesia each required somewhat different consider-
ation.
Mr. Kissinger asked what we are asking the President to do, then, in
choosing a general posture.
Mr. Newsom thought that we could ask for a general posture expressing
priorities and emphasis in Southern Africa in terms of dealing with the
black states and with the white states. The operational examples could
then be broken down into specific actions suitable to the specific territory.
Mr. Kissinger asked if we are saying that the same philosophy can govern
policy toward these areas but that the differences will lie in the application
of that policy. For example, he asked if Option 1 can apply to the colonial
regimes as well as to the more indigenous regimes.
Mr. Pedersen noted that in Option 3 he thought that the degree of our
association would be different.
Mr. Newsom thought there would be specific variations in the basic
philosophy in some options. He noted, for example, that the Portuguese
territories have a different racial philosophy and therefore a different
degree of political acceptability in the area.
Mr. Kissinger asked if their political acceptability was more or less.
SECRET
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Mr. Newsom replied that they were more acceptable because of their
Mr. Kissinger sked, with regard to Option 1, if we had to move closer
to the white regimes to protect our interests.
Mr. Newsom r
There was littl
the white state
states. This o
we would attem
the sacrifice of
plied that, in a sense, Option 1 was the Acheson option.
reason for us to restrict ourselves in our relations with
since we have little to lose from reaction by the black
tion would lift our self-imposed restrictions. In effect,
t to maintain our presence in the black states but not at
Mr. Kissinger commented that we would seek closer association with the
white states by trying to avoid squeezing them.
He asked who seriously holds the view as stated in Option 1. He considered
it a caricature of the Acheson position and thought Mr. Acheson's view
was closer to Option 5.
scribed Option 5 as complete disengagement in which we
improve or expand our relations with either side.
Mr. Kissinger
way. He desc
economic and
illusory gains
terms of not s
proposing an e
asked if we could state the Acheson view in a non-absurd
ibed this view as having no interest in giving up U. S.
trategic interests in the white states for the sake of
ith the black states. He thought it should be stated in
crificing our relations with the white states rather than
pansion of our activities there.
bought this view lay somewhere between Options 1 and 2.
an overstatement of Mr. Acheson's view. He thought in
oted that there were no advocates of Option 1 in the IG
ion was put forward to cover the complete range and was
general the op ion assumed the U. S. had little to gain by attention to
the black states.
Mr. Davis asked whether such matters as flexibility on the sale of dual
purpose items (were taken care of in terms of the options.
Mr. Cargo an Mr. Pedersen thought this was taken care of in Options 2
and 3 in the st ternent of priorities and emphasis and in operational
examples.
SECRET
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SECRET - 5 -
Mr. Pedersen thought the statement of a general posture is important and
that Options 2 through 4 cover the spectrum.
Mr. Kissinger
to the Presiden
bureaucracy an
At least, it sho
though no neces
ommented that while we were supposed to pose choices
, the present Option 1 apparently has no support in the
he sees no reason to include it in its present form.
ld be rephrased so that it can be reasonably considered,
sarily accepted.
Mr. Proctor asked if we were ruling out consideration of Options 1 and 5.
Mr. Newsom t
Option 2 is sup
problems with
the white state
valid features i
Option 2.
ommented or rewrite Option l so that it can be discussed. "
ought that Option 2 takes care of Mr. Kissinger's point
g our interests in the white states, but noted that, while
orted by Defense and by the NSC Staff, State has serious
t. Option 2 calls for unrequited U. S. initiatives toward
over a three to five-year period, and he thought that any
a restated Option 1 could be combined with the present
hought Option 2 called for broader association with both
states. An intermediate option would be not to seek
tion with the whites but not to give up our interests there; or
to maintain the status quo with the white states but not give up our interests
with the black tates.
Mr. Newsom c~mmen.ted that the revised Option 3 would attempt to estab-
lish our credib lity and status in the black states in order to explain thc
necessity fox p -eserving our interests in the white states -- in other words,
under the umbrella of improved relations with the blacks, we could do
what we should do in the white states to advance our national interests. -
Mr. Kissinger
he could not co
position, on the
words, don't s
SECRET
reiterated that since he had not seen the revised Option 3
ment. He asked if we envisaged maintaining our present
white states without prejudice toward the blacks -- in other
ek out the white states but don't kick them in the teeth.
hought this position lay somewhere between Options 2 and
ed the revised Option 3 more activist toward the black
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SECRET
Mr. Kissinger
with Option 3.
of the white sta
continuing with
hought this would depend on what you are trying to do
He thought the possibility of leaving the domestic policies
:es alone, while maintaining our interests there, and of
the black states, was not covered in the existing options,
at our present policy was not that well defined.
ought this was covered in Option 3 (present policy) but
Mr. Morris noted there was considerable bureaucratic disagreement on
Option 2. He considered it was activist in the sense that it ceases to
squdeze the white states.
thought his statement above might be considered as a
stitutes a rest
was the prese
whites in the i
in Option 2.
Mr. Pedersen)
our position s
Mr. Newsom
states next to
states, contin
to Zambia an
visits to the
SECRET
ion 2.
id that our present position toward the white states con-
iction on U. S. activities in those states. He thought this
t Option 3. He thought an agreement to stop kicking the
terests of pursuing U. S. national interests was included
ween the present Options 2 and 3.
fact a shift toward Mr. Kissinger's position and fell
said while the present Option 3 is feasible, the revised
repeated he had not seen revised Option 3 and could not
characterized the present Option 3 as "stay where we are"
Option. 3 as taking steps with the black states to improve
that we could then relax our restrictions and pursue our
white states.
cited the liberalization of our attitude toward investment.
ited creation of a development fund for the three black
South Africa, accreditation of one ambassador to the three
ation of at least one major development project relating
Tanzania, technical assistance to Tanzania and Zambia,
the heads of state of Tanzania and Zambia for official
S. termination of our involvement in Rhodesia including
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SECRET - 7
closing the Consulate in Salisbury and releasing the chrome stocks under
the hardship clause of the Treasury announcement and liberalization of
our economic position toward the Portuguese territories. After six
months, we might reconsider our position toward South Africa to achieve
flexibility on the sale of dual purpose items, permit naval visits on a
racially integrated basis while in port, etc.
Mr. Kissinger asked that the revised Option 3 be circulated so that
participants may comment on it. He noted that it appeared to be almost
a new option..
Mr. Newsom apologized for the late distribution of the revision, noting
that final clearance within State and with AID had been obtained only late
last night.
Mr. Lindjord asked about the solution of the chrome problem and
Mr. Newsom commented that the proposed closure of our Consulate in
Salisbury was directly related to a solution of the chrome problem.
Mr. Pedersen suggested we could remove Option 5 if it was decided to
exclude the extreme positions.
Mr. Kissinger said he wanted to explore all the options but that the
elimination of-Option 1 as presently stated represented no problem. He
noted that we must include in our consideration the fact that the President
has decided not to close our Consulate in Salisbury.
Mr. Newsom noted that Option 2 calls for certain unrequited moves
toward the whites such as naval calls, removal of constraints on EXIM
Bank facilities, etc.
Mr. Davis commented that it does things for the black states, too.
Mr. Newsom said these were minor aspects of the option that were out-
weighed by the three to five-year period of unrequited moves toward the
whites.
Mr. Morris commented that the word "unrequited" was used in the sense
of limiting our squeezing measures without necessarily expecting change.
He thought some of these examples were in the same category as some of
those in the revised Option 3.
SECRET
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SECRET
Mr. Kissin er noted that the revised Option 3 apparently called only
for consideration of moves toward the white states following a six-month
period.
Mr. Kissinger noted that under revised Option 3 relations with the blacks
would determine the nature of our relations with the whites -- in other
words, we would use improvement of our relations with the blacks to
make possible improvement of our position in the white states.
Mr. Newsom said this reflected Secretary Rogers' feelings following his
meetings in New York that we can take certain steps in the white states
if we explained them adequately to the blacks and if we limit them to
things directly in the U. S. interest and not necessarily in support of the
white regimes. He thought the blacks were open to such explanations if
we convince them that we are also interested in their problems.
Mr. Lindjord asked if this could include relaxation on chrome sales.
Mr. Newsom reiterated that this was related to the decision on .the
Salisbury Consulate. He noted that while the office is small and other
agencies were withdrawing their personnel, maintenance of the Consulate
is a symbol.
Mr. Pedersen noted that Secretary Rogers had not been entirely clear on
the factual and legal situation on the chrome sales -- specifically, whether
any shipment of chrome out of Rhodesia would constitute a violation of the
UN sanctions.
Mr. Davis asked if we were sure we would be physically able to get the
chrome out. Could the Rhodesians block us?
Mr. Newsom thought this would be considered by the Rhodesians as a step
toward improvement and that it would represent no problem..
Mr. Kissinger again reminded the group that the President up to now has
not permitted closure of the Salisbury Consulate. This, of course, did not
,mean that the President could not change his mind.
Mr. Newsom noted that the release of the chrome would be politically
acceptable only with regard to a complete closing off of our relations
with Rhodesia.
Mr. Lindjord asked if there were any other off-setting measures which
might be taken, and Mr. Newsom replied no.
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Mr. Davis asked if the Rhodesians would really consider a close-out of
U. S. relations as progress.
Mr. Lindjord replied that it would be considered in relation to the chrome
stock release but noted real problems on timing.
Mr. Newsom commented that a U. S. Government team has determined
that we do not face a critical chrome problem in the. U. S. for another year
and a half.
Mr. Kissinger noted that he had sat in on Mr. Acheson's conversations
with the President and that the Acheson view must be presented fairly to
the NSC, even if it were only to be rejected. He thought the present
Option 1 exaggerated the Acheson position.
Mr. Newsom commented that Option 1 was based to some extent on
Mr. Acheson's preface to the Nogueira book.
Mr. Kissinger thought we could try to produce a version of Acheson's
views and circulate it for comment. He thought we would not violate
bureaucratic interests by stating this option and thought it extremely
unlikely that the President would choose to overrule the Secretary of
State in this regard.
Mr. Newsom agreed.
Mr. Cargo asked if the Acheson position could be fairly stated as "relax
restrictions on the white states and take other steps to protect our interests
in the region. " He asked if this captured the intent of the Acheson proposal.
Mr. Kissinger added that this would be without prejudice to the black states.
Mr. Kissinger said he had a problem with the premise as stated for Option Z.
To induce moderation, we would have to convince the blacks that they have
no hope in improving their position through violence. Did this not require
that the blacks accept extensive oppression? Is it not true that the objectives
of the blacks and the whites are incompatible and that they.cannot be
reconcilc: ' ? .
Mr. Newsom thought it was unrealistic to think that the U. S. could convince
the blacks of this.
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4Mr,. Kissinger added "or convince the whites that moderation does not
produce violence. "
Mr. Pedersen agreed that the whites would say that moderation would
not work.
Mr. Kissinger thought that the old and the new versions of Option 3 were
fairly different and suggested that we keep both as separate options.
He then asked how we can keep Chinese influence out of Souther Africa.
What incentives do African leaders have not to be radical? He noted
recent conversations with Ogden Reid to the effect that Nyerere will soon
take Chinese help. He asked what incentives Nyerere or other area
leaders would have not to take Chinese help. He thought no black state
can do less than accept outside Communist support when it is offered
and asked if this were a fair statement.
Mr. Newsom agreed that it was a fair statement for Tanzania and Zambia
who were under the greatest pressure both from. the liberation movements
within their own countries and from the white states. He saw. little hope
of forestalling Chinese advances in view of their activities on the TanZam
,railroad and in arms supply. But he thought that the Tanzania and Zambia
leaders do not wish to become completely identified with the Chinese or
the Soviets. He believes they hoped that the U. S. would take a position
which would be defensible from their own political standpoints. While we
cannot expect to move Tanzania and Zambia in our direction, he thought
we could maintain a foothold there.
Mr. Pedersen noted the influence of the two personalities -- Nyerere and
Kaunda -- saying he thought they would like to turn in our direction but
cannot. He noted that they had tried to get us to build the TanZam railroad.
Mr. Kissinger asked if Nyerere does not have his own reasons for not
wanting China is it not in his own interest not to sell himself completely?
Mr. Newsom agreed but noted that China was now the only source of
assistance to the military in Tanzania and that, after Nyerere, the mili-
tary held power.
Mr. Kissinger asked what would happen after Nyerere, noting that under
the revised Option 3 we would still not be giving military assistance to
Tanzania.
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Mr. Pedersen, agreed that the revised Option 3 did not improve the
situation.
Mr. Kissinger asked "why do it?"
Mr. Newsom commented that the present policy calls for no more
bilateral assistance to Zambia but it does not refine relations with
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Kaunda looks on economic
assistance as evidence of our general interest in black-white problems
in the area. He thought Option 4 was better in this regard but. would.
not do what should be done with regard to U. S. interests in the white
states.
Mr. Kissin er commented that Option. 4 still might not keep China
out. With regard to strengthening moderate regimes, he noted trends
in'the Middle East and Africa and asked if these trends were not
stronger than anything we could do.
Mr. Ne*som thought we could do little under present aid policies and
with present aid. funds but that we might maintain a better balance if
we could make som.,_ dramatic economic move, for example, assisting
with the railroad.
Mr. Pedersen doubted if this would create much of a shift but rioted
that revised Option 3 would be beneficial. in Tanzania and Zambia.
Mr. Kissinger asked if we were dismissing Option 5. He asked why
we should remove our tracking station. He asked if it were inconceivable
that we not take a stand on the racial issue, noting that the Africans had
not supported us on Czechoslovakia.
Mr. Pedersen replied that Nyerere did support us at that time.
Mr. Morris noted that Option 5, like Option 1, had no bureaucratic support.
Mr. Kissinger asked why we should remove tracking stations from
any country unless it was entirely in the U. S. self-interest. Why
should we consider giving it up if South Africa was willing to let us stay?
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Mr. Pedersen said that the South Africans have used the existence
of our tracking. station as a leverage on policy in various diplomatic
conversations.
Mr. Kissinger asked if we could say that we would take no stand on
the racial issue and would consult our interests in other matters.
Possible we cannot take this position for domestic reasons or because
of the effect of African voting in the UN. He noted, however, that
there appeared to be nothing between black power and white power in
South Africa. Is it conceivable that we would not take a stand on the
racial issue, admitting that this was not an heroic position, but
would pursue our normal economic and strategic interests.
Mr. Newsom thought that Options 1 and 5 represented often-stated
domestic points of view as expressed by Representative Diggs, the
American Committee on Africa, and others. He thought international
credibility on the racial 4uestion requires that we maintain no
relations with South Africa.
Mr. Kissin er remarked that it makes sense to remove the tracking
station under Option 4 but that it appears unnecessary under Option 5.
He suggested Option 5 be rewritten qo that it could be looked at. He
thought we could discuss economic relations with the white states
under Option 5 -- i.n:deed., that we could expand economic relations
with both sides if we consult U. S. interests.
Mr. Kissinger thought economic discrimination and removal of the
tracking station was more punishing to the whites and Option 4 called
for being tougher on the whites. He considered Option 5 a non-neutral
withdrawal.
Mr. Davis thought we should make it clear that Option 3 represents
the status quo.
Mr. Pedersen thought a real Option 5 would be an attempt to change
South Africa by more stringent economic measures. He thought
Option 4 was dissociation, while Option 5 could be interpreted as
either get out of both sides or attempt to change the situation by
economic pressure on the whites.
Mr. Newsom characterized this as the "Green Bay Tree" theory, but
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Mr. Morris replied that the "Green Bay Tree" theory assumes
that internal change will result from economic growth.
Mr. Kissinger said he had no objection to stating a policy that
actively pressures the white states. He thought a real option
might be to leave political problems alone and let economic
forces work themselves out. He thought the present Option 5
was almost the State Department's proposed Option 4. It would penalize
South Africa most but would annoy the Africans just enough to lose
any benefit. If we were to punish South Africa, he thought we
should do it and get it done.
General Unger commented that he considered Option 3 as a
benchmark with Options 2 and 4 giving us the spectrum. From a
military point of view, our interests center in South Africa,
particularly the question of port calls. He cited the 703 force
reductions, particularly with regard to oilers, and said he had
suggested an insert to bring strategic interests to the force. He
noted that we. were running out of oilers and would have to rely on
other nations to oil our ships in order to permit five transits a year.
Mr. Newsom replied that they-, were particularly conscious of this
problem and that they understood that the transits in the fall of 1970
would present real difficulties, while the February and May transits
could be handlied by British oilers. He thought we could include this
as one of the elements in a revised Option 3 after we have developed
certain moves toward black states. He noted the question of port
calls was a critical issue in both the U. S. and Africa, saying that
following the FDR episode State had received petitions from 35
Congressmen opposing all fleet visits to South Africa.
Mr. Ware mentioned also the overflight corridor into the Indian Ocean.
Following some discussion it was agreed that there were no major
overflight problems except for the Sudan but that the overflight question
was another reason for maintaining a good position in South Africa.
Mr. Davis asked if we did not have an anti--submarine interest.
General Uneer replied yes, with the increased appearance of the
Soviets in the Indian Ocean and with increased ASW activities.
Mr. Ware mentioned also the maintenance of normal military relations,
including access to military information.
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General Unger noted that these specifics would follow if the larger
issues were developed.
Mr. Kissinger suggested refinement of the consequences of the
options in a final paper. He asked if the specific issues were
sufficiently treated under the consequences of the options or if
they require special treatment.
Mr. Newsom thought they were included as illustrations of the
consequences of the options.
Mr. Kissinger noted that there was a good chance that the NSC
meeting on South Africa would be postponed for a week and suggested
that a redraft be prepared and circulated which would refine the
options along the lines of the group discussion and would indicate
the most significant operational consequences. He noted that, in
preparing for the NSC meeting on Latin America, we had had only
general propositions and that we had refined the approach into the
specific operational terms which the President prefers. The
technical details of these operations could then be handled by the
Under Secretaries Committee.
Mr. Ware referred to the expanded Defense Department summary
which was then circulated.
Mr. Pedersen thought the Defense summary was too long and suggested
it should be reworked to present a more balanced picture.
Mr. Ware replied that the summary was taken directly from the text
of ihe `paper and
Mr. Kissinger noted that the President did not mind reading.
Mr. Newsom asked if this was what Mr. Kissinger had in mind by
development of the operational consequences.
Mr. Kissinger: replied that we might sift the longer paper and take
irito account the questions that had been raised with regard to Option 5.
Mr. Lindjord asked if the summary would include as an operational
consequence, for example, Rhodesian chrome sales.
Mr. Kissinger thought we could not expect to settle the Rhodesian
chroimquestion at the NSC. He thought the President would want to
look at the legal questions.
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Mr. Cargo described Option 5 as hands off on the political aspects
and maintaining business as usual as U. S. interests dictate.
Mr. Pedersen commented it was not realistic to divorce ourselves
politically.
Mr. Ware thought, however, that this was a policy question that
should be considered.
Mr. Newson-i summarized the requirements as: restate Option 1;
add a new Option 3 between the present Options 2 and 3; revise
Option 4; revise Option 5; and add a 6th option which would include
exerting pressure on the white states.
Mr. Kissinger asked that they look again at the operational consequences
of the options and thought that Mr. Acheson's proposal could be
considered either as a redraft of Option 1 or as a variation of Option 2.
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