REVIEW GROUP MEETING ON LATIN AMERICA -- OCTOBER 9, 1969

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-302-7-1-7
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 57
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 8, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

.., , . ~ . - w?,.
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MEM.vxc.r~,iv~vrn. ~
October 8, 1969
MEMORANDUM. FQR DR. KISSINGER
MORI/CDF 005141858 pages 13-41
003398132 pages 44-57
FROM: Viron?P. Vaky;,~~
SUBJECT: .Review Group Meeting on Latin America -- October
9, 1969
The Review Group will consider the agenda we prepared for the NSC
discussions on Latin America, which are scheduled far Qctober~ 15,
and 17.
Bi11 Butler will be attending the RG meeting on Governor Rocke?e11er's
behalf. I suggest that you open the meeting by giving Butler an oppor-
tunity to make same general comments, but hold questions on specific
Rockefeller recommendations until the discussion of issues. There
probably will be several questions for him. vn the trade, private in-
vestment, and development assistance recommendations.
The purpose of the meeting should be to consider whether the issues
on the agenda are the right ones fqr the NSC and whether they are
fairly and accurately presented. We did not try to list pros and cans
because they are covered in NSSM-15 and the Rockefeller Report, and
the agencies can make their case in the NSC. (We will, of course,
prepare an issues paper with pros and cons for the President before
the NSC meetings).
I suggest that you refer minor editorial suggestions, on the agenda to
rne. However, proposals fax substantial revision or restatement of
issues should be entertained in the meeting..;
~..~ .
I belieue the agenda covexs the major issues. X do not anticipate any
significant problems with the political/diplomatic issues. We can ex-
pect various agency dissents and questions in the other areas--
security/military, trade, private investment, and development assis-
tance. These are noted in our Talkie Points.
USAID, State Dept reviews completed pages
13-41
pages 44-57 cam' ~'"RE T
ON-FILE DOC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
pages 44-57
ON-FILE Trea RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY pages
44-57
JCS and NSC review(s) completed
pages 44-57
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For your background, following is a brief statement of where we
wo~xld like to come out substantively at the end of the NSC process
on the basic issues. ~ .
political/Diplomatic. pragmatic approach to internal
political developments, including a more automatic
recognition policy.
.Treat the "Inter-American System" as of prime import-
ance; use it as the main focal point of.US-Latin relations.
Security/Military. Adapt the Rockefeller recommendations
to provide .increased internal security training and equip-
ment (but would be selective and work toward eventual self-
sustaining programs) and eliminate permanent mil"nary
missions. Seek elimination of restrictive legislation an
sale of military equipment, but allow sales through com-
mercial channels rather than provide through MAP.
Make an effort to structure new collective security machinery
for the hemisphere; explore Rockefeller's idea of a civilian-
directed Security Council (but don't take the lead in pushing it).
Trade. Maximum development of trade with the hemisphere,
giving special treatmennt if that is needed. Seek a liberal
generalized. preference scheme for all LDCs but be willing
~o give special preferences to Latin America if a generalized
scheme cannot be achieved. Give special treatment to hemis-
phere nations where possible in quota allocations, commodity
agreements, etc. E~cplore Rockefeller's idea for a hemis -
phere conference on the division of labor.
private Investment. Adopt measures to support local private
enterprise., encourage US private investment, particularly
joint ventures. Reduce direct US involvement in protecting
US investors--e. g. shift to private or multilateral investment
guarantees, eliminate Hickenlaoper amendment.
Development Assistance. Share increased responsibility fox
our development aid with the Latins - -strengthen regional.
ar.ganizations and channel more aid through them; reduce
bilateral program and presence, direct involvement in internal
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econpmic and social policies. (Adopt Rockefeller recona,-
mend,atans and other. measures to accomplish shift of
. responsibility.) Untie loans to the- rraximu.mextent possible.
.Set up a new organizational arrangement for Latin American
ai.d to supersede AID without waiting for Peterson Commission
proposal for total AID but ad referendum to its final comipre-
hen~ive action. Alternatively, or at the same time, direct
the Peterson Commission to recommend, as part of its
recommendations on overall AID reorganization, a-separate
arrangement for Latin America.
Wark out a generous debt rescheduling: Adopt innovative
new sectoxal approaches to aid, especially in education,
science and technology. .
NOTE:. The summary of the. agenda paper is, in fs.ct, included
in the first four pages of that paper.
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Henry, l think the issues listed in the first two pages of the
agenda are in fact what we need out of the NSC (although not in .
order of priority. )
For convenience l axn relisting them in abbreviated form,
in order of priority. Parenthetically, Y have listed for yov:r guidance
the concrete objectives we are seeking out of each conceptual prin-
ciple,.
Dr. Kissinger:
1. Trade: _What concept should guide our trade~oliGy?
Specifically, the matter of trade preferences and
quota restrictions.
(We want Presidential direction to the bureaucracy
that on trade: policy matters Latin America is to get
favorable treatment, preferably in the contest of
generally liberalized trade policy, but if this is not
possible on a world scale then special treatment for
Latin America. )
(Specifically, we want:
a. Liberal genexalized trade preference, with a
decision to offer special preferences to Latin
America if a generalized 'scheme cannot be
achieved within a fixed period.,
b. Liberal treatment of Latin America in allocat-
ing quotas; preferential allocation if general
liberalization is not possible, e. g. meat, fruits
,and vegetables.
c. Meaningful trade cansulta.tions. )
. Development?
a. A1lecate .and administer primarily bilaterally_
ar share responsibility?
(We want a Presidential decision to undertake
meaningful (nat casxnetic) strengthening of
regional organizations; to give CIAP and OAS
system. real role in allocating and channeling
aicl. Specific ixriplementing decisions will
came in lA-~GOSOC memo)..
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b. ~IOw can we improve assistance administration
iznxnediately? Specifically we should consider
_ ,
uritieing which will be an IA-ECOSOC matter.
(We want decision on principle to untie loans
to maximum degree possible.. Specific proposal
will be made in IA-ECOSOC rn.emo.
(We want decisirn on principle that we should re-
duce bilateral aid presence, shift emphasis from.
bilateral to multilateral and reduce involvement
in internal economic and social matters. We want
a decision that we should seek as~saon as possible
to eliminate restrictive provisions in aid legisla-
tion. )
c. Debt Rescheduling: What posture should we take?
(We want presidential directive to move fast and
generously on this,. and to implement as much of
the Rockefeller proposal as possible, making that
our recommendation to the Latins at IA-ECOSOC--
this may require staffing for final position decision. )
d. Sectors: How should we treat Rockefeller recoxn-
mendations in various sectaxal fields--agriculture,
health, science?
(We want decision to emphasize science and tech-
nology and to study seriously Rockefeller proposal
for Institute of Education, Science and Culture, to
encourage action in other fields especially through
regional organizations.
e. Regional: Should we support econorrxic integration
and regional groixpin~s?
(We want decision to support such groups and dir-
ection to seek ways to do so.
I~rivate Investrxient: How can we hest help increase the-
flow of ~riv~.te capital, both local and foreign.?
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(We want. a decision to;
a. develop measures to support local enterprise;
b, to take steps to encourage US investment, specifi-
sally to relax controls on foreign direct investment.
in LDCs and a study of tax incentives, and
c. measures to reduce direct US involvement in pro-
4 tecting US investors such as private reinsurance,
multilateral agreement on settlement of disputes.
4. Political; How should we view political development?
What recognition policy should we have?
(We should .get Presidential guidance for a pragmatic
approach and a decision to adapt a more automatic
recognition policy. )
a. Should we make multilateral system main focus
of our relatiorxs?
(We want directive to do that a.nd to shape policies
to strengthen C7AS and system. )
5. Security; What should the modalities of our assistance
program be? Specifically, should we sell, give credit
or grants for equipment, training, visible presence?
(W~ want a directive to follow generally a pattern of
na large visible, permanent missions, (either very
small ones or mobile ones), no grants except fox
exnerg,encies, credit for internal security equipment
generally, commercial sale for large and modern items
not directly related to security. We should get a direc-
tive to prepare concrete measures that fit this guidance
and. ixnplernent therm. )
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SECRE T~ ,
HAK TALKING POINTS
'REVIEW GROUP -LATIN AMERICA
,October 9, 19b9
1. I would like to introduce Bill Sutler, Vice President o? the.
Chase Manhattan Bank and an advisor to Governor Rackefeller
an his recent mission to Latin America.
2, What we have tried to do in this agenda is
-- start from the premises of the J~lily 9, NSC rx~eeting, which
the President reaffirmed in his meeting at Carnp David with
Governor Rockefeller and Charlie Meyer.
-- identify the basic policy cancepts arising out of the Rockefeller
Repast and NSSM-15 (we have not listed pros and cons. )
-- give same explanatory maternal-~in the agenda annex-~on
the issues and illustrate haw the basic policy concepts could
be implemented, principally using the Rockefeller recornmen-
dations.
3. A. The NSC should nit be expected to discuss every specific
recommendation of the Rockefeller Repast ar other proposals;
'
~~
it should focus an the major principles and policy directions.
B. The policy decision wall be implemented by specific
measures:
1. Same specific measures may flaw directly from the NSC
disGUSSian.
0
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SECRET .. ~ ~~,-.
2. Many other measures will be incorporated in the position
fox the IA-ECOSOC .meetings, which the president vcrill
pass on after the NSC meeting.
3. Other measures may be staffed out separately, 'same
perhaps for the President's speech an October 31.
Unfortunately, we will have only one NSC session. Hence, we
should, concentrate on getting decisions on mayor conceptual
principles and issues which can serve as .directives or guidance
for specific irxaplementation.
5. T would like, therefore, to suggest, first, that we consider what, ~,~t4. ~~
~j(.t~lfwco
issues should have priority for the discussion and what it is fair b1~;nd
l~A~
to ask the President to decide. I would propose that, because G~t7far
of the IA-ECOSOC meeting, priority generally be given to
Trade, Developmexxt and Private Investment. Hence I would
suggest an agenda--and we can come back to the specifics on
"'these (these are paraphrases);
.a.^''~'xade; What concept should guide our trade policy with Latin
,,. p. .
.America, specifically an trade preferences and quota
restrictions and other trade barriers?
b. DevelaPment:
Should we emphasize a shifting of shared responsibility
by channeling aid and decisions thrciugh regional
oarganizatians such as CTAP7
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What should we do about debt rescheduling?
What. should we do about sectaral approaches _ -science,
culture, health, ruxal development?
What should we do about regional integration? (This
is a new paint we will add to the agenda. )
c. Private Investment: How can we stimulate private capital
flaw tp the development process?
d. Political: How should we view political development, and
what about recognition policy?
e. Security; Should we do anything about the modalities of our
assistance programs?
b. I? these seem satisfactory, we might consider the agenda items
...___.
relevant to them:
TRADE (Annex, pp. 15 -1 b)
-- The.key issue is how do we give effect to the "special
relationship". We would want particularly, to consider
the questions of trade preferences and quotas and non-
tariff barriexs, (Treasury,. Commerce and Agriculture
will probably be negative, and AID probably weak. They
will argue with all kinds of suggestions aiming. at limiting
the scope of-the discussion or watering--down the action.
We_ should point out that we will be discussing the
rind les--the s ecific ro orals for action are coming
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forward se aratel in~the eneral trade reference. a er
(NSSM_4g) and the IA-EGOSOC proposals. )
.DEVELOPMENT (Annex, pp. 20-25)
--- The key-iss~a.e is whether or not the US should share
increasing respansibil.i,ty_-..~.i.,_~~..._~ontrol--with th.e. Latins
for the use of development aid. (We should appose any
attempt by AID to water dawn this issue:`----The "shared
responsibility" option is illustrated by two alternatives:
a series of Rockefeller recorrnnendations for strengthening
regional organizations, and a more comprehensive BOB
approach. AID and Txeasury will probably oppose many
of the specific measures cited. You should indicate the
_ ..
specifics are illustrative of a policy option and will need
further staffing.) ',.'?-..
- (We believe the .question of a new organizational arrange-
M, ..:, ..
meat for aid to Latin America should be discussed.in-the
NSC_?because ~.t is fundamental in t , ~,.-aW? .
erms of haw. we give
,effect to the special relatianshi.p. However, the question
of an overall organizational change, as proposed in the
Rockefeller Report, wi11 be staffed separately.)
- We think the principle of adebt-rescheduling should be--
considered in the NSC. (We would entertain additional
options if proposed. )
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SE GRE T
(The agenda includes the Rockefeller recommendations for
n.ew sectoral approaches. Here .again, we would entertain
other options.)
(AID may suggest issues concerning aid levels or program
.composition, We do not believe the NSC should get bogged
.down in detailed discussion of these questions. )
,(There may be suggestions that aid issues be deferred for
consideration by the Peterson Ca~'nmission. This is a
legitimate option, but you may recall from Camp David
that the President dial not want to wait. On the other hand,
zt will be mare difficult.to get the sweeping changes in
'overall AID which the President wants from Peterson if
one piece is done in advance. )
- _-
PRIVATE INVESTMENT (Annex, pp. 1$-19)
..(Butler may have to explain some of the Rockefeller recom-
mendatians. The most controversial are modification of
Hi.ckerxlooper and tax rules to promote joint ventures. )
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC (Annex, pp. 4-9)
We expect na dissents.
.SECURITY /MILITARY (Annex, pp. 10 .-14) ,
.(Security Assessments; We have soft-pedalled the difference
in security assessments in NSSM-15 and the Rockefeller
Report. However, Nutter i.s expected to ask that the assess
ment be a full agenda item. I do not think the NSC should
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debate this--it will take tao much time. It is basic in a
broad sense, but not necessary to the speech or the issues
listed. 1 suggest we ask for an intelligence cornrnunity evalu-
ation of the Rockefeller assessment; as part of the back up
material; alternatively, we can structure it sa that the
President asks for this .in order to make further decisions..).
0
(Military Missions: Nutter wi11 probably propose that we do
not consider this because a DOD study on missions is under-
way, scheduled for December completion. That study is
under OPRED, however, and this suggestion will basically
be a delaying tactic. We should counter with the fact that the
discussion of visibility and presence could still occur and
does not depend. on a study. We should maintain the item in
the agenda. )
(Equipment Sales; We should entertain any options State and/
or DOD may pose as an alternative to Rockefeller's recom-
"_:mendation that modern military equipment be sold through
MAP. DOD wi11 probably recommend that this be treated as
a separate issue rather than a subordinate part of the ixxternal
security part. There is no objection to this. )
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AGENDA,
NATIOl~TAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MEETING ON LATIN AMERICA
October 15 and 17
The NSC Meeting an Latin America is intended to consider major
feller Report.
.lines pf policy toward the region, with specific reference to the Rocke-
To prcivide some manageable structure to this wide-ranging topic,
it is proposed to concentrate on a few major principles of policy which
are implicit in or expressed in the Rockefeller Report and the NSSM-
15- The .specific recommendations in the Rockefeller Report will be
considered in the context of these basic issues. In same cases decision
may be reached an major principles which will permit follow-up on
specific measures or adequate guidance for general policy implementa-
tion.
The. meetings will use the July 9, NSC sessirn as the paint of de-
parture (See Sec. I, Setting, attached). The fallowing is a summary
listing of the major issues around which it is proposed that the discussion
be structured. More detailed explanatory material an these issues are in
the, attached papers, The attachments are. not intended to staff the
issues ar to list pros and cons,
POI:.ITICAL /DIPLOMA TIC
MORI/CDF
005141858 pages
13-41
A, How should the U. S, view the process of internal development
in other. hemisphere countries, and specifically to what extent
should we promote democracy?
Alternatives : (a) Active involvement
USAID, State Dept reviews completed]
(b) Pragmatism
(IVSSM-15, Sec. IV. , pp. 16-19; 37?45)
[n__y__t_iii__. n_~_~L ~~ A~ eon
SEGR~''I"r
~ References. to NSSM-15 throughout this paper, refer to the IG respars W
. to NSSM-15 rather than the NSS1vI itself.
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Sub-lssues?.
. Should we accept the Rockefeller recommendations for a more
"automatic" recognition policy?
~. What overall approach should we take to the Latin American
military?' .
(NSSM-l5, Sec. IV, pp. 25 -29)
(Rockefeller Report, pp. 17-19)
B. How much should the U. S. use the organizations of the intex-American
system to carry out its policies?
Alternatives. ('a) Treat the OAS and system ~as primary and main
focal point;
(b) Treat system as of very lixn.ited utility and concen- ,
Irate on bilateral relations.
(Rockefeller Report, pp. ~9-44; 103; 1~5)
(NSSM--15, Sec. VIII)
~.,. SECURITY/MILITARY
A. Haw should we structure our internal security assistance program?
Patterns for the program ,
2. Acquisition of modern equipment
(Rockefeller Report, pp. 52 -55)
(NSSM-l5, Sec. y'I, pp. 16-20)
B, Should. we make any effort to improve the collective security mechanism
for the foreseeable future or conclude that vtre can only make the best
_r __-- -~ - ~ .
A rrxajor. effort to structure new machinery
` 2. Accept conclusion that a rrzajar effort cannot succeed and seek
to make modest improvements in the e~cisting mechanisms.
(Rockefeller Report, pp. 52..55)
(NSSM 15, Sec. VIII, pp. 11-13)
SECRET
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SE CRE T
~"STL TRADE
(NSSM-15, Sec. VII, pp. 15..17)
(Rockefeller .Report, pp. 61-71; 113)
Should the U. S continue to allocate and administer developxx~ent
assistance primarily through U. S. -controlled bilateral programs
or begin to share increasing responsibility with the other American
7t.epubli c s ?
(Rockefeller Report, pp. $0-86) ~ _. - _
(NSSM-15, Sec. VII, pp. 20-24)
(Rockefellex Report, pp. 5b-60;- 7Z-~'8)
(NSSM-15, Sec. V. , pp. 2~ -26)
Should anew organizational arrangement be-created to supersede
AID in carrying out Western. Hemisphere davelopxnent assistance
programs? (NSSM-l5, Sac. V. , pp. 2G-301 ._
(Rockefeller Report, pp. 39:-35) ,
(Rockefeller Report, pp. 92-94)
IVY PRIVATE INVESTMENT
A. How should our "special relationship" be gi~cren-affect in the trade
. No special treatment.
2. Limited special attention, essentially far cosmetic purposes.
Special treatment for Latin America......,. :~-
Should we seek a hemisphere conference on "division of labor"?
the U. S. Governn~.ent?
and foxaign, ix~; ways which minimize foreign policy problams far
A. S-Sow should we encourage increased private investment, bath local
t:, DEVELGPM~NT ASSISTANCE
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C. Should we adapt the R
rescheduling?
ckefeller Report recoxnznendatiorz on debt
(Rockefeller Report, pp. 78w79)
D. Should we adopt the new sectoral approaches as recoxnizYended in the
Rockefeller Report, e. g. , for education, science arxd culture, rural.
development, conservation ?
(Rockefeller Report, pp. 95-130)
R
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THE SETTING FOR POLICY CHOICE
'Fhe Western Hemisphere, is experiencing a period of.-rapi~dl~r--i:ntensi-
fying change--change in economic institutions, political traditions, social
structures and national psychologies. The result is a confused political
spectxuxn: some nations operating through democratic institutions, others
tuxning to authoritarian solutions to their dilemmas; governments unable
to 'cope with afters conflicting demands for social reform and economic
garawth; rapidly increasing economic and social problems and growing gaps
between aspirations and performance; restive groups seeking a greatex
role in the political process and limited capacities or willingness of exist=
~ing systems to channel and absorb them.
Over the next several years the region.is almost sure to experience:
._
-- Continued rapid and widespread change in economic, social and
political institutions and processes;
~- Rising frustration with the pace of development, intensified by
irndustrialization, urbanization and population growth;
-- Political and social instability, with parallel growth of political
radicalism and an increased temptation to turn to autharit.arian-
..__~.
ways to handle problems;
-- Growing nationalism., across the spectrum of political groups,
probably marked by anti-US overtones because of our ornni-
present influence throughout the hezx~isphere; an accompanying .
tendency to assert "independence" from us;
-= Continuation of the trend of the military to take power to recast
paliti.cal and economic systems. ~~ --
The dynamics of this situation confront both Latin Americans and us
with major problems of adjustment across ,the whole spectrum. of our re-
lationships. (See NSSM-15, Section II, pp. 5-7)
of interest ~:
The U. S. is especially concerned about this situation and what happens
in the Western Hemisphere.. This concern is based on several dimensions
O..
-- Conventional, political, economic and .security interests represented
by such things as the security consequencesaf geography; Latin America's
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position as an important trade partnex and focus fvr sizeable U. S.
investrzzents, and the diplomatic underpinning for our .own world
policies which these nations can supply;
-- Enlightened self-interest in and-humanitarian concern far-economic
~and_soca.l. _develaprnent;
-- And; above all, the "special relationship" we have historically
maintained with the region and which gives a special cast to our
normal concerns.
A special relationship ha.s existed with the nations of this hernis~here
as a historic fact. It was formed on the basis of geography and the "shared
historic desire to establish the Western hlernisphere as a political area
distinct from Europe and free from external influence. It has evolved
over time and has became solidified in the widespread acceptance of the
idea of hemisphere community and in the web of treaties, organizations
anal corximitments that comprise the inter-American system. The resulting
long historic association and the persistent verbalization of the concept of
community have become self-fulfilling. That ".special bonds" exist is widely.
believed and is apolitical and psychological fact.
The nature and concept of this relationship, and the obligations and
xesponsibilities that flow from it, have been affected by changing circum-
stances, especially since World War II. And_the crux of mutual policy
problems has always been precisely this point of adjustment of the special
relationship to changing circurn?stances, new settings, and a different world
environment. -
,region.
to serve a variety of other purposes having nothing to do with the things for
which they were originally intended or with the needs and problems of the
region and are nolonger suited to existing needs and problems there.,, The 1
Rockefeller Report also affirms that we ourselves have allowed the special I ..,
relationship to deteriorate by permitting other narrow interests, other foreign.,
policy priorities, budgetary and administrative constraints and a burgeoning I
bureaucratic tangle to submerge...-it to the point where the Latin Americans da
not know what we want or if we care. Many of our policies have been distarte~,
Bath NSSM-15 and the Rockefeller Report characterize the current state
of our relations with the hemisphere as unsatisfactory, Bath affirm that our
concepts and policies have not kept pace with the changing dynamics df the
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Both reports conclude that our fun.dazx~ental policy problem is how to
xedefine and reinvigorate our special relationship to meet .mutual needs
in the hernis here in the than in circumstances of the 70's;
The NSC meeting of July 9, considered the conceptual bases of our
policy and .our relationship with the hemisphere.. It was the consensus of
,that meeting that:
-- A "special relationship" has existed and ou ht to exist;
- The purpose of that relationship now ought to be to promote
a community of independent, self-reliant states linked together
in a friendly and mutually beneficial relationship;
--~ Our assistance. to help these nations build mare effective socieities
is an innportant part a? that relationship;
~- We should avoid paternalistic style and tutorial posture;
-- We should seek a true partnership for our special relationship
with greater responsibility being shared with and assumed by
the Latin Americans for their awn development and maturity;
-- We should respect and encourage constructive nationalisrxi.
Using the above guidelines as the point of departure, the following
sections outline the major operational issues far which policy choices
should be made.
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POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC
At least three geineral trends appear alxn.ost sure to characterize
political dynamics in the Western Hemisphere over the next several
years:
Thee growing importance of nationalism and of Latin
efforts to assert greater "independence" of the US;
Continued economic and political instability, accompanied
by increasing outbreaks of social unrest, political crises
and coups, and perhaps societal violence;
An increased tendency toward radicalization of political
life, probably toward authoritarianism, and with greater
participation in political life by military institutions.
These trends are considerably different from what had been hoped far
and envisaged ten years ago under the Alliance.. They also challenge
both the posture heretofore implicit in U5 policy of active promotion of
democracy, and the ideals and commitments in the OAS and Punta del
Este charters.
1n this political .setting there are two major policy issues for the US to.
consider:
How to view the process of internal political development
and specifically to what extent we should try to promote
democratic .systems; and
What rule the niter-American system should have in
Western Hemisphere relationships, and how much the US
should use the formal system to carry out its policies,
Issue: How should the US view the process of internal
develo ~ment in other hemis here countries, ands ecificall
to what extent should we truer to promote democratic systems?
The process of change which the area is currently experiencing presents
a fundamental challenge to the legitimacy and effectiveness of traditional
farms, systems and values,
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i
Recent political dynamics have brought into being in a few countries
"institutional" military regimes. These claim a legitimacy based on
the alleged need for authoritarianism to achieve long-term economic
reform and social change, and with an implicit thesis that civilian
government has failed.
During the 60's the US tried to use various policy tools, such as the
withholding of .diplomatic recognition and economic aid, to promote
social reform and political democracy. Whatever the reason we did
not deflect the current trend toward reliance on authoritarian solutions.
.o
In the present circumstances, the LTS could adopt one of two basic
approaches: (1) Active involvement in promoting representative
democracy and social reform or (2) Circumspect ragmatism. (See
NSSM 15, Section 1V. )
The case far involvement rests on the argument tk~ere is a commitment
to democratic government irz the Charter of Punta del Este; that we
.possess a prepondexent power and influence in the Hemisphere; and
that we should employ it in a fashion consistent with our ideals, interests
~.nd.commitments. (NSSM-15, Sec. IV. 16-19)
Such an approach would employ all policy tools to promote the cause of
democratic and social reform. Thus, we could use recognition to ~...
assert leverage, withhold or grant economic anal military assistance
and use other modes of pressure and aid. We could vary the activism
and kinds of approaches, and vary the degree to which we would,"evangelize"
.for democratic government. But whatever the degree of "evangelism"
we adapt, the basic concept of this approach is that the achievement
of democratic government in other countries is our basic objective and
responsibility. (NSSM-15, Sec. IV. pp. 37-45)
The case for pragmatism rests on the record of the 1960's; and an the
premise that there are sharp limitations to what one government can do
~,% to construct new institutions and political systems in another society.
It would recognize .the expectable resistence and resentment on the part
of a people to pressure from outside,however well meaning. (NSSM-15,
Sec. IV. pp. 16-~19)
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This approach would not deny our preferences for democracy. It
would only argue that the development of such societies is a long-
range process which must be achieved by them. We would be willing
to work with authoritarian regimes who observe a "minimum standard"
of conduct far the sake of helping the people and' the long-range
process of socialJpolitical development. .
Under such an approach vve would relate assistance to helping the
people; generally maintain a passive posture toward internal develop
ments; adopt a modified Estrada doctrine on recognition; and generally
judge th'eavalue of cooperative relations in terms of mutual interests,
hove effectively the governxx~.ent works with its people, and how much
popular support it enjoys. In short, this approach would vary from
involvement in that, while we would make clear our own preference
and affirm our own commitments and values, we would not conceive
it to be our responsibility to promote democracy in other societies.
(NSSM-15, Sec. IV, pp. 37~-45)
The Rocke?e11er Re ort essentiall recommends the ra matic a roach.
It recommends that we affirm a coxrxmitment to work to improve the
lives and conditions of people; that we recognize that political evolution
takes time, and that there will be political societies. we do not like
from time tv time; and that our long-term interests will be best
served by maintaining at least minimal diplomatic relations with ~ ,
~ other governments while trying; to find ways to assist the people. of
those countries. (See Rockefeller Report pages 45-~k8).
2. Two specific questions subsumed under the above basic
issue warrant-specia]. mention:
(a) Sub-Issue: Should we accept the Rockefeller recommendation
for a more "automatic" recognition policy?
fur recognition policy over time has swung between the traditional
British position,. which applies minimum. de facto tests, and the Wilsonian
policy of using recognition to achieve political leverage and seek restoration
ox promise of restoration. of democratic forms. Practice elsewhere in
this hemisphere has also varied widely.
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Most recently, we have operated under Resolution 26 of the Second
.Special Tnter-~Amexican Conference, This calls for Gonsultati.ons
among the nations of the hemisphere, and recommends that the
intentions of the de facto government regarding free elections,
human rights and fulfillment of international obligations be considered
in reaching a decision to resume diplomatic relations.
The Rockefeller Report (pp. 47M4$) recommends a mare automatic
recognition policy based upon Article 35 of the Final Act of the Ninth
Tnter-American Conference which stated that the establishment of.
diplomatic relations does not imply any judgment upon the domestic,
policy of that goverxzxnent. The Cranston resolution, recently passed
by the Senate, recommends essentially the same kind of recognition
policy.
(b) Sub--Sssue: What overall approach should we take to the
Latin American military?
Military institutions will probably play a growing .political role in most
Latin American countries, though it is not clear whether they will
fallow political courses that we would favor. (see NSSM~-15, Sec. lV,
pp. 25~29'and Rockefeller Repoxt pp, 17_19)
How the United States views the current trend toward military govern-
m.ents and what policies we should fallow toward them essentially
depends upon the basic issue posed. above of promotion of democratic
government or a pragmatic approach, Adoption of the former posture
.would lead one to the Fulbright/Church stance of opposing a political
role for the military wherever possible or at least an aloof posture
from. military regimes. The pragmatic posture would accept the fact
that the military is a significant institution in these societies, will
.play a palitiC,~.l role whatever we say, and would. seek to exert
constructive"influence an these institutions in ways and means determined
by the circumstances of each case.
The Rockefeller Report (pp, 50-5.1) ,supports the pragxns.tic posture,
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- 8 -
B. The Inter-Axneri can System
1. Issue : How much should the U. 5, use .the organizations of the Int er-
American system to carry out our relations?
The ?"Ii?.ter-American System" is a conglomerate of inter-
governmental organizations, .treaties and principles that have
evolved as an outgrowth of the unique historical relationships
among the American Republics. This system has had to reflect
one basic reality- -the asymmet ric al makeup of power in the hernis -
phere represented by the fact that the wealth and power of the
U, 5. exceeds that of the other countries combined. The system's
great value, in fact, is precisely that it has muted that disparity
by providing a way to deal with each other and maintain the concept
of solidarity.
Bath the U. S. and the Latin. American countries see advantages
in the system. It provides a forum for the U. S. to deal with the
Latin American countries azxl a means of energizing collective
action on matters of joint concern. For the Latin American coun-
tries the system provides a collective restraint an U. S. power;
it also provides a means for them to work together and to bring
their individual and concerted influence to bear on the U. S.
relations.
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The question is clearly posed whether greater use and strengthen
ing of the various organizations would not be beneficial to the U. S.
in two ways :
a) as a practical means of sharing responsibility for such things as
development and for uniting the individual efforts of the various
countries; and
b) to help overcome the substantive and psychological problems
that arise when a nation of overvcrhelmingly propanderant power
deals with a much weaker one bilaterally,
These are two Poles to the range of policies we could adapt:
1. Treat the organizations and the concept of the "Inter-American
System" as of primary importance to the achievement of U. S,
objectives, and as the main focal point of U, S. -Latin American
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2. Treat the system as an alternative of 7irnited utility in achieving
LT. S. goals in the hemisphere, and concentrate instead an our
?bilateral relations, giving, rn.inimum support to the OAS consis-
tent vriith our membership and commitments or the psychological. -.
needs of the moment.
Pros and cons an the varying positions we could take as well as back-
ground information is contained in Part VIII of NSSM-15.
.,~.. __
The Rockefeller Report in effect leans toward the first pole and recam-
mends major efforts to use the system and multilateral patterns in carrying
out our relations (pp-39-44). The Report recoxrzxnends;
a.
Encaura.gement of regional organizations such as the Andean group;.
b.
c.
Supgart .of the OAS in political problems;
Use of the OAS fox technical assistance prograxxxs;
d.
e.
A strengthening of CIAP giving it greater responsibilities,
allocation of development assistance;
Support of the Council for Education, Science and Culture;.
including
.Use W~10 and PAUO as prime instruments for U:-S. effox?t W in the
health field;
Ixxaprovement of collective security through a Security Council;
Support of OAS initiatives to handle migration problems;
Recognize CECLA as a means of independent expression for
Latin America.
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The Rockefeller Report (see pp. 20-21 and 49-52) concludes
Communism, including Sovi.et`subvers.on is a serious factor;
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,? ~ p ..
SECRET ~ ..
In the period from World War l.I through the mid-50's there was
heavy emphasis an the need for a collective efforrt to defend the hezr~i-
sphere against external attack. The US took the lead in the development
of this effort through negotiation of the Rio Pact and the OAS charter,
and undertook rxiilitary assistance programs to aid those countries which
pledged forces for hexxa.i sphere defense.
In mare recent years internal subversion and instability have.
been identified as the principal threats to the security of the Hemisphere,
and.the nature of our military assistance programs has changed accord-
ingly.
NSSM-15 and the Rockefeller Report vary in their estimate of
the seriousness of the internal security threat, although this may be
more apparent than real.
NSSM-15 (See Sec. VI) concludes that from. the standpoint of
protecting US interests:
- internal security problems appear to be within the
competence of the security forces of the various countries
to contain, though same US assistance appears needed, and.
some of the weaker Gauntries may require particularly
close attention and additional assistance if the situation
deteriorates.
.
#or reducing dependence on the US. Even though it is nat
clear how far they are prepaxed to. go in this regard, this
?~PiEe Soviets are likely to fan any Latin American sen{a
xnent
itself as an alternative to Latin dependence on the US.
particularly when taken in con~unctaan with a Soviet presence
and a Soviet willingness--partial or hypothetical_-to offer
-- .rising nationalism poses a significant threat to US interests,
possibility does present a potential threat.
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the capabilities of subversive farces are incxeasing; they
are tuxning increasingly toward uxban terrorism.
-- the. seriousness of this sub,crersive threat is underestimated
in the US,
While the estimates vary, however, both reports recognise
that internal security problems are of concern to u.s, and that US
assistance will be needed in some cases,
Two basic issues may be pried in this area:
-- Ha~c~r should we structure our internal security.assistance
-- Should we attempt to impxove the collective security
mechana.sms?
A. Internal Security .
Issue: How should we structure our internal security assistance
pxogram to effectively meet legitimate needs and t~J.timately lead to se1f~
sustaining programs in the countries concerned?
1, Patter xas . At the present. time we maintain resident military
missions and AID police missions in.xnost of the countries of the heax~.isphere.
We have begun to phase out. grant material assistance except in cextain
critical countries where a need can be justified; with the bulk of aux equip-
ment assistance being furnished through foreign military sales, We
maintain modest levels of training both in-country and in the US and the
Canal Zone.
changing circumstances. It recornm.ends:
The. RQCkefeller Report (see pp. 52-55) xecomxnends a somewhat _
different pattern 'far our program. designed to meet what it believes to be
Increased giants fox graining;
Provision. far internal security equipment--communications,
transportation, small aims--as reasonably needed
(it dae~ n:ot specify whetnex an grant or FMS),
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Elixnination of permanent military missions in residence
since these axe too visible and too large; but meeting of
military and police training requests on a temporary
mission basis, in-country or in training outside.
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2. Equipment. A principal cause of recent friction with the
Latin Arne titan xi:ailitaxy, particularly in the laxge~ countries, has been
their dissatisfaction with US restrictions vn grants and sales of large
items of new equipment. The Latins feel the need far replacement of
~~ much of theix xnajax equipment items tivhich are obsolete by at least a
genexatian. The focus in the US Congress--and reflected in Iegislation~~
?has been to view such expenditures as unnecessary resauxce divexsions
~, from development purposes, U5 efforts, to~ sti.mulate multilateral'axmS
limitation understandings have failed completely.
Thus the US desire to reduce Latin expenditures on arms. that
may be unnecessary comes into conflict with the fact that as part of a
re-equipment cycle, many Latin nations are determined to make
puxchases of large military equipment items in the next few yeaxs.
The result is a dilemma for the Executive Branch. Latin American
resentment will continue to grow if the US continues to impose restric-
tions on their purchase of modern arms, paxticularly when Euxopean
suppliexs axe anxious to meet their needs. Yet Congressional opposition
to the use of US funds either military ox economic development to enable
any such purchase to be xx~ade continues stxong.
At the present time, the US has no capacity to meet the aspira-
. ,tiaras of these countries for modern items, such as jet aircraft, without
a Conte or Symington amendment penalty. Modificala.on of the Conte
amendment to the farei:gn assistance act is currently. pending.
The Rockefellex Report recommends that the Executive seek
eliminati.~z~:.of all existixa.g restrictive legislation and that we sell such
items through the MAP (p, 54. No. 4).
Collective Security
Issue: Should we make any effort to improve the collective ,
security mechanism for the foreseeable future or seek to make the
best of existing machinery.
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The. principal instruzxa.ent for internal security a.s the Rio
Treaty which is addressed to aggression from the outside as well as
by one rnEmber state against another. A further element of flexibility
is afforded--where there is doubt about aggression--by the OAS
Charter itself which permits the Foreign Ministers to take up cases
of "problems of an urgent nature and of common interest. " These
appear to provide adequate Regal bases for collective security.
The military-security bodies of the Inter-American system-.-..
.are relatively ineffectual, however, Au Advisory Defense Committee
provided for under the Charter has never been brought into being.o ?
The latex-.American Defense Board functions, but it operates in~sei:rii-
isolation from the OAS itself and draws up theoretical hemisphere
defense plans. (A proposal, supported by the US, to incorporate the
Board into the Charter when the latter was being amended was rejected.
'The semi-autonomous Special Consultative Committee on Security and
the OAS Gouncil's own "Lavalle" Committee have played marginal
advisory roles in the field of Castro Communist subversion but neithex
is able to perform an effective intelligence role. (See NSSM,-15, Sec.
VIII, pp. l l -13 )
'The Rockefeller Report states that "no country today can
effectively protect its own internal security by itself. " (p, 5l) It
recommends a major effort to improve collective security by
formation of a Western Hemisphere Security Council in the OAS.
A decision to seek more effective collective security measures
could be pursued along one of the following paths:
A major effort to structure new machinery.. This coul~~-`-`~~
treasures such as the Rockefeller recommendation
of a civilian-directed .Security Organization; or
the structuring of periodic meetings of Ministers
of Defense. and/ox Government; or
.Amendment of the OA5 Charter to incorporate the
Defense Board into the regular s.tructuxe ox to
reshape it outside the structure.
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Acce t the conclusion. that a rna'or effort cannot succeed
and seek to do what one can to make modest iznprovez:.ients
in existing; mechanisms; such as;
a, fprrn: an ad hoc collective force when a particular
situation dern:ands;
b. support and stimulate sub-regional cooperation on
security matters, such as CONDECA or the Colombian
Venezuela staff talks;
o .;
c. seek to bring the Advisoxy~ Defense Cozxzmittee into
................
'being an. a "stand-by" basis and establish a small
permanent military staff in the General Secretariat
to provide backstopping eliminating the Defense Boaxd
(See. NSSM 15, Sec. VIII;- pg. 11-13 ). .-_..
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/05/14 : LOC-HAK-302-7-1-7
III. TRADE
Trade expansion is essential to accelerated development in the hemisphere.
Latin Arn.erica's export earnings have been growing too slowly to adequately
finance its development needs. A major problem is that about 87% of the area's
exports consist of primary products, which have limited growth possibilities
and are subject to price instability. Expansion and diversification of exports
are necessary for long--term growth. The United States, which is the single
largest market for the hemisphere nations, maintains trade barriers which the
Latins see as limiting the growth of their exports, both of primary and
industrial products. They see our restrictive trade measures as inimical
to their development goals and. not responsive to the realities of their situation.
.....They resent the fact. that other LDC's enjoy special preferences in the markets
of other developing nations while they receive Wane from the United States.
,:(See NSSM, pp 43-45 and Annex VII; Rockefeller Report pp 61-6b`
A. Th_e basic issue we face is haw_ our "special relata.onship" should be
iven effect in the trade area.
There are three basic options;
1) No S ecial. Treatment
Our consideration of Latin America's trade problems would be in
the context of U. S. trade policy tpward all LDC's. We would respond
to Latin America's need for greater access to the U. S. market by
continuing to seek a system of generalized trade preferences for all
. LDC's in the developed countries. It would assume no special
political factor for Latirx American countries in consideration of
quota. allocations, commodity agreements.
2) Limited special attention, essentially for cosmetic purposes.
We would make limited gestures on trade policy for the Latins. Such
moves would have same psychological value but would not be in serious
..conflict with domestic interests ar the interests of other regions., The
positions being considered far the IA-ECOSOC meetings essentially
xeflect this approach. We could;
(~.1 Support a generalized preference scheme far all LDG's but give
special. attention to products of interest to Latin America;
(b) Seek removal of duties nn a list of minor products o? interest to
Western Fiernisphere nations;
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 SEGRET - 16 ..
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Try to negotiate~rriare'favarable access for Latin Air~.erican .fruits
and vegetables to thy: U. S, market by such measures as extending
seasonal preferences;
(d) Seek to organize an action program in the OECD for liberalizing
quota restrictions on LDC products, with special attention to
Latin America;
(e) Seek Glaser consultation on trade matters; and
(f) Assist hemisphere tourism.
3) S ecial Treatment for Latin America
This is essentially the approach of the Rockefeller Report (pp b1~71.;
113). Under this .option, we would:
(a) offer special preferences to those nations which do not now have
such preferences frorx~ other developed nations (i. e. , Latin
America) pending achievement of a system. of generalized pre-
ferences for all LDC's. (An alternative would be to announce our
willingness to offer such specialized preferences i.f a generalized
., preference scheme cannot be achieved within a fixed period of
time). Adjustment assistance would be provided to U. S.
industries adversely affected.
fi
(b) Readjust basic commodity (e. g, , meat; textiles, sugar) quota
allocations to hemisphere nations to contribv:te--~~development
,objectives;
(c): Allocate a major part of growth in these imports to hemisphere
.nations;
(d) Support commodity agreements to maintain prices for primary
d
t
to hemisphere nations and re-examine present limitations on
(f) .Allocate a major part of future growth in agricultural consumption
pro ac
s of interest to. Lata.n America;
. .~
., n ..
(e.) Vote with the Western Hemisphere .nations to support the
International Coffee Agreement and assure that hemisphere
nations receive a major share in the growth of the U. S. market;
Latin American farm product exports to the United States;
(g) Review shipping rates in the hemisphere.
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b
i
(.
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Should .we seek a herxa.isphere conference an the division of labor?
period. The Report recommends that the President request the
OAS to convene a majdr conference to establish a more rational.-
The Rockefeller Report (pp g2-g4) suggests .that,.aJ~l....af---the nations of ..
the hemisphere would benefit from a more efficient division of lobar.
It concludes that a smooth adjustxn.ent process could be worked out
through a phased elimination of tariffs and quotas o~rer a reasonable
division of labor in the hemisphere.
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Accelerated growth in the hemisphere will require increased
private investment, bath local and foreign. However, many of the
hemisphere nations' economic policies and structures, and their
attitude toward private investment do not create a framework which
enca.urages private investment. In particular,. there is a fear and
resistance to direct US private investment. Fareign palicy problems
created for the US Government because of nationalist pressures
ag;~z~st ?US direct investment are compounded by 1) the fact that
p~ ~;t'.-:investments have been he~.vily in extractive industries and
public utilities, areas most susceptible to nationalist reaction., and
2) a fundamental divergence between US and Latin legal views on
the status of private investment and the role of gave rnment in
protecting such inve stxnents.
A, The basic issue is how to encourage increased private
investment, both local and forei~n~ in ways which minixx~ize foreign
policy problems for the US Government.
The Rockefeller I~.eport (pp. 80-86) and NSSM-15 (Annex VII,
pp. za-26) suggest three broad measures which the United States
can .take.
1. Support local private enterprise. Measures to implement
this approach could include:
Support far efforts to encourage local savings and
channel them into productive investment. For
example: .
Support reg}onal and national development banks.
Development of local open-end investment trusts.
Assist the development of local and regional
..capital markets. .
World Bank bonds repayable in constant value.
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Develop a Latin ?A:ni~rican daL-lar market -
{similar to the Eura Dollar Market. )
f. Cxuarantees for part of local bank loans for
rural' village development.
-- Give high priority to ,training of _entrepreneurs,
managers, scientists and technicians.
--.Expand the use of capital ,goads import loans far the
private sector.
? 2. Encauxage US private investment articularl~ 'Dint
yexitux.e.s with local axtici ation. Measures to implement this
approach could inc]. ude: ~ .
-- Modification of tax xules to encourage private invest-
anent and promote joint ventures in LDCs.
--. US "start-?up" contract mechanisms to bring private
investors into high risk ventures with goad develap-
anent potential.
--,Improve mechanisms to bring US investors and
Latin American companies together., ?_~_.
--,Relax controls on foreign direct investment in LDCs.
3. _Reduce direct US Government involvement in protecting
US investors. Measures to implement this approach could include:
form "rules of the game" for private foreign invest-
ment. This could be an a hemisphere-wide basis or
alternatively, on a country by country basis.
mandatory aid cutoff.. .(Rockefeller--Report, ...p:..-77~-----------_-,M..._,._..
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Set up a private US insurance group. to take aver insur-
ance of private foreign investments under a reinsurance .
arrangement. with OPIC (Rockefeller Report,.. p. $4);or
alternatively, pxomate a multilateral investment guar-
...
antee arrangement. (NSSM-15 An,n.ex VII, p. 24) -
-- Work with CLAP and private sectors to develop uni-
-- Modify or repeal Hickenloaper amendment to eliminate
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The Western Hemispher: nations need and want both trade
and aid. Even with improved self-help and expanded trade oppor-
tunities, continued external development assistance will be essen-
tial for accelerated progress. As a practical matter, the United
States is the principal source of financial and technical assistance
Government. As a result, there is disappointment and resentment
about our assistance efforts both in the hemisphere and at home.
Past programs raised unrealistic expectations. US assistance pr-
grarns have been encumbered by obstacles and restrictions which
serve domestic or special interest purposes, and conflict with
development objectives. The manner in which we have provided aid
has involved the US Government deeply in politically sensitive
internal policies of recipient governments.
However, several factors> l~.xnit the efficient use of our aid
resources and produce political frictions or problems. for the US
for the nations of the hemisphere.
Moreover, the growing trend toward nationalistic authori--
tarian governments poses practical political problems, particularly
in light of Congressional attitudes, which limit our ability to main-
tain the flaw of substantial bilateral assistance. (NSSM-15, Sec. V;
,Rockefeller Report, pp. 56-6a; 72-75)
The Rockefeller Report and NSSM-15 suggest that it is in
our interest to continue to provide development assistance to the
A, The fundamental issue posed by our experience with the AID '
.program, the prospects for change in the hemisphere, and a reassess-
ment of our overall purpose and style toward the hemisphere is
ycihether the ,US should continue to allocate and administer the devel-
oprnent assistance to the hemisphere primarily through U5-controlled
bilateral programs or begin to share increasing responsibilitX with
the other American republics.
nations of the hemisphere.
Option 1. Continue predorn.inant LTS control over allo-
cation ao.d administration of develo meat aid to the herx~is here.
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This option would maintain. the existing aid pattern under
which most of our assistance for the hemisphere is channeled into
bilateral programs, with a US Government agency responsible far
planning, allocating, negotiating,. and implementing development
loans and grants. It implies the continuation of substantial AID
field missions, and a heavy degree of involvement in the internal
economic and social policies of recipient nations, It assumes that
a predominantly bilateral program has political benefits and/or a
degree of effectiveness which offset the political problems which it
may_, ,.produce,.
Under this option, measures could be taken to improve
the efficiency of the current, program and reduce the political Eric-
, tuns associated with it. Measures of this kind recommended in
the Rockefeller Report (pp. 76-77) could include untieing develop--
ment loans for procurement anywhere in the Western Hemisphere;
seeking removal of AID barnacles which interfere with development;
seek modification of restrictive legislative provisions, such as the
50/54 shipping requirement, the Pe11y, Conte, Symington, Ruess
and Hickenlooper amendments; ease terms for loans; concentrate. on
new approaches to high priority areas such as urban and rural com-
munity development, agriculture, education and public health.
` Under this option, we would continue to consult with and
give consideration to the views of regional arganizatians, but this
would be essentially a gesture far psychological purposes. We
would nit give up any significant degree of control over the bulk of
aa.r assistance.
Option 2, Share increasing responsibility with the other
American republics for allocation and administration of development
assistance; gradually shift from predominant control to partnership.
This option would involve strengthening regional
xxaechanisms and institutions, giving them an increasing role in de-
cisions affecting US development assistance, and gradually trams-
ferring more of our aid through those channels. It implies in-
creased confidence in their capabilities, It assumes that we want
to help but not dominate in the development process; that we want to
reduce. our direct involvement in the, internal policies of recipient
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nations; that w~ vwazit to reduce our presence, though not our support,
in the hemisphere. It would seek to reduce bilateral political abra-
sions and 'insulate the flow of development aid somewhat from -
special interest pressures. and short-terzx~ bilateral political problems.
This option could be~ carried out through various channels
and phased, depending on the readiness and capabilities of the'rnulti.-
lateral mechanisms, A substantial bilateral program would continue,
at least in the initial years, and pleasures, such as those listed
under Option 1, could be taken to irnprave..its .effectiveness.
~~ .
..~~" '- The Rockefeller Report (pp. 76-77) suggests that we .. .
begin to move in this direction, Irnplernenting rrieasures recornmen.ded
include:
-~ assigning greater responsibility to CIAP (which the
Rockefeller Report suggests be renamed the Western
Hemisphere Development Ca~rimittee) for planning,
setting priorities and allocating development assis-
tance to the nations of the hemisphere. Strengthen
CIAP by giving full consideration to its recoxnmenda-
tions and submitting our economic programs to the
Committee far an annual review, as all other members
do.
greater use of OAS channels for technical assistance.
An alternative approach to shifting increasing
responsibility to the other nations is one raised in a Budget Bureau
memorandum. It would transfer part of Alliance far Progress
loan funds ($100 million) from AID to the Inter-AmericanDevelop-
ment Sank for a Private Investment Stimulation Fund.and part ($200
million) to the World Bank to create a fund for Latin American pro-
; gram lending. The remaining loan funds would gradually be channeled
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-- financial and technical support for regional organiza-
tians.
.finance bulk of infrastructure loans by multinational
'.and regional lending institutions.
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SECRET - 23 -
through a strengthened CIAP as its capabilities imprpved, A $10
million AID grant would be made to CIAP to strengthen its central
staff and establish strong country field rzzissions,~ which would
eventually replace US field missions, Other donors (_T.$RD, IDB,
IMF). would be invited to have permanent active participation in
CIAP.
B. Another issue which should be considered in relation to
either option ~discu~ssed above, is whether a new organizational
arran ement should be created to su ersede AID in cart in out
Western Hemisphere development assistance ~arograms.
A new organizational arrangement for Western I-Iemisphere
aid would demonstrate the special importance we attach to the
hemisphere, rt could create a new image, introduce new pets"annel,
and eliminate more directly the encumbrances an the present AID
.program. It might facilitate more continuity of programs through
multi-year authorizations.' The particular type of organizational
arrangement would be related to m:anage;-nent considerations under
the basic program option Selected for Western Hemisphere assis-
tance (continued dominant bilateral or.shift to shared responsibility. )
Some of the.~xxew organizational arrangements possible include:
-- separate the Latin American assistance program coxn-
pletely from, the rest of AID, leaving it within State under
the direction o,f the Assistant Secretary fvr later-American
Affairs.
a new ageincy or corporation for Western Hemisphere
assistance in the Executive Office of the President.
(This is recommended in the Rockefeller Report, pp.
34-35.)
;~- a public -private corporation, reporting to the President.
.The first alternative--separating the Latin American aid program
within State--could be an interim step, implemented by Executive
Order,, pending legislative action an one of the other alternatives.
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_.
 - --_-- - cA de-cisian on a new organizational arrang exnent for the
Western Hemisphere aid, program could be taken before a decision
on the future structure of the rest of AID, keeping open the option
of same form of association later.
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SE CI~tE'1' - 24 -
Alternatively, a decision on an organizational arrangement
" for Western Hemisphere aid could be postponed until the. Peterson
Commission recommendations on the total aid program are con-
sidered.
C. Debt Rescheduling. In addition to new approaches to develop-
, ent assistance, another area in.which the US can contribute to
aeG~~erated growth and give effect to the special hemisphere rela-
tionship is to try to relieve the debt service b~.rden which the hemis -
phere nations increasingly face. The Rockefeller Re ort (pp. 78-$9)
recommends that the US reco nine the advanta es of a enerous re-
schedulin~ of debt service requirements.
1. Rockefeller proposes that CIAP initiate country-by-country
studies of the debt service burden sa that the US and other lenders
can anticipate problems by appropriate debt rescheduling. It further
proposes that where dollar payments axe rescheduled, equivalent
.amounts in local currencies should be paid into a special fund for
development uses. ~ _ .. __.__..
2. Another proposal being considered for the IA-ECOSOC pasiti~a:
is to urge IBRD and IMF..to take the initiative in establishing (1) objec-
tive criteria for debt relief and (2) oxganizing discussions between
the debtor country and various creditors.
D. _New-Sectoral Approaches. .The Rockefeller Repor"t recam-
mends special attention in our assistance programs to new approaches
in a ban and rural carr~munity development, agriculture, education,
and public health. It also suggests a new conservation program.
Although specific decisions on the composition and emphasis of
development assistance programs would be subordinat a to the basic
.., policy.. approach, some xnajar proposals could be considered under
either option.
1. Establish a Western Hemis here Institute for Educa-
tian, Science, and Culture to give special emphasis to these areas,
The Institute would be financed at,the rate of $100, million annually
_. ._
;and would assume responsibility for many of the regional programs
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in these areas naiv carried out by AID, CU, and ether agencies. It
would give full support to the new OAS Council for Education, Science
and. Culture.
2. ~stablis?h a non-profit Inter-American Rural Develop-
ment Corporation to set up a series of agricultural demonstration
pragxams around the hemisphere.. These would involve integrated
production, processing and marketing facilities for selected Zones.
3. Create an Inter-American. Institute for Natural
Resource Conservation within the OAS framework to carry out a
?hemisphere survey, establish education and training programs.
Create a conservation public works program with pant-time employ-
meat of peasant farmers.
(Rockefeller Report, pp. 95-I26)
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'NA'CIDNAL S~CIJRI'TY COUNCIL
WASHifYGTO1V; D.C, 20506
National Securit~r Stud~r 1~Iemorandum 15
The Secretary of~ the Treasury
U. S. posture toward internal political developments in
"SUBJECT: Review of U. S. Policy Totivard Latin America
should concentrate initially on five major segments of Latin American.
a.rze rresiaenti nos asnea ~na~ a ~aroaa sway oe preparea reviewing our
overall policy toward Latin America. The study should analyze the
situation in Latin America and examine U. S. interests in the region
and the conceptual premises which should underpin U. S. policy, as
well as alternative strategies to implement it. The overall review
__.policy:
cipating .agencies far chairmen of the. working groups as appropriate.
-Latin America act as a steering group for this review. The Chairman
i of the NSC Interdepartmental Group should designate working groups to
prepare papers on each of the above five subjects, drawing upon parti-
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Adx~.inistrator, Agency for Znxernational Develapxnent
..The Director of Central intelligence
Latin American countries, especially coups.'
Regional security requirements, U. S. security interests
and objectives; the .purpose and xiature of military assist-
ance pxograrns in the light thereof.
Development assistance strategy, the Alliance for
Progress and the U. S. role in it.
,.Trade and investment policy; x?egional economic integration.
;Role of the OAS and other multilateral organizations.
The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Group for
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each participating agency ;should also provide staff support as xequired
and pexform such subsidiaxy studies in support of the overall papexs
as may be requested. The Chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental
Group may invite othex agencies not noxmally participant in the Group
to take part in individual studies or participate in meetings as appro-
priate.
These five papexs should be submitted to the NSC Review Group by
March 31.
should prepare by May 15 far NSC approval an overall statement of
17. S. policy toward Latin America, incorporating decisions reached
in connection with the individual studies in an overall, coordinated con-
. After NSC review of these studies, the NSC Interdepartmental Group
ceptual summary of our policy toward the region.
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Time and Place: 2:15 P. M. - 4:15 P. M. , White House Situation Room
Subject: Latin America (NSS1Vi 15)
Participation:
State Dept. review completed
pages 44-57
JCS and NSC review(s) completed
pages 44-57
Chairman -Henry A. Kissinger
A.~ariculture -Andrew Mair
State -
Williarrx I. Cargo
Camrraerce - Kenneth N. Davis, Jr.
Gharles Meyer
Donald McHenry
CEA - Faul W. McCracken
ON-FILE Trea RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY pages 44-57
Defense -Richard .A. Ware STR - Carl Gilbert .
CIA - Edward W. Proctor
AID - Rutherford M. Paats
JCS - LTG F. T. Unger
Gav. R,ockefeller's
Office -William Butler
OEP - HaakOn Lind~Ord
ON-FILE DOC RELEASE
_
NSC Staff - Viron P. Vaky
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
pages 44-57
USIA -Frank Shakespeare Arnold Nachmana
Robert E. Osgood
B4S -James W. Clark Fred Bergsten
Jeannie W. Davis
Volcker
Treasury -Paul A
.
AnthOn Jur].Ch
y
MORI/CDF
003309132 pages
44-57
NSC REVIEW GROUP MEETING
.Thursday, October 9, 19b9
... Messrs Vaky and Meyer will rework the Agenda for NSC consideration to:
a. identify the policy issues that require Presidential determilnation,
b, define policy choices, adding the flavor of the pros and cans, out-
lining abold and a safe option and including the costs (economic,
domestic, political, etc.) of each.
c. illustrate options with specific issues lifted from, the IA-EC4SQC
paper.
._ . The NSC meeting should be structured sa as to get basic directives
useful in preparing specific US positions for. the IA-ECOSOC meeting.
... 01.4 should .assess the nature of the threat in Latin America: whether
Nationalism or Communism presents 'the greater present danger,.
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Mr. Kissinger introduced Mr. William Butler of Gavexnor R?ckefeller's
staff and aslceri hixn to comment.
Mr, Sutler explained that the Rockefeller Report had been developed
hurriedly,-- actually in two weeks ~- and that it attempted in general to
develop pxagmatic approaches to the various problems exicountered.
He acknowledged that the report was uneven. -- in some cases taking the
broad approach to problems and in others going into what he felt was
too much detail.. He referred to the section on aid,. specifically the
question of preferences for the LDCs, and. said that this position and
language had been developed with great care and in close touch with the
Al~'L-CIO and that the position taken reflected their feelings. possibly
more than those of others.
Mr. Kissinger explained that there would be only ;one NSC' meeting
although if, at the end of the October 15 rn~eting, the President wishes
another Council, session this will ,f course happen. He referre'd' to the
President's October 31 speech which would l.ay out the basic principles
of a new U. S. approach on Latin. America and said the NSC meeting
must be geared to producing decisions. He thought the Review Group
should focus an an attempt to structure types of decisions we need to
get from, the NSC meeting with same discussion of what decisions might
be handled through interdepartmental papers. He thought we would then
be ready for both the NSC meeting and the October 3l speech'. He
suggested we go through the headings of the Rockefeller Report and of
the previous NSC discussion: and see what to put up for decision. He
asked if the issues in the Agenda paper were, properly posed and if it
was agreed that the. Agenda annex was a fair ,statement of basic policy.
Mr. Volcker said Treasuxy found the Agenda incomplete on the economic
side. He thought many issues raised strictly in the' Latin American
context have implications in other areas of the world, that other interests
should be better ,reflected. He asked how this Agenda paper meshes
with the IA/ECOSOC exercise,. which was much more detailed .and much
more substantive. ;
Mr.._....__.__~ _.
^Meyer said there were three or four facets of the same picture.
While the Agenda paper focuses on broad policy, he acknowled~eci that
each interested agency has in mind parallel specifics from the. IA/ECOSOC
exercise, He thought these would have been self-determining if the broad
policy had been established prior to the preparation of the iA/ECOSOC
paper.
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Mr. Volcker asked if we could make broad. policy in a vacuum.
_Mr. Vaky noted that the IA/EGOS4G papers would be on the .President's
desk priox to the NSG meeting. He thought the NSG could discuss
pxernises and their principal implications and that the President could
then decide on specific .issues for the IA/ECOSOC.
Mr. Kissinger agreed that the ?A/ECOSdC meeting could follow up the
decisions made at the NSC. T'ne NSC could make the basic decisions
and we could concentrate on specifics in focussing on U. S. positions
far the TA/EGrJSOG meeting. He thought the' two things axe reinforcing,
but agreed that a second NSG meeting may be requixed.
Mr. Davis said Gommerce had noted in the sections an txade, izivestment,
and development assistance an omission of any mention of non-U. 5.
foreign business presence in Latin America..
Mr. Kissinger asked. if this wexe; a policy issue.
Mr. Davis noted that the Rockefeller Report had recommended, for
example,. limiting project lending to certain sectors, with the xesult that
we would turn aver to other countries project lending oppoxtunities in
other sectors. He noted this would leave the door open for Japan and the
European countries. He thought we should find a way to keep U. S.
business presence in the picture, indeed t"o stimulate U. 5, business
presence, for e~caxnple, by opening up hemisphere project ].ending, possibly
e~ncouxaging U. 5. companies to shift same activities to subsidiaries.
He saw no mention of the rest of the waxld in the Rockefeller recaxn-
mendations.
Mr. Butler commented that the Rockefeller Report. did rely on inter
national agencies for project lending and questioned whether the role of
.other foreign countries in this area was a xrxajor one.
Mr. Davis remarked that both 3apan and the European, countries were
presently aiming their aid lending toward satin American countries.
Mr. Volcker cited this as a particular example of the general problem
with the Rockefeller Report which way that i.t looked at Dann America
in a vacuum. ;
Mx. Kissinger asked. for any other general comments.
t ~-? ""
General Unger said the military thought the military-security section
should begin with a statern.ent on the canflict.ng view of the nature. of the
threat in Latin .America. He Hated that the response to NSSM 15 cited
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.SECRET
natiox~alisxza as the real threat, with Communism as a potential langer-
range problexx~., while the Rockefeller Report saw Communism as the
real and present danger.
_Mr. Vaky Hated this point was made in the Agenda paper, to which
Genexa.l Unger replied that it was in the precis but not in the Agenda
annex.
Mr. Kissin~ex agreed that the paint should be made and asked CIA far
an assessment of the. problem to be attached as an annex to the NSC
paper, He thought the difference in view in the recommendations was
less than in the theory backing up the recommendations.
General Unger said that on the question of the military missions in
Latin America, JCS would prefer to withhold any action pending the
completion of various related studies, e. g. , the response to NSSM 6$
(The Military and the Church in Latin America), a Defense study now
underway of all military missions,. etc. He Hated a statement at the
July 9 NSC meeting concerning the importance of personal contacts in
Latin America and said that all services. ,were Haw compiling data on
military personalities in the area. He also referred tp a study of the
value of SQUTHCGM in Panama and asked that these studs..es not be pre-
empted by an early decision an the future of military missions in Latin
America.
Mx. Kissinger agreed that we ,could delay the major decision ixt this area.
but thought we could discuss .the problem of visibility and basic attitudes
and relationships.
General Unger noted that the only. rationale in the Rockefeller Report far
their suggestion for closing the military missions was too . much visibility.
Mr. Gilbert thought we must be careful that actions taken to favor Latin
America da not run counter to our interests in other areas. He m.entianed
agricultural products, specifically beef, where the Rockefeller recom-
mendations run directly counter to U, S, interests in Australia and New
Zealand. He thought we should approach these with caution sa that con-
flitting desirabilities are flagged.
Mr. Kissinger agreed.
Mr. Gilbert asked if there would be enough. time to spat such things.
Mr. Kissinger assv.red him that all concerned agencies would .get a crack
at any. major. Presidential .pronouncement. He cited the President's
remarks at Camp David, that he did not want a rehash of familiar `positions.
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SECRET
While he had no fixed. ideas, he wants a new departure and bold policy
suggestions with regard to .Latin America. He thought we could include
options which would be different from past. consensus ~iv~ithout being in-
consistent with our interest in other areas. He reiterated that everyone
would. get a crack. at any new proposals.
He then suggested we go through various items in the Agenda paper.
He thought the theoretical issues had been settled at the 'previous NSC
xx~eeting (pragmatic approach, special. relationship, etc.) and suggested
the Review Group consider trade, development, private investment,
political and .security issues, in that order. With regard to trade, he
thought the key issue was how to give effect to the special, relationship,
with regard the preferences, quotas, non-tariff barriers and. the like.
He suggested the' NSC focus be an general principles with specific proposals
to be a part of the IA-ECOSOC package.
Mr. Butler noted, that while Governor Rockefeller feels strongly on
special treatment for Latin America, he would support a move for
generalized tariff preferences rather .than specific preferences. With
regard to quotas, Governor Rockefeller thought it ,was iza the U. S.
interest to pay greater attention to the Latin American share in the
growth of markets.
Mr. -Kissinger asked if there were counter arguments.
Mr. Moir Hated that of the l75 items (presumably refers to IA-ECOSOC
proposal to eliminate ~~nuisance duties~1) 60 percent. were agricultural.
He noted that with the cut' in production of coffee, bananas and cocoa,
they were na longer competitive, Because of Cuba, we had shifted
quotas an sugar primarily to the other Latin American' countries with.
some to; the Philippines. He noted that many decisions in this area
were controlled by legislation.
Mr. Vaky Hated that there were .areas in which we could rrmve admini-
stratively without requiring new legislation.
Mr. Volcker commented that there. was no quantitative indication of haw
these recoxnxnendations related to position of U. S. industry, domestic
political problems, balance of payments problems, etc.
Mr, Meyeirca,oted that he did not disagree with Mr. Volcker but there had
not been time for any quantitative crass:-analysis.
Mx. Vaky agreed that the paper had attempted to establish what to
dv subject to certain realities.
SEGRET
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SECRET
Mr. Kissinger asked how we cauld frame this as a prapasal on which
the President could act.'. Should we not give him a rough order of rnagni-
tude pf various factors?
He asked if any of the proposals in the Rockefeller Report ar any of the
items in the Agenda paper were non-controvexsial.
:A11 agreed on tourism as anon-controversial iterr.-.
Mr. Bergsten comtiriented that all agencies were agreed to support some
sort of general tariff preferences, and Mr. Volcker commented the
question was how much to shape these. programs toward. Latin America.
Mr. Kissin. ear thought the question might be how it would be possible
within a general scheme to pay special attention to Latin America.
Mr. Gilbert noted that general tariff preferences would work to the
advantage of Latin America. He saw. as a prerequisite that regional
organizations would agree to forego any other preferences, accordingly.
the European: Comxxxunity, the African group, and to .some extent the
Cornm.onwealth would make themselves ineligible fox special preferences,
which would leave only Latin America eligible .for general :ipr'e$srences.
He also thought the State Departrn.ent uses hortatory language on the
question of special preferences and reverse pxeferences. He thought
the agreement by regional gxoups to forego other preferences should be
a prerequisite so that our negotiators should return for further instruc-
tions i.f they are unsuccessful in gettin~ agreexxxent on this point.
Mr. Kissinger thought the Rockefeller Report agreed that a general
system. would favor Latin America, If we can establish a general
system, would that give the President enough until the end of October.
Could we then go to specific recommendations? Could we give the
President the options, as to how to take the next step and do what would.
be necessary t4 get the thing moving?
Mr. Gilbert referred to the possible necessity for leg.slatian but
Mr. Bergsten thought this could be handled in the negotiating instructions
to the U. S. delegation to IA/ECOSOC. He noted that the U. S. needs to
develop a position on what types of preferences should be included.
Mr. Cargo noted that there was an interagency paper on the tariff
preferences question. While the European countries all have schemes
on the' table on this issue, we have not, and there had been an attempt
to develop a position at the Under Secretaries Committee to go to the
Pxesident.
SECRET _
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SECRET
Mr. Bergste.zx rerxiarked that this paper had arrived last night and .was
ready to go to the President.
Mr. Kissinger asked that this basic issue be brought in to the NSC
consideration and in a way which will a11ow everyone to be heard on
the subject:
Mr. Gilbext commented that the tariff preference memo was not distinguished
fox the clarity of its presentation of the issues for Presidential decision.
He thought ane .had to look hard in the paper for these issues.
Mr. Kissinger said he assumed there was a large., range of possibilities
between the. extremes of a liberal and a restricted approach to the problem.
Mr. -Gilbert questioned the implication contained in the memoranda of
conversations with various members of the Congress that described the.
tariff preferences as self-limiting because of the competitive needs of
various departments. He thought there was in fact a major legislative
problem.
Iylr. Kissin~ex said he had no .view on the ;substance of this issue except.
to make sure that it was' clearly defined for the President. He assumed
the President could not make a major speech on Latin America without
referring to it. He thought, however, we should fgcus on the big issue --
on the policy which will permit development of a negotiating position.
The President will need to know the options he has -- various shades betweena
liberal and a restricted position. Was it possible to get' a brief statement
of these 7
Mr. Ber~sten said it was. He thought the issue was stated?well in the
tariff preference paper although the argument s were na t as clear:
He thought the agencies were .developing separate papers which would refine
the pros and cons __ of_ various. arguments.
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_Mx. Kissi~er thought we should present the President with. his
choices with related costs including domestic, political and economic
costs. He thought we should make sure to get a Presi.denta.a.1 expression
at the NSC meeting or later.
Mr. Cargo noted that, under Item .III. on Trade in page 3 of the Agenda
paper, State would prefer that the second option be phrased more within
the framework of worldwide policy -- that it should read, ''...providing
preferred treatment fox Latin America, wherever possible, without a
sigxv.ficant breach of our worldwide commercial policy.
_M_r. Kissingex noted the discussion of the R6ckefellex recommendations
on page lb of the Agenda annex.
Mr. Davis noted that textiles had crept back into the' lA-ECO50C. He
thought textiles was a whole separate issue, and should be taken out of
the IA-ECOSOC paper. .
Mr. Vaky_ thought we had a faxum fox decision on specific issues in
the IA-ECOSOC memorandum, and that we could. discuss concepts in
the NSC with regard to textiles and oi-hex specific issues. He thought
the State Department was still receiving comments. on the I.A-ECOSOC
paper.
Mr. Kie sin:~er said the only concern .was. to keep the NSC; .meeting fxom
becoming a statexnen$ of platitudes -- could we affirm the special
relationship without boring people?
Mr. Volcker thought the Agenda paper was one-sided on what the U. 5.
can do. He thought the Latin Americans could do xxxore on private
investment-and in other areas, and that all of their pxoblerns are not
external ones. ,
Mx. Poats said this point was ,being written into the draft of the
President's speech.'
Mr. Volcker thought the net result of the agenda paper was misleading.
Mr. Vaky said. these issues were covered in the IA-ECOSOC paper.
Mr. Kissinger said we should give the President some illustrative
examples of the sort of things listed under the various headings.' on
pages 15 and ]:6 of the Agenda paper. Otherwise, the 'NSC meeting
would be spent-on theology, and it would be necessary to ren~:gotiate
_.
on all the specific items. He asked Mx. Vaky and Mx. Meyer to redo l
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the paper with this in mind. They should pull out those reco~inmendations
which can be quantified, should outline various options including a bold
option and a safer option, and should incorporate same of the ;specifics
Exam the IA-ECOSOG paper.
Mr. Volcker asked what was meant by the Rockefeller recommendation
fax a. hemisphere conference on the division of labor.
Mx, Nachmanoff said he thought this implied. a. longer-term approach
to the gradual elimination of trade barriers, and that the conference
was conceived as a first step to discussion of the gradual reduction of
barriers in the hemisphere.
Mr. Gilbert said he ha.d read this as an international conference to
enact a doctrine of comparative advantage.
Mr. Kissinger asked who wrote this section?
Mx. Sutler replied that it was a suggestion by the President of Colombia.
Mr. Sergsten suggested that this looked toward a systex~xi of tariff
,preferences to be developed within the hemisphere.
Mr. Posts commented that the Latin American countries could not
agree among themselves.
Mr, Kissinger noted that we were under no injunction to accept every
Rockefeller recommendation. He suggested we move on to the develop-
ment issue.
Mr. Kissinger said the key issue was whether the U. S. should take
increased responsibility for the Latin. American countries on. the .use
of development assistance ar whether we shauld shift tb a partnership
through strengthening the regional institutions, The Rockefeller Report
suggests that we move in the multilateral direction, while the Budget,.
Bureau suggests transferring some Alliance program funds Exam AID
to the IADB and some to the'World' Bank,
Mx. Butler thought the Agenda paper was a good: statement of the options.
With regard to debt rescheduling., he thought the problem should not be
aired publicly --that a public statement would be an open'invitatir~n to
some countries to behave irresponsibly. He thought both the U. S.
Government and international agencies should be concerned with the
problem., but that they should not coxnrnent in a speech or public statement.
Mx. Gilbert thought it,should be made clear that any rescheduling should
be in cooperation: with other countries..
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Mr. Volcker. thought it should be made plain, that debt rescheduling was
not the solution. .
Mr. Kissinger said the question was haw to move more into partnership.
Mr. Volcker thought the drafting of the Agenda paper. was misleading in
t~i,s area, .since most aid to Latin America already goes through inter-
xiatioz~al organizations. There is a question of the feasibility of inxposing
another body between the U. S. and Latin Arn.erica in administration of
the bilateral aid program. He thought the `Budget. Bureau's proposal
would raise problems with the Congress -- for instance, which committee.
would have jurisdiction if some bilateral aid were channeled. through
international institutions? He thought we should put dawn the pros axed
cons -- can we evade our responsibility for the administration. of U. S.'
aid? He thought the Rockefeller recommendations envisaged a role for
an in.ternatianal agency in bilateral assistance.
Mx. Vaky .mentioned the use of CIAP.
Mr. Volcker askew haw soon CLAP could .take on the responsibility.
He thought there was a conceptual probeem -- hour can U. S. funds be.
given away through an agency in which we do not have a primary role?
l~ylr. Meyercommented that the broad framework of the paper is built
on the fact of a special relationship. The President hats said it is
there and let's do something about it. The Rockefeller Report is, by
its genesis, a report of what Governor Rockefeller heard.: The
lA-ECOSOC recommendations were made in response to ~. Latin
American consensus of ,what they think is wrong, what they need, and
what they expect. It is agreed that there is a lot the Latin American
countries should do that they have not done. However, the question