THE MILITARY "BALANCE" IN THE MID-EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-18-3-39-6
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: November 19, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

TION
ACTION
34786
November 19, 1971
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MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
SUBJECT: The Military "Balance" in the Mid-East
At Tab B is the State Department study which underlay Secretary Rogers'
and the Department's recent statements on the military balance.
At Tab A is a memo which you could send to the President if you wish.
It points out not too discreetly that the facts in State's own study and
even some of its conclusions do not support the Secretary's statement.
If you do not wish to send this to the President, consider it my memo
for you because with all the loose talk about the military "balance" you
at least should have the facts.
RECOMMENDATION: That you send the memo at Tab A to the President
promptly while the press is still talking about the balance and before
the President has to decide what he would tell Mrs. Meir?
DOS, DIA,
NSS, HHSaunders :tmt 11/19/71
reviews
completed.
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INFORMATION
34786
S ECRE T LNODIS
MEMORANDUM FOR. THE PRESIDENT
FROM. HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Military Balance in Middle East
In view of the recent public statements and reports concerning the
military balance in the Middle East and the role of the Soviets, I
thought you might be interested in the conclusions reached in recent
intelligence studies on this subject.
Following the Egyptian-Soviet communique from Moscow, Secretary
Rogers in New York said we would "reconsider the military balance.
Then last week in an interview with US News November 11 he said,
"Up to now, the military balance has not shifted' and noted that the
Soviets had operated ''with some restraint" in shipments over the past
four or five months, A few days after that the State Department noted
the arrival of TU-16 missile-carrying bombers in Egypt.
I thought you would be interested in the conclusions of the State Depart-
ment study which, in consultation with CIA and DIA., reviewed and
assessed the current balance of Arab and Israeli military forces. The
two main conclusions of this study were.
--Israel's military superiority has been reduced because of Egypt's
much improved air defense system that would make impossible a
pre-emptive air strike such as that in 1967 and make very costly
resumption of deep penetration attacks such as those in early 1970.
But even larger numbers of additional aircraft would not enable
Israel to attack deep into Egypt without suffering "unacceptable"
losses.
--Israel does retain the ability to defeat Arab attacks without
sustaining "unacceptable' I losses, the ability to break up an
Egyptian invasion force at the Suez Canal and a ''definite edge" in
attack capability. Israel is '"qualitatively" superior on the ground
and at sea and its air force is capable of inflicting ''far more damage''
on its Arab neighbors than they can inflict on Israel.
SECRET/N?DIS
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ECRET / NODIS - 2
Some of the more important facts that went into the above conclusions
were:
_-The Israelis have fewer aircraft but they are superior in terms
of performance and the Israelis have more and better combat pilots.
Thus, for itastance, Israel's jet fighters have an average range-load
superiority of about 4:1 over the comparable Egyptian aircraft. While
Israel has about three qualified pilots per supersonic jet aircraft and
more than one pilot for each jet aircraft in their total jet inventory,
it is estimated that it will be as much as two to five years before
Egypt has one available or qualified pilot per jet aircraft.
--Even In the question of absolute numbers, the Israelis received
119 new jet aircraft from the US in 1970 and 1971 while Egypt received
125. While Egypt retains overall numerical superiority, the increase
in numbers of aircraft over the past two years has been almost even,
and the Israelis have the capacity to put the entire increase to military
use while the Egyptians do not.
--Aircraft overhaul and maintenance capabilities of the Egyptian
Air Force are such that only 50-65 percent of its aircraft are
operationally ready at any time. The Israelis keep about 85 to 90
percent of their aircraft operational and measure their combat turn-
around time in minutes compared to hours for the Egyptians.
--The Arabs have always outnumbered, out-tanked, and out- gunned
Israel but they have never been able to defeat it in battle. The poor
record stems from qualitative differences in organization, materiel,
manpower and leadership which from all Indications" continue to
give Israel a 'decisive advantage' today and for a 'considerable time"
into the future.
--There has been a "dramatic" improvement in the Egyptian air
defense system since early 1970. Determined to deny the Israelis
the freedom to fly with impunity in Egyptian air space, the Soviets
have deployed extensive air defense equipment including as many as
10, 000 Soviet personnel to man air defense units and five of their
own fighter squadrons.
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S ECRET f NOPIS - 3
--Israel's air defense system has also improved since 1967 by
the installation of new equipment and procurement of additional
HAWK launchers and, most important, by retention of the occupied
territories which provide strategic depth, added warning time and
permit deployment of interceptor aircraft nearer to Egyptian bases.
--The Arab navies pose no significant threat to Israel whose own
navy is capable of interdicting Arab naval forces, conducting
limited anti-submarine warfare and supporting amphibious operations.
This boils down to three main points:
1. The shift in the balance that has taken place as a result of the
Soviet-installed defense capability mainly affects Israel's pre-emptive
strike capability. Israel's own defensive capability remains adequate
and not in jeopardy. This loss of ability to make a decisive pre-emptive
strike is important to Israel because it deprives Israel of the ability
to impose a short war. It enhances the Arab ability to prolong a
war of attrition, but the Sinai buffer. Israel's defenses and Egyptian
offensive inadequacy make it difficult for Egypt to direct such a war
at Israel proper. Hence the effect of a war of attrition might be
limited.
2. The other important element in the picture is the continuing
buildup in the USSR's own position in Egypt. Despite a decline in Soviet
shipments this spring--perhaps simply because the massive missile
buildup was completed--the Soviets have this year introduced the
SA-6 mobile missile system, the Flagon-A supersonic interceptor,
the Foxbat reconnaissance aircraft and now the missile-carrying
TU-16s. All these improve Soviet capability against the US and even,
in an extreme situation, against Israel. While Soviet shipments have
declined comparitatively in numbers or tonnage, there seems to be
,t steady qualitative improvement in the Soviet position rather than any 11
significant "restraint.
3. When all the studies of the military balance are complete, the
decision now to provide another complement of Phantoms is political--
in both the Egypt-Israel and the US-Soviet contexts. Everyone here
admits that Israel will need more planes over a 1-3 year span to
continue normal modernization and upgrading of its air force. The
main question is when those planes will be provided and in what
political context.
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W * 34786
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C. 20520
SECRET November 16, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Review of Arab-Israeli Military
Capabilities
There is enclosed the up-dated review of the Arab-
Israeli military balance which the Secretary announced
we were undertaking on October 14. It has been prepared
by the Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research
after consultation with CIA and the Defense Intelligence
Agency on the facts and general assessments contained in
it.
The enclosed review is based on all intelligence
data available as of November 1 and takes account of the
consequences of the Sadat trip to the Soviet Union as
best we can evaluate them at this time. It assumes that
military balance means insuring that Israel could defeat
an Arab attack without suffering severe damage. The paper
does not address the effect on the military balance of
Soviet participation in large-scale offensive operations
against Israel.
The study's main conclusions are: (a) Israel's
military superiority has been reduced because of Egypt's
improved air defenses but it retains the ability to defeat
Arab attacks without suffering unacceptable losses, a
definite edge in attack capability, and the ability to
break up an invasion force at the Canal. (b) Israel has
an adequate defense capability to defend its ceasefire lines
even against a combined Arab attack. (c) Israel is
qualitatively superior on the ground and at sea; the key
to an assessment of the overall arms balance is the
respective air.force capabilities. (d) Even larger num-
bers of additional aircraft would not enable Israel to
attack deep into Egypt without suffering unacceptable losses.
SECRET
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SECRET
(e) It would appear that during Sadat's visit the Soviets
agreed to provide additional military assistance to Egypt,
but we do not know its nature. As far as we are aware,
the Soviets have made no deliveries of aircraft to Egypt
during the last four months.
Senator Symington and Representative Hamilton have
asked Assistant Secretary Sisco in recent weeks for data
on the Middle East military balance. We believe that
INR's review will be fully responsive to their requests
and are forwarding copies to them in their capacity as
Chairmen of the Senate and House Near East Subcommittees.
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Review of Arab-Israel
Military Balance
SECRET
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,i~~ / Irv runci wr ua~~Grv
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RESEARCH STUDY
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND. RESEARCH
LNovember-1,.1971
ARAB-ISRAELI MILITARY CAPABILITIES
This paper assesses the current balance of the respective military
forces of selected Arab states and Israel. It addresses primarily, though
not exclusively, the balance between the Egyptian and Israeli air forces
and Israeli capabilities in the air versus those of Egypt, taking into
consideration the impact of Soviet arms shipments to Egypt. It also
reviews the' ground and naval forces of certain Arab states and Israel,
as well as the Egyptian capability to launch a major attack across the
Suez Canal.
its Arab neighbors, the military capability of its forces is superior
`to-that of the Arab armies. Arab naval forces do not present a
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
While Israel's, ground forces are much smaller than those of
viable threat to Israel. Therefore, the respective capabilities
Vi f
of the Israeli and Arab air forces, particularly Egypt's,
are the key to an assessment of the overall arms balance in the
Middle East.
First of all, it is imperative to define what is meant by
"aims balance." To Israel, it means an overwhelming military
advantage in Israel's favor. Ideally, Israel would like to have
the kind of air superiority (due largely to substantial numbers
of vastly better trained pilots) that enabled it to attack
at will any target in Egypt, as was the case in 1967.
This report was produced by the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research. Aside from
normal substantive exchange with other
agencies at the working level, it has not
been coordinated elsewhere.
No Objection
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- ii -
For purposes of this analysis, balance means insuring that_._.
Israel could defeat an Arab attack without suffering severe damage.
This involves an Israeli capability to defend its pre-June 1967
borders and the occupied territories against even a combined Arab
attack, but not necessarily the ability to strike deep into Egypt
without much higher losses than was previously the case. This
analysis al l o'ws for active Soviet participation. i n Egyptian air
defense. It does not, however, address the impact on the'Arab-
Israeli military balance if the Soviets were to participate in
large-scale offensive operations against Israel or Israeli-held
territory.
While recognizing that,; due to the improved Egyptian air
defenses, it cannot regain the absolute superiority it previously
enjoyed, Israel wants to come as close as possible to that goal.
Therefore it considers substantial additional military assistance
necessary. The analysis presented in this paper, however, con-
cludes that Israel now has adequate defense capabilities as
defined above.
_._.-'The maintenance 'of Israel's defense capability will require
careful. US monitoring and selective aid on the basis of several
a/
factors. Particularly important among these factors will be the.T
nature.and.ti.ming- of dontinuinq Soviet_arms deliveries -to Egypt,._?
especially i ri the' wake of ' the assurances Sadat received duri nq his.
Moscow visit in October 1971-. .Although the Soviets, ,. accordin.g_.to.__
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the joint communique, promised to strengthen the "military-might--
of Egypt," Sadat probably did not receive the offensive arms he
sought. It would appear, however, that the Soviets have agreed
to provide additional military assistance to Egypt, but it-is not
yet possible to determine whether this assistance will include
increased deliveries of weapons already in the Egyptian inventory,
new categories of weapons, or a deeper commitment of Soviet forces
to the defense of Egypt. The timing of future Soviet aircraft
deliveries is also unclear. Irr this. connection, our intelligence
indicates that the Soviets have made no deliveries of aircraft to
Egypt in the last four months. (See Table II.) Other factors that
will have to be considered in maintaining Israel's defense capability
are:, 1) any wider Soviet air combat role over the Canal; 2) signifi-
cantly higher Israeli losses if fighting were to resume; and 3) equip-
ment attrition in the Israeli Air Force. (See Table IV for a-list
of major items approved for sale to Israel.),
The principal conclusions of this paper are: (1) even larger
numbers of additional aircraft would not enable Israel to. attack
Egypt at will without suffering losses the Israelis would consider
unacceptable; and (2) while Israel's overwhelming military.superi-
ority has been reduced as a result of Egypt's improved air defenses
(supply of missiles, etc.,. by the Soviets), it has'retained both the
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ability to defeat Arab attacks. without suffering unacceptable-losses,
and a definite edge in attack capability: Israel's air force is, capable of inflicting far more damage on its Arab neighbors than they
can inflict on*lsrael, even assuming that the Soviet pilots in Egypt
fly defensive missions over Egypt. In this-connection, we call
attention to the chart that compares American and Soviet deliveries
on a month-by-month basis during 1970-71 (Table 5II). This chart
shows the substantial effort made by the US and explains w6iy the
-ratio in numbers of supersonic aircraft between the Arabs and Israelis
has been maintained during 1970-71 (Table I).
Thus, although there is perceptible movement away from Israeli
air superiority in the Middle East -- especially over Egypt, where
active Soviet involvement in 'Egypti an air defense efforts would prevent
Israel from conducting sustained air operations without very heavy
'losses --' Israel's capability to defend its own borders, as well as
the occupied territories, is still unquestioned. Despite the massive
Soviet involvement in Egypt, and this includes what the Soviets have.
done this past year, Egypt's capability to launch an assault across
the Canal is still limited. Although Israel would want to deter the,
Egyptians from a major cross-Canal operation by retaining an obvious
capability to launch a pre-emptive air strike against the rear staging
areas for . an. invasion buildup, the Israelis almost certainly no longer
have this capability on'the same favorable terms that existed before
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Egypt's air defenses were greatly improved and expanded.-- Israel
would, therefore, have to recalculate its probable losses in such
an operation and be prepared to accept a much higher rate than
would have been the case before the'summar of 1970. We believe,
however, that Israel remains capable of breaking up an invasion
force at the Canal.
INR/Near East and South-Asia
Director : Curtis F. Jones o
Analysts., : AAVaccaro/Rl314erri k/PHStoddard
Ext. 20819/22027/22235
Released by: t" '''
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Air Forces and Air Defense (See Table
The shifting relationships among the Arab states and Arab unwilling-
ness and demonstrated inability in the past to conduct effective- combined
military planning and operations make difficult an assessment of what
Arab forces Israel night have to face if hostilities broke out again.
The Egyptian awrcd forces, however, would offer the greatest opposition,
and for that reason, this assessment concentrates on the Israeli-Egyptian
military situation.
_ ,....._. -
Aircraft- -..-Both theEgyptias
n and Israeli air forces have substantially
increased their inventories of jet. fighters in the past four years. Over
100 supersonic aircraft (i IIG-2.1 s and SU-7s) have been delivered to Egypt
since September 1970. (See Table II.) Many of these-MIG-21s have probably
been the late model FISIIDED J. Israel has 119 supersonic jet fighters
(F-4s and MIRAGE IIIs, including 6 F-4 and 2 MIRAGE photo reconnaissance
versions). It has received from the US since September 1970 a:total of
79 F-4 and A-4 aircraft. The A-4, although a subsonic aircraft, can carry
four times the load of the SU-7 over approximately the same distance. The
F-4 enjoys an even greater advantage over any of 'its MIG-21 competitors.
Israel's jet fighters have an average range-load superiority of about 4:1
over the comparable Egyptian aircraft.
Pilots. Although the Egyptian Air Force has been almost completely
re-equipp:e since June 19ty , it still suffers from an acute shortage of
qualified combat pilots and skilled and experienced unit commanders.
Many experienced officers were dismissed for political reasons between
the June war and late 1969, and combat and accidental losses since the
June 1967 war have also taken a heavy toll of qualified pilots. Conse-
quently, a large percentage of the combat pilots are young officers, who
lack sufficient training and operational experience. Despite the increased
emphasis on pilot training over the past year, there are probably no more
than 320 co;iibat-ready fighter pilots -- not enough to fly all the jet air-
craft, in' inventory -- with an additional 100-120 in training or in units
'being converted to newer types of aircraft. It may take as much as two to
five years before Egypt has available one qualified pilot per jet aircraft.
The Egyptian manpower pool thus far has not been able to.produce adequate
numbers of individuals with the mental, physical, and psychological
characteristics that are necessary to assimilate the training required''
for effective operation of sophisticated fighter aircraft. This deficiency,
which is also characteristic of manpower in the other Arab states, has an
equally serious impact on efforts to train competent maintenance personnel.
The Israeli Air Force, on the other hand, selects its trainees from
an abundant pool of responsive.and competent candidates and currently has
over 500 cocrbat-ready fighter pilots and 200 more in training. Israel thus
v has about three qualified pilots per supersonic jet aircraft and more than
one pilot for each jet aircraft in the total inventory.
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 Air Defense. The i mnrnvPmon+ of +hr% v! ,,m4-, w -.t- - ~- - item Since
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u4?y L11 brae ii5 Lne freedom
to fly with impunity i W ypti an air space, the Soviets have deployed
extensive air defense- equipment to Egypt; as. many as 10,000 Soviet personnel
may be manning air defense units there. The Egyptian Air Defense Command was
'established in 1969 and presently is heavily dependent on the expertise of
Soviet advisors and technicians,
The precise nature of the Soviet integration into the Egyptian air
defense system is not known, but the Soviets almost certainly would be
actively engaged in the defense of Egypt. Soviet personnel man five fighter
squadrons, totaling about 60 aircraft, mostly RIG-21s (FISHBED J), but possibly
including 8-10 FLAGON-A fighters, about 40 SA-3 sites and several SA-6 units,*
and an undetermined number of ZSU-23/4 anti-aircraft units; in addition, the
Soviets exercise at least a strong influence throughout the con, and and control
networks of the Egyptian air defense system. Moreover, four Soviet-manned
FOXBAT aircraft have been deployed to Egypt and are being used in a reconnais-
sance role. During the latter part of 1970, the surface-to-air missile system
in the ceasefire zone was expanded to.about 150 SA-2 and SA-3 sites, and now
numbers about 180. As many as 40 of these-sites are operational. Throughout
Egypt about 70 SA-2 sites are manned by Egyptians, and about'10 SA-3 sites
have been or are being turned over to them. These are in addition to the 40
SA-3 sites mentioned above that are manned by Soviet personnel. Roth high- and
low-level early warning radar coverage are of a high standard, with few gaps
in the system. Additional dispersal airfields have been constructed, and Egypt
now has over 600 hardened hangarettes--enough to accorrmodate about 700 jet
fighters.
Israel's air defense system has been improved since the June war by the
installation of new equipment and the procurement of additional HAWK launchers
and, most important, by retention of the occupied territories;'which provide
strategic depth and added warning time.and permit deployment of air defense
interceptors nearer to Egyptian bases. About 230 of Israel's combat aircraft
are housed in hardened h
angarettes. and shelters.
Maintenance and Readiness. F .. -
gypt ref ies solely' on the USSR for its
supply of combat aircraft and associated armaments and ammunition, Un-
like Israel, Egypt is not expected to develop a production capability
for combat aircraft for many years to come, and the production of asso-
ciated armaments is not expected to be significant for the next three
or four years. Furthermore, aircraft overhaul and maintenance capa-
bilities in the'Egyptiarf Air Force are such that only about 50-65 per
cent of its combat aircraft are operationally ready at any given time.
Israel, despite its continued dependence on the US for major items,
produces considerable quantities of a limited variety of aircraft
armaments and.munitions, as well as some electronic equipment and other
mi l i tari ly ,signi ficant items. Its, excellent support and maintenance _ -,
* One surface-to-air missile site is normally manned by one battalion; the
of sites in Egypt exceeds the number of battalions by a factor of almost fiveer
bedause numerous alternate positions have been constructed to permit tactical
flexibility.
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facilities enable about 85-90 per cent of its combat aircraft to be
operationally ready at any time. Moreover,' Israe?l's combat turnaround
Lima is measured in minutes, compared to- that of Egypt, which is measured
in hours.
The Arabs have always outnumbered, out-tanked, and out-gunned Israel,,
but they have never been able to defeat it in battle. This poor record
stems from qualitative differences in organization, materiel, manpower,
and leadership. Although these factors are impossible to measure with
the same precision that can be achieved by counting the hardware of the
respective armies, they were present in 1948, 1956, and 1967. All
/evi dence and analysis indicate that the qualitative differences continue
to give Israel a decisive advantage today and for a considerable time to
come.
Israel. Active duty strength of the- Israeli ground forces is about. -
88,50O77-1hrough mobilization, these forces can achieve a strength of
350,000 within one week; The army has stressed mechanization of its
combat elements and has been converting infantry units to mechanized
infantry. (Of a total of 32 active and reserve maneuver brigades; 10
are armored, 8 mechanized, 9 infantry, and .5 parachute.)
Ground Forces (See Table III)
Israel has the advantages of highly trained manpower under superior
leadership. 1?-oreover, ioderni zati on , intensive training, and advantages
V of terrain in the occupied areas give the Israeli Army a greater advantage;
over the Egyptians than it had in 1967.
Egypt. Egyptian ground forces, with a present strength of 225,000
iri th 37 maneuver brigades), have- a better defensive capability
now than at any time since the 1967 war. Training emphasis has been on
defensive operations . The Egyptian Army is not expected to develop a
credible offensive capability any ti r; soon. For example, although Egypt.
is known to have enough bridging equipment and amphibious carriers to
conduct a multi-division crossing of the Suez Canal, its forces lack
the training, operational capability, and the will successfully to con-
duct .a multi-division crossing. In a Canal crossing situation, the Israelis
wp ld.retain the options, of attacking the assault elements west of the, Canal or
a1 owing the Egyptian-bridgehead to develop and then destroyi-ng the main force
"after it had crossed into the Sinai
Egypt poses the greatest threat to Israel from among the Arab states,
but the effect of combining the ground forces of selected Arab armies
against Israel, must also be considered. Egypt and Syria are the-most likely
of the Arab states to take joint action against Israel. While the two
states together have approximately the sane military manpower as Israel,
with mobilization by all, and about a 2:1 edge in the quantity of tanks and
artillery, Israel would still have a clear advantage. The 90,000-man.
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Syrian Army has all of the handicaps of the Egyptian Army and more. Since
1967, the capabilities of the Syrian Army have probably not significantly
i n proved in any respect. The Syrian Army, which lacks multi-division offensive capabilities, is not a major addition to the threat to..Israel,
even in coirbi nati on with Egypt.
Naval Forces (See Table.
highest priority to the personnel and training for its 19 missile-equipped
patrol boats-of the Komar and Osa classes. The Egyptian submarine force
looks impressive on paper, but maintenance of submarines is very poor, and
they have been noted only' on the surface in their limited training activity.
The Egyptian Navy could hinder merchant activity and offer some contest to
Israeli naval forces. However, the lack of repair facilities in the Red Sea
area (although they exist in the Mediterranean area), a poor- logistics sys-
tem, spare parts shortages, and poor motivation have rendered'most units
ineffective. -
The Arab navies pose no significant threat to Israel. The most
formidable naval force is the 16,500-man Egyptian Navy. Egypt gives
1.submar-ne warfare, and supporting amphibious operations.
Israel has not, in the past, considered that the Arabs posed a
serious naval threat. The Israeli Navy is small but effective. I t is
capable of interdicting Arab naval forces, conducting limited anti=
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TABLE I
ESTIMATED AIR AND AIR DEFENSE ORDER' OF BATTLE: ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL -
October 3 , 97
Jet Aircraft. Inventory
Total Fighters* Supersonic Fighters
Bombers
Total
Egypt
536*?
336. (14IG-21 ; SU_7)*
52*
588*
Syria
281
180 (MUG-21 ; SU-7)
--
281
Iraq
207
137 (111 G-21 ; SU-71
21,
228
Jordan
43
17 (F-104)
--
43
43
Libya
20
20 (Mirage -III ; F-5)
--
20
TOTALS
1,087 -
690
73
1,160
Israel
333*0
119 (FL4; Mirage III)
~-s?
333*
* About 100 of Egypt's fighters are not operationally assigned, but are still
flyable. Thirty-five of Israel's'subsonic jets were recently-placed in
_.._.._~.::. .
storage and would require over 72 hours to reactivate. ..... _.. _.._ '
? The Egyptians also have 117 L-29 jet trainers, and the Israelis have 90 Fouga
Magister jet trainers. The Fouga Magister aircraft could be used ina combat role
in a total air superiority environment, as they were used during the 1967 war.
,-~_Trie lack of qualified pilots would 1 i mi t the. ability, of_ the Egyptians.. o yse._ . .
L-29s in a combat role.....
Arab States/Israel Fighter Aircraft Inventory Ratios**
July 1970 October 1971
Total Fighters Arab States/Israel 3.0:1 3.3:1
Supersonic Fighters Arab-States/Israel 5.8:1 5.8:1
Total Fighters Egypt/Israel 1.4:1 1.6:1
Supersonic Fighters Egypt/Israel 2.6:1 2.8:1
Surface-to-Air Missiles
SA-2
Egypt 70 battalions
Syria ' - 10 battalions
Israel
SA-3
10 battalions
Hawk
12 battalions
** Gross inventory figures include'aircraft not operationally assigned.
Arab States include Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Libya.
SECRET/140 FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/23 : LOC-HAK-18-3-39-6 _
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-18-3-39-6
w
DELIVERIES OF JET AIRCRAFT TO SELECTED PJtP$ STATES AND ISRAEL
JANUARY 197O7-OCTOBER 1971
Soviet MIG-21/SU-7 Soviet-manned air- US F-4/A-4
craft in Egypt
Date Egypt Syria Iraq Israel
1970
January
February -
March 15
April
May -
June -
July
August -
September 10
October
November -
December 18
January
February
9
- *4
60 MIG-21J ,4
4' TU-16 4
- - 4
4
- 6
5
4,6
20 - 1
March 14 - 10
April 27 1 1
May 6 - -
June 11 21 -
July 6 -
August - 2 1
September
October
119
TOTAL ''125 51 27 68*
SOVIET4MANNED EQUIPMENT IN EGYPT (estimae as of October- 31, 1971)
SA-3 Surface-to-Air Missile (about 40 battalions)
SA-6 Mobile Surface-to-Air Missile (possibly 8-9 units, involving probable
maximum of 32 launchers)
FOXBAT Fighter (4 of the reconnaissance configuration)
* Fighters: 5 squadrons,_.trith .60 aircraft, mostly ZIIG-21 FISHOED Js. In addition,
8.-10 FLAGON-A fighters may have been delivered in 1971 for Soviet pilot use.
TU-16 Medium Bombers (10, at least 6 of which are configured for reconnaissance --
these 6 have been based in Egypt since. April .1968)
AN-12 Transport (7, at least one of which is equipped for electronic intelligence
collection)
IL-38 Anti submarine Warfare Aircraft (4)
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/COUTROLLED DISSEM
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/23 : LOC-HAK-18-3-39-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-18-3-39-6
TABLE ITj
Armies of Israel, Egypt, and Syria
ESTIMATED GROU'40 lND NAVAL' FORCES' (OCTOBER 31, 1971)
Personnel
Mobilization plans
*Tanks
APCs
SP 'Assault Guns
Artillery
Israel
88,500
350,000 (M+5 days)
1.,400
.3_,154_
175
800
Mortars (100-mm and-.over) 560
Selected Comparisons
Army strength
Mobilization plans
Tanks
APCs
Artillery and
heavy mortars
Egypt
225,000
Sri a
90.00.0-.-
275,000 (14+30) 11.3,000.
1, 655
?.155
1,580
205
1,675 _T
1,030? _
975.. _
130 .,:
640
. 335
Egypts E9YPiIr'acg_,_.__ Egypt', Jordan,
Israel Egypt S yria Syria Syria, Iraq
88,500 225,000 315,000 405,,000 . ...._...465,000
~
350,000 275,000 388,000 478;000 ~567;000
1,400 1',655 2,685 .. 3,485 3,920.___.
3,150 1,675 2,650 3,730 _....__4~.l3.5~._.......
1,360 1,785 2-,760.. 3,630 3,925 T
Navies of Israel and Egypt
Israel E t
Destroyers 1 ? . 5
Submarines .3 12
Missile Patrol 12. 19
* The US t4-60 and t4-48 are qual i tati vely superi or to .the Soviet T-55, the best
tank in the Egyptian or Syrian inventory. Advantages include superior crew
comfort, better horsepower to weight ratio, better armament, larger load canaci ty,
less maintenance,and a fire control system that ensures a higher probability
of hitting the target.
SLCRCT/110 FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROL LED DISSEM
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-18-3-39-6
 CONTROLLLU U15 )t1
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-18-3-39-6
...
TMU'. IV
Air Force
F-4 Phantom
A-4 Skyhawk
MAJOR E1401 ITEMS'- APPROVED' FOR' SALE' TO _ISRAEL
EC91
C-130
AN-TPS-43
(3-dirensional
SHRIKE
WALLEYE
CBU
Arm
86 (Sales and deliveries through Sept? 1971
137 (Sales and deliveries through Sept. 1971
18 (On order for deli very November 1972-June 1973)
2 (Delivery scheduled for November 1971)._
4
radar)
180 (60 yet to be delivered; 12 expended)
100
7,050
M6OA1 Tanks
150
Hawk
4 batterie's _1
1448A1 Tanks
100
? 175nni SP guns
36
M113 APC
450
M109 (155m1n SP
how)
24
Foreign r4i l tart' Sales (contracts signed
FY 1969
FY 1970
FY 1971
$327.3 million
74.8 million
525 million (estimated)
Directed Co n rcia1 Purchases (under munitions. licenses approved by USG)
$ 26' million
63 million
90-100 million (estimated)
End of Year FMS Credits for Israel
credits. DOD has tailored the repayment schedule to allow a lover level of
-principal payments to DOD over the first 5 years, when repayments on bank
Direct -DOD credits (10 years at approximately 6 1/2% i nteres,t
- mitted in FY 1971 to $525 million, plus the $20 million in guaranteed bank
DOD guarantee of bank credits (5 years-at 6-6 1/2%)
The White ' House approved the allocation "of $45 million in unused FY 1972
credits to 'Israel on the condition that this credit, pending a later review
of its FY 1972 needs, should be considered an advance against the $300 million
planned for Israel in FY 1972. This brings the total military credits corn-
credits will be substantial,
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-18-3-39-6
W
TABLE V
Factors in Israel's Qualitative Advantage over qYpt in the Air
I. Pilot/aircraft ratio
Israel has more than two qualified pilots per jet aircraft.
E pt has not enough qualified pilots to fly its total jet
inventory. We estimate it will be two to five years
before they have available one qualified pilot per
jet aircraft.
II. Proven Combat Proficiency
Since the June war Israel has lost 1 aircraft in air-to , air
combat and possibly 2 others. Egypt has lost 89 aircraft-in air-
to-air combat.
III. Range/load ratio
Israel's jet military aircraft have an average range/load
superiority of about 4 to 1 over comparable Egyptian aircraft.
For example, the A-4 can carry four times the load of the SU-7
over approximately the same distance. The F-4 enjoys an even
better advantage over any competitor.
IV. Aircraft Maintenance
Israel keeps 85-90% of its aircraft operational and measures
its combat turnaround time in' minutes.
Egypt keeps 50-65% of its aircraft operational and measures
its combat turnaround time in hours.
SECRET/f1O FORE IGN/CONTRQLLEP..IJISSE14
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/23 : LOC-HAK-18-3-39-6