MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-179-2-21-8
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: June 27, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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D MORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
State Dept.
review completed
FORMATION
Outside System
June 27, 1972
PARTICIPANTS: Ashraf Ghorbal, Head of UAR Interest
Section
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff
DATE AND PLACE s 12:15-12:45 p. in. Tuesday, June 27 in
Dr. Kissinger's office
Dr. Gborbal opened the conversation by oongratualting Dr. Kissinger'
on the "tremendous job" that he has been doing in recent months.
Ghorbal smiling said he was especially proud of a ''fellow Harvard
alumnus. '
Dr. Kissinger thanked Dr. Ghorbal and said that he hoped it would be
possible to make "progress in other areas" as well.
Dr. Ohorbal replied, "I I ava counting on it. "
DrI n er replied that realistically wail after the US election no
significant movea are likely on our side. This did not preclude moves
initiated by others. But In spite of that, we recognise the need for a
peaceful solutloD of the Middle East problem. It will certainly be a
major item on the agenda of the new administration. How that solution
will be arrived at, "I don't know. " However, we do have to find a way.
Dr. Kissinger continued that his philosophy is to promise lose but to
deliver on everything we promise. He felt that the trouble with the
US-Egyptian dialpgue has been that it did not lead to any concrete
r*sults.We expected too much.
Dr. Ghorbal said he was glad to hear this. He always likes to look to
the horizons. Dr. Kissinger's concern about the dialogue, he felt, was
valid. There has been unhappiness over it in Cairo.
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Dr. Kissinger said that, very honestly, he had been afraid this
would happen.
Dr. Ghorbal said that he would not report this conversation formally
and that if there were anything Dr. Kissinger wanted to say it could
be reported orally when Ghorbal returned to Cairo. Dr. Kissinger's
conversation with the Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad in New York
had never been reported.
Dr. Kissinger said that the reason negotiations conducted from the
White House have been effective is that we have never promised
anything we could not deliver. We have never really had a good dialogue
with Egypt about what is "do-able" and in what time frame.
Dr. Ghorbal said that he felt that Cairo needs now more than a general
promise that the US will try again "after elections. " Cairo's patience
has been "eaten up. " In fact, Dr. Ghorbal felt that Cairo had shown
more patience since May than he had expected. He said he would
like to take to President Sadat and to Hafe x Ismail some indication of
what they can hope for.
Dr. Kissinger said he would like to start a dialogue with someone on
the Egyptian side "who can keep a secret. " He said he frankly had not
believed that the road we were on would work. On the o$e hand, Egypt
has asked for too much too soon. On the other hand, the US has "fudged
up the differences" between Israel's position and Egypt's to make it
seem as if they were smaller than they actually were. He skid this had
all worked to Israel's advantage -- not that anyone here tried to make
it turn out that way, but it had been the obj,ct' ~bxrs+egttence of what we
have done that the status quo has been continued, and that is what iavaaeel
has hoped for.
Dr. Kissinger reiterated that in principle we are prepared to establish
a high-level contact. Out of that we would hope to crystallize some
position. This would, however, have to be kept secret -- even from our
own people.
Dr. !Ghorbal asked how he could contact Dr. Kissinger if Cairo wished
to respond to this suggestion.
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Dr. Ghorbal asked what kind of meetings Dr. Kissinger envisioned.
Would it just be Dr. Kissinger and one other to start and where might
they be?
Dr. Kissinger said that the negotiations would be conducted "under
my supervision. " He might be in Europe sornetims for Vietnam talks,
although he usually makes those trips in secrecy. He might be in
Europe for a few days in September for the Olympics. Or talks could
take place in New York.
Dr. Ghorbal said he would like to come to the substance of the issue.
He recognised that Dr. Kissinger could not promise anything at this
point. But what can you give we at this stage?" We had the Rogers
proposal two years ago. Where are we in this regard? Where are we
on such issues as demilitarized zones, arm al Sheikh, Gaza? He
asked how Dr. Kissinger could help him to wake his case in Cairo.
Dr. Kissinger said that he did not want now to make a concrete pro-
posal. The US stands very "generally behind" the Rogers Plan. The
problem is, in his view, that we have to start Israel moving. From
some points of view making maxim m demands plays into Israel's
hands because Israel finds it easier to turn those aside.
Dr. Kissinger continued that he could see how the Israeli logic might
works The Israelis could argue that Egypt alone cannot defeat Israel
and that the US and USSR will not fight over the Middle East. Therefore,
they could justify going on with the status quo rejecting all demands that
they could find any reason to teeject. if, on the other hand, tensions get
too bad, the Israelis can play on the anti-Communist line to get US support.
Dr. Kissinger said that he knew Dr. Gborbal was familiar with Israel's
views on Sbarm al Sheikh. "Just thinking out loud, " Dr. Kissinger said
he felt that it might be possible to work out some formula for a period
of time which could meet Israel's security concerns. He said he personally
could not be persuaded that Sharm al Sheikh is as essential to maintaining
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access to the Gulf of Aqaba as the Israelis feel. The strategic
question is one problem, but the symbolic problem is another. If
we talked informally, we could deal with problems of that kind and
seek answers.
Dr. Kissinger said that we do not support the "Israeli possession
of the Sinai,'' What we need is a formula to move Israel back. The
US is willing to press Israel back but not to dissociate itself to the
extent that It would encourage an attack an Israel.
Dr. Kissinger continued that we have "gone through the Bergus
exercise" and "drawn lines on a map until we are sick of it. 11 Two
years ago he said he favored an interim settlement if it *ould be
done quickly and with modest terms. He felt that if too much were
tried, the withdrawal would be too much for Israel and too little for
the Arabs. But if a very small withdrawal had been agreed then
Israel would have begun moving and yet the Arabs would have been
able to demonstrate that the small Israeli withdrawal was obviously
not a final settlement.
Dr. Choral said that it is, frankly, difficult to sell this point of view
in Cairo.
Dr. Kissinger said that the important thing Is that Israel should give
the Sinai back. The US is accused of "balance of power politics' and
that is a lot of nonsense. We realize that Egypt is a big country and
an important country in the Middle East. We have no conceivable
interest in being in a permanent state of estrangement from Egypt.
If we can normalise relations with Peking, why can we not do so with
Cairo? We have gone against the China lobby in the United States and
we will go against"llother lobbies" provided we can establish a framework
where we both know what we are doing.
Dr. Gharbal said be would convey this to Hafez Ismail. He jokingly
said that he referred to him as Hafer Kissinger.
Dr. Kissinger- said with a smile that he had often been referred to as
"the American Ismail. "
Dr. Ghorbal said that he wanted to explain the apprehension that exists
in Cairo that Israel will try to make permanent whatever line is drawn
on a map short of a complete withdrawal.
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Dr. Kissinger said that he felt that the mistake that had been made
was to get into the issue of drawing partial withdrawal lines on a
map. What has to be done is for is to sit down and to talk about where
we want to come out in the end. Otherwise, we will never get off
dead center. "you are strong minded
too. Ft This is a tough problem, and any solution is extremely difficult.
Dr. Ghor l said that Cairo is apprehensive about the "Last mile. "
That is the most difficult.
Dr. Kis.inaer a&reed. H. said the reason he is reluctant to present
a final proposal is that he felt we needed to talk about some sort of
interim arrangements perhaps. just speaking hypothetically, he
wondered whether we could agree on a final it+ps that would define
sovereignty but find some way to provide for Israeli military control
for some Interim period -- "civil bases" or some other such arrange-
meat. The US would be willing to bring some pressure on Israel -
but It would have to be pressure that is short of causing a war.
Dr. Kissinger continued that we cannot have an interest in having
Egyptian leaders for the next fifty years blaming the US for a settle-
ment that Egypt could not live with. He said he would rather live
with they present situation than to have to live with that kind of solution.
Dr. Kissinger went on saying that we have not load an exchange at
"our level" -- moaning at the level of the two presidencies. Maybe
there is nothing at all that can be done. But an our side, we see
Egypt as a per maneent and important factor in the Middle East. We
recognize that there have been many faults on our side. Dr. Ohorbal
could convey this in Cairo.
Dr. Gborrbal replied that Cairo does not understand the notion that
there have not been high-level exchanges After all, Secretary Rogers
was in Cairo and saw President Sadat.
Dr. Kissinger said that Dr. Oborbal could tell Cairo -- he ML* been
in Washington long eeuough to observe this -- that the question -is not
a question of whether the level is high or low but that one has to
observe where the agreements that have been worked out in this Adaeaia
istration have been negotiated. The things that have been worked out
in this Adainistration have not been negotiated in that channel.
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Dr. Kissinger concluded that we would have to wait until after the
election for any significant developments, but a meeting could take
place before. He again cautioned Dr. Gborbal that it would be of the
utmost importance to maintain the secrecy of any such ezcbanges.
They parted with an exchange of best wishes.
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