US MILITARY PERSONNEL SUPPORT FOR IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-152-1-10-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: August 2, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-152-1-10-0
NSS, OSD, USAF, JCS,
State Dept. reviews
completed
Farland sent his m.aaage,..
of exactly how this is to be worked out, and it is ia,that context that
SUBJECT: US Military Personnel Support for Iran
In the back channel message at Tab B, Ambassador Tarland directed
your attention to an embassy telegram which I have attached under
Farlamd's incoming message and asked for your guidance. The subject
is the "blue-gaiters" -- the US military technical personnel --which the
President promised to the Shah. We are now getting into the specifics
li'1't7Mr HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
MEMORANDUM WOR: DR. KISSINGER
Since that message, g'srlsvA haiNt s s tar regalanr telegram (Tab C
which removes the issue he ratsed. Hoarw*"r, I want you to be aware of
the issue and believe you Will want to respond to p'arl nd in say case,
and the Iranians are working on now.
dependents-that could raise the American military presence toward
10.000. But we cannot intelligently discuss the total number until
the jobs to be done are identified, and that is what the Pentagon
required. This will take about two months in Iran and here. At
that point, there may be some question about the magnitude of
our operation. The number could reach 2500-3000 and with
--A lot of work will have to be done at the military level in
cooperation with the Iranians to identify the Jobs that n.eel to
be done, and that in. turn will affect the numbers of US technicians
addressed as we work out the kind of Mission pare emd&
Just to put P'arland's initial esble into context. and to tell you Where we
stand on this whole subject, there Will be two general questions to be
--The immediate issue is to set clear exactly wbat kinds of jobs
the US is coamitted to doing, and it to on this plot that Farland
sent his first cable. For the most part, that is a job for the military
to figure out, but there is one policy l that should, be addressed now.
SS,,
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-152-1-10-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05
SECRE
The issue I. that the Iranian air forcer prase rated to our MAAO chief
projections which include US-personnel to occupy operational positions
in Iranian units As we have previously talked about and applied. the
"blue-suitor" approach, we have not envisioned operational personnel
such as air crews to fly the S-4s1 our picture has been that we
would supply people to work alongside Iranians .in their units to train
their x n the use of equipment and in US operational concepts. In
milixw ry terms, we have operated and envisioned a very sophisticated
on-h -job training program. Now the Iranians have added this new
o n ..e this more concrete, our MAAO so far has had requests for:
(1) ! USAF pilots to fly F?4st (2) h boom operators for air refuelers
(KC - 7 0 7); (3) 84 USAF crewmen for P3E aircraft to fly maritime patrol;
(4) lZ 1~11ots and flight engineers for air v'iduAorp. 'fir last two requests
could W met by civilian contract persvnnel;a# smell as by USAt me
Other request* could surface from th t as r, a navy,,
The is a ae. therefore, is whether a, ' -sAwi.,, .. d
""tic 10 -rrrr rriH draw a
line +rt of annin Combat ealem rats of antan units th USAF yersgM
)?iM1y~~i1Rl S r. "f per'-W' b" ~4 ry ~ H ~' `wM1 s J'~Ms
Anna ca-r.aador Farland in his first, embassy telegram primed that thin lane
b~n. He used it tentatively when bead with. the Initial Iranian proposal..
He proposed telling the Iranians that our concept to to expand the well
defined technical training teams which have operated is Iran so far but to
draw v distinction between those and the assignment of US personnel for on
line o erational responsibilities. Farland would make It clear that we are
prepared to help in every way possible but recaanmended telling the Iranians
now that an operational role "to not possible and was not contemplated in
previous discussions. " This could be discussed fully with the Shah, so if
would not appear that we were backing out on a promise. Presumably the
Shah himself has an interest iu not looking as if his forces are being run .
by the US.
A. I understand it, US forces do have arrangements with some of the
countries of the British Commonwealth for exchanging operational oaers.
The logic I. that if we were some day to co duct joint operations, as we
have in the past, it would be useful for each aide to understand the
operating procedures of the other. We could do this on a small scale with
Iranians, ton, if it'seemed mutually beneficial. However, that exchange
relationship is a somewhat different concept from sending active-duty US
military personnel to operate some combat elements of the Iranian forces.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-152-1-10-0
 No Objection
US operational personnel could be provided if xtecessaarre but s ce
allow our personnel. to participate in such .ail. operatton."A
Saudi opposition. for instance, we would Lacs the problem of WLI 'heer to
this for others like the Saudis or Pakistanis might arise. Also, U the
Shah were to use his military forces against someone in the Chill with
ng
The Congressional implications aze obvious. TxLwu ther question o o
would give other governments some control over further US involvement.
i
f d
home is the issuer of our intimate military Lavolvirnout in ways that
considering some of the problems that would a rt The mate? epee at
lbat so far is a relatively small portion of the overall job, it to worth
Simply m atte, 2S00-I000 it vie ' - have s, Implication'.
ate. r deting the same in lrs -wsspei iallyyin the woks of Sadat'$
t h a t the ' C T S has made a major issue wL t a . u ssc. =or iwe ?aara~:& u .
The west imisartant consideration, wbtcit stands in a class by itself. Is
to stop short of operational personaelan combat mrtitra?
slip in as an exception. But as a general rule to start, it might be wise
contractors could do the job and we might even.let a few US AV technicians
speeding up the training and iffostiven* U tho Iranian forces, while our
doing the job for the Iranians 18, AU the helpful in the long run. In the
low cases where operational people are r.qu red for a' time,' civilia -
oar technical assistance #ie14 teams ' can maks a major., contribution to
what the Shr-h
The basic tats 'teems to altos of
WAUL
wants without ettin into then obl ^. r; A substantial enlargement Of
but I a,s ucrae ser r iks+tr
removes the issue, but I propos ._ rat you still give Worland an answer to
at all to Tehran,, and in any case the Shah hixnse& hss now told his people
that he does n want A=*ricans in &n-operational role. After Farlaud's
initial cable, he was informed by Court Minister Alum that Iran did not
envisage an operational rote for US tochmiclans and that these proposals
were the result of overzeilous*ess at lower levels. This essentially
My assumption is that this ?issuersally was got by the President
his question.
back.channel to AMbaasador Freeland &cd lhat i use thin as gn#danc? n
g,ECOMMENDATIONz That yoat approve the message at Tab A to be sent
formulating Yarlaxsd's formal instructions.
. Approved
ECRE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-152-1-10-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-152-1-10-0
formulating the formal iesponse to it.
aura response. As you note I b-4, be ar,travi g
read Tehran 4639'which see ua s
the commitment made was a e n withor ege Ief r o to the
kinds of details which we must now address
distinction you described to your initial telegram-Am
we possibly can to provide technical asslstaneet training short of
actually having US personnel occupy operational
general practice
forces?-is a sensible one as it
important that this not be handled in such a way, e,* ft dissipate the
advantage gained from the President's very forthcoming respons..
If you need to discuss the subject confidentially any further,
talk with Alam seems to indicate that we are over that hurdllc
might consider noting the following points
EGRET E 4 L
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-152-1-10-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05
JEC /EYES ONL
The pentagon and MA,ACi have been iustreucterd to work with
... .:..''..
the Iranian forces to identify the tasks yr sere US personnel can
be useful. you understand this Will take s eoup'e of months in
Iran and in Washington. We want to be sure we are organizing
aeelkvea to do this properly and do not want to go at it Pis
our
and find later that we have to go back and start over. YOU are
Sara that constatations will
tbie.
16,
as elueickly as pos
"~1i... ) x 2 N Fh..': M q~?.u[x."'7P'Gi4 .3 i,Zx idea Tani
"-,w "eao~ ta'' eaa~rltt# ple,asmw arki
with a training rather ~:
0 ieas-ootl
~ppetawta,talsrelon.' We"would like
to maintain that di*tinctton'tor two IM
e will as share that they go,
,r. fAN, it k
eat seeaaoi~N-e (1) t perr~atioaal
involvement would raise domestic oppositlc+n avtr "sr~i itrr-a t volver-
C
meat which we could otherwise avoid. ) l Bring attei-cked the
persistently operational axvl+ In Egypt? we would
Soviets for their
prefer not to assume that role now ourselves
and. wet 'want to avoid
ran we to somehow dependent
anything that would make it appear as If l
on US forces. Sine training is the main misstono we feel almost
all of what the Shah wants dome can be done this way and
we do not
feel making this distinction as a general practice will uignUtcantllr
cases where minor excerptions seemed logical for a period. we
limit the etfectivenees of the new program. U there were a few
certainly b e- flexible.
ALCRETIEYES ONLY-
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05
SECRET/EYES ONLY
I ou may not need to use this, but I did wwA to eonf
s we z. s in accord with the distinction you hsv Wis.
1 -1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-152-1-10-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 LOC--HAK 152-1-10-0
4
# T 0 P S E ?C R C T ***'*
P"ITY
20RQn2Q
rn
1
~ ~L~?Z~.~4
111,2Q0
p 2 OalOZ JUL 72
FM TEHRAN
To THE ;vHITE HOUSE
;T 0 p 5 E C R E T 26O741Z JUL 72 ..~
ARLA-10 TEHRAN 042
FM AMBASSAOUR F
ER
TO THE tiiHITE HOUSE, FOR MR. HENRY KISSING
BELIEVE IT MOST IMpf1RTSh;` ITNUStuJRj~CTiYUUS MILITAkYy
TU TF:HRA~'dI cy.h ~?Iw~ICM ut=AL
PERSr1N, E SUPPDRT FOR IRANIAN ARMED FURCESGARON BASIS
INFO PREVIQU?SLYSUPPLIED ME, AM LNCLEARDIEG DIU UPON
PRECISE PRESIDENTIAL CGM '1ITMENT.
COMMITMENT, PROBLEM iiUST BE APPROACHED FRONTALLY ASAP.
TU PREVENT IT FROM Bt7CUMING
APPKECIATE YOUR CUMMENT5. WARM REGARDS!
150
n ^, . _No Objection to Declassification in Part2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-152-1-10-0 T('. : 7(1()n 161