GERARD SMITH MESSAGE ON SEPARATE ABM AGREEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-10-2-37-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: December 3, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/11/27: LOC-HAK-10-2-37-7
SECRET/ NODLS
(Outside System)
MORI C05138157
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt
ACTION
December
DOS, NSS,
reviews
completed.
SUBJECT t Gerard Smith Message on Separate ABM Agreement
As you anticipated yesterday, Gerard Smith, while reaffirming his objection
to formal limit on ABM only, does not want to reject the Soviet proposals
flatly (Tab B). He claims that the President may want to direct a review
of our policy, and that an 'Instant rejection would be unnecessarily rough
and might prevent us from learning more of the Soviet proposals. He notes
that the Soviets have urged us to at least leave the door open.
25X1 Smith has sent in the draft of a presentation (Tab C)
which is a reply to the Soviet proposal, in very general terms. However, he
and Parsons want to defer making a reply, while Allison and Nitze want to
go ahead tomorrow, Friday.
There are some problems with the specific language in the speech and it
should be gone over fairly carefully. For example, it opens with the statement
that "We will carefully consider the Soviet presentation ..." It closes with
an implication that we might proceed to discuss ABM separately, if we had
a better idea of what offensive limits would follow.
In order to keep your channel from becoming entangled with the normal
Backstopping committee, I have told Farley in the Backstopping context that
I feel (1) Smith, as Chairman, should have discretion to defer his speech
on ABM, (2) that we will want to make some changes in the presentation,
and (3) that it was quite clear from Smith's existing instructions in NSDM 90
that we had to reject the Soviet proposal.
Unless you want me to do something different, I will stick to this position.
Over the weekend Smith will send in his recommendation on dealing with
forward based aircraft by means of a "formula. e thus are being maneuvered
into the position of either appearing favorable to a separate ABM, or if that
is rejected by Washington, of having to be forthcoming on FBA on the grounds
that if we do not we face a total and complete stalemate. The formula'
question is on the Verification Panel agenda.
SECRET /NODIS
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/11/27: LOC-HAK-10-2-37-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/11/27: LOC-HAK-10-2-37-7
25X1
SECRET/NODIS -2-
This leaves the reply to Smith to be dealt with. I would propose
that you take the position that the timing of Smith's speeches is mainly
his business and that you support him as chief of the delegation. That your
previous message still stands, I. e., that we must oppose a separate ABM
agreement. That you agree we do not want to make an instant" rejection,
and should hear what the Soviets have to say privately and publicly. On
other issues such as FBA, NCA definitions, etc., he will hear from you
after the Verification Panel.
message to this effect to Smith is at Tab A.
RECOMMENDATIONS
. That I take the position in backstopping meetings, etc? outlined above.
Approve Disapprove
2. That you send the attached reply to Smith (Tab A).
WH:rrarn
SECRET/NODIS
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/11/27: LOC-HAK-10-2-37-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/11/27: LOC-HAK-10-2-37-7
IP
SECRET/EYES ONLY
TO: Gerard Smith, Chief, US Salt Delegation, Helsinki
FROM: Henry P. Kissinger
REF: SALT Helsinki 068
agree that 'instant" rejection is not necessary and think the timing
of your speecheis up to you. On the substance, however, we will have
to reject a separate agreement on ABM only, though whatever you learn
of their ideas without implying serious intent to accept them, would, of
course, be helpful. I think your best position v.ould be that we will study
their presentation, but that you have instructions to negotiate only a
combined offensive and defensive package, and do not expect any change in
these instructions during Helsinki. I seriously doubt that between now and
a December 18 adjournment, we e could conduct any thoughtful reappraisal
of our poeition. Hopefully we will be able to clear up some other problems
at the VE..rification Panel meeting.
W Hyland: rnm: 12 / 3 / 70
SECRET/ EY ES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/11/27: LOC-HAK-10-2-37-7
25X1
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L C R ? E. T (1336Z DEC ? 71 ? VI
?.?:? .:AE,TiA.SSA DOR SMITH,. :;.;ALT,t.HELSINK I I OnD 'ATE ?63.10 DR. HENRY K1SSINGE, .
THE. WHITE HOUGE,VASHINCT
19-10
IA 33
DEAR .
?...NY PER SONAL .03JE CT ION TO F3iAL L IP IT ON 'AB WHILE
...OFFENSIVE ? SYSTENS REMAIN ? OCHE CKli:Dt ? ST ANDS.; AND I THINK. .
SliOULD 1 OiNEAL TERNS. COT INUZ. ? TO ST F,E;':,5 ? INTERRELATION OF.. DEFENSIVE
OFFENSIVE :,SY?.;TES ;51J1,, NOT FL AIL Y REJECT SOVIET ? PROPOSAL, . ( IN
VIEW OFHL MICE ? STE HERE,- PRESIDE NT NAY WANT TO ? DIRECT A REVIEW OF ?
OUR ??POLICY AGA IN ST AS N ONLY ARI EENT ? AND ? WOULD NOTE. ?TliAT.....? ?
HOS/ USSRH P.OITIONS APPEAR TO. HAVE S TCEL. I3Z D14REES ? SINCE. -
? VICNANARA/ jOHNSON/ IFOSYOIN. MEETINI... ?IN 19670 ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
:IN ANY -EVENT., I THINK A 1TANr REJECTION WOULD ? BE
.:ONNEOEI.S2A.R.It Y. ? ROUG.A. ON. A PROPOSAL WHICH SOV IE TS APPARENTLY TAKE
VERY SERIOUSLY :AND NIGHT ? PREVENT US FROM LEARN 'NG ? MORE A6CILIT
SOVIET DETAILED IDE AS FOR LIE IT n(-7.: ON THIS ? COPE, YESTERDAY Y:
SOVIET OFFICIALS ? TOLD G.A;'.2,ThOFFdrVkALER T hAT- DE CEIAR? 5 .1 H? SOVIET
PRESENTATION RE AN PROPOSAL 'WOULD ? NOT GIVE OE3ER S AND OILIER ...
spE cIF I cs, BUT THEY '.;ERE AVAILABLE IF SEEENOV BELIEVED .WE vOutp...
COOSIDER".. THEIR ABM PROPOSAL. ? ThEY STRONGLY ? IJCED T . NOT .
PE4ECT ..THE ,PROPOSAL ? OUT OF ? HAND. ?? ? .. .
?
ALSO, BEFORE WE "OPPOSE" SOVIET PROPOSAL, I 'RECOMMENDH' .
UNSIDERATIOW BE?C IVEN TO THE POSAB IL 'TIES _OF LEVERAGING IT?.INTO
"SOME. ?,1( IND OF OFFENSIVE/ DEFENSIVE TACIT L IUTAT ION WHILE WE CONTINUE?
opTIAtioNs FOR FOR'NAL? AGREEMENT ALONG LINES OF AUGUST 4 'PROPOSAL:
IN THZ CONNECTION, LATEST JNTELLIG.ENcE. RE SOVIET IORN?CON$TRUCTIONSEEMS. RELEVANT.?
' 25X1
25X1
IT
NOTE: AMBASSADOR smITH REQUESTS TIME OF DELIVERY TO
DR. KISSINGER, PLEASE ADVISE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
GF4.1
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/11/27: LOC-HAK-10-2-37-7
FrO
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/11/27: LOC-HAK-10-2-37-7
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SECRET
PAGE )1 SALT I0475' 01 OF 02
50
ACT ION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 000-00 SSO- 00-
0313042:
NSCE-00 DODE-: 00 ? CIAE 00
123441
0 031200Z DEC 70
! FM UWIEL SALT III
TO SEC SI AT W A C I M MED IAT E 641
,
bR ET SECT ION 1 OF 2 U,S0 EL SALT 475
EXD IS/ SALT
SUBJECT: DR AFT ST AT EMEigT ON ABM
/46 W
ATTACHED 'Si DRAFT TEXT OF A
SOVIET A Y OPO:SAL OF
BEL IEVE SHOULD AQjLTI
DO _NOT, lij-L,PLOT, BELIEVE
OTTE- SOVIET PRESENT AT ION 0
C L
N JRILkAY, DEC
PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO
DECEMBER 1, WHICH ALL DELEGATES .
BE G I VE N PAR SONS ?
hEsTATETiii.:61- SHOULD E
P.R OPOSAL HAS. BEEN
?a-TEN i'7ADE
ATT-Rite-TAT-E?Gli ID A CE
STATEMENT BY A MEA SSAD OR SNIT H
G-1-u. a ?
1 ? ti.}E ILL CAR EFULL Y CONSIDERSEHE SOVIET
PROPOSAL FU I A STR AT EG IC MS L I'M IT AT ION
WHICH ?ROVI3ES SOLELY FOR LIM IT AT IONS ON
HE AREA OF Okii RESPECTIVE NCA S.
2. IN YOUR DECEBER ? 1. Sr AT E ME NT
'W IpH MOTIVATdJTHE SOVIET SiDE
ALENT WHICH WOLLD CONSTRAIN
!BELIEVE, HOWEVER , THAT IT WOULD
Pk EL I MINAR Y COiNENT S ON SOME OF
PRESENTATION OF
AGREEMENT
ABM DEFENSE IN
YOU PRESENTED THE RATIONALE
T ai OPOSE, SUCH A LINITED .
ONLY A1314 DEFL...',16. I
E. HEL UL IF I ? GAVE- YOU SONE -
HE POIAS YOU. RAISED ?
3. th:,i DECEMBER 1 YOU CITED THE U.S. STATEMENT OF JUNE 19 .
, .
IN !OLii STATEMENT OF JULE 19 WE WERE REFERR ING TO YOUR
STATEMENT OF JUNE, 12 IN WHICH YOU SAID, 'IN MY VIEW WE ME '
ALL AGREtiD I HAT IN CERT A IN C Iii CUMST ANCES D EPL OYiii..\11 OF
STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE AR MAC/ENT 5 CAN ;',34 A DE Si As IL IZ ING FACT OR
A Ng T Hai EBY CREATE THE PR v_COND IT IONS FO it INCREASING THE 'DANGER
? No Objection to Decla-s;ific'aiion in Part 2012/11/27: LOC-HAK-10-2-37-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/11/27: LOC-HAK-10-2-37-7
. ?
PAGE. 2 SALT I 004..75 0.1 OF. 02 . 0313042
OF ? OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR W AR ." OUR ?R EMAR KS ON ABM ON? THAT
TATE WERE NOT PRESENT 'ED. I THE HE COT EXT I WHICH YOU
:HAVE PR 0 PO SED AND ABM ON L Y AUR EE,MENT E AD I NG FWIHER IN
THE. 'U.S. ? JUNE ? 19 'ST AT EMENT I. YOU WILL NOTE THAT THE. U.S
'D. EL EGAT ION SAID ..!*13or 1-1.. SID ES HAVE EMPHASIZED THE. NECESSITY ?
.FOR LINKAGE' BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYST as IN A'
?: STRATEGIC. Ai-HiS LINITAT ION AGREE.k.;ENT CONSISTENT WITH THIS ?
POSIT ION. THE U.S. HAS FOUND IT POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER I, IVAIT ING
AB EPLOYEENT S. TO ? SYSTEMS ?D SIGNED FOR NCA DEFENSE
AGAINST ? .STR AT EG IC. OFFi ISSIL ESI THE ? COM' EAT OF A PPR OPR TATE::
? L IMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE MISSILE SYST .OUR ... ? ?
. VIEWS ON THIS INT ERR ELAT IONSHIP REiAI UNCHANGai YOUR USE
OF. A PART OF THE U.S. ST AT EMENT PESE.LJTS AN ERR ONEOUS ?
PIOT Liii? .0F. THE U.S. POSIT ION..
4. THE .U.S. ? SIDE POINTS OUT ALSO THAT THE U.S. ABM SYSTEM
CWREHTLY BEING DEPLOYED IS IN DEFENSE OF OLE STRATEGIC RETALIATORY.
..CAPABIL IT Y. WE DO NOT VIEW. THIS CIRCUMSTANCE AS ONE WHICH.
INCREASES THE 'DANGER OF 'NUCLEAR . WAR. ? ON THE CONTRARY ?
.T HESE OLOYNENT S WERE :N',E;C:t.SSITATEL BY THE. CONT INUIL..43 BUILDUP
OF !SOVIET ? OFFENSIVE STRATEG IC ? FOR CES WHICH POSE A 1-',R EAT TO
?
THE U.S. RETALIATORY CAPABILITY. AND HENCE OUR SEC LE IT Y. IS' IT
LOGICAL. 1.0 AGREE 10 LIMIT THOSE. WHICH ENHANCE: UUR,
DETERRENT CAPABILITY W HILE .LEAVING UNL IM Ira) ? THOSE WHICH
...THREATEN THAT DETERRENT.?
?
5.
IN YOUR LAST STATEMENT ? YOU 'MENTIONED THAT, OFFENSIVE. SYSTEMS
...ARE MORE. C?OM PL. EX THAN DEFENSIVE ? SYSTEMS. THIS. NAY OR ? ?
M'AY .NOF PR OVE TO. BE SO ...IN ? THE CONTEXT. OF A STRATEGIC ARMS
-1.? LI IT AT ION AGREEMENT. . IT IS TR UE THAT THE AGGREGATE, OF ? .
?...C.TENTR AL SIR AT EG IC FORCES IS. COMPOSED OF D IFFIa:RENT TYPES ? OF
WEAPONS. SYSTEMS. EACH HAS UNIQUE .0HAR AOT ER IST ICS AND .
? .0APABIL IT IES W HICK CR EATE, D 'HI:RENT CONCERNS. THE C 0i,i?LEXIT? TES.
WITHIN ?AD AONG THESE ? SYSTEMS, HOWEVER, HOWEVER* MAY NOT BE MORE. '
. ? D IFF1CIJLT TO 'DEAL WITH THAN. THE ..001.4-1 E XII IES OF L IN IT AT IONS ?
ON STA AT.EG IC 'DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS, I ALA LAUNCHERS. AiNO
INTER CEPT .OR So RADAR S, AND NECESSAR Y COROLLARIES SUCH. AS
THOSE. AGAINST ? UPGRADING SA 6 TO AZiiti' S. WE HAVE ?RESENTED ? ?
OPOSAL ? WHICH WE? FEEL AUE.UATELY DEALS W IT h THE CONFLEXITIES
O. BOTH 'AREAS.
6, YOU HAVE SUGGESTED IN YOUR DECEMBER 1 ST AT E:MENT THAI AN,,,
SECkt.T.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/11/27: LOC-HAK-10-2-37-7
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? ..PAt3E 5, SALT I ?475 al OF 02 03 130,4Z
INDE'PENDE.i,iT '? SOL UT ION OF T h. Ab QUE ST .I ON WOULD bE .A0 V ISASLE ?
.. ? FRO HE ST A 'ND r)0 INT ? OF i'OV1G Th TALKS FOR W THiS U.S.
EG AT 10.iv bEL IEVES 1i-AT I HERE. IS AD E. QUAT E .6A IS. FOR ..tOV
HE ?TALK3 F W ARID IN ? .A iAiui. tc 'HIGH LiCiS T hi IIjO1 A '?:41
II-ELiT 100...SHIPS bETWEEN _STA AFEG IC UFFLSIVE P1 DEFENSIVE
??.W.i-A?Gi'.:S.,SYsTEI-AS. 'THE. U.S. ?Oz.',AL OF AUGUST 4
... A E AND COHESIVE 0i)0 S IT LON FOR INGFUL iATGIC
At LYiS L IH1TAT I01.S; 'WE; HAVE.. PUT ? 'FORWARD A D Eii If EP OPOSAL
W IT }i SPECIFIC ..PR OV .YOUi SIDE HAS NOT J QUALLY
? ? iDliTHC0i4 Wi'L: HA VE T ,T. RECE THE SOVIET DELEGATION
. ? A C OV,PL.ET PA PO SAL FC L Li IT Iiv3 SThATEGIC OESIVE O?? ?
? " D EFENSIVii: i'lENT S.: ?-?
. O.UR. . ILL USTR AT: I VE. ELL PiENT S PRE SE al' ED IN HilsrL?LAst.
YiAi, THE TWO APROACHESP,iESEidED. EARLY VUtItG IHE V A
? PHASE, A;ND".:c.A.Iii AUGUST 4 OPO 6AL ? .ALL COT?AliED ? Pa OV IS IOvi S
??.15(...JT H. SIR AT EG 'IC . OFFENSIVE Ai) STR AT EG IC'DEFENSIVE SYS): E6S
T. SOVIET :3A SIC . PR. OVISIOLs S E SENT ED IN V IE '044 A A 'ND .YOUR ? ? ?
PR ESENT AT I THIS YEAR -.- U.? TO DECELER 1, 19.70- -
? ALL TOOK OOG?NIZANCE CF THE LINK.. AND THE IpiT ER 7R EL AT ION5171 IFS
.._.BET:'EEi STR AT EG I.0 OFFENSIVE AND STRATEGIC?? DEFENSIVE ?FORCES
? .?
SINCE THE BEG INN ING -OF..? SALT THE U.S.: POSIT ION ON THE
IrTZR-
RELAIIONSHI? OF STR AT IC OFFENSIVE ? ANO EFtIVE PNAiEiTS
TjAi3 E'EN WaL );.ow. U OT T ith. ID E T OF T HE LaT ED
TAT ?E; AT 1 ii. T OF SIG i4ING I hi. rFf ON JULY 1 19 66 W HEN HE ?
.?.A O.U.'4CED T HAT: ' 'riA Ei4 R E: AC HED B ET W EEi4 THE ? .
?.
GOVENT3 OF THE UNION OF. ? .SOVIET SOCIALIST. REPUBLICS AND
?I Hi UiT IED ThTES TO ENTER . THENEME ST -FUTUiE ,Iar G. ? ?
USSION S .OLN? THE LliITpJIO1 AiD THE RED UCT ION OF ? BOTH .
OFFENSIVE STA AT EG IC 1,-) UCL 'EAR . ;WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEi4S AND
SYSTEpiS OF DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC . SSIL ES." AT :THE??
? 0 PEN ING OF SALT O OVEbEr 17,.? 1969, I READ ? A EiE SSAGE ?
FROi ESIDENT IXOH TO THE EFFECT THAT "WE ARE ?PREPARED
TO DISCUSS LI6ITATIOiliS ON ALL OFFENSIVE ?ANS FSIV i-:YSTENS
HA 04). TO /CH .AGR ZEi.d.NT SL W. HIGH iOl H SIDES CAN HAVE
COLF1UICC..SI
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/11/27: LOC-HAK-10-2-37-7
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T. 0 ?R. LAD SPMATE AGRE TS ON IND IV ID UAi- A S. ON
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? UL MRA 1,1E4 TO DEAL WITH A COED NAT ION-, OF .
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/11/27: LOC-HAK-10-2-37-7
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1, No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/11/27: LOC-HAK-10-2-37-7