YOUR SCHEDULE AND TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR MEETINGS WITH THE JAPANESE LEADERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-167-6-1-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 109
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
Your Schedule and Talking Points for Your
Meetings with the Japanese Leaders
Table of Contents
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
State Dept. review completed
Arrival at Haneda Airport; Met by Messrs. Iwasa,
Segawa, Yoshino, Fultuda, Bogen, Ambassador
Ingersoll and Mr. Sneider Tab A
Japan - U. S. Economic Council. Meeting followed by
Lunch, June 10 Tab B
Komeito Party Chairman Takeiri and Democratic
Socialist Party Chairman Kasuga - Reception,
June 10 Tab C
Prime Minister Sato -- Dinner, June 10 Tab D
Foreign Minister Fukuda --Breakfast, June 11 Tab E
Liberal Democratic Party Executives Nakasone,
Kosaka, and Mixuta -- Luncheon, June 11 Tab F
Senior News Editors -- Mid-afternoon Meeting,
June 11
Socialist Party Leaders -- Late Afternoon Meeting,
June 11
Former Foreign Ministers Miki, Aichi, Ohira,
' Fujiyama, Shiina, and Kosaka -- Dinner, June 11
International Trade and Industry Minister Tanaka -
Breakfast, June 12
University Professors -- Luncheon, June 12
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Tab G
Tab 11
Tab I
Tab
Tab
MORI C03353099
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You will be met at the airport by:
From Japan-US Economic Council:
Yoshizane Iwasa, Chairman of Fuji Bank Ltd and
Chairman of JUSEC
Masahisa Segawa, Iwasars personal secretary
From Foreign Ministry:
Bunroku Yoshino, Director General - American Affairs
Mr. Fukada, Yoshino's Staff
Mr. Hagen, Yoshino s Staff
From U. S. Embassy:
Robert Ingersoll, Ambassador
Richard L. Sneider, DCM
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Japan - U. S. Economic Council
This is a blue ribbon list of Japanese business leaders, but few of
them will have an adequate command of English. Essentially con-
servative in political outlook (they fund the LDP), they will be as
worried and concerned about the state of U.S. -Japan relations and
about their future role in the world as any of the politicians. They
are generally fairly close-mouthed about what transpires at their
meetings. However, Mr. Iwasa shows signs of wanting to use his
chairmanship of the Japan-U.S. Economic Council as a means of
gaining ascendancy over Mr. Uernura, President of Keiclanren (the
Federation of Economic Organizations, which is roughly the equiva-
lent of our National Association of Manufacturers), and others to be-
come the leading international spokesman for Japanese business. As
your host, he will doubtless seek as much publicity from this meeting
as he can. The expanding overseas operations of Japanese trade and
industry is forcing business leaders such as those represented in this
group to take an active interest in foreign policy in its political and
security aspects as well as its international economics. This group
will therefore probably prefer to hear you discuss political and
security matters, and will not expect you to reflect an intimate know-
ledge of world economic problems. You may be as frank with this
group on the great international issues as you are with any of the
leaders but Sato and Fukuda.
Suggested Talking Points
-- Outline your views on the emerging multipolar system in Asia,
and what this means for the prospect for peace and stability in
the region.
Describe in what ways Japan might related to this changing
international context.
Reassure the group that the U.S. continues to attach the
highest value to its alliance with Japan, intends to stand by
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its defense commitment to Japan, and sees no contradiction
between these intentions and the U.S. effort to improve
relations with the PRC.
Explain that the U.S. interest in adjusting our basic relationship
toward greater equality, inter-dependence, and reciprocity is
aimed at making our alliance more sustainable over the long
term, and is in no way a subterfuge for pressing Japan to
stand alone on its own.
Reassure the group that the U. S. intends to continue to play
a vital balancing role in Asia, and will maintain the mix of
ground, naval, and air forces in the area necessary to make
that role effective.
? Express awareness of Japan's past efforts to liberalize its
trading practices. Emphasize, however, the seriousness with
which the U.S. views its continuing trade deficit -- especially
that with Japan -- and encourage the Japanese business leaders
to generate greater levels of imports from the U. S. through
both governmental and private efforts.
Refer to the upcoming (June 15-17) meeting between Mr. asa's
Economic Council and its U.S. counterpart, the Advisory
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Council on Japan - U. S. Economic Relations (headed by Jeeb
Halaby), and ul?ge the Japanese to listen carefully to what the
U. S. business leaders say.
-- Express an interest in the timing of the recovery of Japan
from its business slowdown, and suggest that the measures
taken to expand the Japanese economy be calculated in such
a way as to generate a greater demand for U. S. goods.
? Urge Japan to take concrete steps to implement the seven-
point program announced on May 20, and insist that Japan
must take the steps necessary to remove its restrictions on
foreign trade and investment and to moderate the continued
rapid rise in its exports.
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HAK STATEMENT BEFORE JAPAN-US ECONOMIC COUNCIL
A Changed World
? It is a great privilege to be here in Japan. I appreciate the
opportunity to come that JUSEC has provided, and the chance to meet
your Board of Directors. The Japanese members of this organization
have made a major contribution to this country's astonishing economic
growth in recent years.
-- I was last in Japan in 1963, and the changes which have taken
place since then must be seen to be believed.
-- These changes in Japan illustrate a point I would like to make:
the world itself has changed greatly from what it was a generation ago.
-- Japan and Western Europe have recovered fully from World War II
and have gone on to new economic heights. Among the countries of
Western Europe a new degree of political accord has also been achieved.
-- Dozens of new countries have gained independence and dignity
and are making their mark upon the world stage.
The so-called "socialist camp" has fragmented. The time has
long past when we can think of it as a monolithic bloc.
? The military equations in the world have altered. All-out war is
unthinkable and meaningful arms control measures now serve to enhance
national security.
-- The relationships among the great powers have become much more
fluid, and the cold war to some extent less intense. Instead of a situation
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of confrontation between two powers or blocs, there are now multipolar
centers of power and influence.
-- U. S. foreign policy under the Nixon Administration has changed
to reflect this changed world. And we attach no higher priority to any
task than that of reshaping and strengthening our traditional bonds with
Japan.
? We see Japan in the process of defining its own role in this multi-
polar world, and its relationship to each of its elements. It has a crucial
economic and political role to play in this multipolar world. It is only
natural that you carefully scrutinize the policies which you have followed
in the past to see if these still are valid in terms of Japanese national
interest.
-- One central element that I am confident that both of us recognize
must endure is the strong US-Japan partnership.
US Approach to Japan in a Multipolar World
-- This leads us to U. S. foreign policy in recent months. I know
that many Japanese are wondering about moves which we have made --
the President's visits to Peking and Moscow, the implementation of the
Nixon Doctrine, Vietnamization, the SALT Agreement, the New Economic
Policy, and others. We are not insensitive to the fact that in Japan there
has indeed been something called the "Nixon shoku."
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-- You are asking: Where does Japan stand in all this? Is the
U. S. turning away from its alliance with Japan? Or is the U. S.
trying to push Japan into doing things or shouldering responsibilities
of a regional or global nature which the U. S. now wants to avoid?
Does the U. S. attach more value to reaching agreements with Moscow
and Peking than to maintaining its close and friendly ties with Japan?
Does Japan really count in U. S. calculations? Is the U. S. in effect
getting out of Asia? Should Japan in return strike off in new directions
of its own?
? As a general response to these questions, I want to state flatly
that the U. S. places the highest premium on its relationship with Japan.
In President Nixon's Foreign Policy Report of February 9, 1972, he
said:
. "Japan is our most important ally in Asia. It is our second
greatest trading partner. It is an essential participant, if a stable
world peace is to be built. Our security, our prosperity, and our
global policies are therefore intimately and inextricably linked to
the U.S. -Japanese relationship. The well-being of both countries
requires cooperation and a shared commitment to the same
fundamental goals."
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-- In this connection the U. S. highly values the Mutual Security
Treaty between our two nations.
? The President, his Administration and the American people
strongly believe in these factors.
To put the whole question of Japanese-U.S. relations into better
perspective, let me talk about the kinds of basic relationships which
we find it necessary, or desirable, to maintain in the world today.
. First, those derived from a close mutuality of interest,
or upon similarities in philosophy or outlook. In this category I
would place U. S. relations with Japan, with our neighbors in
North and South America, with the NATO countries, and with
other countries to which we are tied by bilateral or multilateral
treaties. With such nations the central theme of our relationship
is interdependence.
. Second, those with countries having profoundly different
political and social systems from our own, but with which we must
deal realistically if our goal of building a peaceful world order is
to be achieved. In this category are such countries as the Soviet
Union and the People's Republic of China. Although we have had
serious disputes with such nations, the demands of peace obligate
us to find areas where our interests overlap and where relaxation
of tensions may be achieved. We hope for increasing cooperation
with these countries but with them we are at the beginning of a process.
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. Third, countries with whom we have a more peripheral
relationship, but where we also wish to maintain friendly relations.
The point to be stressed concerning Japanese-U.S. relations
is that in seeking out areas of agreement with the countries in the second
category, we will not sacrifice our close bonds with countries in the first
category. It would be fatuous to think that we could make the PRC or the
USSR more amenable by turning away from our friends and allies, even
if we wanted to -- which we don't. We can better advance the cause of
peace in our dealings with potential adversaries when they see that we
are reliable partners and we respect our friends.
-- We believe it is in the national interests of the U. S. and Japan
for our two countries to remain close friends. We also believe it is
in the national interests of the U. S., as well as of Japan, for the U. S.
to seek a relaxation of tensions with the PRC and the USSR and move
on to increased cooperation, if possible. There is no clash of interests
here.
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Japanese Questions
? Having said this, let me return to the more specific questions
which have arisen in the minds of the Japanese people about the
constancy and reliability of the U.S. in its dealings with Japan.
? I believe the most useful discussions that I can have with you and
the other leaders of Japan this week is on the future of U.S. -
Japanese relations rather than dwelling on past events. This,
I hope, will be the focus of my talks here -- how our two countries
see the international scene and Asia in particular; how we see the
Japanese and American roles in this context; and what we think
the shape of the US-Japan partnership should be.
? Nevertheless, we must candidly recognize that in the fast changing
international patterns of recent months, some misunderstandings
have developed in our bilateral relations. I believe the fact that
such ripples have occurred should not greatly surprise us at a time
when the world has changed so much and the places of your country
and mine have changed in that world. But let us first deal briefly
with some of the problems that I know many Japanese have raised
head-on so that we can then move to a more constructive discussion
of future vistas.
-- Rather than go over a long check-list of what I understand are
Japanese grievances, I would like to address three major areas
of concern:
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? The "Nixon shock" (or "shoku"), that is, the abrupt way that two
major policy decisions were announced by the U.S. with very
little advance notice to Japan.
? We regretted the necessity of acting the way we did, but in
both instances we believed that the sensitive nature of these
moves made it impossible to provide prior consultations to any
of our friends and allies.
' These were special cases and clearly not part of a pattern.
-- The related concept that political and economic considerations in
Japan are simply not given much weight in U.S. policy determinations.
? Admittedly, there have been political and economic repercussions
in Japan over moves such as the President's China initiative,
the NEP, the textile issue, and the Chirep vote in the UN last fall.
I've already talked about the President's July 15 and August 15
as
announcements /special cases. Since then we have consulted
closely on both China policy and economic issues. On the NEP,
we are working closely with Japan on world monetary reform
and trade liberalization. There are still differences in our points
of view, but these hopefully can be handled with good intentions
and mutual respect for each other's interests.
? On the textiles issue, let's hope that it remains a closed book.
There were problems in it for us, too. With respect to the UN
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issue, we had no reason to believe that our approach wouldn't
work. We thought it was fair and realistic. And I was assured
by the experts before my Peking trip last year that the vote
would not possibly take place before well after my departure
from Peking.
In any event, as the San Clemente meetings last January on Okinawan
reversion showed, we are certainly taking Japanese internal
considerations very heavily into our calculations. We are main-
taining the closest consultations with Japanese leaders both here
and in Washington.
? Ambassador Ingersoll has the full confidence of President Nixon
and this is one of his primary tasks. It is also one of the major
purposes of my trip here.
? The thought that the U.S. is pulling out of Asia and in some way is
attempting to get Japan to replace us in a balance of power role.
? The U.S. is emphatically not pulling out of Asia. We intend to
stay on and to fulfill our commitments, and will maintain the
military forces required to do so.
? We are not trying to push Japan into anything. We believe that
what the Japanese do will be in terms of their own judgment of
their national interests.
? We are not seeking, either, to see a. perpetuation of the classic
19th century balance of power situation. What we hope will
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eventually emerge is a world order without blocs and with
countries treating one another as equals.
Agenda for the Future
-- I hope that we can make some headway on such concerns in our
discussions. But in all candor, explanations and reassurances
and promises of consultation by both sides -- though important
will not suffice to place our partnership on a sound footing. Only
a constructive discussion of where we go from here and then the
process of joint action will serve to maintain and enrich our
traditional close ties.
-- There are many pressing international problems that the U.S. and
Japan -- and in most cases Europe -- not only can talk about, but
must talk about. It is not so much that they offer opportunities for
cooperative action as they demand it. We must begin to talk
creatively and act more in harmony about an imposing agenda
of issues:
? Trade: How do we work out new relationships so that the
commercial exchanges between our countries, and those of
Western Europe, enrich our political cooperation, rather than
jeopardize it?
? International Monetary Reform: How do we and the Europeans
shape a new global system that reflects new monetary realities?.
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? Economic Assistance: What should be the role and the share
of economic assistance by various developed countries to
developing ones?
? The Environment: How do we share our knowledge so that we
can help each other clean up our environment and together help
to cleanse the world's?
? Energy: How are we going to fill the growing needs for energy
to fuel our societies?
? Technological Cooperation: The advanced nations have a great
deal to share in the fields of science and technology, whether
it be in addressing problems here on earth or seeking new
horizons in outer space.
-- These and other challenges constitute a constructive agenda for our
'two countries. They point to an enduring relationship that Prime
Minister Sato and President Nixon referred to last January in San
Clemente. As they put it, over a hundred years of association
between our two countries must be continued on the foundation of
mutual trust and interdependence.
-- I have only touched the tip of the;iceberg. But let me stop now and
take your questions and comments. For I have come to Japan more
to listen than to explain.
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Korneito Party Chairman Takeiri
and
Democratic Socialist Party Chairman Kasuga
You may encounter these two opposition party leaders at the reception on
June 10. You have met both within the past half year: Kasuga when he called
on you December 3, and Takeiri when he met with you March 15.
The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), which was formed in 1960 when its
members split from the Socialist Party on the issue of political extremism
and which now has 32 members in the 486-member Lower House of the Diet,
is the only opposition party that supports the U.S.-Japan alliance. Kasuga,
who took the DSP over last fall, is regarded as a controversial head of a
party split between those like himself who feel the DSP should work for unity
with the other opposition parties even if it means sacrificing the traditionally
more moderate stance, and the party's moderate wing.
? The Komeito Party, Japan's third largest, is the political arm of the
militant Buddhist sect Soka Gakkai. It is based primarily on the urban
displaced, and, while it grew rapidly during its earlier stages of organiza-
tion, has shown little additional expansion in recent years. Takeiri is a
clever leader, but his Party is, despite its disavowals, closely bound and
subordinate to the Soka Gakkai.
Both Kasuga and Takeiri have travelled to Peking since you saw them last,
and Takeiri in addition is just now returning from a visit to Pyongyang,
where he met with Kim Il- song.
Suggested Talking Points
-- You might invite both Kasuga and Takeirirs observations on their
recent visits to the PRC.
-- You might ask Takeiri for his comments on the political atmosphere
in Pyongyang, and what impression he gained as to North Korea's
current foreign policy direction.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Prime Minister Eisaku Sato
Sato is not altogether predictable as a conversationalist. Usually
forthcoming, he can at times prove taciturn. He will probably seek
to maintain your conversation on a fairly elevated plane, avoiding
details on any specific subject. We understand he has asked to see
you alone. This does not mean he will automatically regard all
aspects of your conversation as secret. On the contrary, he will
feel that something newsworthy must come of it, and he will at a
minimum feel he must share the substance of your talk with his
principal associates. Therefore, you should reach an agreement
before the meeting ends on what is privileged, what may be discussed
with colleagues on a confidential basis, and what will be said to the
press.
1. China. Sato's principal substantive interest will focus primarily
on China policy, how we envisage the development of our relationship
with Peking, what our intentions are toward Taiwan, and what trans-
pired during the President's visit to Peking. He will want to obtain a
feeling for what it is like to deal directly with Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-
tung and for the general atmospherics of Peking. He will be particular-
ly concerned to hear from you whether the conversations in Peking in-
cluded any mention of matters of great concern to Japan, such as the
Senkakus problem, the U.S. - Japan security relationship, Chinese fears
of Japanese militarism, and Chinese attitudes toward dealing with the
Japanese government.
-- Express regret (this word is important -- it implies no blame,
but rather an understanding of their problem) that our need for
secrecy did not permit us to consult with the Japanese before the
July 15 announcement, and our understanding of the political
problems the China issue has caused Sato and his supporters.
-- Assure Sato that our China initiative is not an attempt to play
Japan and China off against each other in balance of power
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politics, and that we are in no way trading our alliance with
Japan off against a hope for a limited improvement in rela-
tions with China.
-- Assure him we wish to avoid conflict in our approaches to
Peking and intend to consult closely on future steps and
developments.
-- Assure him that no deals were reached on the Senkakus, off-
shore oil, security issues, or any other subject of concern to
Japan, and that we will not take any actions to undercut Japan' s
vital interests.
-- Explain the Shanghai Communique, especially the sections on
Japan, Taiwan, and Korea.
-- Describe the atmospherics of Peking, and emphasize the need
for firmness in dealing with PRC leaders. (We suspect that
Sato's repeated entreaties to Peking for direct official contacts,
while perhaps useful to him in Japanese domestic politics, have
increased PRC leverage on him.)
-- Draw him out on the status of Japan's efforts to establish contacts
with Peking, the results of Mikits recent visit there, and Japan's
intentions.
1=t
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? Indicate that while you recognize the importance of China
policy to Japan, particularly at this point, and while we fully
intend to consult closely on this question, you believe that we
must not allow China to obscure other important aspects of
our relations.
2. Soviet Affairs. Sato will be particularly interested in a final
run-down of the Moscow trip.
-- Brief him to the fullest extent possible on the President's Moscow
trip and on the agreements reached there.
? Give him your assessment of Moscow's intentions regarding
regional security arrangements, in both Europe and Asia.
-- Give Sato your assessment of Sino-Soviet relations.
-- Draw him out on his own estimate of the prospects for negotia-
tions for a Peace Treaty with the Soviets this fall, for settle-
ment of the Northern Territories issue, and for conclusion of a
loan agreement to finance the pipeline from the Tyumen oil field
to the Pacific Coast. If asked, tell Sato the U.S. Government
has put no obstacles in the path of private American participation
in the Tyumen oil project and some U.S. oil companies and con-
struction firms are in contact with their Japanese counterparts.
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3. Korea. Given Japan's security and economic stake in the Korean
Peninsula, Sato will be interested, first, in the U.S. 's continued avowal
of its defense commitment to and intention to maintain a troop presence
in South Korea; second, in our assessment of the tentative moves by
Seoul and Pyongyang toward some modus vivendi on the Peninsula;
third, in how we plan to approach the Korean question in next fall's
U. N. General Assembly; and, fourth, in our views on Japan's increasing
contacts with North Korea and our plans for any possible contacts with
the North.
-- We will stand behind our defense commitment to the ROK, and
do not intend to reduce our forces there further in the foreseeable
future.
-- We will support the efforts of the ROK to seek a relaxation of
tensions and increased communication on the Korean Peninsula.
-- We welcome the direct discussion between North and South Korea
as what we hope will be the beginning of a long-term process of
relaxation of tensions between the two.
-- We believe it is too early to conclude that Pyongyang has firmly
committed itself to long-term peaceful accommodation with
Seoul, and it is necessary to know to what extent Peking and
Moscow can and will restrain Pyongyang. Therefore, we should
move cautiously.
-- We should also avoid those moves that could seriously under-
mine political cohesion in South Korea, or could help Pyongyang
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SECRET 5
drive wedges between South Korea, Japan and the
U.S.
? We are presently exploring strategy and tactics on the Korean
question in next fall's U.N. General Assembly, and are co-
ordinating with ROK, Japan and others. Postponement of the
question this year as last would have the advantage of not under-
cutting the Seoul-Pyongyang talks and injecting another irritant
into our relations with Peking and Moscow. But we must also
consider fallback positions.
4. Vietnam and the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty. The use of U.S.
bases in Japan to repair and supply materiel intended for the GVN
forces, and the recent dispatch of a Marine air wing from Iwakuni to
Vietnam has given the political opposition in Japan an opportunity to
attempt to embarrass the government for its support of our Vietnam
effort, focussing particularly on the "prior consultation" provisions of
our Security Treaty with Japan.
-- Express appreciation for the understanding and support of his
government for our efforts in Vietnam over the years, and
particularly following the President's May 8 speech.
? Express gratitude for the Japanese Government's cooperation
in the use of bases in Japan in indirect support of our operations
in Vietnam during the current North Vietnamese offensive. (This
should be expressed privately to Sato and Fukucla only.)
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If Sato raises the question of prior consultation on U.S. use
of bases in Japan, you should assure him that the U.S. will
not take any action regarding the Vietnam conflict that would
require prior consultation, and that we will continue to inform
his government in advance of any significant movements that
might affect U.S. units in Japan. If asked about reviewing
prior consultation arrangements, you should say that we should
think carefully before making substantial changes in a system
that has worked so well for so long.
-- Give him your estimate of the military and political situation
in the South and the ability of the North Vietnamese to maintain
the level of their offensive, and explain the necessity for the
moves which the President announced on May 8 against North
Vietnam.
-- Give him your estimate of the roles played by the Soviets
and Chinese in this action.
5. The Multipolar World. If there are Japanese who envisage a major
and much more independent role for Japan in a world dominated by four
or five more or less separate power centers, Sato is not among them.
He professes publicly to be puzzled about what role Japan might play,
or what role the U.S. might expect Japan to play, and he and most
Japanese still have the feeling that Japan's future would best be assured
by continuing a close association with the United States in which Japan
would enjoy most of the forms of equality and a fair degree of flexibility
but in which it would in fact remain clearly the junior partner.
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SECRET 7
Describe in general terms how you see the multipolar world
emerging over the next decade, stressing Asia. What we
hope to see is a relationship of equals, and not the perpetua-
tion of traditional balance of power concepts.
-- Reassure Sato that the U.S. fully intends to play an effective
role as a power in Asia and the Pacific over the long term,
and that we will maintain the mix of ground, naval, and air
force necessary to do this.
? Use this as an opportunity to assure Sato of the importance
we place on maintaining our close ties with Japan, and that
we will not sacrifice our essential relationship with Japan
for other goals.
-- Explain that the U. S. interest in adjusting the basic relation-
ship with Japan toward greater equality, inter-dependence,
and reciprocity is aimed at putting our alliance on a more
sustainable basis over the long term.
6. NPT. Japan, having signed but not ratified the NPT, is reportedly
waiting for EURA.TOM to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA,
after which Japan will seek an agreement of its own under which the
safeguards requirements will be no more burdensome on Japanese than
on European industry. There have, however, been a disturbing number
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or reports to the effect that government officials believe the U. S.
has lost interest in the NPT and is indifferent to whether Japan
signs or not.
-- Express the views of the Administration on the NPT: we
signed it; we favor it; we favor other countries accepting it;
but we believe that others should make their own decisions
on the grounds that the NPT suits their national interests.
-- Note the salutary influence this would have, however, on
limiting the international arms race. It would also tend to
defuse Chinese suspicions of Japanese militarism.
- Reassure Sato that our security commitment to Japan will
remain firm, and will serve as an adequate deterrent against
all threats to Japan.
Grace Notes
-- Okinawa. Congratulate Sato on achieving a major goal in
Okinawa Reversion and express appreciation that this was
accomplished in ways that do not impair our mutual interests.
- Succession. Express appreciation of Sato's almost eight
years of leadership of Japan in close association with the U. S.
Acknowledge reumors of his pending resignation as President
of the LDP. Express the hope that should he choose to leave
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his high office now or later, he will remain an active in-
fluence in Japanese political life and that he and his
successor will continue to support the close association
between our two countries. (This may elicit some comment
on the timing and outcome of the succession struggle.)
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Foreiln Minister Takeo Fukuda
Fukuda is reportedly highly sensitive to any circumstance that
might adversely affect his ambitions to succeed Sato. Conversely,
he would be eager to utilize any development that might improve
those chances or garner him favorable publicity. Of all Japanese
politicians, he has been among the least flexible on the China issue
in public utterances. On relations with the U.S., he has responded
to heavy Diet pressure to be tough with the Americans on a wide
range of issues, especially involving Vietnam and prior consultation.
This is a standard GOJ tactic, however, and one that should not
disturb us unduly.
The press in particular will be watching avidly for any hint as to
whether we favor Fukuda or Tanaka in the succession struggle. You
should let your meeting with Fukuda determine how long your meeting
with Tanaka should last and the kind of frills -- photographs, press
treatment and the like -- that should accompany it. In Japanese terms,
you have no counterpart in the GOJ but most of your functions -- to
the extent they exist -- are performed by the Foreign Minister and
his staff, and Fukuda is Tanaka's senior in every respect. For these
reasons it would be natural that your discussion with Fukuda should
be longer and wider-ranging than with Tanaka, whereas if the opposite
were the case, it would excite considerable speculation.
While Fukuda heads his own faction, his views and political antecedents
are much like Sato's. He is a product of the bureaucracy, and he made
his deepest impact as Finance Minister, a position he occupied twice.
Basically, his interests will coincide with Sato's and you should deal
with him on China, the Soviet Union, Korea, Vietnam, rnultipolarity
and the NPT in the same way you do with Sato. In addition, Fukuda
may also raise the questions of residual problems related to Okinawan
Reversion, the territorial dispute over the Senkakus Islands, and a
permanent seat on the U. N. Security Council; and we have included
talking points on these below.
1. China. Like Sato, Fukuda will focus primarily on China policy,
how we envisage the development of our relationship with Peking, what
our intentions are toward Taiwan, and what transpired during the
President's visit to Peking. He will want to obtain a feeling for what
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it is like to deal directly with Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung and for
the general atmospherics of Peking. He will be particularly concerned
to hear from you whether the conversations in Peking included any
mention of matters of great concern to Japan, such as the Senkakus
problem, the U.S. -Japan security relationship, Chinese fears of
Japanese militarism, and Chinese attitudes toward dealing with the
Japanese government.
-- Express regret (this word is important -- it implies no blame,
but rather an understanding of their problem) that our need for
secrecy did not permit us to consult with the Japanese before
the July 15 announcement, and our understanding of the political
problems the China issue has caused the Sato Government.
-- Assure Fukuda that our China initiative is not an attempt to
play Japan and China off against each other in balance of power
politics, and that we are in no way trading our alliance with
Japan off against a hope for a limited improvement in relations
with China.
-- Assure him we wish to avoid conflict in our approaches to
Peking and intend to consult closely on future steps and
developments.
-- Assure him that no deals were reached on the Senkakus, offshore
oil, security issues, or any other subject of concern to Japan,
and that we will not take any actions to undercut Japan's vital
interests.
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Explain the Shanghai Communique, especially the sections
on Japan, Taiwan, and Korea.
-- Describe the atmospherics of Peking, and emphasize the need
for firmness in dealing with PRC leaders. (We suspect that
the Sato Government's repeated entreaties to Peking for direct
official contacts, while perhaps useful to Sato in Japanese
domestic politics, have increased PRC leverage on the Sato
Government.)
-- Draw him out on the status of Japan's efforts to establish
contacts with Peking, the results of Miki's recent visit there,
and Japan's intentions.
-- Indicate that while you recognize the importance of China policy
to Japan, particularly at this point, and while we fully intend
to coordinate closely on this question, you believe that we must
not allow China to obscure other important aspects of our
relationship.
Z. Soviet Affairs. Like Sato, Fukuda will be particularly interested
in a final run-down of the Moscow trip.
Brief him to the fullest extent possible on the President's
Moscow trip and on the agreements reached there.
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- Give him your assessment of Moscow's intentions regarding
regional security arrangements, in both Europe and Asia.
-- Give Fukuda your assessment of Sino-Soviet relations.
-- Draw him out on his own extimate of the prospects for nego-
tiations for a Peace Treaty with the Soviets this fall, for
settlement of the Northern Territories issue, and for con-
clusion of a loan agreement to finance the pipeline from the
Tyumen oil field to the Pacific Coast, If asked, tell Fukuda
the U.S. Government has put no obstacles in the path of private
American participation in the Tyumen oil project and some
U.S. oil companies and construction firms are in contact with
their Japanese counterparts.
3. Korea. Given Japan's security and economic stake in the Korean
Peninsula, Fukuda, like Sato, will be interestecl,first,in the U.S. 's
continued avowal of its defense commitment to and intention to maintain
a troop presence in South Korea; second,in our assessment of the
tentative moves by Seoul and Pyongyang toward some modus vivendi
on the Peninsula; third, in how we plan to approach the Korean question
in next fall's U.N. General Assembly; ancl,fourth, in our views on
Japan's increasing contacts with North Korea and our plans for any
possible contacts with the North.
We will stand behind our defense commitment to the ROK, and
do not intend to reduce our forces there further in the foreseeable
future.
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-- We will support the efforts of the ROK to seek a relaxation
of tensions and increased communication on the Korean
Peninsula.
- We welcome the direct discussion between North and South
Korea as what we hope will be the beginning of a long-term
process of relaxation of tensions between the two.
-- We believe it is too early to conclude that Pyongyang has
firmly committed itself to long-term peaceful accommodation
with Seoul, and it is necessary to know to what extent Peking
and Moscow can and will restrain Pyongyang. Therefore,
we should move cautiously.
? We should also avoid those moves that could seriously under-
mine political cohesion in South Korea, or could help Pyongyang
drive wedges between South Korea, Japan, and the U.S.
-- We are presently exploring strategy and tactics on the Korean
question in next fall's U. N. General Assembly, and are
coordinating with ROK, Japan, and others. Postponement
of the question this year as last would have the advantage of
not undercutting the Seoul-Pyongyang talks and injecting another
irritant into our relations with Peking and Moscow. But we
must also consider fallback positions.
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4. Vietnam and the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty. The use of U.S.
bases in Japan to repair and supply materiel intended for the GVN
forces, and the recent dispatch of a Marine air wing from Iwakuni
to Vietnam has given the political opposition in Japan an opportunity
to attempt to embarrass the government for its support of our Vietnam
effort, focussing particularly on the "prior consultation" provisions
of our Security Treaty with Japan.
-- Express appreciation for the understanding and support of
the Japanese Government for our efforts in Vietnam over the
years, and particularly following the President's May 8 speech.
-- Express gratitude for the Japanese Government's cooperation
in the use of bases in Japan in indirect support of our operations
in Vietnam during the current North Vietnamese offensive.
(This should be expressed privately only to Sato and Fukuda.)
-- If Fukuda raises the question of prior consultation on U.S.
use of bases in Japan, you should assure him that the U.S.
will not take any action regarding the Vietnam conflict that
would require prior consultation, and that we will continue to
inform his government in advance of any significant movements
that might affect U.S. units in Japan. If asked about reviewing
prior consultation arrangements, you should say that we should
think carefully before making substantial changes in a system
that has worked so well for so long.
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-- Give him your extimate of the military and political situation
in the South and the ability of the North Vietnamese to maintain
the level of their offensive, and explain the necessity for the
moves against North Vietnam which the President announced
on May 8.
-- Give him your estimate of the roles played by the Soviets and
Chinese in this action.
5. The Multipolar World. Fukuda's views on Japan's role in a
multipolar world appear to be close to those of Sato. Fukuda does
not seem to relish the idea of a much more independent Japan maneu-
vering in a world having a congeries of power centers. Like Sato,
he is presently groping for what role Japan might play in such a world,
probably would prefer the greater security afforded by a continued
close association with the U.S. in which Japan would enjoy most of
the forms of equality and a fair degree of flexibility but in which it
would in fact remain clearly the junior partner.
-- Describe in general terms how you see the multipolar world
emerging over the next decade, stressing Asia. What we want
to see is a relationship of equals, and not the perpetuation of
traditional balance of power concepts.
-- Reassure Fukuda that the U.S. fully intends to play an effective
role as a power in Asia and the Pacific over the long term, and
that we will maintain the balance of ground, naval, and air forces
necessary to do this.
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-- Use this as an opportunity to assure Fukuda of the importance
we place on maintaining our close ties with Japan, and that
we will not sacrifice our essential relationship with Japan
for other goals.
Explain that the U.S. interest in adjusting the basic relation-
ship with Japan toward 'greater equality, inter-dependence,
and reciprocity is aimed at putting our alliance on a more
sustainable basis over the long term.
6. NPT. Japan, having signed but not ra ified the NPT, is reportedly
waiting for EURATOM to conclude a safeguards agreement with the
IAEA, after which Japan will seek an agreement of its own under which
the safeguards requirements will be no more burdensome on Japanese
than on European industry. There have, however, been a disturbing
number of reports to the effect that government officials believe the
U.S. has lost interest in the NPT and is indifferent to whether Japan
signs or not.
? Express the views of the Administration on the NFT I we signed
it and we favor it; we favor other countrie s accepting it; but we
believe that others should make their own decisions on the
grounds that the NPT suits their national interests.
-- Note the salutary influence this would have, however, on the
international arms race. It would also tend to defuse
Chinese suspicions of Japanese militarism.
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SECRET 8
7. Okinawa Reversion. Fukuda played a key but little publicized role
in the Okinawa reversion negotiations. As Finance Minister, he and
Ambassador Kennedy, who as Secretary of the Treasury was Fukuda's
counterpart when the negotiations began, worked out the basic financial
arrangement.
As Foreign Minister since shortly after it was signed, Fukuda has had to
defend the agreement in the Diet and is accordingly intimately familiar with
the details of the difficulties which remain. 1-le may well raise one or more
reversion-related issues and may possibly remind you of the Japanese
request at San Clemente that we enter into early discussions regarding further
reduction of U.S. base areas in Okinawa. The Japanese at that time had in
mind the release of the Awase Golf Course and Yaka Beach.
Assure him subject he has raised will be given serious considera-
tion within USG.
-- State that we will do what we can to accommodate urgent Japanese
requirements, but that whatever problem we are discussing -- P-3' s,
removal of nuclear weapons, claims, etc. -- there are equally strong
inhibitions on our actions.
If Awa.se Golf Cour se and Yaka Beach are raised, suggest that the
Japanese discuss this through regular channels and that you will ensure
that the appropriate U.S. officials are properly informed of the nature
of the San Clemente discussion.
8. Senkakus. Fukuda is more likely than Sato to raise this specific
Okinawa-related issue, and perhaps to complain about our half-hearted
support of the Japanese position. We desire to avoid public involvement
in any dispute.
-- Reaffirm our position that in returning administrative rights to
the Senkakus to Japan, we neither add to nor detract from Japan's
claim to sovereignty as it existed in 1945.
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-- State that we can take no position on the claims by any party
regarding the factors affecting earlier claims to sovereignty
or the means by which sovereignty was acquired.
-- If Fukuda asks, acknowledge that the language of the Security
Treaty, which applies "to territories under the administration
of Japan," could be interpreted to apply to the Senkakus in the
post-reversion period.
9. Security Council Seat for Japan. The Japanese have informed us
that they intend to campaign hard to obtain a permanent seat on the
U. N. Security Council. Some officials are said to feel that we are
opposed to this.
--Acknowledge the reasons (economic power, heavy U.N.
assessment, size and influence, potential future growth)
why Japan's claim to major power status by this means is
valid.
-- Say we would support Japan's claim as a matter of principle
and would be interested to hear how Japan feels membership
might be achieved in the face of the problems associated with
charter revision, the size of the Council, and the veto.
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LDP Leaders Kosaka, Mizuta. and Nakasone
This group comprises a senior minister and two of the three chief
officials (after Sato) of the LDP. Mizuta, currently Finance Minister,
is a conservative and heads his own small faction. Kosaka, a former
Foreign Minister, is a member of Ohira's faction and is currently head
of the LDP's Policy Board. Nakasone (your former student), who leads
his own large anti-Mainstream faction, is chairman of the Party's
Executive Committee. An opportunist and sensitive to the winds of
political change, he is undecided as to whether his Prime Ministerial
ambitions can best be satisfied by affiliation with the Mainstream or by
pursuit of China's blessing on his own. Dynamic and possessing something
akin to what Americans think of as charisma, Nakasone is a nationalist,
and as Defense Minister several years ago enunciated the doctrine of self-
reliance for Japan in military haraware. Most Americans respond well to
his personality and end up with an exaggerated estimate of his chances to
become Prime Minister.
Suggested Talking Points
1. China Policy
Express regret (this word is important--it implies no blame, but
only an understanding of this :problem)that our need for secrecy did
not permit us to consult with the Japanese Government before the
July 15 announcement, and indicate understanding of the political
problems caused for the LDP leadership.
-- Assure them we wish to minimize conflict in our approaches
to Peking, and intend to consult closely on future steps and develop-
ments.
Describe the atmospherics of your meetings in Peking with
1111 Mao and Chou.
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-- Explain the Shanghai Communique, e specially the sections on
Japan and on the Taiwan problem.
Describe our policy toward Taiwan, especially the importance we
place on its continued economic viability and that it not be isolated
internationally.
? Draw them out on the status of Japan's efforts to establish contacts
with Peking, and how they believe Japanese investment in Taiwan
can be protected over the long term.
-- Ask their opinions as to possible points of friction in our
approaches to China, and how we can best prevent the Chinese
from playing the U.S. and Japan off against each other.
2. Policy Toward the Soviet Union
- Give them your general assessment of the Moscow summit,
and discuss what you believe to be Soviet intentions regarding Japan
and China.
Stress that the SALT agreement is the kind of progress on arms
control by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. for which Japan expressed a
desire when they signed the NPT.
- Ask them what they foresee in terms of future Japanese-Soviet
relations, the prospects for a peace treaty, and possible U.S. -Japan
joint ventures in Siberia.
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-- Assure them that the U.S. supports Japanese claims to the
Northern Territories,
3. Vietnam
-- Give them a current assessment of the situation in Vietnam, as
well as any insight you may have as to the intentions of the Hanoi
leader ship.
4. The Emerging Order
Describe how you see the world after the Peking and Moscow
summits, especially in Asia and with special reference to the U.S. -
Japan relationship and multipolarity.
-- Reassure them that our security commitment to Japan remains
firm, and that we do not expect Japan to undertake military commit-
ments beyond its own borders.
- - Explain that the U.S. interest in adjusting our basic relationship
toward greater equaliiy, inter-dependence, and reciprocity is aimed
at making our alliance more sustainable over the long term, and is
in no way a subterfuge for pressing Japan to stand by itself.
Reassure the group that the U.S. intends to play a vital balancing
role in Asia, and will maintain the mix of ground, naval, and air
forces in the area necessary to make that role effective.
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CONFIDENTIAL
4P
Meeting With Senior News Editors
The media organizations represented at this meeting cover the spectrum
in Japan. Yorrxiuri and Asahi are probably the most stridently anti-establish-
ment, anti-government and, given the government's close ties with the
U.S., are the least sympathetic to the U.S., particularly on Vietnam and
the U.S. -Japan security tie. Sankei in the past year or two has changed
from its earlier pro-U.S. bias. At the other end of the spectrum is the
pro-government Japan Times, which because it publishes only an
English-language edition is of relatively small influence. (Several others
such as Mainichi and Yorniuri also publish English-language editions, but
these are quite different in news and editorial content than their
Japanese-language editions.) Also included in this group is Japan's
leading news commentator, Mr. Ogata. Speaking most generally, however,
Japanese media tend to be heavily critical of the Liberal Democratic Gov-
ernments, and usually of,the U.S. as well.
You can expect a sharply probing, well-informed reception, and what they
write will probably be balanced toward the negative side. They will almost
certainly press for the content of your discussions with Sato and Fukuda,
but will also be particularly interested in your global and regional
perspectives, China and its relationship with the Soviet Union, and how you
see Japan relating to all of this.
Your Talking Points
Outline your views of the emerging multipolar system in Asia
and the world, and in what manner Japan might relate to this
evolving order.
Reassure the group that the U.S. continues to attach the highest
value to its alliance with Japan, intends to stand by its defense
commitment to Japan, and sees no contradiction between these
intentions and the 1.T.S. effort to improve relations with the PRC.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL 2
? Explain that the U.S. interest in adjusting our basic- relationship
with Japan toward greater equality and reciprocity is directed toward
making our alliance more sustainable over the long haul.
-- Reassure the group that the U.S. firmly intends to stay in Asia
and the Pacific to play a balancing role, and will retain a mix of
forces required to make this role effective.
-- Explain the U.S. commitment to Vietnam, particularly our response
to the current North Vietnamese offensive.
CONFIDENTIAL
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SENIOR EDITORS
Sunday, June II, 1972
Mr. Moto? Goto, Managing Editor, Asahi Press
Mr. Shinji Sakai, Managing Editor, Kyodo Press
Mr. Teruumi Nagata, Executive Director, Sankei Press
Mr. Johei Tachibana, Managing Editor, Jiji Press
Mr. Kiyoaki Murata, Managing Editor, Japan Times
Mr. Ichiro Hotta, Managing Editor of TokyoHdqs. Chunichi Press
Mr. Yasuo Takeyama, Director, Chief Editor & Chief Editorial
Writer, Nihon Keizai Press
Mr. Akira Ogata, Chief Commentator, NFIK
Mr. Eiichi Saito, Chief Editor, Mainichi Press
Mr. Tsutomu Shiragarni, Chief Editorial Writer, Yomiuri Press
Mr. Kazushige Hirasawa, Former Editor Japan Time, & NI-IK
Commentator
Mr. Goro Fujise, NHK
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CONFIDENTIAL
Socialist Party Leaders
It is only recently with the emergence of some good younger people in
the Japanese Socialist Party that Americans have found it useful to
talk to the Party's leadership. The Party's Secretary General,
Mr. Ishibashi, is one of the more worthwhile Socialists, and has a
broader world view than almost any of the others because of his years
as head of the Party's international section. In the presence of the
Party Chairman, Mr. Narita, however, it is unlikely that he will speak
up in any spontaneous way. Narita himself has always appeared to be
the hide-bound Marxist ideologue and he has occasionally lectured
visiting Americans on our ideological sins. His Party has been too
distressed by internal wrangling to serve as any kind of a threat ?
beyond harassment -- to the LDP. It is unlikely they will be much
interested in economic affairs.
Suggested Talking Points
Outline your views on the emerging multipolar system in Asia,
and in what ways Japan might relate to this evolving international
order.
-- Reassure the group that the U.S. continue to attach the highest
value to its alliance with Japan, intends to stand by its defense
commitment to Japan, and sees no contradiction between these
intentions and the U.S. effort to improve relations with the PRC.
-- Reassure the group that the U.S. intends to continue to play a
vital balancing role in Asia, and will maintain the mix of forces
required to make that role effective.
C ONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL 2
-- Explain the U.S. commitment to Vietnam, particularly our
response to the current North Vietnamese offensive.
To derive the full flavor from this conversation, draw Mr. Narita
out as regards Japan's domestic political situation, the U.S. -Japan
relationship, and Japan's future role in Asia and the world.
CONFIDENTIAL
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SECRET
Meeting With Former. Foreign Ministers: Miki, Fujiyama, Aichi,
Ohira, Shiina and Kosaka
This meeting will provide you with the opportunity to meet two Prime
Ministerial aspirants, Ohira and Miki. Ohira heads the fairly strong
faction he inherited from former Prime Minister Ikeda, which places
him in the LOP Mainstream, though not in its inner circles. Recent
reports indicate that he will throw his weight behind Tanaka's candidacy,
but there is still an outside chance that Ohira might emerge as a dark
horse candidate if, as seems quite possible, the first ballot at the Party
Convention produces a deadlock. A more likely outcome is that he would
be Foreign Minister to Tanaka should he win. Less aggressive than
Tanaka or Fukuda, Ohira is skilled in the art of Japanese-style con-
sensual politics. As Foreign Minister in 1963-66, he was in his dealings
with the U.S. Government consistently a reliable, cooperative counterpart.
Mild, who was Sato's Foreign Minister during the period when the Korean
agreement was worked out and the discussion on Okinawa Reversion began,
heads his own faction. A perennial candidate, he ran against Sato in
the last two party elections. As a leader of the anti-Mainstream group
within the LDP, he is less committed to the alliance with the U.S. and
more inclined toward independent initiatives than the heretofore
predominant Mainstreamers.
The others are less important. You will already have met Kosaka at
the luncheon with the LOP executives; he is an Ohira faction ma tx? whose _
position as LDP Policy Board Chairman is,due more to his standing within
the Ohira faction than to his own abilities. He is, however, friendly to
Americans. Aichi, a very decent man, is a faithful Sato follower. His
work is negotiating the Okinawa Treaty with us has been appreciated by
both governments, although he lost considerable face over his Ministry's
failure to anticipate our China initiative. Fujiyarna, who negotiated the
Security Treaty with us as Kishi's Foreign Minister, has since turned
against the Kisbi-Sato line, and has attempted to create a position for
himself as the best LDP connection to Peking. The Chinese, however,
have a clear view of his influence and are apparently only stringing him
along. Shiina, a workman-like Foreign Minister well liked by the Foreign
Ministry professionals, is not a prominent factor in LDP politics.
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SECRET
Of this group, Fujiyama and Mild have recently been to Peking, and
both advocate acceptance of Peking's conditions for a discussion of
normalization of relations. These men should be approached on about
the same basis as the Mizuta-Kosaka-Nakasone group.
Suggested Talking Points
1. China Policy
-- Express regret (this word is important) that our need for secrecy
did not permit us to consult with the Japanese Government before the
July 15 announcement and indicate understanding of the political
problems caused for the LDP leadership.
-- Assure them we wish to minimize any conflict in our approaches
to Peking and intend to consult closely on future steps and developments.
-- Describe the atmospherics of your meetings in Peking with
Mao and Chou.
-- Explain the Shanghai Communique, especially the section of
Japan and Taiwan.
Describe our policy toward Taiwan, especially the importance
we place on its continued economic viability and that it not be
isolated internationally.
SECRET
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SECRET
? Draw them out on the status of Japan's efforts to establish
contacts with Peking, and how they believe Japanese investment
in Taiwan can be protected over the long term.
-- Ask their opinions as to possible points of friction in our
approaches to China, and how we can best prevent the Chinese
from playing the U.S. and Japan off against each other.
Z. Policy Toward the Soviet Union
-- Give them your general assessment of the Moscow summit
and discuss what you believe to be Soviet intentions regarding
Japan and China.
-- Stress that the SALT agreement is the kind of progress on
arms control by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. for which the Japanese
expressed a desire when they signed the NPT.
Ask them what they foresee in terms of future Japanese-Soviet
relations, the prospects for a peace treaty and possible U.S. -Japan
joint ventures in Siberia.
Assure them that the U.S. supports Japanese claims to the
Northern Territories.
1110
SECRET
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SECRET
3. Vietnam
4
-- Give them a current assessment of the situation in Vietnam as
well as any insight you may have as to the intentions of the Hanoi
leadership.
4. The Emerging Order
? Describe how you see the world after the Peking and Moscow
summits, especially in Asia and with special reference to the U.S. -
Japan relationship and rnultipolarity.
-- Reassure them that our security commitment to Japan remains
firm and that we do not expect Japan to undertake military
commitments beyond its own borders.
-- Explain that the U.S. interest in adjusting our basic relationship
toward greater equality, inter-dependence, and reciprocity is aimed
at making our alliance more sustainable over the long term, and is
not a formula for pressing to attenuate its ties with us and to stand
by itself.
-- Reassure the group that the U.S. intends to play a balancing
role in Asia, and will retain the mix of forces in the area required
to make that role effective.
SECRET
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CONFIDENTIAL
Minister of International Trade and Industry
Kakuei Tanaka
The rough-hewn Tanaka is running hard for the Prime Ministership.
The Japanese press will assess your meeting with him as an effort
to size him up as a potential Prime Minister and will be eager for
any hint of the outcome of your discussion as it bears on this
situation. Tanaka will have difficulty resisting the temptation to
exploit this to his own advantage. He is a member of Sato's own
political faction and should Sato step aside, Tanaka would contest
with former Chief Cabinet Secretary Hon i for control of it.
Tanaka alone of Mainstream LDP politicians has avoided close contact
with Americans, and his views on our security relationship, on Chinese
affairs and on other matters of major concern are not well known.
Tanaka is the quintessential political tactician. He hade his greatest
impression as Secretary General of the LDP during the 1965-66 and
1968-71 periods, and his stock with Sato has risen recently because he
has successfully undertaken several tough jobs for Sato (the textile
agreement with us and settlement of the defense budget squabble in
the Diet) at considerable risk to his own prestige.
Tanaka like to project the image of a youthful, vigorous defender of
Japan's interests. Possessed of a considerable ego, he is very
publicity conscious. Be certain to agree with him in advance on what
may or may not be said to the press.
1. Major Political and Security Issues
Tanaka will probably be less interested and informed than Sato and
Fukuda on the Chinese, Soviet, and other major international issues,
but will nonetheless want to discuss them with you. Given our relative
lack of knowledge of his views in this area, you should try to draw him
out on these problems.
A. China
-- We regret (in the Japanese context the term implies no admission
of guilt, but only an understanding of their problem) that our need
for secrecy did not permit us to consult with Japan before the
CCVNIVT TIWTVT'T A T
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CONFIDENTIAL 2
July 15 announcement, and our understanding of the political
problems the China issue has caused the Sato Government.
-- Our China initiative is not an attempt to play Japan off
against China.
-- We wish to avoid conflict in our approaches to Peking, and
intend to consult closely on future steps and developments.
-- We made no secret deals during the China trip, and we took
no actions that compromise Japan's basic interests.
-- Explain the Shanghai Communique, especially the sections
on Japan, Taiwan, and Korea.
-- While we recognize the importance of China policy to Japan,
particularly at this point, and while we fully intend to consult
closely on this question, you believe that we must not allow
China to obscure other important aspects of our relationship.
B. Soviet Union.
-- Review for Tanaka the President's Moscow visit and the
agreements reached there.
-- Give Tanaka your assessment of Moscow's intentions regarding
regional security arrangements, both in Europe and Asia.
-- Give Tanaka your assessment of Sino-Soviet relations.
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CONFIDENTIAL
C. Korea
3
? We will stand behind our defense commitment to the ROK, and
do not intend to reduce our forces there further in the foreseeable
future.
-- We will support the efforts of the ROK to seek a relaxation of
tensions and increased communication on the Korean Peninsula.
- - We welcome the direct discussion between North and South Korea
as what we hope will be the beginning of a long-term process of
relaxation of tensions between the two.
? We believe it is too early to conclude that Pyongyang has firmly
committed itself to long-term peaceful accommodation with
Seoul, and to know to what extent Peking and Moscow can and will
restrain Pyongyang if necessary. Therefore, we should move
cautiously.
? We should also avoid those moves that could seriously undermine
political cohesion in South Korea, or could help Pyongyang drive
wedges between South Korea, Japan, and the U.S.
-- We are presently exploring strategy and tactics on the Korean
question in next fall's UN General Assembly, and are coordinating
with ROK, Japan and others. Postponement of the question this
CCINVITYRNTTAT,
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CONFIDENTIAL 4
year as last would have the advantage of not undercutting the
Seoul-Pyongyang talks and injecting another irritant into our
relations with Peking and Moscow. But we must also consider
fallback positions.
D. Vietnam
-- Express appreciation for the understanding and support of the
Japanese Government for our efforts in Vietnam over the years,
and particularly following the President's May 8 speech.
Give Tanaka the rationale for the basic U.S. commitment in
Vietnam, as well as that for our response to the current
North Vietnamese offensive, stressing the position articulated
in the President's May 8 speech.
E. The Multipolar World
? Describe in general terms how you see the multipolar world
emerging in the next decade, stressing Asia. What we hope to
see is a relationship of equals, and not the perpetuation of
traditional balance of power concepts.
-- Reassure Tanaka that the U.S. fully intends to play an effective
role as a power in Asia and the Pacific over the long term, and
that we will maintain the balance of ground, naval, and air forces
necessary to do this.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL 5
-- Assure Tanaka of the importance we attach to maintaining
our close ties with Japan.
-- Explain to Tanaka the vital role we believe Japan can play in
Asia, particularly as regards economic and technical develop-
ment, but also in Asia's political councils. (Specifying the
roles we envisage for Japan as essential, inasmuch as some
Japanese believe that what they see as our failure to do so in
the past year indicates that we are encouraging japan to move
toward a regional security role in Asia.)
? Explain that the U. S. interest in adjusting the basic relation-
ship with Japan toward greater equality, inter-dependence, and
reciprocity is aimed at putting our alliance on a more sustainable
basis over the long term.
F. NPT
? Express the views of the Administration on the NPT: we signed
it and we favor it; we favor other countries accepting it; but we
believe that others should make their own decisions on the
grounds that the NPT suits their national interests.
-- Note the salutary influence this would have, however, on
limiting the international arms race. It would also tend to
defuse Chinese suspicions of Japanese militarism.
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CONFIDENTIAL
? Reassure Tanaka that our security commitment to Japan will
remain firm, and will serve as an adequate deterrent
against all threats to Japan.
U. S. japan Bilateral Economic Issues
Tanaka will expect you to review economic issues in a general way with
him, and it would seem strange to him if you did not.
-- The U. S. intends to pursue its effort to persuade Japan to remove
trade barriers, particularly quotas illegal (under the GATT),
both through diplomatic channels, and in the GATT.
-- Although Japan has made considerable progress in liberalizing
inward investments, we would hope that the GOJ will permit
full foreign capital participation in all Japanese industries.
? We welcome Japan's cooperation in examining and formulating
recommendations for revising the international monetary
system.
-- The U. S. is mounting a major effort to promote U. S. exports,
and we would believe that it is important that the Government
of japan assist us in increasing our exports to Japan.
-- The U. S. is controlling its inflation, and thus is gradually recovering
the stability essential to the world trading system. Japan's
cooperation is appreciated.
e4rms11,TM,1-1-M1tl"1,T A T
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SECRET
University Professors
This group represents Japan's leading .commentators on domestic politics,
security problems and international relations. While most of the people on
this list are basically conservative in outlook, their views cover a wide
political spectrum. They are listed as academics, which is true enough,
but it should be recognized that Japanese professors contribute widely to
the public print. Unless clearly enjoined from doing so, virtually every
one on this list will feel iMpelled to publish something about this meeting.
China and U.S. -Japan relations, especially the security area, will be the
fields of specific interest.
Suggested Talking Points
Outline your views of the emerging multipolar system in Asia
and the world and in what manner Japan might relate to this
evolving order.
-- Reassure the group that the U.S. continues to attach the highest
value to its alliance with Japan, intends to stand by its defense
commitment to Japan, and sees no contradiction between these
intentions and the U.S. effort to improve relations with the PRC.
-- Explain that the U.S. interest in adjusting our basic relationship
with Japan toward greater, equality and reciprocity is directed toward
making our alliance more sustainable over the long haul.
Reassure the group that the U.S. firmly intends to stay in Asia
and the Pacific to play a balancing role, and will retain a mix of
forces required to make this role effective.
SECRET
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SECRET 2
-- Explain the U.S. commitment to Vietnam, particularly our
response to the current North Vietnamese offensive.
-- Tell them that you well understand Japan's reasons for not
undertaking a military role beyond its borders, and the dangers
of an independent Japanese nuclear capability.
? Ask them for their views on U.S. -Japan economic problems.
Ask them for their suggestions on how American studies in J pan might
be improved.
Express regret that your present responsibilities do not permit
you more time to meet and exchange views with intellectuals in Japan.
SECRET
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NAME
Shinkichi ETOH
Shinpei FUJIMAKI
Tadao ISHIKAWA
Fuji KAMIYA
Masa.nori KIKUCHI
Masataka KO HSAKA
Yohnosuke NAGAI
Mineo NAKAJIMA
Michio ROHYAMA
Takashi SAITOH
UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS
Luncheon -- June 12, 1972
(in alphabetical order)
TITLE ORGANIZATION
Professor University. of Tokyo (China exp.)
Assistant Professor Tokai University
Professor Keio University (China expert)
Professor Keio University
Assistant Professor University of Tokyo (Soviet exp.)
Professor
Professor
Assistant Professor
Professor
Professor
Yoshikazu SAKAMOTO Professor
Hiroharu SEKI
Hayao SHIMIZU
Hajime TERASAWA
Kei WAKAIZUMI
Professor
Lecturer
Professor
Representative
Kyoto University
Tokyo Institute of Technology
Tokyo University of Foreign
Studies (China expert)
Sophia University
Gakushuin University
University of Tokyo
University of Tokyo
Meiji University (Soviet expert)
University of Tokyo
Tokyo Office of Kyoto
Sangyo University
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