MEETING ANGOLAN CONTINGENCIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-104-6-1-8
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 24, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/29: LOC-HAK-104-6-1-8
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Meeting Angolan Contingencies
DOS Review
Completed.
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. XGDS-2
~SIS
May 24, 1975
TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: P - Mr. Sisco
FROM: AF - Nathaniel Davi
In a recent series of memoranda to you, AF
has assessed Angolan developments and has suggested
a range of choices available to us to meet a series
of unfolding. scenarios. This paper sets forth
recommendations as to specific courses of action
in three contingent situations most likely to
obtain over the next few months. For purposes of
this paper, the enclave of Cabinda is considered
an integral part of Angola proper.
Contingency Two represents a progressive
worsening of the current situation as described in
Contingency One. Contingency Three stands alone it could conceivably erupt at any time, from any
given set of circumstances. However, whichever
contingency obtains, and even in the case.of in-
creased Soviet arms shipments to MPLA, it is un-
likely that any one faction or combination of
factions would be able to eliminate the other as
an effective political force.
Ideally, we,would wish the situation to remain
as in Contingency One or, if the situation deteriorates,
to return to it. Therefore, our recommendations aim
at returning to Contingency One with a relative
standoff .n the power balance, a tuation that we
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believe to be generally favorable to our interests
and which meets our overall objective of containing
the conflict and maintaining a balance of power in
which political accommodation is both possible and
necessary. In any case, we do not believe that
.U.S. interests in Angola are strong enough to
warrant a high level of U.S. involvement or a sig-
nificant commitment of U.S. resources, particularly
.'in providing arms, which in the last analysis is
the type of assistance most desired by all contend-
ing factions.
. Contingent Situation 1
. The situation remains relatively unchanged from
what it is now through independence (November 11)
with no significant realignment of the power fac-
tors and occasional outbreaks of serious, but
limited, violence. Although in absolute terms all
three liberation movements would gain both military
and political strength, they would remain in the
same relative proportion to each other, and the
situation would remain basically a standoff with no
one achieving a dominant military or political
position. Soviet material assistance to the MPLA
would remain at its current level (exact volume
unknown). The Portuguese would remain in the back-
ground but would be prepared, however reluctantly,
-_~ to interpose military forces in the event of spreading
violence. The January agreement between the three
liberation groups and Portugal would be modified,
but would continue to provide for a coalition govern-
ment both before and after independence. Together
FNLA and UNITA would remain in a position to check
the MPLA. All parties would make achieving independence
w on schedule their, first priority.
U.S. Objectives
To minimize the violence,-assuring the pro-
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/29: LOC-HAK-104-6-1-8
tection.b U.S. lives and property.
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--- Publicly encourage Portuguese efforts toward
peaceful transition, making clear we continue to
believe the problem is one to be resolved by Portugal
and the Angolans themselves.
-- Improve intelligence collection to determine
the volume of Soviet assistance to MPLA as accurately
as, possible.
-Risks
T influence a futuregovernment not to
take positions prejudicial to U.S. interests.
Toy prevent the Angolan situation from
deterioratin to the point of affecting the delicate
glance elsewhere in southern Africa.
Recommended Courses of Action:
Continue to avoid direct, overt involvement
in Angola's pre-independence struggle, but counsel
restraint, privately or publicly as opportunities
arise, e,g. during the next cycle of violence.
-- Carry out presently authorized program
looking to expenditure of $129,000 for support of
FNLA's Holden Roberto between now and November.
While this course might succeed in minimizing
violence now, the growing military strength of all
contenders would increase the potential for future
confrontation between them.
-= FNLA, and thus Zaire's Mobutu, might feel
this course provides insufficient support for their
ojective, i.e. denying politics control of Angola
to the MPLA.
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Contingent Situation 2
? At some future point, it becomes clear to us
that the balance is beginning to tip in favor of
MPLA; Portugal becomes openly partial to it; Soviet
.assistance to it increases; MPLA openly seeks
political control over Luanda and steps up political
,efforts in the countryside. FNLA and UNITA are at
an increasing material disadvantage because of
increasing Soviet arms supply to MPLA. Requests
to us for assistance (including arms), supported by
Zaire, become urgent. FNLA., encouraged by Zaire,.
prepares for pre-emptive strike against MPLA. The
potential for all-out armed confrontation grows.
U.S. Objectives
--Re-establish balance of forces.
Limit flow of external assistance to MPLA.
Contain potential for conflict to Angola.
Recommended Courses of Action:
-- Seek to dissuade Soviets from increasing.
assistance to MPLA; enlist Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana
ant perhaps other African countries in this effort.
in.a'parallel effort, seek to dissuade Zaire from
intervening militarily.
..I
-- In order to dampen down potential for all-out
confrontation, seek to discourage xre-emptive FNLA
strike.
-- In consultation with interested Africans,
suggest fo:+^ination of an inter-African, or international,
watt -..og-committee. to monitor, situation and make
recommendations.
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bbc.;"7X - L'IUU LD
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-- Consider the. advisability of consultation
with NATO and interested Africans in an attempt to
dissuade Portugal from actions that could lead
Angola to civil war and could thus seriously affect
Portugal's internal. situation.
Risks: (While some of the above recommended
actions could be taken under Contingent Situation
One, the attendant risk of exacerbating tensions
outweighs the advantages to be derived in a situation
which is still favorable to our overall interests.)
-- Would clearly identify our interests in the
area and open us to charges of interference.
-- Increased support to FNLA and UNITA, if
extended, could have reverse effect of exacerbating
tensions and stimulating a greater Soviet commitment.
-- Angolan liberation groups_might all reject
efforts to internationalize issue.
Contingent Situation 3
.fiLtMAt_ign deteriorates with widespread an
sua,tained fighting, andatotal breakdgw of exis -
i na administrative and political strggture3. Con-
fusion prevails and no faction gains the upper hand
-- in the short term. It is difficult at best for us
to determine the relative fortunes of the contesting
parties.
Each combatant calls for increased outside
support. Outside powers would be strongly tempted
to increase.assi.stance to their clients, i.e. the
Soviets and perhaps the Portuguese to the MPLA;
Zaire and possibly the PRC to the FNLA.
Zambia and Tanzania-step up-their efforts to
seek.a political solution. The OAU attempts to
modera&a.the situation. Portuga'. and some African
countries seek UN efforts to restore order.
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U. S. Objectives
Contain conflict to Angola in order to main-
-tain del cate balance in southern Africa.
-Limit outside involvement that might lead to
big power confrontation. -
Achieve a cease-fire in Angola.
-- .Divert conflict into diplomatic/ olitical
channels were our ability to influence the situation
woud enhanced.
--.Prevent MPLA takeover.
Recommended Courses of Action:
-- Actively encourage African efforts to achieve -
and monitor -- a cease-fire. Encourage and support
OAU efforts to restore order.
-- Work with interested Africans, the OAU, and/or
the UN to limit intervention of other African states
and to bring pressure on USSR and other arms suppliers.
Warn Soviets of potential for big-power con-
frontation inherent in situation.
-- If taken to the UN, support efforts to restore
order but resist any maneuvers by Soviets and/or Portu-
galto exploit UN action for the purpose of placing MPLA
in control.
- If foregoing efforts fail and it appears that
MPLA is ainin g the u er hand, review U.S. covert
support policyan levels with respect -to all factions.
Risks :
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/29: LOC-HAK-104-6-1-8
OAU efforts are unlikely to restore order.
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- USSR might seek U.S. concessions elsewhere
that we are not prepared to make.
-- UN action might provide increased opportunities
for Soviet influence in Angola.
Drafted: AF/S:SF'McDonald/AArenales
x28131:5/24/75
Concurrences :
INR/DDC - Mr. McAfee
(intelligence assessments)
EUR/IB-`-- Mr. Kelly;
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/29: LOC-HAK-104-6-1-8