COMMENTS ON EMBASSY KINSHASA CABLE ON ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-102-4-14-8
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: October 15, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-102-4-14-8
T
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET/NODIS
DOS, OSD Reviews
Completed
October 15, 1975
The Secr Lary /,
William G. Hyland' G
4-
Comments on Embassy Kinshasa Cable on Angola
The basic thrust of this critique and recommendations
(Tab A) is that we should limit out commitment in Angola because
the risk of becoming more deeply involved outweighs any
objectives that are within our grasp. The Embassy officers --
25X1
-- estimate that the present zoAl
policy has only the s immest chance of success; they fear that
unless we limit our commitment to Mobutu he will overreach
himself and the net result will be that either he will opt
out after achieving his own immediate aims, or that he will
go so far that his position in Zaire will be endangered.
1. Objectives
The Embassy officers start with a statement of our
maximum objectives: to block a communist or communist-dominated
government in Angola, and to remain ostensibly neutral in doing
-- This ignores some other aspects: to demonstrate to
Mobutu and Kaunda (and other Africans) that we are not paralyzed,
that as a great power we will stand against the intrusion of
Soviet power.
-- This is especially important if Zaire is in a shaky
position; certainly, Mobutu is more likely to turn against the
US if he thought we were passive observers and had no concern
at all about his problems than if we make some effort to help
him.
2. Risks
The risks described by the Embassy are self-evident ones:
(1) Mobutu may opt for a narrow solution preserving his own aims;
SECRET/NODIS
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(2) Zaire could overcommit itself, and destroy Mobutu's own
regime; (3) a Zairian grab for Cabinda would compromise his
image and jeopardize his American and European financial
assistance; (4) we could lose Congressional support, especially
for an extended or escalating commitment, and this is precisely
the required kind of commitment to win, if the Soviets have
the determination to outlast us; (5) we lose credibility if,
having supported friendly forces in Angola, we are forced to
climb down; (6) too close an involvement with Mobutu in an
unpopular involvement in Angola will jeopardize our relations
with a successor.
The risks of the present course would have to be weighed
against the risks of any alternative: for example, it is
likely that Zaire will opt for its own solution in any case;
that Cabinda is clearly up for grabs; that we lose credibility
if we take no action, just as much as if we make some effort;
Congressional support cannot be an overriding criterion,
since it can oscillate on any given issue, and would probably
not be opposed to success.
The only serious analytical point is the danger of
Mobutu's going too far because he will assume that we have
given him a blank check. This is a valid appreciation of the
risks, and certainly one that has to be faced as the present
commitment is exhausted.
3. Recommendations
The Embassy recommendation seems naive, or, if not naive,
almost guaranteed to produce the results they warn against.
Their recommendations are: (1) fix a sustainable level of
involvement with fail-safe check points such as no shipment of
US-supplied weapons, no advisors; (2) inform Mobutu, Savimbi
and Roberto that our support is not unlimited; (3) make clear
to Mobutu that too open and deep involvement in Angola could
jeopardize US and other bilateral financial assistance; (4) spell
out the following objectives to Mobutu: (a) settle for less
than optimum, i.e., a coalition government; (b) the US advocates
free elections in Angola and Cabinda; (c) US does not encourage
Mobutu to take action in Cabinda; (5) continue to "challenge
the communist initiative" -- but make an international demand
for a ceasefire and negotiations under US auspices; (6) lobby
for free elections.
SECRET/NODIS
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SECRET/NODIS
If we were to adopt this course, then all the major
participants would have to conclude that we were close to
opting out altogether: explaining the limit of our commitment
at this time can only be read in this way; calling for free
elections and hinting we can accept a coalition, at this
critical juncture, can only guarantee that each of our
will conclude we are looking for a way out and
,participants
suggesting they do the same. In this case, the Embassy's
prediction of failure almost certainly would then prove correct.
Overall, this seems a typical "dissent": a fairly well-
reasoned critique, but limp and. with almost meaningless alterna-
tive policy suggestions.
The Present Prospects
Leaving aside this message, however, the outlook is not
promising:
-- It is highly unlikely that either the FNLA or UNITA
will gain any significant ground between now and the Portuguese
withdrawal.
-- MPLA will have a strong territorial and military
position, and will gain the recognition of a large number of
African and Soviet bloc countries.
-- FNLA and Mobutu will not acquiesce in MPLA domination;
some level of fighting will continue; Savimbi will be more of
a question mark, but will probably continue in opposition to
the MPLA.
--- Alast--minute facade of coalition might be arranged by
the OAU, but it will not last.
Thus, the Embassy is correct in a sense in raising the
question of the limits of our commitment in the political
circumstances that are likely to prevail in mid-November.
The outlook is for a continuing civil war and a temporary
partition of Angola. Over time, the MPLA, assuming strong
Soviet support, will gain control over most of the country,
forcing Savimbi to come to terms, especially if Kaunda believes
he must deal with the MPLA for access to the sea; in this case,
Mobutu will probably also look to a settlement, and probably
seize Cabinda -- or have it occupied by FLEC elements he
controls --.in the process.
SECRET/NODIS
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-102-4-14-8
 Ah
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SECRET/NODIS
The main point for the US is that the African partici-
pants should not be led to this conclusion because they find
us a weak reed; if they choose to live with the MPLA in
Angola, it must be their decision and not ours.
SECRET/NODIS
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SECRETJSESI11VE
"r na## u
EYES ONLY ~
initiated, within the framework of the Rockwell Report,
results of the dialogue mentioned above."
b. "We will keep you informed of our proposed dis-
cussions and will offer recommendations based on the
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22/08: LOC-HAK-102-4-14-8 GROUP
x
EYE ONLY PAPEI70
I5 OCT1915
there to discuss a
REPORT: WORKING GROUP ON ANGOLA
that General Rockwell return 25X1
is the threat a perceives from Uganda and from Sudan, and for
t}, i c raaCnn he would prefer instead that the U.S. equip a
as soon as pos- 25X1
Bible.
2. 'Mobutu attributed his change in priorities largely
to Soviet influence over Ugandan President Amin. Mobutu said
he was furious about Amin's speech against Israel and on
Angola at the United Nations General Assembly as it was a
complete reversal of the position Amin had assured Mobutu he
would take. Mobutu interprets the reversal as evidence of
Soviet manipulation, making it necessary that Mobutu protect
47
.his flanks against Amin. In this regard, Mobutu noted partic-
ular concern about the lengthened Ugandan air strip at Arua,
on the border of Zaire. The threat from Sudan, said Mobutu,
is the two military bases near the border in northeastern
Zaire which could be used for aggression against Zaire.
Consequently, Mobutu now would like to discuss with General
Rockwell U.S. military assistance to respond specifically to
the danger of attack from both Uganda and Sudan.
3. The Charge advised of Mobutu's 25X1
request, and they asked that their views on.it be brought to
the attention of Ambassador Vance and the Working Group:
a. "In view of the constantly changing requirements
on the part of the Zairian Government, it would seem that
the return of General Rockwell at this time would be
premature. His return may indicate to Mobutu that the
U.S. Government commitment is open ended, and that we
are prepared to satisfy all perceived needs. Accordingly,
we propose to suggest to Mobutu that discussions be
WARtW G NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
sEcR~tIsr~sstIVE
rittrA M V
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