POLITICAL DISCONTENT IN SOUTH YEMEN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-56-1-2-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 18, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Tae'. Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
(National Security Affairs)
Political Discontent in South Vietnam
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gents Agency, may be of value to you in placing the recent flare-up
1. The attached memorandum, prepared within the Central Intelli-
of opposition political activity in South Vietnam in perspective. It
concludes that while the recent agitation does not represent a serious
or immediate threat to President Thieu, political unrest is likely to
continue and may intensify, especially as next fall's presidential
election in South Vietnam approaches.
2. We are sending copies of this memorandum to Secretary
Schlesinger, Deputy Secretary Clements, General Brown, and Deputy
bS.asiztant Secretary Abramowitz in the Department of Defense, and to
Deputy Secretary Ingersoll, Assistant Secretary Habib and Deputy
Assistant Secretary Miller in the Department of State. We are also
sending copies to the Directors of DIA and INR.
cc: Secretary Schlesinger
Deputy Secretary Clements
General Brown
Deputy Assistant Secretary Abramowitz
Deputy Secretary Ingersoll
Assistant Secretary Habib
Deputy Assistant Secretary
General Graham
Mr. Hyland
SAC ET
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Intelligence Memorandum
Political Discontent in South Vietnam
MORI/CDF
C02720712
pages 2-12
Secret
November 18, 1974
No. 1147/74
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November 18, 1974
Political Discontent in South Vietnam
Key Judgments
The recent upsurge of opposition political ac-
tivity in South Vietnam comes against a backdrop of
growing public frustration based primarily on wors-
ening economic conditions over the past two years.
The small radical opposition elements responsible
for the agitation and demonstrations of the past
two months do not represent a serious or immediate
threat to the authority of President Thieu and
there seems little reason to expect significant
erosion of his political position during the next
three to five months.
--Buddhist and Catholic activists are not
united and lack the full endorsement or ac-
tive backing of their respective Church hier-
archies.
--To date they have had far more success in
attracting foreign press coverage of their
activities than in converting public frustra-
tion into active opposition to the government.
President Thieu has been able to cope with
this level of opposition without resorting to se-
vere repressive measures.
Comments and queries on the contents of this pub-
Zication are welcome. They may be directed to
of the Office of
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--The government's policy of restraint has
created no martyrs and helped to protect Sai-
gon's image at home and abroad.
--Thieu is in position to deflate or preempt
some of the opposition charges. He has al-
ready taken some strong actions in shaking up
his cabinet and in sacking or transferring
large numbers of corrupt military officers.
--Most South Vietnamese do not now see an ac-
ceptable alternative to Thieu's policies re-
garding the war, the Communists, or the coun-
try's economic problems.
Over the longer term, political unrest and
opposition could become a growing problem for the
government. At a minimum, political agitation and
unrest is likely to continue, and may intensify, as
next fall's presidential elections near.
--Last summer's intensification of Communist
military pressure and the prospect of declin-
ing US assistance, however, have contributed
to a new sense of public pessimism regarding
the government's ability to cope with the
country's economic problems or to hold the
military line against the Communists.
In the final analysis, political stability in
Saigon will depend on things over which the present
political opposition has little control--the course
of the war, economic developments, and future US
aid levels.
--A combination of major military setbacks,
continuing economic decline and further.,re-
ductions in US assistance would cause popular.
pressure to mount for Thieu to step aside in
favor of a new government prepared to renego-
tiate the cease-fire.
S Rt1
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--Accommodation with the Communists would re-
quire extensive political and military conces-
sions on the part of Saigon which no signifi-
cant non-Communist political element would be
prepared to make today.
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Political Discontent in South Vietnam
The recent upsurge in political activity in
South Vietnam by Catholic and Buddhist. dissidents
and a number of less significant opposition elements
primarily reflects the grim economic situation which
has developed over the past two years in the South;
secondary factors are public frustration .over the
continuing hostilities, the poor prospects for peace,
public uncertainty regarding the future reliability
of American support, and the fact that. various op-
position elements are beginning to maneuver for
next year's national elections. The end.-of Ameri-
can military presence, declining levels. of US aid,
and a dramatic shift of population from r-ura.l to
urban areas have combined to magnify the impact of
worldwide inflation in South Vietnam .and.cr.e.ate a
substantial level of popular frustration and dis-
content in South Vietnam's cities. The standard
of living has been reduced, unemployment .h.as....ri-sen .
and the real income of urban residents and ,those
on fixed incomes has declined sharply.
Given this setting of economic hardship, it is
not surprising that the opposition has-focused its
attack against the government's failure to curb
corruption in official ranks. Corruption within
the government normally has been accepted. and
shrugged off as a tolerable evil. But at a time
when the Vietnamese people are being subjected to
bleak forecasts and repeated calls for belt tighten-
ing, Thieu and his administration are obviously
more vulnerable to attack on this issue. The gov-
ernment has not been blind to this problem and has
often engaged in anti-corruption campaigns in the
past. But the alacrity with which Thieu denied
recent opposition charges of corruption within his
immediate family and his action in removing large
numbers of corrupt military officers indicates that
he is increasingly concerned and recognizes that
this issue might serve as the catalyst for wide-
spread political ferment.
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7
The political dissidents now grabbing the head-
lines in South Vietnam include a small number of
Catholic and Buddhist hard core activists, disaf-
fected elements of the press and various small op-
position groups represented in the two houses of the
South Vietnamese legislature. They do not represent
the more moderate and influential political opposi-
tion which is unhappy with Thieu's refusal to
broaden the base of his government but unwilling
to contribute to political instability which could
play into the hands of the Communists. The two
most significant radical opposition groups, the
Catholic People's Anti-Corruption Movement and the
Buddhist National Reconciliation Force, have not
had any notable success thus far in tapping public
frustration or converting it into active opposition
to the government. The vast bulk of the urban and
rural population has been untouched by political
agitation and the foreign press has exaggerated
the size of opposition demonstrations. Neverthe-
less, the small number of Buddhist and Catholic
activists who comprise the hard core of their move-
ments are continuing to organize in Saigon and the
provinces and appear determined to press their at-
tacks against the government.
By banding together, the various opposition
groups could achieve greater momentum and project
an image of greater political disarray-in South
Vietnam. There is, however, little precedent for
such opposition unity and no sign that an anti-
government united front will emerge anytime soon.
Another factor that has kept political agita-
tion in bounds has been the fence-sitting attitude
of the Catholic and Buddhist hierarchies toward
their respective opposition splinter groups. The
Buddhists view themselves as the principal polit-
ical as well as religious force in the South, and
they have not hesitated in the past to take to the
streets to protest government policies. In recent
years, however, this militancy has been moderated
by internal factionalism, the crushing defeat in
1966 of the last Buddhist political move against
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the government, and by a growing anti-Communist
orientation following the Hue massacres of 1968.
The leaders of the An Quang Buddhist faction would
like very much to pressure Thieu from office-before
next year's presidential elections. They want,
however, to be virtually certain of success before
actively committing themselves against Thieu.and
realize that the President's position is not yet
seriously weakened.
Another factor inhibiting aggressive Buddhist
action against Thieu is internal disunity. brought
on by personal rivalries within the Church leader-
ship. Such internal differences might eventually
be put aside, but this would be likely-only if a
combined Buddhist leadership senses a severe weak-
ening of Thieu's position.
The Catholic hierarchy, anti-Communist and
pro-government in the past, finds it difficult to
stand in open opposition against.Thieu. The Church
leadership has acknowledged that corruption is a
valid issue, but has avoided endorsement of .the
People's Movement Against Corruption.
The government has been able to cope with the
kind of opposition that has emerged so far without
having to resort to severe repressive measures.
In fact, President Thieu has thus farreacted.to
the demonstrations with restraint--a well-advised.
approach that has created no martyrs and protected
the government's image at home and -abroad., -If the
opposition begins to resort to more violent tactics
in order to provoke a confrontation on the streets
of Saigon, there is little doubt that the govern-
ment would adopt a harder approach. The massive
police presence in Saigon over the November 1 Na-
tional Day period and Thieu's implied warning in
his National Day speech that a tougher government
approach might be in the offing could be enough to
cause a slackening of opposition activities in the
weeks ahead.
Thieu's position vis-a-vis the political op-
position will become clearer by early next year.
By that time the now embryonic anti-government
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groups will have had ample time to develop whatever
potential exists for a well-rooted popular movement.
Much of the initial agitation represents..preliminary
maneuvering for next year's presidential and Lower
House elections. The prospect of another full.term
for Thieu could yet breathe some new life and unity
into the opposition and political agitation may in
crease if., as still seems likely, Thieu.declares
his candidacy for reelection.
On the other hand, the government may be in a
position to preempt or deflate some of the opposi-
tion issues in the next few months. On the critical
economic front there are a few short-termbr.ight
spots in the generally bleak outlook. A combination
of improved stocks and a good harvest this year
leaves South Vietnam in a strong food situation.
The Saigon retail price index has held relatively
stable for the past two months despite the polit-
ical disruptions that have occurred in the capital.
The short-term psychological boost provided by-re-
cent indications of an oil find in South Vietnamese
waters should also work in favor of the government.
Much will depend on the scope and effectiveness
of Thieu's response to opposition demands for re-
form. Thieu has moved to meet some of the.opposi-
tion's protests by his recent dismissal of his eco-
nomic ministers, his sacking of a large number of
corrupt military officers, his transfer .of some.
senior commanders, and his liberalization of press
censorship and political party and labor .regula-
tions. The reform measures that Thieu has taken
or could take in the future will not deter radical
opposition activists from pressing their attacks.
Their public impact, however, could undercut radi-
cal opposition efforts to attract wider popular
support in the months ahead.
The Longer Term
To date, President Thieu has been able to cope
with the current political agitation without great
difficulty. He continues to have the support of
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the military and there seems little reason to ex-
pect significant erosion of his political position..
during the next three to five months. Beyond this
time frame, the outlook is less certain.
It is difficult to translate popular frustra-
tion into concrete opposition potential or to gauge
the effect of war-weariness on a population that has
lived with war for 30 years. The South Vietnamese
population generally recognizes that pondi.tions and
prospects in Communist-controlled areas are bleak
and unacceptable. There is also a.general.recogni-
tion that no other group of South Vietnamese lead-
ers would be any more successful in securing greater
US or other foreign aid. Nevertheless, last sum-
mer's intensification of Communist military..pres-
sure and the prospect of diminishing US support
have contributed to a new sense of pessimism regard-
ing the Thieu government's ability to cope with the.
country's economic problems or to hold themilitary
line against the Communists. At this point, Thieu's
administration symbolizes to a small minority of
South Vietnamese the perpetuation of a "no win"
situation without hope for peace or economic im-
provement, and as the war grinds on this.feeling
could become more pronounced and widespread. At a
minimum, the high degree of economic ..and military
pressure the South is almost certain to face in
the years ahead will probably mean that frequent
demonstrations and protest actions will become a
familiar feature of the South Vietnamese -political
landscape in contrast to the relative calm of the
last two years.
Given President Thieu's firm control. of the,
levers of power and the present lack-of unity and
commitment of the opposition side, the government
should continue to be able to contain such polit-
ical pressures. But the risks of g.overnment.mis--
calculation, adverse publicity and Communist ex-
ploitation inherent in a high level of political
agitation will bring a new element of uncertainty
to the South Vietnamese situation.
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Over the longer term, future political develop-
ments in Saigon are highly problematical. Thieu'.s
continued authority, as well as the very survival
of the present South Vietnamese government, will de-
pend on factors over which the political opposition
has little control. If heavier Communist offensive
action in next year's dry season results in major
territorial gains and heavier government casualties,
a defeatist psychology could begin to take hold in
earnest and popular sentiment for change could be-
gin to snowball. A failure by the US Congress to
restore some of the cuts in US military assistance
for 1975 or future reductions in the overall level
of US aid could have a similar effect. Under such
extreme circumstances, Thieu's departure would be-
come a much greater possibility than it is today.
Thieu, unlike Ngo Dinh Diem, could well choose to
step down voluntarily or at the request of his mil-
itary colleagues in order to head off a full blown
political crisis which could paralyze the govern-
ment and play into the hands of the Communists.
The end result would be another military dominated
government with Prime Minister Khiem or some other
senior officer replacing Thieu.
The exact makeup of" a successor regime and its
policies would probably depend on the severity of
the situation facing South Vietnam. Such a govern-
ment might be prepared to explore the possibility
of renegotiating the cease-fire as a means of mol
lifying.anti--war sentiment and gaining respite
from Communist military pressure. But., any accom-
modation agreement with the Communists would require
extensive political and military concessions on the
part of Saigon which no significant non-Communist
South Vietnamese political element would be prepared
to make today. This lack of widely acceptable al-
ternatives to present policies regarding the war
and the Communists is a major obstacle to the de-
velopment of a more serious domestic opposition to
Thieu in the near future.
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