EARLY ANGOLA AID BY U.S. REPORTED
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
LOC-HAK-103-6-2-8
Release Decision:
RIFLIM
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date:
March 16, 2011
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 18, 1975
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/03/17: LOC-HAK-103-6-2-8
EARLY ANGOLA AID!
BYUI& REPORTED
Officials Say C.I.A. Received
Approval t0 Give Funds
Before Soviet Build-Up
By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Spiciaf to The New York Ttmes
WASHINGTON, Dec. 18-The
Ford Administration's initial
authorization for 'substantial
Central Intelligence Agency fi-
nancial?, operations inside An-
gola came- in January 1975,
more than two months, before
the first significant Soviet
build-up, well-informed officials
report.
It could not be learned on
what specific basis the agency
approval to deepen its clandes.
Won approval to deepen its elan
destine involvement in Angola
at that point, but William E.
ligence, told a secret Congres-
sional .hearing two months ago
that the January increase in
C.I.A. activity was negded to
match increased Soviet activity.
The Soviet Union has been
involved in Angola since 1956
but, according to well-informed
American intelligence officials,
did not substantially increase
its.support for one of the liber-
ation armies in Angola until
March and April of this year.
At that time at least two ship-
loads and two planeloads of
!Soviet war materiel were sent.
!.. Told of the Administration's
Continued From Page 1, Col. 2
decision, of January, 1975 a
number of Government officials
and lawmakers contended that
it was impossible without more
information to determine
whether the subsequent'Soviet
build-up had been purely ag-
gressive and expansionist, as
Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger and others have cone
tended, or whether it might
have been in part a Soviet re-
sponse to the action by the
United States.
$800,000 for Roberto
The Adminis,cation's hig;,-
level intelligence-review pan-
el, known as the 40 Commit-
tee, discussed Angola at its.!
January meeting -- the firiti
such discussion of the African
nation since the mid-1960's,
officials said. They said the
? group agreed to permit the,
C.I.A. to provide $300,000
clandestinely to Holden Rober-
to, the leader of one of three
factions now seeking control
of Angola.
At the time, Mr. Roberto,
whose links with the C.I.A.
began in 1961, was on a $10,-
1000-a-year agency retainer for
"intelligence collection," the
- officials said. Mr. Roberto
leads the National Front for
the ? Liberation of Angola,
which also has been aided: by.
Zaire and China.
During the same 40 Commit-
tee meeting in January, the, of-
ficials said, the C.I.A. unsuc-
cessfully also sought authority
to provide a $100,000 subsidy
secretly to Jonas Savimbi, lead-
er of the National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola.
At the time, the movements
led by Mr. Roberto and Mr.
Savimbi-since merged--were
trying to negotiate a settlement
with the Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola, a
third liberation group, which
has been, supported by arms
and aid from the Soviet Union
since its formation in 1956.
Those talks failed.
There was a sharp division
today among Government offi-,
ciai- and some lawmakers
about the significance of the
40 : ommittee's decision in Jan-
uary to increase the funds
available to Mr: Roberto,
Link to Mobutu Seen
Some officials belittled its
importance and argued that the
funds, which reportedly were
not meant ? for direct military
support, were supplied merely
to reassure President Mobutu
Sese Seko of Zaire that the
Ford Administration was not
going to permit the Popular
Movement to win the Angolan
civil war. Mr. Mobutu, who is
Mr. Roberto's father-in-law,
was an early advocate of Amer-
ican intervention.
Many others, including Sen-
ators and Representatives who
have.had,access to secret C.T.A.
briefings on Angola, believe
that disclosure of the January
';decision to increase the Amer-
ican involvetncet raises new
questions about which nation
- - the United States or the
Soviet Union -- initiated what
,uinside Angola. ?
"I think it's very important,', 1
one well-informed official ac-1
knowledged. "That money gave
him a lot of extra muscle. He'd
been sitting in Kinshasa for.;
nearly 10 years and all of a
sudden he's got a lot of bread
"
-he's beginning to do things.
Since the early 1960's Mr.,
Roberts had maintained his
headquarters in Kinshasa, the
capital of Zaire.
The official's point was that
the C.I.A. source of the re-
vitalized flow of funds for the
Roberto movement would be
quickly perceived by the Pop-
ular Movement and its Soviet!
supporters.
The disclosure further con-1
tradicts the insistence of Secre-
tary Kissinger in Senate testi-
mony that is still secret that
the State Department's Bureau
of African Affairs had, in of-'
feet, withheld information about
Angola. from him early this
year. He suggested that the
bureau had done so in an effort)
to limit the -options available]
to the Ford Administration.
In January Mr. Kissinger was
!secretary of State and also
President Ford's adviser on na-
tional security. As adviser, hel
was .chairman of the 40 Com-
mittee when the decision was
made to increase greatly the
C.I.A. cash subsidy to Mr.
Roberto.
Behind the Decisions
In an extensive recounting
of Washington's Angola deci;
sign-making, well-informed of-
ficials, also made these points:
C.I.A. statistics as of early
last month show that the agen-
cy. had paid $5.4 million to
ship what was listed as $10
,million in arms to Angola be-
tween late ? July and October.
The high shipping costs were
described by many knowledg-
eable officials as evidence that
the. agency had been systemati-,
clly underestimating the value!
of the weapons shipped thus
far, in an effort to make they
United States role, appear as'
minimal as possible.
The intelligence agency was
explicitly authorized by Pres-
ident Ford on July 27, 1975,
to begin a $500,000 information
program inside Angola as part
of a 40 Committee decision
to begin major shipments of
United States arms there.
The precise date of the 40
Committee's meeting in Janua-
ry, 1975, could not be learned,
but January was a pivotal
month, in Angola.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/03/17: LOC-HAK-103-6-2-8
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/03/17: LOC-HAK-103-6-2-8
NYI
-Soli.i;i u".ltical Pact 4 , y
On -. Jan. 5, leaders of the
three liberation movements met U
in Kenya and signed a political
accord that was viewed as pav-
ing a way for Independence
for the Portuguese territory.
On Jana 10 Portugal formally
agreed to. grant independence
in Angola in the following No-
vember.
On Jan. 31 the three libera-
.fion movements agreed to share
cabinets posts and power
equally with a Portuguese con-
tingent until . the formal date
of independence.
The three liberation, move-
ments further agreed to prepare
for and hold national elections
for a constituent assembly.
Those elections were never held,
however, as the coalition dis-
golved? over the next few
months and warfare broke out.
American officials were in-
terviewed repeatedly by corres-
;pondents of The New York
Times in ? rbcent weeks, but
,none suggested what Mr. Colby
and other CJ.A. officials have
said in recent secret briefings
iht Congress-~^-that Soviet build-
ups in Angola before this year
were in any way a factor in
the subsequent United States
decesion to intervene directly
in July 1975 with shipments of
arms and aid.
100 'Tons. of Arms
c
number of officials have said, the 40 Committee met on program to
the build the abilities
C.I.A. lobbied intensively said, United States role July 17, 1975. By then theand integrity of the forces con-
for in_ a Angola, larger justifying its argu- Popular Movement, using thejtrolled by Mr. Savimbi and Mr.
meri t on increased Soviet aetivi Soviet supplies shipped since RRoberto.
ties. Specifically, the C.I.A. was March, had seized firm control I tiThe dispatch of cash in two
seeking high-level approval to i of Luanda, Angola's . capital, stages to Angola, with $6 mil-
begin supplying funds directly tones a ewhereignificant vie-hand to $8 million in Stage be expended in to The
to Mr. Savimbi.
The matter was discussed at The Popular Movement waslsignificance of the two-tiered claimin control of
not a 40 Committee T11Cwith no Angola' 16 p ovinces. 11 of clear by then sou ces. made
airs, officials said, ~.--- --?-~~
these shipments, American of-'40 Committee to support both
ficials have contended up tolMr, Roberto and Mr. Savimbi
row, that led to rapid military would be perceived as an esca-
advances by the Popular Move- lation by the Soviet Union and
meat and the subsequent de- lead. in turn, to even more
cision by Secretary Kissinger involvement by the Russians.
land President Ford to intervene in Control of Luanda
directly. , Following the National Secu
Throughout the, spring, a C
1 review officials
More than 10 Otons of arms
were reported to have been
landed by Soviet planes in
-southern Angola and the Congo
in March and April. It was
resolution, although a full-scale
National Security Council study
of the issues and the various
options was authorized.
it was at this point, State I
Department sources said, that i
opposition to further United
States involvement was repeat-
edly raised by Nathaniel Davis,
then the Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs.
Mr. Davis, who resigned in
protest over the Administra-
n's policies on Angola, is
tw Ambassador to. Switzer.
'land. He explicitly argued in
The 40 Committee authorized
the following steps;
9The direct shipment of arms
to the forces led by Mr. Savim-
bt and Mr. Roberto and the re-
placement of arms that had
been previously supplied and
would continue to be supplied
by Zaire and Zambia, the two
neighboring African nations
that supported the American in-
tervention. It was agreed to
permit Zambia and Zaire to
provide as much non-American
equipment as possible at first
in order to minimize the overt
link with the United States.
qExposure through informa-
tion programs and other means
of the Soviet arming of the
Popular Movement, with em-
phasis on the possible embar-
rassment of African nations re-
laying the Russian arms or in
other ways serving as conduits
for such aid.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/03/17: LOC-HAK-103-6-2-8