EARLY ANGOLA AID BY U.S. REPORTED

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
LOC-HAK-103-6-2-8
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RIFLIM
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K
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2
Document Creation Date: 
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date: 
March 16, 2011
Sequence Number: 
2
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Publication Date: 
December 18, 1975
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OPEN SOURCE
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/03/17: LOC-HAK-103-6-2-8 EARLY ANGOLA AID! BYUI& REPORTED Officials Say C.I.A. Received Approval t0 Give Funds Before Soviet Build-Up By SEYMOUR M. HERSH Spiciaf to The New York Ttmes WASHINGTON, Dec. 18-The Ford Administration's initial authorization for 'substantial Central Intelligence Agency fi- nancial?, operations inside An- gola came- in January 1975, more than two months, before the first significant Soviet build-up, well-informed officials report. It could not be learned on what specific basis the agency approval to deepen its clandes. Won approval to deepen its elan destine involvement in Angola at that point, but William E. ligence, told a secret Congres- sional .hearing two months ago that the January increase in C.I.A. activity was negded to match increased Soviet activity. The Soviet Union has been involved in Angola since 1956 but, according to well-informed American intelligence officials, did not substantially increase its.support for one of the liber- ation armies in Angola until March and April of this year. At that time at least two ship- loads and two planeloads of !Soviet war materiel were sent. !.. Told of the Administration's Continued From Page 1, Col. 2 decision, of January, 1975 a number of Government officials and lawmakers contended that it was impossible without more information to determine whether the subsequent'Soviet build-up had been purely ag- gressive and expansionist, as Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and others have cone tended, or whether it might have been in part a Soviet re- sponse to the action by the United States. $800,000 for Roberto The Adminis,cation's hig;,- level intelligence-review pan- el, known as the 40 Commit- tee, discussed Angola at its.! January meeting -- the firiti such discussion of the African nation since the mid-1960's, officials said. They said the ? group agreed to permit the, C.I.A. to provide $300,000 clandestinely to Holden Rober- to, the leader of one of three factions now seeking control of Angola. At the time, Mr. Roberto, whose links with the C.I.A. began in 1961, was on a $10,- 1000-a-year agency retainer for "intelligence collection," the - officials said. Mr. Roberto leads the National Front for the ? Liberation of Angola, which also has been aided: by. Zaire and China. During the same 40 Commit- tee meeting in January, the, of- ficials said, the C.I.A. unsuc- cessfully also sought authority to provide a $100,000 subsidy secretly to Jonas Savimbi, lead- er of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. At the time, the movements led by Mr. Roberto and Mr. Savimbi-since merged--were trying to negotiate a settlement with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, a third liberation group, which has been, supported by arms and aid from the Soviet Union since its formation in 1956. Those talks failed. There was a sharp division today among Government offi-, ciai- and some lawmakers about the significance of the 40 : ommittee's decision in Jan- uary to increase the funds available to Mr: Roberto, Link to Mobutu Seen Some officials belittled its importance and argued that the funds, which reportedly were not meant ? for direct military support, were supplied merely to reassure President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire that the Ford Administration was not going to permit the Popular Movement to win the Angolan civil war. Mr. Mobutu, who is Mr. Roberto's father-in-law, was an early advocate of Amer- ican intervention. Many others, including Sen- ators and Representatives who have.had,access to secret C.T.A. briefings on Angola, believe that disclosure of the January ';decision to increase the Amer- ican involvetncet raises new questions about which nation - - the United States or the Soviet Union -- initiated what ,uinside Angola. ? "I think it's very important,', 1 one well-informed official ac-1 knowledged. "That money gave him a lot of extra muscle. He'd been sitting in Kinshasa for.; nearly 10 years and all of a sudden he's got a lot of bread " -he's beginning to do things. Since the early 1960's Mr., Roberts had maintained his headquarters in Kinshasa, the capital of Zaire. The official's point was that the C.I.A. source of the re- vitalized flow of funds for the Roberto movement would be quickly perceived by the Pop- ular Movement and its Soviet! supporters. The disclosure further con-1 tradicts the insistence of Secre- tary Kissinger in Senate testi- mony that is still secret that the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs had, in of-' feet, withheld information about Angola. from him early this year. He suggested that the bureau had done so in an effort) to limit the -options available] to the Ford Administration. In January Mr. Kissinger was !secretary of State and also President Ford's adviser on na- tional security. As adviser, hel was .chairman of the 40 Com- mittee when the decision was made to increase greatly the C.I.A. cash subsidy to Mr. Roberto. Behind the Decisions In an extensive recounting of Washington's Angola deci; sign-making, well-informed of- ficials, also made these points: C.I.A. statistics as of early last month show that the agen- cy. had paid $5.4 million to ship what was listed as $10 ,million in arms to Angola be- tween late ? July and October. The high shipping costs were described by many knowledg- eable officials as evidence that the. agency had been systemati-, clly underestimating the value! of the weapons shipped thus far, in an effort to make they United States role, appear as' minimal as possible. The intelligence agency was explicitly authorized by Pres- ident Ford on July 27, 1975, to begin a $500,000 information program inside Angola as part of a 40 Committee decision to begin major shipments of United States arms there. The precise date of the 40 Committee's meeting in Janua- ry, 1975, could not be learned, but January was a pivotal month, in Angola. No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/03/17: LOC-HAK-103-6-2-8 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/03/17: LOC-HAK-103-6-2-8 NYI -Soli.i;i u".ltical Pact 4 , y On -. Jan. 5, leaders of the three liberation movements met U in Kenya and signed a political accord that was viewed as pav- ing a way for Independence for the Portuguese territory. On Jana 10 Portugal formally agreed to. grant independence in Angola in the following No- vember. On Jan. 31 the three libera- .fion movements agreed to share cabinets posts and power equally with a Portuguese con- tingent until . the formal date of independence. The three liberation, move- ments further agreed to prepare for and hold national elections for a constituent assembly. Those elections were never held, however, as the coalition dis- golved? over the next few months and warfare broke out. American officials were in- terviewed repeatedly by corres- ;pondents of The New York Times in ? rbcent weeks, but ,none suggested what Mr. Colby and other CJ.A. officials have said in recent secret briefings iht Congress-~^-that Soviet build- ups in Angola before this year were in any way a factor in the subsequent United States decesion to intervene directly in July 1975 with shipments of arms and aid. 100 'Tons. of Arms c number of officials have said, the 40 Committee met on program to the build the abilities C.I.A. lobbied intensively said, United States role July 17, 1975. By then theand integrity of the forces con- for in_ a Angola, larger justifying its argu- Popular Movement, using thejtrolled by Mr. Savimbi and Mr. meri t on increased Soviet aetivi Soviet supplies shipped since RRoberto. ties. Specifically, the C.I.A. was March, had seized firm control I tiThe dispatch of cash in two seeking high-level approval to i of Luanda, Angola's . capital, stages to Angola, with $6 mil- begin supplying funds directly tones a ewhereignificant vie-hand to $8 million in Stage be expended in to The to Mr. Savimbi. The matter was discussed at The Popular Movement waslsignificance of the two-tiered claimin control of not a 40 Committee T11Cwith no Angola' 16 p ovinces. 11 of clear by then sou ces. made airs, officials said, ~.--- --?-~~ these shipments, American of-'40 Committee to support both ficials have contended up tolMr, Roberto and Mr. Savimbi row, that led to rapid military would be perceived as an esca- advances by the Popular Move- lation by the Soviet Union and meat and the subsequent de- lead. in turn, to even more cision by Secretary Kissinger involvement by the Russians. land President Ford to intervene in Control of Luanda directly. , Following the National Secu Throughout the, spring, a C 1 review officials More than 10 Otons of arms were reported to have been landed by Soviet planes in -southern Angola and the Congo in March and April. It was resolution, although a full-scale National Security Council study of the issues and the various options was authorized. it was at this point, State I Department sources said, that i opposition to further United States involvement was repeat- edly raised by Nathaniel Davis, then the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Mr. Davis, who resigned in protest over the Administra- n's policies on Angola, is tw Ambassador to. Switzer. 'land. He explicitly argued in The 40 Committee authorized the following steps; 9The direct shipment of arms to the forces led by Mr. Savim- bt and Mr. Roberto and the re- placement of arms that had been previously supplied and would continue to be supplied by Zaire and Zambia, the two neighboring African nations that supported the American in- tervention. It was agreed to permit Zambia and Zaire to provide as much non-American equipment as possible at first in order to minimize the overt link with the United States. qExposure through informa- tion programs and other means of the Soviet arming of the Popular Movement, with em- phasis on the possible embar- rassment of African nations re- laying the Russian arms or in other ways serving as conduits for such aid. No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/03/17: LOC-HAK-103-6-2-8