CHINESE OPPOSITION TO DRV HEGEMONY IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-117-3-2-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 57
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 26, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Autlint:ty 'L4 C",""
1KArdk
China analysts and many others tend to believe that t
opposed to North Vietnamese hegemony in Indochin.7.
intended to .pest evidence the contrary view
eIgncd toj un I:teemed about or even desires ev..4.
ornination of Indochina.
FRC is basically
:his paper is
China is either
I North Vietnamese
China fears that Hanoi and the area it contrc
fall under Sov
-- China also fears that a Hanoi-controlled Ind
a rival in Southeast Asia, or at least promote actic
PRC security such as provoking the Thais to lea,.
security. By implication, the PRC is concerned thz,
11 on the DRV and that Hanoi ? like Belgrade --
an independent position which could be contrary to Cl
e area. The North Vietnamese in the past have fix,
in any event their nationalism and historic anti-
could be hostile to PRC interests,
could someday
.la might become
at would affect
uottsiders" for
cannot force its
be able to assert
ese interests in
d Chinese advice,
:nese attitude
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A.tinii
ChIna therefore desies to Iith&t Ha.noi's expansion in Indochina,
to preserve viable, fairly autonomous states (at least in Laos and Cambodia)
and itself to plaq the primary power role in the region.
To prmote fts policy of a balkanized Indochina dependent on the PRC,
Peking has counseled rest rint South Vietnam nd heel championed Sihaneuk
in Cambodia. In Laos it has maintained correct but distant relations with
Souvanna Phottma and has built its own extensive road systems in the northern
part of the country. Apparently different Chinese perceptions of the situation
In Indochina reportedly hay; given rise to some frictions with. Hanoi -- as
evidence4 drjng Le D &s visit to Peking in June 1973.
The ease that China in fact favors or is indifferent to Hanoi's eventual
domination of Indochina rests in the following considerations:
? North Vietnamese hegemony is a far stronger..bulwark to Soviet
e etrati of Indochina than a fragrnented region by a collection of
autonomous governments, each susCeptible to ivioscow s influence. The
xencpholeic North Vietnamese traditionally have kept a tight reign on all
foreigners -- including the Russians. Despite its heavy dependency on the
Soviet Union since 1965, Hanoi has not allowed the Soviets to gain a position
in North Vietnam whith would be in any way inimical to Chinese interests.
Indeed, the North Vietnamese still appear ideologically more compatible
with their Chinese neighbors. than with the Soviets who have provided Hanoi
with the bulk of its hea:ey and expensive equipment. Presumably China's
nightmare -- and Moscow's dream would be a North Vietnamese grant
of base rights to theSoviets. Coneidering Hanoi's experiences with western
bases in Indochina, the proximity of China and the dictates of third world
imagery, It wozd appear extremely unlikely that the DRV would accept
Soviet se ui4.er .y circumstances and that therefore China knows it
n'ed not wry to well on this
th Vietnamese in
usly compromise Chinese interests.
A0i is overwhelming. (However, possible Sovi
factors would greatly inhibit direct application of this power against Han
The DRV shares a long border with China, and the Chinese still enjoy treaty
rights enabling them to use rail lines and roads leading from Kwangsi
Province through Hanoi to Yunnan Province. (The PRC in fact stationed
over 50,000 engineer and AAA troops along this route during the 1965-1968
bing period.) The P11C's ultimate leverage over Hanoi was highlighted
de ring the mining of the DRV' s ports last year when Peking enjoyed a
stranglehold over all imports into North Vietnam. Quite apart from this)
dochina could not
ower position vis-a-vis
eaction and other
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=kutlini ity
SEC RET
which it long
V have been compatible neighbors with no lasting dif-
cover, North Vietnam has never sought to emulate Yugoslavia,
garded as a renegade and traitor to riternatictnal Communism.
a.
Realist y, Peking cann'ot hope to play a dominant role direotlY in
each Indochinese state because it is Hanoi -- not Peking -- which created,
nurtured, enoadred and now sustains all three insurgencies. in the area.
Thealeadersiiip the,Illmer Rouge and the Pathet Lao are loyal first to
the DRY. Consequently, China has few wholly reliable assets of its own
on the ground and thus has little choice but to direct its influence through
Hanoi rather than build rival "apparatsuin Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.
-- Evidence suggesting Chinese opposition to a DRY hegemony can
support the equally plausible contention that Peking i$ concerned more
lad* the timing and tactics of DRY ascendency than in the goal of hegemony
Itself. The critical element in Chinese thinking is their perception of
1,44ted States policy in Indochina and -the extent to which we link detente
with untoward DRY actions in Indochina. China's advice to Hanoi thus
appears more in the nature of "go s1
an indefinite freeze on the current
Le Duan's visit last June did not invc
China overtly endoises -- but rather
in Indochina (e.g. U.S. and Soviet bite
.ipint
the present" rather than accept
quo. The by-play in Peking during
damental DRY goals -- which
ng assessments of the situation
, status of the Agreement's
a. Particular items evidence cited as examp e
to DRY hegemony are in fact ambiguous. For exampl
Chinese opposition
Chinese road building in Laos indirectly supports DRY interests
by extending North Vietnamese -- as well? as Chinese -- road
connections into north Laos and by relieving the NYA of the burden
to garrison that section of the country. at is signifIcant that
Hano ontrolled Pathet Lao forces have closely supported this
Chines?e operation.) Also) the Chinese road network can be seen as
a ploy directed primarily at Thailand, either to pressure the RTG
Into concessions or to provide greater logistics capability to Chinese
supported insurgents in the northeast (and in aukma). (There is,
incidentally,. good reason to believe Hanoi and Peking are cooperating
supporting the Thai insurgency..
Similarly,n Cambodia, China's support for Sihartouk can he
uterpreted aimed at embarrassing Soviet policy and attracting
third world sympathies which Sihanouk had cultivated. Despite
the cosmetic attention which China lavishes on Sihanouk, China's
patronage has not been carried to the extreme of seriously jeopardizinp
DRY interests in the insurgency or of pushing Sihanouk at the insurgents'
,
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deal h we have good reason to believe Peking offered the GICR
following Sihanouk's ouster: The PRC would deny Sihanouk asylum and
recognize the new government if the GIKR would give the North Viet-
namese a fret hand in Cambodia! Since the events of March 1970,
Chinese and North Vietnamese policy pronouncem-ents in Cambodia
have been basically similar (e.g. , support for an "independent and
neutral" Cambodia, ritualistic support for Sihanouk, the "5 points"
and opposition to foreign intervention). The Chinese, moreover, have
Lerated the actions of leng Sary. Hanoi's chief watchdog on Sihanouk
the man whom Sihanouk has described as being his "worst enemy."
ed, the Chinese have bolstered Sary's position by according him
protocol precedence over the GRUNK ministers, although he has no
clearly defined role in the ?RUNK.
Finally, even China's protocol treatment of Sihanouks recently to
have waned. For example, Premier Chou did not attend ihanoult's
banquets on the Prince's return from the Non-Aligned Conference and
North Korea. Also NCNA heavily edited its coverage of Sihanouk' s majc
ddresses at Pyongyang and Algiers.
Further, if the Chinese really supported Sihanouk as a counter to the
Hanoi-controlled insurgents, why should Sihanouk go to the extreme of
publicly threatening to resign if the Khmer Communists do not accept
return and that of the exiled GRUM ministry. Presumably, China has
sufficient leverage i"rt Hanoi to persuade the North Vietnamese and their
r subsidiaries t allow Sihanouk's return.
. in Vietnam, there is no evidence that the Chinese have ever objected
to Hanoi's basic objectives in the South. The Chinese have consistently
supported Hanoi's policies and the FRG's position. For example, the
DRV-PRC joint Communique of July 11 contains assurances of Chinese
support for the PAC's El LI( point political proposal of April 25, 1973 ant
Chinese reference to the PRG as the "only authentic representative" of
the Southern people. (In contrast, the Soviet-DRY Communique of July ,
omits references of Soviet support for the PAG's political offer and
employs the awkward description of the PRG as the group which "alor:
genuinely expresses the aspirations of the South Vietnamese populatior,
The Chinese promptly signed economic and mtlitary aid agreements
Hanoi and the PRG during the past summer, while theSoviet agreemerr.
layed nearly one month and no accord was signed with the PAC.
On the other hand, there is good reason to believe that the Chinese have
not
not always Agreed with Hanoi's strategy. There is, for example,
evidence that at tirnes Chinese felt the mtv was unwisely departie:
from sound Maoist military orthodoxy and that they questioned the tix
the 1968 negotiations with the United States.
The Soviets n actions in Indochina do not support the view that they
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41. Utirrti
Sy
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chief rationale for the theory Ghiria opposes DAV hegemony. If Moscow
regarded Hanoi as a reliablechannel for Soviet influence, the Russians
logically should be more enthusiastic over the DRY' s military/political
enterprise in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. To the contrary,
Soviet actions far more than Chinese -- appear to be aimed at obstructing
DAV hegemony with a view towards a balkanized Indochina more susceptable
to Soviet penetration. Thus, in Cambodia, the Soviets crossed DRV and
Chinese policy by spurning Sihanouk, recognizing the GKR and providing
no aid to the Hanoi-inspired insurgency. In Laos, Moscow has maintained
more candid relations with Souvanna than have the Chinese (who have not
yet replaced their Ambassador in Vientiane); and the Soviets have down-
played support for the LPF. For example, the Joint Communique in Moscow
last July did not even refer to the LPF. Also, Moscow's public statements
On indochina such as 13rezhnev's speech October 26 to World Conference
of Peace) emphasize the sovereign rights of all countries in the area.
f the a elation bio,roAn (lines and North Vietnamese
Communists parties indicates a long..standing DRV-PRC cooperation in
Southeast Asia and Chinese support for DRV aims.
Hanoi-Peki g Cooperation in Southeast Asia
?
The Chinese have long been aware that for over 40 years the Vietnamese
Communist leaders ultimately intend to dominate all of Indochind. The
Vietriatriiise Communist leadership has been quite open in their espousal
of this objective. The Party founded by Ho in 1930 was, after all, the
Indochinese Communist Party, not the Vietnamese Communist Party. Until
as late as 1949 these leaders were opening advocating the formation of an
Indochina People's Republic." For political and diplomatic reasons, the
Politburo decided in 1951 to take a different public position and created
operate overt parties and movements for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia --
and in 1960 for South Vietnam. Privately, however, the Politburo's
objectives remained unchanged, a fact which has certainly been known to
the Chinese. Despite -- or perhaps because of these objectives the
Chinese have pisovided the Vietnamese Communists with essential' milita y
and economic support from 1950 when Mao had extended his control to
the North Vietnamese border) to the present. it is, for example, doubtful
that the North Vietnamese could have succeeded in defeating the French at
Dien Bien Phu w istance. In fact, without
this assistance t t 131g(*nht scajaveeCbheincen5:bia(7to have defeated the French
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DEi
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at all. At this should be borne in mind, lie's "Viet Minht, forces
were fighting all over Indochina. Moreover, Hanoi, and probably the
Chinese, expected Hanoi-controlled elements to prevail throughout Indo-
china despite the Geneva Accords of 1954. Of course it should be remembered
that in this earlier period the Communist world was relatively monolithic.
st up to 1954, the Chinese and the Soviets probably pursued a common
respect to Southeast Asia, It later became increasingly evident
that Khruschev was pursuing policies (1. e., de-.Staliuization and detente
with the West) which were inimical to the interests of both China and the
Vietnamese Communists. From 1957 on, both the Chinese and their Viet-
a.mese allies became increasingly disenchanted with the Soviet Union for
he same reasons (i. e,, the application of Soviet policies W4i.tit
internal problems for both China and North Vietnam). While the
Chinese eventually made an open break with the Soviets, the more international-
ded North Vietnamese opposed overt Communist disunity and, moreover,
did not want to lose Soviet support and assistance. Accordingly, they did
not openly side with the Chinese, but cicarly sh.eeei their concerns about
the evolution of Soviet policies. Since then, the North Vietnamese have
been closer to the *Chinese both politically and ideologically then to the
Soviets. While Hanoi has had some ideological and other differences with
the Chines(most recently in repect to Sine-U. S. detente policies), the
North Vietnamese have, since 1957, had more problems with the Soviets.
The Chinese, for example, have been more constant in their support for
"wars of.liberation" than have the Russians. Peking has, therefore, pro-
vided more ideological support for Hanoi's objectives in Indochina than has
Moscow.
In recent years, particularly, China has strongly supported the concept of
Indochinese unity. This was particularly evident china's hosting of the
Indochinese Summit Conference of April 1970 in which all Indochine
participants, except for Sihanouk, belonged to movements under Hanoi's
control. The Chinese have echoed Hanoi's call for close cooperation among
ents in Indochina under Hanoi's control. If China wanted a balkanized
bins., it would certainly not be advocating this kind of unity. Rather,
it would be supporting those elements in Indochina vbieh were resisting Hanoi
o extend its domination over the whole area. This has never happene:i.
has only supported those parties in Indochina which are essentially
domination,
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kutiovi
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19.
a'inSt leaderswithout undoing the counte v ng
stu?re he needs tO balance the commu
other dLlenxna is hew to induce the in
in 0etiAtions and a settlemen
remnant. We h
try to resolve
imself as te make;
Sih s
he
S. His
n s into acce
ch will preserve a
e doubt that Sihanou
mmas and subtly promote
he current stalemate.
effort we believe will be lost wiles s ,
a kers and controllers, the
F. Chinese.ion and Perspective
Chou sn -lei has apparently been a friend of Sihanouk
since the 195$ Bandung conference and Sihanouk's subse-
quent denunciation of the SEATO umbrella. The Chinese
were no doubt pleased that Sihanouk chose Peking, rather
than Moscow, as his Place of exile after his 1970 de'
Posal; -olorrly tr ttc 'ric'z arrf,v,al in
Peking, the Chinese reportedly offered the new Phnom Penh
government a deal whereby the Chinese would deny Sihanouk
exile in the PRC if Phnom Penh would not interfere with
blvA/C operations in Cambodia. This offer was refused.
Vhe..Chinese have gone out of their way to make
ihanouk and his entourage comfortable in Peking and to
Sihanouk at diplomatic and public functions.
na has bankrolled a GUN K worldwide diplomatic
effort. It supported the GRUNK at the Georgetown Non-
aligned Conference and at the recent NAC in Algiers,
and was prominent in the successful effort to inscribe
the pre-Sihanouk Cambodian representation item on this
years UNGA agenda. Both Ch'iao Kuan -hue in his major
policy speeches at UNG A and Huang Hua in the inscription
debate on October 16 left no doubt of China's firm public
baOking for GRUNK's legitimacy. Huang Hua, moreover, made
a sharp attack on the U.S., including the charge that we
Instigated the Lon Nol coup and were now the only source
of oUteide interference in Cambodia's affairs.
Points
Proach to
at on with
ined fro
of emphasis vary
Cambodian issues.
Ch'iee K
exPrel5ai
behind- he -sc nes
tober 3 conve
the latter ra
or Sihanouk and
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)1/44tbn
F")y
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20.
urged that the Khmer shoulde to settle their
own Problems.
hile the September 14, 1973 joint
communique on idou's trip to China stated "Both sides
believed that the Cambodian issue should be settled by the
Cambodian people without foreign intervention," Chou
Un-lai reportedly pressed Pompidou to recognize Sihanouk
Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-
fei reportedly told the New Zealand Ambassador that the
U.S. should stop supporting Lon Nol and let the Cambodians
work things out among themselves.
,
before the Soviet Union does.
s at the UN excepted, Peking has in public
-pedaled Sihanouk's criticisms of the U.S. and
while predictably giving full play to his
ks on the Soviet union. Peking has not commented on
cent Soviet moves to switch support to Sihanouk.
Given Sihanouk's acknowledged differences with the
r Pouge, China's continued strong suppor
nee F4ght z4g5ast scalz scmcwhat at v
ho_ ef Hanoi or the insnrentc.? There is the
that China seeks to gain influence, at Hanoi's expense,
in Cambodia through a restoration of Sihanouk. If, on
the other hand, China is seeking to play off Sihanouk
against Hanoi, t is difficult to understand why China
tolerates the presence of Hanoi's watchdog on Sihanouk,
Ieng SerY (whom Sihanouk amtiliNaY dislikes).
To what degree China's position on Cambodia agrees
with 'or diverges from that of the DRV is not really known.
In both their Public and private statements, the Chinese
take basically the same line as the North Vietnamese--
i.e., Cambodia should remain independent and neutral, and
Sihanouk's GlluNK should come to power. These vague
ormulations are open to opposite interpretations, especi-
llY in view of Hanoi's ill-disguised designs on Cambodia.
Also China likely views its support of Sihanouk
partly in terms of enhancing Chinese influence in the
third world, That Sihanouk chose Peking instead of Moscow
was certainly a feather in China's cap from an inter
for the
Point of view.
0
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Fay
:'r/NODI S
?
21.
A Predictable hone of contention between Hanoi and
ing would be the treatment of Sihanouk if and when he
urns to Cambodia. Hanoi and the insurgents wouldlik
minimize his role in every respect; whereas the Chinese
would probably not want to see their former honored guest
od, whether he had arlY real Power or not.
The ussR on October 10 announced that it forma
nowledged its support of the GRUNX and Sihanouk
he legal regime in Cambodia and would so i.nstruc
delegation (however, it still is not clear
he Soviets have formally recognized the GRUN
e had been earlier signalled by Soviet p
cry and appears partly to be in response
ioism in the last several Months by an
1 ck d4rect t.Onotheehnom;enhgovernment,rnment,
? partly in fear of a separate
t most of all it is an effort
se the insurgents win. The
opean allies (Poland, Czech
many) have retained embe
PhnOM Penh since Sihanou
rassing in the Sociali
c.wished to retain
fluence, in Cambodia
n that the CommUn
air support
.viets have trad ionaJ
ns with gov
exile. Sov
ak with t
one of
41,4 ?
ther
This
S ommen-
vio ent
ouk about
AY1 rPe-ng
placaL
RU
lin
Un
e
-S. -PRC arrangement
edge Soviet bets in
eta and their eastern
lovakia, Bulgaria, East
es, but without ambassado
a overthrew. Though em-
/pOlitical context, the Sovi
foothold, and some potentia
particularly since it was uncer
t forces could in given U.S-
e Lon Nol regime. Moreover, th
y been reluctant to sever rela
ents in power in favor of governments
refusal to recognize the GRVNX and to
Lon Nol regime has no doubt been a major
tion between Hanoi and moscow.
their recent announcement concerning the
nd Sihanouk, the Soviets continued to take the
ith us that the Khmer parties should be free to
their differences even though both sides appeare
?aneigent. The USSR over recent months Professed to
efuen
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SEC T/49DIS
tit,a0
? Unpredio and sometimes uncon
pint whOse pUblic utterances are
nt both Hanoi and the insurge
noi assilned Ieng Sary to ke
d to accompany him wherev
?s not kept Sihanouk co
noi rePeatedlY voiC
"head
n of state"
sistent rep
t Hanoi w
?Ould h
si$
.24*.
tree
of n embarrass?
to
In 1971,
a ihanouk
e gces. This, however
y under control.
public support for Sihanouk
"the legitimate, genuine and
ative of the state of Cambodia";_
want to see his role severely restric
er return to Cambodia. Hanoi also has
tly demanded that the U.S. cease all "inter -
Cambodia and that the Cambodian problem
d on terms formally announced by Sihanouk
MateriiUd to Cambodia
7,he 'united state this fiT,F,.a1,3?rtu"gc411.2.cd)di
apcn0;4 6 r
?,.
aPProximate,Ly $80 million ln pL.480 tunds our
earlier plans for FY 74 Cambodian military assistance
called for about 180 ?million dollars worth of ammuni-
tion, supplies and almost $6 million for training.
The end of us bombing and ammunition expenditures
of between $600,000 and $800,000 daily have now
resulted in projected military anid requirements for
this fiscal Year of $310 to $320 million. Total USG
FY 74 expenditures if all funds are obtained) would
therefore be approximately $475 million.
S military aid is designed to enable the GKR
0 field a 220,000 man light infantry force with a
000 man supporting staff, We are concentrating
basic defense needs and discouraging massive
itary programs. Attrition of material and ammuni
ion exPeuditures will account for more than 80% of
MAP expenses.
Our economic help basically supplies foreign
thange for essential imports to shore up the govern
its economy can return to normal conditions.
ed
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ptelAt No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-2-6
The other major expense is humanitarian aid for the
increasing refugee program expected to cost about
$8 million this fiscal Year.
atic Suppo
Diplomatically, the United States has strongly
and persistently supported and advanced the GKR's
:laim to legitimacy and viability in all available
s and in its bilateral discussions around the
d. we have encouraged multilateral participation
rams to meet Cambodian economic and humanitarian
nd discreetly supported friendly Asian state-
tents and initiatives supporting the GR and a
negotiated solution in Cambodia. Us representatives
have simultaneously resisted the counter-claims of
Sihanouk's government. Additionally, we have guided
and encouraged the GKR'S own initiatives in behalf of
these objectives. Our Intervention with South Vietnam
A swhallnA help^c1 th- GKR in , pply and rice
turchas t
The sharpest test of US diplomatic support
for the GER is now underway in the United Nations
General Assembly. We are in closecontact with the
GIcR and other appropriate delegations to resist the
claim of Sihanouk's government to the Cambodian UN
seat. Politically, the U$ has supported the Govern-
ment of the Khmer Republic in contrast to any one
group or person and implicitly linked our continuing
assistance to the GKR, to an eventual Political
resolution of Khmer problems by all Cambodian pa
Limitations of US Aid
arrying out our programs and objectives,
the US is sharply restricted in the size and nature
of its support to the GKR. The US mission cannot have
more than 200 US citizens Partially or wholly Paid
by the usG4 inside Cambodia at One time nor employ
in-country more than 85 citizens of countries other
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Awl) itqC
r.,-t Dr.t&
SEC
than the US or Cambodia. U
issance constitute Qur ai.
individuals ein take part in
serve as advisors to the Cambod
120 US military and SO civilians
unarmed
No Us
activi
litary.
the
US mission in no: Penh. A total e>petditur
ceiling (exclusive of US air operations) of
$341,000,000 per year remains in the legislative
language OD Cambedia? but whether its effects are
governing under a continuing resolution and with the
end of US bombin9 has not been established.
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1
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Qitti
oft
ely Chinese Positi
This is described above, in the Background
P?rtl?t1 of this paper. The major eleients are:
general 'desire to see some solution in Cambodia;
a specific desire that Sihanouk should be an important
factor in that solution; but also a disinclination to
play an active role in manipulating a solution.
Publicly and privately the PRC has supported sihanoukts
announced policies, and, urged the us to stop supporting
,ItOn Nol Government.
B. US Position "
The most a ible US objective currently
prospect is a negotiated solution in Cambodia that
prevents the communists from gaining sole control of
the countrY. Other more desirable outcomes seem lin -
?ochievh1P. - -Atr0.01 1,t(rd tiArtinue'/ US .911Prort t/"4t
Phnom Penh government is essential it a military
equilibrium is to be reached that causes the other
side to abandon its policy of military conquest and
to start talks that could lead to a coalition settle -
ant. Your trip to Peking gives an opportunity to
st whether the Chinese will be willing to play any
le at all in promoting talks between the Khmer parties
it c?/41d lead to negotiation. The Chinese desire for
hanouk to have a part in any future government of
Cambodia might be utilized to stimulate a more active
role on the part of the PRC.
C. Your Objectives
To convince the PRC that the USC will not
stop supporting the Phnom Penh Government because we
believe that a negotiated settlement will be facilita-
ted by the continued viability of that government.
- To convince the PRC that the K/ are not
o achieve a military victory, and that the
interests (including their hopes for -
Sihanouk) dictate that negotiations should begin
48 soon as possible.
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To find out whether the PRC is willing to
start negotiations and if so, how.
Induce the Chinese to encourage the DRV to
ly with Article 20, both in Cambodia and in Laos.
seek to tone down the vigor with which
in the UN on the Khmer representation
the
issue.
There are obvious differences between US
sitions on Cambodia. However we share a
e to see an independent, peaceful and neutral
Cambodia that is not caught, up in international
rivalries. we also share a desire to prevent domi-
nation of the region by any one power. The US
Government is not committed to any particular form
ot government in Cambodia. We hope the PBC shares
our view that an essential first step is to stop the
fighting and open negotiations among the Khmer-
We do not see how a debate in the UN on
Presentation can possibly contribute to peace
Cambodia. We realise that Chinese principles may
require PRC support of the Sihanouk resolution in the
UN, but we hope that .abrasive rhetoric can be avoided.
We view Sihanouk as more of a Passive than
an active factor in the situation at this time. How-
ever, it is possible that he might play a role in
influencing the Khmer insurgents, who are the actual
determinants of any cease-fire and negotiations.
-"" We think the time may now be appropriate
for an additional effort to get negotiations started.
The Government is standing firm and the military
situation is nearing equilibrium. A change in xi
attitude toward negotiations is more likely now than
at any previous time. The Phnom Penh Government is
willing to begin negotiations at any level and at
any location. We recognize that the PRC does not
want to be involved directly, but we hope the PRC will
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1,1,14.1ority
gr. L
nfluence on the
to promote
29
urgents, through Sihanouk
ks between Rhmer fatios.
Sihanouk has said he will not talk to u
and we ate not anxious to talk to him. However if
he has any proposals he wants to make to Phnom Penh,
or through us to Phnom Penh, we would be willing to
mine the proposals carefully and sympathetically%
other side refuses negoti
let events take their course.
F THE CHINESE 'OFFER TO PUT YOU OR A MEMBER
OF YOUR PTY XS, TOUCH WITH SIHANOUX: Before any
US ofioial can be in touch with Sihanouk, we would
need to knew whether he is likely to advance workable
proposals or whether he is solely interested in re-
iterating his public stands.
Ir TNE CHINESE CAY IT IS M SIBLE FOR
sIHANoux To mtVII-VJITii-ANYuT
channel of secure communi
any elements of the Phnom
wish to be in touch with.
any time through our U.S.
ready to serve as a passive
ation between Sihanouk and
enh Government that he may
This can be accomplished at
Liaison Of..fjce in Peking.
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RBIS
SIHANOUK SAYS 'CAMB7I)IA WILL NEVER ACCEPT CEASE-FIRE'
B132349 PEKING NCNA IN ENGLISH 2339 GMT 13 APR 73 B
(TEXT) PEKIA, APRIL 13, 1973 (HSINHUA)--CAMBODIAN HEAD OF
STATE SAMDECH NORODOM SIHANOUK STRESSED AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE
HERE THIS EVENING: "CAMBODIA WILL NEVER ACCEPT CEASE-FIRE,
NOR COMPROMISE. IF THE USA DOES NOT STOP ITS INiERFERENCE IN
CAMBODIA WE WILL GO ON FIGHTING."
44-
LLIos
THE SAMDECH SAID, TWO MONTHS AGO HE PROP6SED OFFICIALLY
ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT AND THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT
OF NATIONAL UNION OF CAMBODIA THAT HE MIGHT HAVE, WITHOUT
ANY PRE-CONDITIONS, SOME CONTACT WITH THE U.S, SIDE, TO
STUDY TOGETHER A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF CAMBODIA.
HE SAID, "ME SHOULD BE READY TO FORGET ALL THE BOMBING
AND SUFFERINGS IMPOSED ON OUR PEOPLE BY THE USA.
WE PROPOSED TO HAVE A RECONCILIATION WER THE USW
"TUT WE MAINTAIN THAT THE USA MUST PUT AN END TO ITS
MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN CAMBODIA, BUT AN END TO AIDING
LON NOL, AND CEASE ITS INTERFERENCE IN OUR AFFAIRS."
HOWEVER THE U.S. SIDE WAS NOT READY TO NEGOTIATE WITH
US, SAMDECH SIHANOUK POINTED OUT, SO ME HAD NO CHOICE BUT
TO CONTINUE OUR ARMED RESISTANCE.
THE SAMDECH WENT ON TO SAY: "WHEN WE SPEAK OF NEG.:MATING'
WITH THE USA, WE MEAN TO NEGOTIATE THE QUESTION OF
ENDING U.S. INTERFERENCE IN CAMBODIA, NOT THE QUESTION
OF CEASE-FIRE. THEY ARE TWO DIFFERENT QUESTIONS. FOR,
IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, CEASE-FIRE MEANS SPLITTING
OUR COUNTRY, MEANS RECOGNITION OF THE LON NOL-CONTROLLED
ZONE. AND THIS IS DANGEROUS.: INSTEAD OF SOLVING THE
PROBLEM OF CAMBODIA' IT WILL PROLONG THE WAR, IF THE USA
CEASES ITS INTERFERENCE IN CAMBODIA, THE TRAITOROUS LON
N3L REGIME WILL QUICKLY COLLAPSE. THEN, THE PROBLEM OF
CAMBODIA WILL BE EASILY SOLVED."
SAMDECH SIHANOUK STRESSED: "WE NOW CONTROL NINE-TENTHS
OF THE TERRITORY OF OUR COUNTRY. OUR PEOPLE'S ARMED, FORCES
OF NATIONAL LIBERATION ARE STRONGER THAN EVER. THE BOMBING
BY U.S. PLANES CANNOT MAKE US RETREAT. INSTEAD IT WILL
URGE US TO PRESS FORWARD. THE OSA CANNOT DEFEAT US.
WE WILL NEVER ACCEPT CEASE-47 IRE. NOR COMPROMISE. WE DO
NOT LIKE WAR. WE LOVE PEACE, BUT WE HAVE NO CHOICE."
14 APR 0118Z EH/HH'''''
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Authority (.)1a95%
By NARA, Ds
SEC
T./SE
T VE,
MEMORANDt714 OF CONY
PARTICIPANTS:
DAT
THEWHITE ROUSE
WASHINGTON
RSATION
Henry A, ger, Secretary of State
Arthur Humme, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Far Eastern Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Senior Staff
laang Hua PAC Representative t the UnitedNations
Mrs. Sigh Ten-hua, Interpreter
Mr Kuo, Notetaker
AND TIME: Wednesday, September 26 1973
230 - 1:20 p.m.
PLACE:
T? e were
pressed c
joked th
compl
staff,
A
:orreC
Se
ecretary of Stat&s Suite, The Waldorf Towers
New York City
opening p
about
entries during
sador Huan
had postponed
4th Mr. Lord
cretary Ki
oft condition. H also
trip to China wit he
d at bringing hi . .ack on the
you ree1'ved 1e dates for
s, I be answered yes rday.,[to Mr.
B that
I annot sure
r side said Oct)*
t we should
th and 29th in C
the intent
om October 26
n the 25th
. We ca
pend he 2
what you wa
message say
meant us
and leav
Amb. fluency You
SECIkET /SEXITIV,F
26 to 29 an
e on the ater
and then leave
t we should
Frankly?
n th
k Ambass
get a reply fr
nted to be sure
n of the 26th and
n the 30th, Is thi
ye on the 29th the
n't know wb r you
arrive e 26th
u.
;
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gDE,C,LAS,FrNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/17: LOC-HAK-117-3-2-6
Authority 70
By PAL4 Pat
Arrib. using: On the Carribodia question,
General n September lOth but up till now
this document yet.
Mr Knot Ws from PHnce Sihanouk to
Sec. ngert
-
Nations, ?lie gives
telegram
ted Nations
Secretary Gener
Secretary
circulated
ose it's becante be has no official standing in the United
uch publicity.
you probably kno that at the summit conference of the
non-aligned they have adopted a resolUtion on the Cambodian question. That
resolution recognizes the Royal Government of National Union under the
leadership of Prince Sihanouk as the sole legitimate government of Cambodia
and calls upon aJi nonaligned countries and other countritS to render recog-
nition and support to the just position of the Royal Government of National
Union for the restoration of their seat at the United Nations and other inter-
national organizations,
Sec. Kissinger: As you know, we ca&t agree with this either. We stated
our view on the Cambodian question on many occasions to the Chinese Govern-
ment. The basic ideas we expressed to your side in May or June are still
our iea8 and within that framework we are willing to proceed. But if
Prince Siha ak finds those unacceptable, the best solutioi really is to let
events take tbir course in Cambodia.
We think our interests and those f thePeople's Republ,ic from the overall
point of view on Cambodia are not so different. We don't want Cambodia
to be part of a Kg power system; under what particular domestic struc-
ture it is,that is not our principal con . [There was some discussion of
the translation among the Chinese.]
ln this connection., you should know that we were told by Thailan.d this morn-
ing that there seems to be new activity in connection with the collective
security idea. We pointed out that we were nt in favor of it.
Amb. Huant The Thai theme
1
have published saute proposal in this
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Autheb
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By %A) NARA bate
ITIVE
a It
PaPee
?I don't know what you refer
The Soviet proposal on collective security.
Amb. Huang: We have consistently held that the C mbodi n question should
be settled by the Cambodians themselves free from any foreign interference.
The situation in Cambodia now is very delicate and China will not get itself
involved. During your past visits to Peking, you discussed the Cambodian
question with the Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister stated China's
position.
C.
then, of COA.1 s
Of course,
this, I will be
week.
I under baud your POsition.We threaght tat what we discussed
was consistent wLth your position and our necessity. Since
there have been many developments not foreseeable then.
come tO Peking if the Prinle Minister wishes to discuss
happy to. Or if the Vice Minister wants to discuss it next
Who is coming to dinne.r from your side next k? How many people? We
can get the technical people work this out. Lets see- -- should we get in
touch with your Misiion of the United Nations or in Washington?
t's probably better her
? You should contact our Mission here for details. It is up to
Hurtmiel and Mr. Lord. It is entirely up to you,
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