FIAB MEETING: PROPOSED DISCUSSION OF SNIE ON LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-5-5-15-4
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: May 13, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-5-5-15-4
MEMORANDUM ! W
Tab A. The memorandum to you dated March 31, on which
you noted your questions.
Tab B. SNIE 58-70.
As you suggested,
Graham in ONE).
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
8846
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KtSSINGEF'.
FROM: Lindsey Grant
SUBJECT: FLAB Meeting: Proposed Discussion of SNIE on Laos
You indicated that you wished to discuss SNIE 58-70 "The Communist
View of the Situation in Laos" at the next FIAB meeting.
The particular issues which you wanted to raise were
Page 7. Shouldn't the SNIE' set forth the historical record
as well as the Communists' view of 'it?
Page 8. Shouldn't the SNIE give the gamut of estimates
concerning Communist intentions rather than providing
a least common denominator?
The next FIAB meeting is scheduled for June 4.5, and Mr. Watts has
included discussion of this SNIE on the agenda.
Atta chinent s
we have raised your two points with CIA. (James
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SECRET
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MEMORANDUMS
THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM. John H. Holdridge,
INFORMATION
March 31, 1970
C
L-17 -Ixt-
SUBJECT: Notes on SNIE 58-70 "The Communist View
of the Sia
You asked for comments on certain questions which you had
statements in the recent SNIE on Laos (Tab A).
APR 6 1970
raised concerning
Page 2. "While the Communists believe that the U. S. has violated the
Geneva arrangements -- and have certainly done so themselves... " You
ask whether we really believe this -- whether they believe it or pretend to
believe it. You suggest that maybe we should rethink our own policy.
I think that the statement in the SNIE is correct, but perhaps is not very
important. It would be hard to claim that we have not been violating the
agreements in three important respects.
-- mounting air raids from neighboring countries.
-- playing a military advi'ory role.
-- mounting operations against the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
On the point of violation of the Geneva agreements, the Communists undoubtedly
know that they started violating them first, .-- though it is not Communist
practice to admit this sort of thing, even to oneself. This is a much different
question from the issue as to who started the escalation of the past two years
(see below).
Page 6. "Specifically, they believe that the U. S. has subverted the neutralists,
encouraged the RLG to penetrate areas rightfully controlled by the Communists,
and used Laos to support the war against the Vietnamese people. " You ask:
How do we know this ?
SECRET
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SECRET _Z_
The answer of course is that we cannot with any certainty separate what they
say from what they believe. I doubt that they make this separation very clearly
themselves. As you know, the Communists tend to be moralistic, and this
encourages them to fuzz or rationalize their perception of reality to accord with
doctrine. This process is made easier by the fact that we did in 1963/64 provide
considerable logistic support for Souvanna's neutralists, and that we developed
the Meo guerrillas pretty much on our own, and then encouraged the RLG to
acquiesce in guerrilla operations into areas which the Communists had considered
"theirs". Some of our behavior over the past four years which they consider
escalation is,described in the section immediately below.
Page 7. "The Communists no doubt viewed the RLG capture of Nam Bac in 1966
and its use as a support base for guerrilla and intelligence operations in Phong
Saly Province and other areas close to the Chinese borders, the establishment
of navigation sites related to the war against North Vietnam such as Phou Pha Thi,
the expansion into the Sedone Valley in the south, and the growth of Vang Pao Is
forces and their activities in areas of Houa Phan and Xieng Khouang Provinces
as requiring retaliatory action. The RLG's recent rainy season operations against
Muong Phine in the south and Vang Pao's successful drive across the Plain of Jars
undoubtedly falls into the same category. " You ask: "Then why the hell did we do
it? and who wrote this report? "
The second of your two questions is the easier to answer. The SNIE is drafted by
a branch of CIA (the Office of National Estimates) and rewritten by representatives
from the principal intelligence outfits in Washington. It represents a joint document,
and is cleared by a senior group convened for the purpose.
The statement is the SNIE is correct, though it. is not complete. We come here to
the old question: who started it? The SNIE sets forth the Communists' version.
It does not really give the flavor of the time -- the Communists' capture of the
"left neutralists" and the series of minor inroads into Government-held territory
which encouraged us to retaliate.
It will take an historian to put together the complete answer as to why we did it.
Some of the efforts, such as the establishment of a site at Phou Pha Thi, were
undertaken to improve the accuracy of our bombing in North Vietnam. Others
were taken because we had developed resources such as the Meo, and people were
anxious to use them.
V j~ H'~7rL` G ~f,~
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`'121
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SECRET -3-
Perhaps the basic problem was the one which the Ad Hoc Group on Laos was
created to counter: the fact that the war was run out of our Embassy in
Vientiane, and received only the most casual scrutiny in Washington (usually
by obtaining oral concurrence to CIA briefings at the Assistanct Secretary level
in State.) This was insufficient policy guidance from Washington to forestall
new initiatives, or to set a framework to limit field enthusiasms.
Page 8. You ask whether the Communists' military actions in Laos are really
largely responsive to our actions.
At this point in history, each side is responding in turn to escalation undertaken
Eby the other. As to whether the Communists are deliberately pushing up the
/' stakes, intelligence community estimates rim the aam?f- n,,.d +I,,- ; ....,. .._
language. The most that can be said with any confidence i s that the
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lug ance in Laos to their advantage, without yet having done anything which suggested
a desire to overturn the remaining validity of the Geneva agreements (i. e. , they
have not tried to overthrow Souvanna). This has not been a high-priority target,
i,
y'L 4ompared to those in South Vietnam, judging by the patience with which the
~It
-t high e. g. , if we make it militarily expensive -- they may be prepared to back
away fromthe active pursuit of the objective, so long as they can continue to use
the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Any hope for stabilization in Laos depends upon achieving
%I,,Ah;i `b'alance -.- allowing the Communists to protect what they consider their basic
/ interests in Laos, while we make it expensive enough to deter them from the pur-
suit of their maximum objectives.
Page 12. You ask why we didn't withdraw from the Plain of Jars last summer.
This is perhaps the most poignant and recent example of the tendency for the field
to allow immediate opportunities to sway its judgments as to what we should do to
advance our broad strategy. The attack was launched before it was scrutinized in
Washington, and the decision was made to try to hold the Plain without referral to
Washington. In Washington we were getting descriptions of the operation as a raid
to destroy Communist stocks in the Plain, and thus inhibit any further Communist
advance beyond Muong Soui. At the same time, the Lao King, Souvanna, and Vang
Pao were elated by their success and agreed to hold the Plain. Our Mission went
along with the decision. The judgment was later questioned from Washington, but
no sufficiently firm decision was taken to instruct Ambassador Godley to tell the
Lao that we would not go along with the decision.
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It takes a strong hand, presumably from Washington, to subordinate the exploita-
tion of targets of opportunity to a broadcr strategic plan.
The institution of the Laos Ad Hoc Group and the intensified scrutiny of our Laos
operations by WSAG were of course meant tea- remedy this situation, and so far as
I am aware, no important decisions have been taken by our people in Vientiane in
recent months without referral to Washington.
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OF SNI:E 58-70 "Tho Communist View of the
Situation in Laos
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/15: LOC-HAK-5-5-15-4