THE TACTICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM'S FOUR MILITARY REGIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-559-16-1-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 17, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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Intelligence Memorandum
The Tactical Situation in South
Vietnam's Four Military Regions
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 THE TACTICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH
VIETNAM'S FOUR MILITARY REGIONS
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Summary
June 17, 1974
Despite periodic fighting in many parts of South Vietnam since the January
1973 cease-fire, relatively little population and territory have changed hands. Saigon
still controls the vast majority of the people as well as most of the economically
important land. The Communists hold a fairly wide swath of territory along the
western portion of the country, but they control only some 5 percent of the
country's population.
Both sides have rebuilt and augmented their combat forces. Although the
Communists have narrowed the gap in capabilities between themselves and the
South Vietnamese, the government still retains an overall edge in the balance of
forces. The South Vietnamese still have far more combat troops than the Commu-
nists, but the government's edge in firepower assets has been reduced. The Commu-
nists have moved in large numbers of tanks and field artillery and shifted a number
of air defense units into the country from Laos and North Vietnam. In the past few
months, South Vietnam has lost a number of aircraft to these defenses and, in some
areas, South Vietnamese pilots have started flying at higher, safer altitudes. If the
losses continue to mount, Saigon could be forced to restrict further its air operations
over heavily defended Communist territory, giving the Communists a significant
advantage in these areas.
The Communists also have improved their logistic position throughout the
country, and they are estimated to have enough supplies on hand in South Vietnam
to support their forces for at least 18 months of heavy fighting.
The South Vietnamese, too, have improved their supply system since assuming
the task of distribution from the US, but they still have significant shortcomings.
Government forces have had to conserve supplies, and munitions stockpiles are
critically low in several places. South Vietnamese troops guarding Hue, for example,
This Memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence of the Central Intelligence
Agency and has been informally coordinated with working-level analysts of the Defense Intel-
ligence Agency and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of'State.
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probably would run short of ammunition in a few weeks if they expended ammuni-
tion at a rate comparable to 1972.
Since early May, the level and scope of the fighting have increased sharply,
especially in southern Military Region 1 and in the provinces west and north of
Saigon. Communist attacks appear to be directed at securing traditional infiltration
corridors, expanding population and territorial holdings, and testing the govern-
ment's resolve. Although the fighting may be heavy at times, most reporting
indicates it will be confined to local areas and not expanded into a major country-
wide offensive. As heavy summer rains reduce the mobility of opposing forces in the
southern three fourths of the country, the fighting there may diminish.
This memorandum presents detailed assessments of the tactical situation in
each of South Vietnam's four military regions.
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Military Region 1
GVN NVA
dh infantry division HQ Infantry division HQ
1 Infantry regiment 1 Infantry regiment
i Armor brigade ~..- Communist motorable route
Armor regiment
. Artillery regiment
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Despite its relatively small population and insignificant economic re-
sources, Military Region I has been and still is of considerable military
importance to both the Communists and the South Vietnamese government.
The Communists have long used the road and trail network in the
western portion of the region as a corridor for infiltrating troops and
supplies into South Vietnam. Hanoi's strategy in this region generally has
been to secure this network, to gain access to the sea, and, if possible, to
defeat the South Vietnamese on a battlefield close to North Vietnam.
In 1968 and again in 1972, Hanoi sent large combat forces directly
across the Demilitarized Zone and tried to advance toward the coast. The
main target in both offensives was the former imperial capital of Hue, the
cultural center for all of Vietnam, and, Saigon aside, the most important city
in South Vietnam. Possession of Hue is critical to the government. Its fall
would be a major military and psychological blow, and might seriously
threaten the survival of the Saigon government.
Saigon has always viewed the northernmost region as its first line of
defense against the Communists, and its strategy has, until now, been based
on blocking Communist infiltration through the region.
Little Heavy Fighting
The government controls the more populated and economically impor-
tant coastal lowlands throughout much of the region: the Communists
occupy most of the sparsely settled, mountainous terrain to the west. The
Communists have secured their infiltration routes through the region, and
they also gained access to the sea in the far northern part of the area.
Immediately before the cease-fire in 1973, the government, aware of
the potential of the Cua Viet River as a supply route, tried unsuccessfully to
close it to the Communists. A government armored column succeeded in
capturing an old naval base near the mouth of the river, but could not hold
it. The government did, however, prevent the Communists from gaining a
seaport in the southern part of the region.
Since early May, the Communists have increased the fighting in this
sector. Government setbacks in Quang Tin Province have already forced the
South Vietnamese to shift some units, and they may even have to suspend
pacification efforts in nearby Quang Ngai Province.
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On balance, both sides generally have avoided significant combat,
concentrating instead on consolidating their political and military positions.
This is particularly true of the Communists, who are attempting to develop
the northern part of Quang Tri Province into a showcase for the Provisional
Revolutionary Government.
To accomplish this, North Vietnamese engineers have built several new
communities, and tens of thousands of North Vietnamese civilians have been
sent into Quang T ri since the cease-fire. Hanoi has introduced the same
administrative apparatus it uses in the provinces of North Vietnam and has
been using Dong Ha as a reception center for foreign dignitaries visiting
Communist territory in South Vietnam.
The Military Balance
The South Vietnamese have 101,000 combat troops in the region, the
Communists 83,000. Both sides have their forces concentrated in the north-
ern two provinces of the region; the government has about 60,000 troops
there, including its three best fighting units-the Marine, Airborne, and 1st
Infantry divisions.* They face some 60,000 North Vietnamese troops, in-
cluding the tough, combat-experienced 304th, 324B, and 325th divisions.
Hanoi has reduced its offensive capability in the northern provinces,
however, by withdrawing, three other divisions during the past year or so.
Hanoi did rebuild most of its infantry units in MR 1, move in large
numbers of tanks and field artillery after the cease-fire, and shift numerous
air-defense units into South Vietnam's two northern provinces from Laos
and North Vietnam. Although a few air-defense units have gone home in
recent months, Communist air defenses still largely offset the government's
tactical air power. The North Vietnamese also appear to have an advantage in
long-range artillery in this sector.
The Communists have expanded and improved their logistic position
throughout the region and now have sufficient supplies on hand to support
heavy fighting for at least 18 months. They have opened a major north-south
infiltration route, extended their petroleum pipeline, built extensive base
areas and supply facilities, and shipped in large quantities of war materiel.
*One brigade of the Airborne Division was transferred to Saigon in early June.
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The North Vietnamese have also developed Dong Ha as a port. While
the Communists still rely heavily on the overland infiltration system, Dong
Ha has been used to move large quantities of supplies by sea into northern
South Vietnam.
A Defensive Strategy
At the present time, neither side has a decisive edge in the region.
Despite a strong and improving position, the North Vietnamese still
appear to lack the manpower to sustain prolonged heavy fighting and the
Communists would require additional heavy infiltration to replace casualties.
So far this dry season, Hanoi has sent in only 17,000 replacements-one of
the lowest totals in the past six years.
The South Vietnamese have sufficient supplies to support their forces
in MR I at the current level of fighting, but would be hard pressed to do so
if the action increased sharply. South Vietnamese units guarding Hue would
run short of ammunition in a few weeks if they expended it at the same rate
as in 1972. Moreover, the government would have difficulty getting addi-
tional supplies to Hue if the Communists cut Route I south of the city.
These factors have led the government commander, Lieutenant General
Ngo Quang Truong-considered by many as the best field commander in the
South Vietnamese army-to adopt essentially a defensive strategy aimed at
buying time and inflicting maximum casualties on the Communists if they
strike south again.
Truong has used the prolonged lull in combat to improve and
strengthen government defenses throughout the region, and he has developed
a comprehensive plan for defending Hue. The plan calls for South Viet-
namese units to pull back in stages while they are still strong.
Truong believes that by this tactic he can conserve his own forces while
inflicting maximum casualties on the Communists. He also realizes that he
can better defend Hue with his forces in a tight cordon around the city,
rather than spread out to the north and west.
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Because of the advantage the Communists gain by being close to North
Vietnam, this region is likely to be the scene of heavy fighting the next time
Hanoi decides to commit its forces to a major offensive. Until then, the level
of military activity in MR I will probably remain relatively low.
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Over the past few months, the North Vietnamese have augmented their
combat forces in the central highlands of South Vietnam's Military Region 2.
Communist combat units have shifted closer to Konturn and Pleiku cities
during May, and skirmishing around these provincial capitals is probably a
Communist effort to keep the government on the defensive and away from
important base areas and infiltration routes. The relatively slow pace of
infiltration to the highlands this dry season, however, suggests that the North
Vietnamese are not planning a large-scale offensive in this region in the next
few months.
At various times since the cease-fire, both sides have held the initiative
in the highlands. Aware that the North Vietnamese were understrength,
General Toan, the MR 2 commander, has conducted operations along the
fringes of Communist-held territory in an attempt to draw the enemy into
the open where he could use his air and artillery firepower. Toan's strategy
has generally failed. North Vietnamese strategy, on the other hand, seems to
have centered on protecting their infiltration routes and eliminating isolated
government outposts. They have made only a few attempts to occupy some
contested or government-controlled territory.
The first of these confrontations took place last June when government
troops moved to reoccupy the village of Trung Nghia in Kontum Province,
which had been seized by the Communists shortly after the cease-fire of
January 1973. After three months of heavy fighting, the South Vietnamese
retook the village.
In late September, North Vietnamese tanks and infantry, supported by
artillery, forced the government to abandon an outpost at Plei Djereng in
nearby Pleilcu Province. The base remains in Communist hands, despite
government attempts to recapture it.
Last fall, heavy fighting broke out in Quang Duc Province. The Commu-
nists used a mixed force of armor, artillery, infantry, and sappers to drive
South Vietnamese units from several outposts along the Cambodian border.
The bases were close to the new infiltration route that the North Vietnamese
were then setting up through that sector, and the Communist objective was
to secure the route from government harassing attacks. Thus far, the South
Vietnamese have managed to recapture only one of the positions, the Dak
Sona outpost. Two others remain in Communist hands,
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NVA
e Infantry division HO
Infantry regiment
AIW-Armor regiment
L AAA regiment
ar Artillery regiment
t rten
mute
Military Region 2
ti4ratidn
rtr# A i C
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N H:.'..
GN
t Infantry division 0
4 Infantry regiment
Armor brigade
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In more recent fighting in Kontum Province, limited government at-
tempts to cut Communist roads have resulted in severe North Vietnamese
reactions. On May 16, North Vietnamese forces overran a government
outpost at Dak Pek, deep in Communist territory. In retaliation, South
Vietnamese aircraft bombed Communist base areas, while government troops
mounted an operation against a large Communist logistic base just north of
Kontum City. This drive has made little progress. The Communists appear
intent on keeping the South Vietnamese relatively dispersed.
Communist Build-up
Since the cease-fire in January 1973, the North Vietnamese have
steadily enlarged their combat forces in the highlands, where they now have
25,000 troops, compared with 38.000 for the military region as a whole
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Hanoi has infiltrated approximately 10,000 replacements into the
central highlands this dry season. Another 5,000 troops went to the coastal
areas of the region. These new troops are enabling the Communists to
rebuild understrength units and to begin a manpower pool. The infiltration
total, however, is considerably lower than in past years-an indication that
the North Vietnamese are not preparing for a large-scale offensive any time
soon.
The build-up in air defenses has already caused the South Vietnamese
air force to change its interdiction tactics. Some government aircraft attack-
ing Communist targets in heavily defended areas of Kontum and Pleiku
provinces are now dropping their bombs from as high as 20,000 feet,
significantly reducing their effectiveness.
The South Vietnamese have approximately 78,000 men under arms in
MR 2, including two infantry divisions, seven Ranger groups, and one
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armored brigade. The South Vietnamese air force provides tactical support
to these forces, The bulk of the government's combat forces (45,000 men) is
in the western half of the region.
Although the South Vietnamese hold a significant advantage over the
Communists in terms of troop strength, many of the government units have
very poor combat records. A number of MR 2 units also have high desertion
rates.
The South Vietnamese now find themselves manning defensive posi-
tions in Kontum, Pleiku, Darlac, and Quang Duc provinces. Many govern-
ment positions, including those around the provincial capitals of Kontum
and Pleiku, are difficult to resupply and reinforce. The roads pass through
rough terrain and are easily interdicted.
Although the Communists are obviously better off than they were a
year ago, they still lack a clear military superiority. In fact, neither the
government nor the Communists seem to have much of an edge. Even now,
Saigon has nearly twice as many combat troops in the highlands as the
Communists, although this advantage is partly offset by North Vietnamese
firepower.
As long as this balance remains relatively intact, neither side is likely to
make any large-scale combat commitment of its forces. The government,
however, may be more cautious in its operations into Communist-held
territory now that the North Vietnamese units are operating at close to
normal strength. For their part, the Communists still seem primarily in-
terested in defending their territory, rather than in launching a major
offensive. They may well be content to feign attacks toward the provincial
capitals of Kontum and Pleiku in an attempt to tie down the South
Vietnamese and keep them on the defensive.
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MILITARY REGION 3
Though each of.the four military regions in South Vietnam has military
significance, Military Region 3, which takes in the provinces surrounding
Saigon to the west, north, and east, is in many ways the most important. If
the Communists are ever to defeat the South Vietnamese government, they
must secure a large base in the region and then move on Saigon, the political
heart of the country.
For many years, the Communists have sought to establish and expand
such a base in the provinces to the north and west of the capital, where they
could take advantage of favorable jungle terrain, shorter supply lines, and
sanctuary in Cambodia.
At times, their control in this area has been extensive, especially in the
provinces of Binh Long, Phuoc Long, and northern Binh Duong. They were
still strong there at the time of the cease-fire in January 1973, although their
influence over the populated areas elsewhere in the region had .badly eroded.
Since that time, Communist strategy in this region has been essentially
to protect and expand their position along the Saigon River corridor, mainly
with North Vietnamese units. Elsewhere in the region, they have used a mix
of main force and Viet Cong units to try to weaken the government's hold
through small-scale harassing attacks, sabotage, and terrorism. So far the
government seems to have held its own rather well, defeating each important
thrust by North Vietnamese units in and around the corridor and giving up
little or none of its control of the population elsewhere in the region.
New Government Vigor
One of the most important moves by the government was the assign-
ment of Lieutenant General Phan Quoc Thuan as commander of Military
Region 3 late last year. Thuan considered that the South Vietnamese army
was not providing adequately for the defenses of the capital city-especially
in view of the new, heavier weapons available to Communist forces in the
region.
Thuan immediately moved to strengthen these defenses, constructing
checkpoints, bunkers, and other works designed to hinder the forward
movement of Communist tanks and heavy artillery, General Thuan also
shook up the administration in the region, forcing a number of key changes
in province chiefs, division and regimental commanders, and his own staff.
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25 50 Miles ZONE
25 50 Nllemelers
Military Region 3
GVN
NVA
Infantry division HQ
It
Infantry division HO
Infantry regiment
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Infantry regiment
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Artillery regiment
AAA division
AAA regiment
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Once these steps were taken, Thuan turned his attention to the Com-
munist main force units. With few exceptions, all subsequent significant
engagements in the region have been Communist reactions to Thuan's
operations. In February, a South Vietnamese foray into two long-held
Communist redoubts north of Saigon caught the Communists by surprise
and disrupted their build-up along the Saigon River infiltration corridor.
Last month, overriding the timid counsel of the local commander,
Thuan decided to take on two North Vietnamese regiments along Route 2 at
the border of Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy provinces. The action reportedly
resulted in severe North Vietnamese losses and disrupted the Communists'
link between two of their important base areas.
Thuan followed up by pushing the North Vietnamese 5th Division out
of Duc Hue District in Hau Nghia Province, an area that lies next to
government communication routes with Tay Ninh Province to the north-
west. This successful operation relieved the month-long siege of the Duc Hue
Ranger base,
These aggressive operations have by and large kept the Communists on
the defensive. Blocked in their effort to strengthen their salient in the
direction of Saigon, the Communists have turned to improving their position
in Phuoc Long. Part of their logistic spine from the highlands to Military
Region 3 runs through the northwestern section of this province.
Currently there are about 40,000 Communist regulars in the region-
some 14,000 more than at the time of the cease-fire. Major units committed
to Military Region 3 include three infantry divisions, an artillery division, an
antiaircraft division, and ten infantry, sapper, and armor regiments.
The infiltration of armor, antiaircraft, and field artillery into the
provinces north of Saigon in violation of the cease-fire provides the Commu-
nists with more firepower than ever before. In northern MR 3, the Commu-
nists have an air defense division and two antiaircraft artillery regiments.
South Vietnamese aircraft over this area frequently encounter fairly heav
Opposing the Communists in MR 3 are about 96,000 South Vietnamese
troops--three infantry divisions, one airborne brigade, one armored brigade,
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four Ranger groups, and supporting artillery and territorial force units. The
South Vietnamese have created a reserve by moving an airborne brigade to
Saigon from northern South Vietnam.
The government combat forces were increased by about 21,000 men in
the past year and are now roughly two and a half times those of the
Communists. The government's superiority in numbers is partly offset by the
fact that its forces are spread throughout the region.
The South Vietnamese are continuing to put pressure on some of the
major North Vietnamese units in MR 3. Current government operations have
encountered stiff Communist resistance in their efforts to recover all of the
lost positions in Binh Duong Province, but the South Vietnamese have
inflicted heavy losses on the Communists. Recent small scale attacks in
nearby Tay Ninh Province may be followed by similar attacks elsewhere, as
the Communists attempt to break up the large concentration of Saigon's
forces just north of the capital.
The Communist Central Office for South Vietnam hopes to make a
better showing in the region during the coming months. It issued orders for
an "offensive phase during May and June to bring about a more favorable
balance" against the government.
It has been characterized by the Communists as a limited series of
operations not designed to renew the war on a large scale. Heavier rains
during the next few months will inhibit any ambitious operations by either
side that involve armor and heavy artillery.
On balance, it is unlikely that any significant change in the balance of
military control by either side will result from the Communist initiative. The
performance of Saigon's forces so far suggests the government can keep the
military advantage in the region through the summer months.
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MILITARY REGION 4
The 16 southernmost provinces of South Vietnam that make up Mili-
tary Region 4 include the heavily populated, agriculturally rich flood plains
of the Mekong Delta. The delta contains 7 million people-more than a third
of the nation's population-and produces 75 percent of its rice and a good
deal of its livestock, vegetables, and fruit.
Because of the political and economic importance of the delta, both
sides have fought hard to control it, and it has experienced relatively little
lessening of action since the cease-fire in January 1973.
In 1973, for example, 8,000 government troops were killed in the area
and 38,000 were wounded. Communist losses were correspondingly high.
The same pattern of high casualties has continued during the first four
months of 1974.
The Communists rarely have been able to utilize large main force units
in the delta's open and watery terrain. For this reason, the fighting in
Military Region 4 is characterized by a high level of terrorism, relatively
small-scale attacks, and ambushes.
A Shift in Initiative
Immediately after the cease-fire, government forces were kept busy
countering a substantial Communist land-grabbing effort. They were success-
ful, and by mid-year, the initiative began to shift slowly in the government's
favor,
The Military Region 4 commander, Lt. General Nguyen Vinh Nghi,
abandoned a strategy pegged to a chain of heavily defended outposts in favor
of an aggressive and mobile approach that more effectively utilized the
firepower of his forces-three divisions, plus supporting air, armor,, and
artillery. Nghi also began to use many of his regional force troops in a
combat role, relying on militia to provide security for cities and towns.
As a result, there has been a significant erosion of the Communist
position in some of their old delta strongholds, which have been used as
supply and infiltration routes from Cambodia. General Nghi's forces have
virtually eliminated the long-time sanctuary in the Seven Mountains area
astride the Cambodian border, and more recently mounted large-scale opera-
tions into a major Communist base-known as. Base Area 470-in western
Dinh Tuong Province and southern Kien Phong Province.
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Military Region 4
GVN NVA
Q Infantry division HQ d Infantry division f Q
Armor brigade -- Artillery reginpent
HAU 'DOC
G I AN 0
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Cana Tire
PH0NC/
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There are still a number of Communist strongholds in the delta,
including the U Minh Forest, and large areas in the southernmost provinces,
particularly along the coast, which the government has virtually ceased to
contest.
The government's tactics have gradually forced the Communists into a
more defensive posture. They had started out in the cease-fire period using
combat forces to protect and enlarge their control of certain populated
areas. Since autumn 1973, the focus has shifted to the protection of
threatened base areas as well as supply and infiltration corridors.
Communist main force operations are now centered in large part in
Dinh Tuong Province. Here, the aim is not so much to hold territory as to
inflict casualties, create a climate of insecurity, and keep infiltration routes
open.
The government has some 97,000 men in the region. They are organ-
ized into three infantry divisions and one armored brigade, with supporting
artillery and a large number of regional force battalions. This total gives
Saigon better than a four-to-one advantage over the Communists -nearly
double that of any other military region in the country. These forces are
supported effectively with close air support in most areas, and by naval units
and marine police who maintain security along the hundreds of miles of
rivers, streams, canals, and coast line.
Government military officials are concerned, however, about the
morale and combat capability of their regional forces, particularly in the
southern provinces. In addition, the South Vietnamese 21st Division, said to
be the poorest in the army, has done little to improve the military situation
in the southern delta.
Major Communist main force combat units in the delta number some
22,000 men in 12 infantry and two artillery regiments and numerous local
units. Communist units in the region are understrength and more than
10,000 would be needed to rebuild these forces to early 1972 levels.
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The commitment of regular North Vietnamese units in the delta has
historically been small, compared with other areas of the country, and is
likely to remain so.
There has been little significant improvement in Communist firepower
since 1972. As elsewhere, they are trying to improve their antiaircraft
capability, but the development of an effective air defense system will be
relatively difficult in the open terrain of the delta.
Although the balance in the region weighs heavily in favor of the
government, numerical superiority does not necessarily give a decisive edge
in combat. By its nature, the war in the delta concedes a certain advantage to
Communist guerrilla tactics and will continue to tie down a relatively large
number of government troops. Unless North Vietnamese infiltration of men
and supplies into the delta is substantially increased, however, the govern-
ment should continue to improve its position as the Communists concentrate
on protecting their base areas and supply lines.
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Secret
Secret
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